

THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SANSKRIT GRAMMAR

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BY

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उत्सर्गः

उन्मीलत्प्रतिभासुधाकरकरैर्दिङ्मण्डलं मण्डयन्
शिष्टानां हृदयानि साधु कुसुदानीव प्रबोधं नयन् ।
देशेषु प्रथयन् शिवं व्रतमहो सारस्वतं शाश्वतम्
किं नासौः सुहृद् आशुतोष ! सुचिरं विद्यार्थिनां भारते ।

आसीद्यण्डमरौचिरञ्चिततमोदर्पान्तको दुर्दमः
काले सन्ततसान्द्रनिर्मलयशःपीर्यूपवर्पी शशौ ।
विद्यासम्भृतगौरवैकनिलये त्र्योविश्वविद्यालये
शान्तोग्रा तव कौर्त्तिरङ्ग ! सुतरामद्याप्यहो जृम्भते ॥

किं देयं भवतः स्मृतेरनुगुणं निःस्वस्य मे वर्त्तते
यत्त स्नेहविलोलदृष्टिरनघां संसृजतां स्वर्गिणः ।
आदेशप्रतिपालनाय भवतो नो दर्पमोहान्ध्यतो
यः शब्दार्थनिबन्ध एष रचितः स प्रीतये जायताम् ।

त्वदुत्साहपयःसिकसमेधिततरीरिदम् ।
शब्दशास्त्रार्थविज्ञानं फलं तुभ्यं समर्प्यते ।

चत्वारि वाक्परिमिता पदानि
तानि विदुर्ब्राह्मणा ये मनौषिणः ।

* * * * *
वृषभो रोरवीति महो देवो मर्त्या आविवेश ।

Rk-Veda.

* * * * *
यस्तु प्रयुङ्क्ते कुशलो विशेप्ते शब्दान् यथावद्व्यवहारकाले ।
सोऽनन्तमाप्नोति जयं परत्र वाग्योगविद्वध्यति चापशब्दैः ॥
* * * * *

मुखं व्याकरणं स्मृतम् ।

Sikṣā.

अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् ।

विवर्त्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ॥

* * * *

आसन्नं ब्रह्मणस्तस्य तपसामुत्तमं तपः ।

प्रथमं कृन्दसामङ्गं प्राहुर्व्याकरणं बुधाः ॥

* * * *

तद्धारमयवर्गस्य वाङ्मलानां चिकित्सितम् ।

पवित्तं सर्वविद्यानामधिविद्यं प्रकाशते ॥

Vākya-pāṇi.

—



PREFACE

The following pages present substantially my Doctorate Thesis submitted in 1924, and embody the results of my long-continued efforts to bring together in a concise form the speculations of the Hindu grammarians determining the scope, the function, the definitions of grammatical concepts and the value of grammar as a distinct branch of Sanskrit learning. The systematic study of the purely philosophical aspect of Sanskrit grammar as attempted in this book is, I believe, a long-felt want.' The idea of preparing a comprehensive account of these speculations, based on different treatises on grammar, specially on the *Mahābhāṣya* and the *Vākyapadīya*, was first suggested to me by the late lamented Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, and I can well imagine how pleased he would have been had he been alive to-day to see in print the work inspired by him. It may be stated here that I have endeavoured to the best of my powers to represent the grammatical speculations of the Hindus in their true significance without unnecessarily amplifying them. I hope that the speculations contained in this book will serve to show that grammar in Sanskrit literature was not a mere by-product of scholarship; on the contrary, it was elevated to the dignity of *Smṛti* and *Āgama* and considered a system by itself broadbased on philosophical principles.

I take this opportunity of acknowledging my gratefulness to Sir Devaprasad Sarvadhikari, for the encouragement I have all along received from him from the very inception of this work.

I am much indebted to my esteemed friend and colleague Mr. Sailendranath Mitra, who has read the book in proof and has helped me from time to time with his valuable suggestions. I have also profited by discussing with Mr. Kshitish Chandra Chatterjee, Lecturer in Sanskrit and Comparative Philology, some of the points treated in the book.

The index is entirely the work of my pupil Mr. Chintaharan Chakrabarti, Kāvya-tīrtha, M.A., Lecturer Bethune College, Calcutta, who is a keen student of ancient Indian history and culture.

My thanks are due to Mr. Jogesh Chandra Chakravarti, M.A., Assistant Registrar, for his uniform kindness and courtesy.

Mr. Atul Chandra Ghatak, M.A., Superintendent, Calcutta University Press, has helped me in all possible ways in seeing the book through the press, and to him I am much indebted for the keen interest he always took in the progress of the work.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY, }
The 15th January, 1930. } P. C. CHAKRAVARTI.

प्रधानं च षट्सङ्गेषु व्याकरणमिति ।

* * * *

दुष्टान् शब्दान् मा प्रयुक्ष्महीत्यध्येयं व्याकरणम् ।

* * * *

सोऽयमचरसमान्नायो वाक्समान्नायः पुष्पितः ।

फलितश्चन्द्रतारकावत् प्रतिमण्डितो वेदितव्यो ब्रह्मराशिः ।

* * * *

सर्ववेदपारिषदं ह्रीदं शास्त्रम् ।

* * *

व्याकरणं नामेयमुत्तरा विद्या ।

Mahābhāṣya.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

Evolution of Sanskrit Grammar—Grammatical speculations—Ancient grammarians—Yāska, Vyādi, Vājapāyana, Pāṇini, etc.

The history of the origin of Sanskrit Grammar affords a difficult field of study. It is not possible to say anything definitely either about the period when speculations of a grammatical nature had really come into existence, or about the ancient teacher who might be credited with having for the first time assimilated the principle of a regular system of grammar. An attempt is, however, made here to discuss some of the most plausible views on the evolution of Sanskrit Grammar.

Sanskrit Language, though no longer a spoken tongue, has got such a vast stock of words, and contributed so largely to the real knowledge of the intellectual world by its monumental productions, that it can defy any language ever known to the philological world. The refinement of thought, the melody of

intonation and the unsurpassably high order of spiritual and religious speculations that breathe through this "Divine tongue," reveal to us not only the intellectual capacity of the Indo-Aryans who made wonderful progress in civilization, but also serve to show the extent of perfection to which the Indian mind had developed in those primitive days. Let us begin with the first intellectual unfolding of the Indian mind—the Vedas, which are regarded either as a symbol of eternity, or as revelations of eternal truth finding audible expression through the utterances of ancient seers. The Vedas never represent, as some Western scholars have opined, a huge collection of "pastoral songs." But what is true is that they are a sublime embodiment of wisdom. It may be stated without hesitation that the four Vedas with all their subsidiary literature are in reality an encyclopædia of human knowledge. Through centuries they continued to be the sacred storehouse of knowledge, and their authority, in matters both religious and secular, was so great with the ancient Hindus that any idea running counter to the Vedic injunctions was liable to be rejected. In the creative period of the Vedic literature we find, among other things of purely sacrificial and religious interest, the brilliant dawns of many speculations which were popularised and co-ordinated into a coherent system of thought by later thinkers. It can consequently be maintained that the Vedic literature, revealing as

it does, in a crude form, the intellectual horizon of our ancient forefathers, provided ample room for the subsequent development of different branches of science and art. There was a time in ancient India when by 'learning' people used to understand only the Vedic learning ('वेदविद्या'),¹ and a man's education was not complete until he had acquired a thorough knowledge of the Vedas. The time has much changed since then and the ordinance of Manu² is but little honoured in these days.

The reason why we have dilated upon the originality and authoritativeness of the Vedas and their influence on the history of Indian thought is that the origin of Grammar is organically and most intimately connected with the study of the Vedas. The six Vedāṅgas, as is well-known, mainly owe their origin to a vigorous attempt at facilitating the Vedic studies, and, among these, Grammar seems to have been the most important subsidiary. That an earnest student of the Vedas can hardly ignore the studies of these Vedāṅgas (Grammar, Phonetics, Etymology, etc.) is made sufficiently clear by the Śruti³ which emphatically declares

१ हे विद्यो वेदितव्ये इति अथ यद्ब्रह्मविदो वदन्ति परा चैवापरा च । तदापरं ऋग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः सामवेदोऽथर्ववेदः शिष्या कल्पो व्याकरणं निरुक्तं छन्दो ज्योतिषमिति । अथ परा यथा तद्वचनमधिगम्यते ॥

Mundaka Upaniṣhad

२ योऽनधीत्य द्विजो वेदानव्यक्तं कुरुते श्रमम् । स जीवन्नेव यूढत्वमागु गच्छति सान्त्वय ॥

Manu Saṁhitā, 2.

३ ब्राह्मणेन निष्कारणो धर्मः पडङ्गो वेदोऽयं यो ज्ञेयः ।

that the unconditional duty on the part of a Brahmin is to make a thorough study of the Vedas along with these popular 'Aṅgas.' The injunction "स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः" does not only insist upon a regular study of the Vedas, but presupposes a knowledge of grammar sufficient for the understanding of the Vedic texts. Patañjali refers to the ancient custom¹ when Brahmin students, as a rule, used to take up grammar first for their study, as an indispensable step towards the study of the Vedas. Grammar was, therefore, studied not only for its own sake in ancient India, but as a helping guide for penetrating into the structure of the Vedic texts. While enumerating the motives that are practically served by the study of grammar, Patañjali has first mentioned "Preservation of the Vedas" as the primary reason why the science of grammar should be studied with particular attention. How useful and indispensable the study of grammar is, so far as the understanding of the Vedic texts is concerned, is best shown by such descriptive epithets of grammar as "वेदानां वेदः,"² "मुखं व्याकरणं स्मृतम्,"³ etc.

When we enquire into the origin of Sanskrit Grammar from a historical standpoint, we find

¹ पुराकल्प एतदासीत्, संस्कारोत्तरकालं ब्राह्मणाः व्याकरणं आधीयते । तेभ्यस्तत्र स्थानिकरणानुप्रदानञ्चेभ्यो वैदिकाः शब्दा उपदिश्यन्ते । Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 6.

² Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 7. 1.

³ Pāṇinīya Sīkṣā, 42.

that there were three prominent causes in operation which brought the speculations on grammar into existence. First, certain principles of spontaneous growth, followed consciously or unconsciously in the utterance of significant sentence, provided the very basis of grammatical generalisation. In combining one word with another so as to make a significant unit of speech, people undoubtedly made use of certain laws or order regulating the mode of their verbal expression. The question of priority of language to grammar is too well known to require any explanation. The way in which men learn almost instinctively their mother tongue without having any knowledge of grammar is an evidence of how we become familiar with the vocabularies as well as with the method of constructing sentences before we actually come in touch with grammar as such. Long before any regular system of grammar was written and studied, people with whom Sanskrit was a spoken tongue could, for example, use such a verbal form as 'भवति,' without having any idea of the grammatical operations whereby the root 'भू' might be changed to 'भो' and 'भव' in obedience to the technical process of 'guna' ¹ and 'sundhi.' Similarly, forms like 'गच्छति' and 'गच्छोति' had obtained currency in a certain grammarless period when the grammatical conception of 'प्रकृति' and 'प्रत्यय' were unknown, and when

the conjugational difference of the root 'गम्' from 'शक्' could not be explained as peculiarities of two well-marked classes of roots, namely, 'भृदि' and 'खादि.' The rule 'अकः सवर्णे दीर्घः' presupposes a phonological principle according to which two 'अ' or 'आ' sounds having close proximity in their utterance usually and invariably show the natural tendency of being amalgamated into one lengthened 'अ' sound. To such principles underlying the physical structure of language may be ascribed the rudiments of grammatical speculations. The fundamental basis of grammar is not purely artificial but appears to be more or less natural. A careful study of the *Paribhāṣās* (generalisations of grammar) and of the rules of euphonic combinations makes it abundantly clear that the principles of grammar have close affinity with popular axioms and laws of nature. The extent to which grammar is related to popular usage is best shown by Patañjali in his elaborate exposition of the rules of grammar.¹ The method in which Patañjali² has analysed words or, more properly, a group of similar words, in order to distinguish the stems and formative elements of words, is an indication that grammar has a scientific stamp so far as its basic principles are concerned. The science of grammar does not, however, attempt

¹ नैविश्वर आत्रापयति, नापि धर्मसूत्रकाराः पठन्ति—अपवादैरुत्सर्गा बाध्यन्तानिति । किं तर्हि ? लौकिकोऽयं दृष्टान्तः ।—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 115.

² सिद्धं त्वन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्याम् ।—*Mahābhāṣya*, *ibid*, p. 219.

to coin new words and expressions for use, but takes them in the very forms in which they are popularly used.

Secondly, the most important factor in the evolution of grammar, as a scientific and indispensable branch of study, was the necessity, more religious than academic, of devising some practical means ensuring a successful study of the Vedas; and the result was the evolution of grammar. By Śabdānuśāsaṇa or governance of words, the author of the Mahābhāṣya has, as Kaiyaṭa maintains, in clear terms expressed the immediate or supreme end of grammar as such, and by the expression 'रक्षोहागमलघुसन्देहाः प्रयोजनम्' he has shown the indirect purposes that are usually served by grammar or Śabdānuśāsaṇa, as he calls it. "Preservation of the Vedic text"¹ seems to have been the sole purpose that made the study of grammar so useful and indispensable at the same time. It is, however, difficult to say definitely when such a necessity was actually felt for the study of grammar. It is in all probability in the transitional period² between the poetical activity of the oldest Samhitās, and the prosaic exegesis of the Brāhmaṇas with greater tendency towards classical forms, that we may try to find out the crude beginning of grammatical speculations. The trend of human thought does not always

¹ रक्षार्थं वेदानामध्येयं आकरणम्—Mahābhāṣya, p. 1.

² Systems of Skt. Grammar., Belvalkar, pp. 2-3.

flow along the same level, but it changes its course as time rolls on. The palmy days of beautiful poetry that witnessed the appearance of the Samhitās were followed by a period of intellectual decadence, if we are allowed to say so. To be more clear, the period of outstanding originality was followed by one of interpretation and elaboration. The ancient seers or Ṛṣis are said to have been born with such a spiritual vision as to possess all knowledge intuitively, and it was possibly through their medium that the sacred hymns came to light. The etymological meaning of the term “ऋषि”¹ corroborates this view. Next to these Ṛṣis came a comparatively inferior class of seers, better known as “Śrutarṣi” who were not gifted with intuitive knowledge from their very birth, but rose to the eminence of ‘seer-ship’ by receiving instructions on the Vedas from their teachers. These sages,² out of compassion for the people of future generations, on account of their shorter span of existence and intellectual dwarfishness, are said to have composed the Vedāṅgas with the avowed intention of making the Vedic study less arduous. There is reason to believe that the exact meaning of the oldest hymns had already begun to be forgotten in the second stage spoken of above ; and it was undoubtedly to preserve the

¹ ऋषिर्दर्शनात्—Nirukta.

² विद्यग्रहणादिभिर्यत्नं समान्नासिषुर्वेदं च वेदाङ्गानि च—Nirukta, p. 143 (Bom. ed.)

Samhitā texts intact and to save them from misinterpretation that particular attention was directed towards grammar and the Nirukta. Yāska¹ frankly admits that the study of the Nirukta derives its importance from the fact that the meaning of the Vedic texts are not otherwise comprehensible. As a matter of fact, the Vedic hymns had ceased to be intelligible to a great extent even at so early a period, and, what is still more surprising, some teachers of respectable antiquity even pronounced in clear terms their verdict about the meaninglessness of the hymns. An ancient teacher like Yāska has recorded the contention of Kautsa² against the Vedas. The hymns, he contends, are meaningless and as such not worthy of commanding respect. When an acknowledged teacher of such remote antiquity could have assailed the trustworthiness of the Vedas on grounds, hardly justifiable, it is not at all surprising that later teachers belonging to the atheist school of Sugata and Cārvāka would come forward to demolish the glorious edifice of the Vedas. In the face of such undignified attack threatening to undermine the very basis of religion, the Mīmāṃsakas were confronted with a problem of great seriousness; they consequently tried

¹ अथापौदमन्तरेण मन्त्रेष्वर्थप्रत्ययो न विद्यते—Nirukta, p. 115.

² यदि मन्त्रार्थप्रत्ययायानर्थकं भवतीति कौत्सोऽनर्थका हि मन्त्राः—Nirukta, p. 115

their level best to set aside all antagonistic views regarding the eternality and the trustworthiness of the Vedas. Both *Nairuktas* and *Vaiyākaraṇas* seriously engaged themselves in the arduous task of preserving the Vedic texts intact by advocating the eternality of *Śabda*, on the one hand, and by analysing the entire structure of the Vedic words, on the other. The etymologists sought to bring out the meaning by suggesting derivation of words, while the grammarians took upon themselves the task of supporting the Vedic forms by an analytical process; and these methods, supplementing each other, proved to be of much importance in preserving the sacred texts in their pristine glory. Patañjali seems to have been conscious of this paramount function of grammar, as is clear from his statement ‘रक्षार्थं वेदानामध्येयं व्याकरणम्.’ In the estimation of Patañjali grammar is pre-eminently the greatest of all *Vedāṅgas*; its greatness is obviously due to the fact that grammar is indispensable to an understanding of the Vedic hymns. The epithet “*Vedānām Vedam*,” as applied to grammar by the seers of the Upaniṣads, is really suggestive of the importance and dignity in which *Vyākaraṇa* was held in those days.

In the third place, the growing popularity of different forms of Prākṛta served almost like an incentive to the rise of so many systems of grammar in Sanskrit. Sanskrit, even when it was a spoken tongue, had been confined to the area of the cultured community. The *Śiṣṭas* or the

Sanskrit-speaking people had, however, to come frequently in touch with the untutored masses, and this was calculated to destroy the purity of the "Divine tongue" to a certain extent. As a result of this intercourse, many Prākṛta forms crept into Sanskrit and became almost naturalised in course of time. That Sanskrit had suffered mutilation and distortion of forms at the hands of those who failed to pronounce the correct Sanskrit words, either on account of wrong imitation or their natural inaptitude, is testified by the so-called *Apabhraṃśas* which represent Sanskrit only in a distorted form. The space at our disposal will not, however, permit us to discuss the much vexed question as to whether Prākṛta-*Apabhraṃśas* are directly descended from Sanskrit under circumstances stated above, or originated from an altogether different source. We only repeat what we have pointed out elsewhere that the Hindu grammarians, because of their unbounded regard for Sanskrit as the most original of all tongues, or for the striking similarity of the so-called *सदृश* forms of Prākṛta with Sanskrit, held Prākṛta to be an off-shoot of Sanskrit. To look upon both Sanskrit and Prākṛta as two sister tongues, descended from a common source, is a view that is little favoured by the Hindu grammarians. As the number of Sanskrit-speaking people gradually diminished, and Prākṛta dialects, on the other hand, began to

obtain greater popularity till they spread all over the country, the orthodox Hindu teachers were almost compelled to notice the linguistic peculiarities of Sanskrit and draw hard and fast rules regulating them, their sole motive being the preservation of their traditionally sacred tongue from corruption. The expression शब्दानुशासन, as significantly used by Patañjali instead of the more popular term व्याकरण, serves to indicate that the main function of 'grammar' is as much to support the correct forms in conformity with the fixed rules, as to show indirectly how words of pure Sanskrit origin differ from *Apabhraṃśas* which represent the linguistic corruption caused by wrong imitation and inability to pronounce the correct Sanskrit words. In the *Mahābhāṣya* we find it explicitly stated that 'governance of the correct words'¹ forms the main function of grammar, and by the discrimination of correct forms as *gauḥ*, the corrupt ones as *gāvī*, *goṇī*, *gotā*, etc., are indirectly pointed out.² Sanskrit grammar thus draws a line of demarcation between the correct and corrupt forms, the former being conformable to the rules laid down in grammar, and the latter lying entirely outside the scope of Sanskrit grammar. The spread of Buddhism, as it was accompanied by the popularity of *Prākṛta*, is supposed to have given a

¹ साध्वनुशासनेऽस्मिन् शास्त्रे, etc., *Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 104.

² गौरित्थेतिस्मिन्नुपदिष्टे गम्यत एतद्वाक्यादयोऽपशब्दा इति ।—Vol. I, p. 5.

stronger impetus to an intensive study of Sanskrit grammar. It must be, however, remembered that the Hindu grammarians, in spite of all their attempts, as is evinced in their formulation of rules, could not entirely evade the possibility of their sacred tongue being mixed up, though to a small extent, with the corrupt *Apabhraṃśas*. Kumārila speaks of the naturalisation of certain Dravidian forms into Sanskrit.

Thus, there grew up different systems of grammar in Sanskrit; commentators after commentators came to elaborate and supplement them in the light of new facts. At this stage of our knowledge, we cannot exactly determine the number of grammatical systems that once existed in ancient India. We generally hear of eight prominent systems each founded by a renowned *Śābdika* or grammarian.¹ The *Aṣṭādhyāyī* mentions the names of many grammarians whose works have, unfortunately, not come down to us. In the *Mahābhāṣya* mention is made of two eminent grammarians, namely, Vyādi and Vājapyāyana, the former is supposed to have written a huge treatise on grammar called *Samgraha*, which is so authoritatively spoken of by Patañjali.² Yāska has

¹ "ऐन्द्र चान्द्र काशकृत्स्न कौमार शकटावनम् । सारस्वतं चापिशलं शकलं पाणिनायकम् ।"

² रुग्ण एतत् प्राधान्येन परीक्षितं नित्यं वा स्यात् कार्यो वेति ।—Vol I, p 6

recorded a controversy between two grammarians—Śākātāyana and Gārgya—each of whom had undoubtedly a system of grammar to his credit. The old treatises on grammar are almost irrecoverably lost; but those that remain are sufficient to constitute a vast literature of which there is no parallel in any language of the world. In no other land except India was the science of grammar studied with so much zeal and deliberation.

This is, in short, the history of the evolution of Sanskrit grammar. It is, however, difficult to ascertain the period to which the real foundation of the science of grammar might be traced. The analytical method upon which is based the fundamental principle of *Vyākaraṇa* is first seen, though in a crude form, in the *Pada-Pāṭha* arrangement of the *Samhitā* texts, which is popularly attributed to the authorship of Śākalya. It is in this method of decomposition that we meet with the beginning of disjoining *Sandhi* and *Samāsa*, and the addition of *Upasarga* with the verbal forms. While the *Pada-Pāṭha* order thus represents the first step towards grammar, the elaborate phonological speculations of the *Prātiśākhya*s may be said to have shown grammar in the making. Some problems of real grammatical interest are also to be found in the *Prātiśākhya*s. The oldest specimens, however, of the *Prātiśākhya*s, which are so akin to grammar, are not accessible, and most of the extant treatises are of comparatively

modern origin, some of them being even posterior to Pāṇini. There is ample evidence to indicate that different schools of grammar had already been in existence when Yāska wrote his famous commentary on the Nighaṇṭu. That Yāska was preceded by a good many grammarians is clear from his statement *वैयाकरणानां चेके*¹ and the grammatical controversy he has referred to. Yāska made ample use of these earlier systems of grammar current in his time. The definition of *Sandhi*, *परः सन्निकर्षः संहिता*,² quoted by Yāska, and incorporated into his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* by Pāṇini, is supposed to have been taken from some older systems of grammar. Moreover, Yāska's fourfold classification of *Padas* as noun, verb, preposition and particle, also seems to be a reproduction from a certain grammar which has not left any trace behind. The use of such technical terms as *कारित*, etc., does not really indicate originality on the part of Yāska, but what is plausible is that they were undoubtedly borrowed from some earlier systems of grammar no longer extant. The loss sustained by grammatical literature is enormous; we find numerous references to several grammarians both in Yāska's *Nirukta* and Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, but it is regrettable that very little of their works has come down to us. Just as

¹ न सवौषीति गार्ग्यो वैयाकरणानां चेके—*Nirukta*, p. 99

² *Pan*, I iv 109

among the huge Nirukta literature, the work of Yāska only is available in a complete form; even so it is the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini alone that has fortunately survived the numerous systems of grammar, such as those of Śākalya, Śākatāyana, Gārgya, Gālava, Senaka, Sphoṭāyana, Bhāradvāja, Āpiśali, Kāśakṛtsna, Vyāḍi, and Vājapyāyana.

The identity of the first grammarian is also a difficult point of enquiry in the history of grammatical speculations. Having discussed the circumstances that paved the path for the evolution of such a scientific branch of study as grammar, we now turn our attention, though without any avail, to the question of determining the first author of a system of grammar. The peculiarities of language, specially when the older forms became obsolete and were consequently replaced by new words of spontaneous growth, provided the basis upon which was built the scientific structure of grammar. There are certain fixed laws underlying the use of words; they are more or less natural and simple. But the real difficulty comes when we proceed to determine that clever being who first assimilated such principles and developed them into a system of grammar. The *Taittirīya Saṃhitā*¹ contains a narration according to which Indra may be styled the first grammarian. In an

¹ वाग्वै पराच्यव्याकृतावदत्ते देवा इन्द्रमब्रुवन्निमां नो वाचं व्याकुर्विति..... तामिन्द्रो मध्यतोऽब्रह्मस्य व्याकरोत्तन्मादिष्टं व्याकृता वागुद्यते।—Tait. Sam., VI. 4. 7.

age, when speech was undivided into its component elements, it was Indra who is said to have divided speech, and thenceforward it is known as व्याकृता वाक् or analysed speech. This view, though apparently incredulous, is strengthened by the evidence of the *Mahābhāṣya*¹ where a tradition is recorded to the effect that Indra made a thorough study of words under the tutorship of Brhaspati—the divine teacher. Further, the name of Indra may be traced in the list of eight *Sābdikas*² or grammarians. But we do not know whether it would be a truism or a positive mistake to ascribe the authorship of the so-called *Aindra* grammar to Indra as a divine personage. There is, however, no wonder that the conception of a grammar had first originated with a respectable divine being, because Pāṇini is also said to have received the first 14 *Sūtras* from the lord Śiva and these rules are consequently known as “*Māheśvara Sūtra*.” Nandikeśvara³ in his *Kāśikā* has shown how on the pretext of beating drum the lord Śiva revealed the fundamental principles of grammar. Similarly, Sarvavarman, the author of the *Kātantra Sūtras*, is said to have received the nucleus of his grammar from Kārttikeya and hence the system

¹ “एवं हि यूयते—ब्रह्मस्यतिरिन्द्राय दिव्यं वर्षसहस्रं प्रतिपदीकानां शब्दानां शब्दपारायणं प्रोवाच नानं जगाम” (—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 5)

² वृत्तावसाने नटराजराजो ननाद दक्षा नवपञ्चवारम् ॥

उद्गर्तुं कामः सनकादिसिद्धानेतादमर्षे शिवसूक्तजालम् ॥

is popularly known as "*Kumāra Vyākaraṇa*."¹ Whatever value we may attach to these narratives and traditions, there is every reason to suppose that long before the grammarians of the Alexandrine period, the Hindu teachers had developed different schools of grammar and succeeded in giving them a highly scientific character.

Before concluding this topic we need only make a passing reference to what has been said by "Bhartrhari in regard to the origin and importance of grammar. Following in the wake of Patañjali, the author of the *Vākya-padīya*² describes grammar as the foremost of all *Vedāṅgas* and as a direct auxiliary to the Vedic studies, supporting as it does the correctness of the Vedic forms. He is loud in eulogising the importance of grammar, for he boldly asserts that it is impossible to comprehend the meaning of words without an adequate knowledge of grammar. He maintains grammar to be the most sacred of all branches of learning and calls it '*Adhividyā*' and sometimes "*Ajībhā rāja-paddhati*." As an exponent of the doctrine of '*Sphoṭa*,' Bhartrhari looks upon grammar from a different standpoint, raising grammar to the dignity of *Āgama* and *Smṛti*, for he is

¹ शङ्करस्य सुखादानीं श्रुत्वा चैव पठाननः । लिखितं शिखिनः पुच्छे कलाप इति कथ्यते ॥

² आसनं ब्रह्मणस्तस्य तपसासुत्तमं तपः । प्रथमं कन्दसानङ्गं प्राहुर्व्याकरणं बुधाः ॥

even prepared to maintain that the study of grammar ultimately leads to salvation¹ *Vyakarana-Smṛti*, he holds, is a set of rules that helps the comprehension of correct words, it seems to be almost without beginning² (नित्य), because such a process as followed by grammar appears to have been current from time immemorial

In my "Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus" I tried to show on the basis of some passages from the Rg Veda and Brahmanas³ that speculations on language and grammar had their origin in India in a very remote age. The Samhitā literature represents, of course, the crude beginning of grammatical speculations, and there is consequently absence of systematisation and elaboration. It is interesting to see that the scientific accuracy of these speculations is almost unquestionable. The earliest reference to grammatical speculations, we may venture to add on the authority of Patañjali and Sayana, is to be found in the *Rk* चत्वारि ऋद्धा,⁴ etc., which

¹ 'तत्त्वावबोध शब्दानां नास्ति व्याकरणादृते'—*Vākya-pāṇini I Kar 13* तद्धारमपवर्गस्य ' and तद्धारकरणमागम्य पर ब्रह्माधिगम्यते

—*Vākya-pāṇini I Ār 14 & 23*

² "तस्यान्निवध्यते नित्या साधुत्वावयवा स्मृति ।

—*Vākya-pāṇini I Kar 29* and

तद्यादकृतक शस्त्र स्मृति वा समिबन्धनाम् ।

आश्रित्यारभ्यते शिष्टे शब्दानामनुशासनम् ॥

—*Vākya-pāṇini I Ār 43*

³ चत्वारि ऋद्धा तथोऽस्य पादा द्वे शीर्षे सप्तहस्तासौ अस्य । विधावद्भो ह्यभो रोरवीति ऋद्धो द्विर्भो मयि आविर्भव ।—*Rg Veda 4 58 3*

admits of double interpretations—sacrificial and grammatical. The bull spoken of here represents the science of grammar and is said to be a divine being characterised by sound. Its four horns stand for four component parts of speech नासाख्यातोपसर्ग-निपाताः; three feet for three tenses (present, past and future); and two heads and seven hands symbolise respectively two kinds of *Padas* (सुबन्त and तिङन्त) or नित्य and कार्यशब्द and seven case-endings. Another *Rk*,¹ as we have already pointed out, speaks of four different forms of speech (*Parā*, *Paśyantī*, *Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī*) and lays down that it is the fourth form of speech that is current among men. The ancient term denoting a grammarian seems to have been “वाग्योगवित्” meaning ‘one who knows the connection of words, viz., combination of stems and suffixes;’ and it is emphatically stated in a *Rk* that *Vāk* ² or speech reveals herself entirely to such ‘analysers of speech.’ While commenting on the *Rk* सुदेवोऽसि वरुण,³ etc., Patañjali explains the expression सप्तसिन्धवः as an allusion to grammatical case-endings which are seven in number. There are many passages in the *Samhitās* which have thus either direct or indirect bearing upon grammar—a fact which

Bhartrhari also speaks of *Śabda* or, more properly, *Śabda-Brahman*, as a Bull representing the Supreme Deity—“प्रादुर्महान्तमृषभं येन सायुज्यमिष्यते”—*Vākyapadīya*, I. 132.

¹ चत्वारि वाक्परिमिता पदानि तानि विदुर्ब्राह्मणा ये मनीषिणः ।

² “उतोल्लसै तन्वं विसर्जे जायेव पत्य उशतो सुवासाः”—*Rg Veda*, X. 71. 4.

³ *Rg Veda*, VIII. 69. 12.

proves beyond doubt that Indian speculations on grammar are decidedly the oldest of their kinds. In the *Tait. Samhitā*, as we have already shown, *Pāk* is said to have been originally undivided into parts, and that it was Indra who analysed speech in response to an appeal made by gods.

Then, we turn to the *Brāhmaṇa* literature. Here we find the real beginning of grammar. The etymological explanations of words, such as, यदरोदोत् तद्द्रव्य रुद्रत्वम् and so on, showing us at once the derivative meanings as well as the method of analysing words into their parts, bring us face to face with grammar in its growth. The *Nairuktas* or etymologists adopted this method of explaining words and have quoted largely from the *Brāhmaṇas*. The term *Pyākaraṇa*, meaning as it does the 'science which dissolves words into elements' (stems and suffixes) and thereby brings out their exact meanings, is in itself an indication that grammar and etymology are intimately connected with each other. It is obviously for their mutual dependence that *Yāska* has expressly stated that the science of etymology (*Nirukta*), though it has its independent character as well, may be viewed as a complement to grammar. The difference between the *Saṁhitās* and the *Brāhmaṇas* is not, far from speaking of their subject-matter, one of melodious poetry and monotonous prose, but a careful study will reveal that there is distinct

difference of language too. In the transitional period of this literary activity we find, as we have already shown, that the older Vedic forms have almost disappeared and new words and expressions with greater tendency towards classical forms were coming into existence. That the Brāhmaṇa literature made some progress in grammatical speculations is quite evident from the fact that there occur here and there such grammatical terms as *Vacana* (number), *Vi-bhakti* (case-endings), *Dhātu* (root) and so on. Of the Brāhmaṇas the Gopatha deserves special mention, since it contains in a passage¹ almost all the popular technical terms of Sanskrit grammar. In its enumeration of different branches of learning the Chāndogya Upaniṣad makes mention of such a branch of study as वेदानां वेदः, which is explained by Śaṅkara as referring to the science of grammar. The epithet “the Veda of the Vedas,” as applied to grammar, serves to indicate the indispensable character of grammar for an understanding of the Vedic texts. That is why grammar is compared to the face of the Vedas. Patañjali also observes that grammar is pre-eminently the greatest of all *Vedāṅgas*.

Even in so remote a period as that of the Brāhmaṇas, necessity was already felt to devise

¹ ओंकारं पृच्छामः । को धातुः ? कः प्रत्ययः ? कः स्वरः ? किं प्रातिपदिकम् ? किं नाम ? किं साध्यातम् ? किं लिङ्गम् ? किं वचनम् ? का विभक्तिः ?

practical means for the preservation of the older texts and the natural outcome was the evolution of the *Vedāṅgas*. Of these *Vedāṅgas*, *Śikṣā* and *Nirukta* are more or less related to grammar. The *Śikṣās* or treatises on phonetics deal with letters (vowels and consonants), accents (*Udātta*, *Anudātta* and *Svarita*), different organs of pronunciation, *Sandhi* or euphonic combination and so on. We do not, however, fail to see that the "*Śikṣās*," though their main importance lies in the correct recitation of the Vedic hymns, deal with the phonological side of grammar. That grammar has connection with accents is clearly shown by the fact that the so-called *Samāsas*, so far as the *Samhitās* are concerned, had to be determined by different modulations of accents. Here again we first meet with "*Sandhi*," i.e., the combination of letters with one another in accordance with certain euphonic principles. The arrangement of words, as shown in the "*Pada-pāṭha*", serves to evince an attempt not only at disjoining the so-called "*Sandhis*" but clearly indicates how the grammatical method of analysis had already been in operation. Early treatises on phonetics are almost irrecoverably lost. The *Pada-pāṭha* texts which are popularly attributed to Śākalya only seem to have been well preserved.

Early Sanskrit literature had to suffer enormous loss; and nowhere such loss is more remarkable as in the case of the *Prātiśākhya*s and the

Niruktas. We have got no oldest specimen of these classes of literature indicating the historical and continuous development of so ancient but extensive a literature; and what have practically survived seem to have a comparatively modern origin. The Prātiśākhya, even in their present forms, are sufficient evidence that the study of grammar as a science had already been taken up with all earnestness. "If the nature and contents of our existing Prātiśākhya literature," says Dr. Belvalkar, "can safely be made the basis of any inference, we may suppose that these earlier treatises (1) classified the Vedic texts into the four forms of speech known to Yāska; (2) framed and carefully defined some of the primitive Samjñās or technical terms; and (3) possibly also made some more or less crude attempts to reduce the words to their elements and explain the mode of their grammatical formation."

We have already referred to the fact that Yāska, who flourished at a date not later than 700 B. C., had a good many predecessors—both etymologists and grammarians; and his work is not the first of its kind. The list of etymologists and grammarians, as mentioned by Yāska, gives unmistakable proof that Yāska had already found in existence different schools of the Nirukta and grammar. We are naturally inclined to think that the speculations on grammar which had had their crude beginning in the Brāhmaṇa literature had gradually obtained

wider scope and scientific character and finally developed into regular systems long before Yāska. That plagiarism as a literary theft was unknown in ancient India is borne testimony to by the fact that a teacher, whenever he happened to cite anything in support of his particular view, either from his predecessors or contemporary authors, was not at all slow to acknowledge his indebtedness to them by mentioning their names. This practice has been of considerable help to us, as it enables us to trace the names of those teachers whose names, like their works, would have been otherwise undiscoverable. In the *Prātisākhya*s mention is made of a good many teachers some of whom were undoubtedly grammarians. In the *Taittirīya*, for instance, are mentioned some twenty teachers, but we fail to trace there the name of any reputed grammarian. Among the host of teachers mentioned by Yāska, there are four, namely, Śākaṭāyana, Gārgya, Gūlava, and Śākalya who are credited with having founded their respective schools of grammar and their works seem to have been existing even in the days of Pāṇini. Yāska has recorded a controversy which had ensued between Śākaṭāyana on the one hand and Gārgya and the grammarians on the other, with regard to the reducibility of words to roots. Śākaṭāyana seems to have been one of the oldest grammarians, and some of his views (as his work is no longer available) might

be collected from the works of later authors. Mention is made of Śākaṭāyana in the Atharva-Prātiśākhya in connection with combination, division, and disjunction of words. Yāska has thrice referred to Śākaṭāyana and has probably given his doctrines verbatim thus:—(1) ‘All words are derivable from roots’; (2) ‘Prepositions have no significance by themselves apart from nouns and verbs to which they are prefixed’; (3) his fanciful derivation of the word “*Satya*” from two different roots (*as*, *in*).

Though our knowledge of ancient grammarians is nothing but scanty and meagre, it is admitted without contention that speculations on grammar had already taken a definite form long before the Christian era. The few observations, as mentioned above, will serve to show the extent of scientific accuracy exhibited by the Indian grammarians. Yāska had undoubtedly many treatises on grammar and etymology before him and he made ample use of them. The theory enunciated by Śākaṭāyana as to the reducibility of all words to roots was accepted by Yāska with all earnestness; he followed it as a basic principle in all his etymological explanations. He classified speech into four forms, namely, noun, verb, preposition, and indeclinable, giving their exact significance. This four-fold classification of words seems to have been taken by Yāska from some earlier works on grammar. He not only distinguishes nouns from verbs with their grammatical terminations (*sup*, *tin*) but

seems to have known even the formation of verbal nouns (*kṛdanta*). In his discourse as to the priority of combination (*Samhitā*), he has given a definition of *Sandhi* 'परः सन्निकर्षः संहिता' which was probably incorporated into his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* by Pāṇini in a later period. The two well-marked forms of the language, namely, *Chandas* and *Bhāṣā* (current speech) were known to him, as he has sometimes derived Vedic words from 'laukika' (spoken tongue) roots and *vice versa*. He has also taken notice of dialectical varieties of Sanskrit as they existed in different parts of India, where Sanskrit had been then a spoken language.

Among the ancient grammarians, Vyādi and Vājapyāyana appear to be somewhat prominent, specially as the exponents of two popular doctrines of grammar.

Vyādi and Vājapyāyana are said to have been reputed grammarians. The former is well-known as the author of a huge work on grammar called 'Samgraha.' Patañjali has referred to this work, as an authoritative one, while discussing the eternality of *Śabda*. Mention is again made of Vyādi in the *Vārttika* as one holding 'substance' (द्रव्य) as the meaning of all words. This is, in short, what we know about Vyādi. The name of Vājapyāyana also occurs in the *Vārttika*. In conjunction with the Mimāṃsaka point of view, Vājapyāyana holds that all words are expressive of 'class' (श्रृङ्खला).

Next we pass on to Pāṇini, the popular author of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. As the founder of a scientific system of grammar which has survived the destroying hands of time, Pāṇini is regarded as the highest authority on grammar. Pāṇini is mentioned as one of the reputed eight grammarians. His work is often alluded to as a great system पाणिनीयं महाशतृ पदसाधुत्वलक्षणम्¹ and sometimes as “*Vyākaraṇa-Smṛti*.”² He was not a pioneer in his attempt, but had the advantage of consulting many earlier treatises on grammar before he could develop such a system which bears the stamp of scientific perfection in so remarkable a way. With him closes a period of Sanskrit literature which represents the beginning of the classical period. His aphorisms have a history behind them and presuppose a vast literature. Prof. Goldstücker in his ‘Pāṇini: His Place in Sanskrit Literature’ has dealt with the question of pre-Pāṇinian literature and has discussed at length Pāṇini’s scope of knowledge; but my views differ from those of the learned professor in some points. The object kept in view in writing these pages is to show in broad outlines the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar and not to attempt a historical study of grammatical literature. Prof. Belvalkar’s learned work ‘Systems of

¹ Parāśara-Upapurāṇa.

² “मातृपुत्रानविषया सैषा व्याकरणस्मृतिः । Vākyapadīya and तत्कर्म तद द्वितीयार्थद्वयेव पाणिनेः स्मृतिः ।

Grammar,' however, gives a historical survey of different systems of Sanskrit grammar, and is a valuable contribution to our knowledge.

Though Pāṇini had many predecessors in the same line, it is his "Aṣṭādhyāyī" alone that has survived as a great landmark in the domain of Sanskrit literature. To a student of ancient Indian history, Pāṇini's "Aṣṭādhyāyī" has got its historical importance too. Thus, judged from both grammatical and historical standpoints, Pāṇini's work is a very valuable record of Indian culture. Many other works on grammar following in the wake of pre-Pāṇinian and Pāṇinian schools came into existence and gave rise to a vast literature which is almost without a parallel. The system of grammar founded by Pāṇini was studied with uncommon zeal, as a *Vedāṅga*, by so reputed scholars as Kātyāyana and Patañjali. Attempts were also made from time to time to elaborate and supplement it in such a way as to make it a complete whole. Kātyāyana to whom is attributed the authorship of the '*Vārttikas*' tried his best to supplement the work of Pāṇini, having paid keen attention to the new stock of forms that gradually obtained currency in the course of linguistic development. Then came Patañjali with his wonderful genius and unparalleled erudition and wrote his famous commentary the '*Mahābhāṣya*,' which is still regarded as the highest authority on all problems of grammar. He

may be said to have changed the angle of vision. He proceeded on a new line with the consequence that grammar received a far more scientific treatment in his hands and ultimately came to be regarded as a particular system of philosophy. He approached grammar from a logical standpoint always trying to find out the principles underlying the aphorisms of Pāṇini and Kātyāyana. There is indication in the first 'Āhnika' of the Mahābhāṣya that grammar was not only a heterogeneous combination of Sūtras with Patañjali, but it was treated by him as a regular science.

Though virtually a commentary, the Mahābhāṣya has its originality both in method and exposition ; it brings the system of Pāṇini to perfection and provides a vast field of study. Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali are popularly known as the " Triad of grammarians " and the system as "*Trimuni Vyākaraṇa*" (त्रिमुनि व्याकरणम्). Next came Bhartrhari, the author of the " Vākyapadīya," who seems to have made a masterly study of the " Mahābhāṣya " which fitted him to write his famous work dealing mainly with the philosophical aspects of grammar. It was, therefore, finally in the hands of Bhartrhari that the philosophical character of grammar became more and more conspicuous and grammar was ultimately established as a distinct system of philosophy.

To give a consistent history of grammatical speculations and the huge literature that evolved

out of them lies almost beyond the compass of this work. What we have tried to show in the foregoing pages is to point out that the speculations on grammar which had had their crude beginning in the Brāhmaṇas and subsequent literature had to pass through different stages of perfection before they could develop into regular systems in the hands of Śākaṭāyana, Śākalya, and others.

The indispensable character of grammar for understanding the Vedic texts was a matter of so great concern that grammar came to be regarded as the greatest of all *Vedāṅgas*. The importance of grammar lies in the fact that without a thorough knowledge of grammar one cannot distinguish correct words from incorrect ones (as there is no difference of meanings) and consequently fails to attain that religious felicity which is only attainable by the use of correct words. The study of grammar enables one, on the other hand, to discriminate the correct words as opposed to the so-called "*Apabhraṃṣa*." Bhartṛhari calls grammar "*Smṛti*" ¹ which has for its subject the knowledge of correct words. One may argue that the knowledge of correct words may be obtained from popular or current usage and consequently grammar does not serve any useful purpose. Bhartṛhari ² meets this

¹ साधुत्वज्ञानविषया सैषा व्याकरणस्मृतिः । अविच्छेदेन शिष्टानामिदं स्मृति-
निबन्धनम् ।—*Vākyapadīya*, I, 143.

² तत्त्वावबोधः शब्दानां नास्ति व्याकरणादृते ।—II. 1. 13.

argument by holding that grammar derives its importance from the fact that it lays down principles covering almost the entire field of correct words and has thus become a practical standard for distinguishing the correct words current among the “*Śiṣṭas*” from corrupt forms. For the recognition of current words, we should take recourse to certain principles to avoid unwarranted uses ; grammar is identified with such principles made on the authority of the Vedas, conforming to the current uses and handed down to us through generations of teachers. “*Vyākaraṇa-Smṛti*”,¹ as Bhartṛhari often applies this epithet to grammar, is current from time immemorial and does not appear to have suffered any breach of continuity in the course of its development. The author of the *Vākyapadīya* is not content with this statement only but goes further and maintains that the study of grammar leads ultimately to salvation. How final emancipation is obtained from a study of correct words will be understood only if we, like the ancient seers, try to find out the mystical aspect of sound and look upon words as an emblem or symbol of All-pervading God. The origin of the doctrine of ‘world-producing Logos’ or शब्दब्रह्मवादः may be traced to an attempt to discover the divine element in words. Punyarāja quotes a verse² which states that

¹ तद्वारमपवर्गेषु वाङ्मलानां चिकित्सितम् ।

पवित्रं सर्वविद्यानामधिपतिं प्रकाशते ।—*Vākya.*, I. 14.

² *Vākyapadīya*, I, p. 8.

water is the most sacred thing in the earth ; the Vedic *mantras* are more sacred than water, but grammar is even superior in sanctity to the Vedas. The references given above are intended to show the respect that was accorded to grammar in those days.

CHAPTER II

ANUBANDHA AND CATEGORY

Grammar—Name and definitions—The Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar—*Anubandhas*—Categories of Grammar.

The earliest name whereby the science of grammar was designated is possibly वेदानां वेदः 'the Veda of the Vedas,' as is to be found in the long list of Śāstras enumerated in the Upaniṣads. The popular term 'Vyākaraṇa' appears to be an old one; it points at once to the analytical process (संस्कार) by which words are dissolved into bases and suffixes. The expression like व्याकृता वाक् meaning 'divided speech' is also to be met with in the Vedic literature. Both the terms व्याकरण and वैयाकरण occur in the Nirukta. Grammar is also called शब्दशास्त्र, and the grammarians are popularly known as शाब्दिक and sometimes as 'वाग्योगवित्,' i.e., one who knows the combination of speech. Patañjali has used the expression 'शब्दानुशासन' instead of व्याकरण at the very beginning of his work, his object obviously being to point out that the first and foremost function of grammar is to show how by their conformity to the rules of grammar correct words are distinguished from incorrect ones. He derives the term व्याकरण as 'व्याक्रियन्ते व्युत्पाद्यन्ते शब्दा अनेनेति-व्याकरणम्' and speaks of both words and rules as

what constitute grammar that supports the correctness of Sanskrit words (लघ्यलक्षणे व्याकरणम्). He holds further that the knowledge of words does not really follow from the rules alone, but from a clear interpretation of those rules showing both examples and counter-examples. Of the six *Angas*, Patañjali maintains, grammar is decidedly the greatest, as it directly helps the study of the Vedas. Durga holds that grammar consists of rules and primarily deals with the physical structure of words, whereas the science of etymology lays greater stress on the psychological aspect, viz., significance. Grammar seems to have attained to scriptural authority, for Bhartṛhari and others are often found to ascribe such epithets to grammar, as व्याकरणस्मृति and व्याकरणागम. There is a special section on grammar in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā system where grammar has been referred to as a branch of *Smṛti* having bearing upon *Dharma*. The way in which grammar comes in close touch with *Dharma* may be shewn by the fact that grammar, as a science, deals with the correct forms of words, the proper knowledge of which is necessary for the attainment of religious merits. Though the correct Sanskrit forms, says Patañjali, as well as the corrupt words are equally expressive of sense, it is only the use of correct ones that is attended with religious felicity. Moreover, grammar is the only instrument whereby correct words are distinguished from corrupt forms, and the

meanings of words are ascertained. The importance and usefulness of grammar for a thorough knowledge of the Vedic texts cannot, therefore, be over-estimated.

It will be a mistake to suppose that Sanskrit grammar, as defined above, is nothing but a number of rules that attempt to explain the formation and analysis of words in a manner that has nothing to do with principles as such. Words are so numerous and so diversified in forms, that the grammarians had had to face a great difficulty in making a thorough study of words. Scholars of the reputation of Patañjali and Durga failed to take notice of the entire field of words ¹ which, as we find, is always being enlarged with the advancement of knowledge. But credit to the vigorous attempts of the Indian grammarians who succeeded conspicuously in their study of words and placed the grammatical speculations on a purely scientific basis.

It is really striking to see how the grammarians could systematise their studies of words in spite of such varieties of forms. Great as the task was, the grammarians proved equal, as they adopted the scientific method and framed the rules on the principle of generalisation and particularisation, taking notice of all possible forms. Still greater was the difficulty in determining the radical and

¹ अहं च भाष्यकारश्च कुशाग्रैकधियावुभौ । नैव शब्दान्वयः पारं किमन्ये नङ्गुद्वयः

inflexional elements in words. Analysers of speech as they were, the grammarians had to reach the last stage of linguistic analysis, and this, as we know, was practicable by the application of the principle of अन्वयव्यतिरेक or the method of agreement and difference. The conclusion to which we are naturally led is that Sanskrit grammar was not busy with isolated words but was based on principles. An attempt may be made here to show that the study of grammar is not a mechanical way of mastering the conjugation and declension of certain forms and that grammar does not give a cumbrous process of fanciful derivations. Grammar, like all philosophical systems, has its own categories and logic and is ultimately based on the principles that are strictly philosophical. The study of grammar on a philosophical line received its inception at the hands of Patañjali who, in his elaborate commentary known as the Mahābhāṣya, has dealt with the grammatical problems from a different standpoint and has practically given them a philosophical character. The work of Pāṇini has been treated by Mādhavācāryya as a system of philosophy.¹ Grammar was no longer looked upon as an artifice but as embodying the principles of spontaneous growth. Bhartṛhari seems to have made a careful study of the Mahābhāṣya ; this had not only widened his scope of knowledge but befitted him to

¹ पाणिनीयदर्शनम् ।

explain the principles of grammar from a purely philosophical stand-point. With him grammar was a regular system of philosophy and he treated it as such. What Patañjali and Bhartṛhari have done for grammar is really wonderful; they would always deserve our admiration as the founder of an interesting branch of study as the 'Philosophy of grammar.' Their conspicuous contribution towards the building up of this new school of thought is none the less important and valuable than what Plato and Aristotle have actually done for philosophy proper. Thanks to the labours of these grammarians, we can boast of this peculiar system of philosophy to the rest of the world.

Having taken a brief survey about the origin of grammatical speculations and the subsequent periods in which those speculations had been systematised by the ancient grammarians in a scientific way, we now proceed to shew, following the line of thought of Patañjali and Bhartṛhari, that Sanskrit grammar may be studied as a regular system of philosophy. There was a time when the authoritativeness of grammar reached such a height as to deserve such epithets as *आगम* and *स्मृति*, and the author of the 'Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha found in the Pāṇiniyan system of grammar certain characteristics which induced him to treat it, as if it were a regular system of philosophy. Now, as a system of philosophy,

grammar must have its *Anubandhas*, categories and principles. Grammar, to begin with, is mainly connected with *Sabdas* and their corresponding significance, and is, therefore, popularly called *Sabda-śāstra*. The relation, again, in which words stand to the world of objects is one of *Pācya-Pācaka* (connotor and connoted), and there are as many words as there are objects to be named. Thus, we see that the scope of *शब्दशास्त्र* covers almost the entire sphere of thought. It¹ is said that the entire world of objects resides in words in a subtle form and the so-called *Pācya* and *Pācaka* are not really different but essentially one and the same thing. Further, no cognition² whatsoever is ever possible without the use of words, and the knowledge of all descriptions seems to be bound up with words.

Every system of Hindu philosophy has its own *Anubandhas*. Grammar, when viewed as a system of thought, may be shown to have its particular *Anubandhas*. (1) Grammar has *Sabda* as its subject, (2) the relation of grammar with *Sabda* is that the former analyses *Sabda* into stems and suffixes (*प्रकृति* and *प्रत्यय*), and thus helps the understanding of the significance

¹ शब्देवेवाश्रिता शक्तिर्विश्वस्यास्य निवन्धनी ।—*Vakya-piṇḍya* 1 119
and अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञान सर्वशब्देन भासत ।— 1 124

² वाचाभिव प्रसादेन लोकयात्रा प्रवर्तते ।—*Kavyadarśa* 1 3
and इदमन्यतमं कृत्स्नं जायत भुवनत्रयम् । यदि शब्दान्न ज्योतिरासृष्टारं
न दीयते ।—*Kavyadarśa* 1 4

While explaining the expression वेदानां वेदः, as an epithet of grammar, Śaṅkara states that grammar by division of words enables us to comprehend the meanings thereof. As regards the *Prayojana* or object, it is definitely stated by the expression शब्दानुशासन, that is, the first and foremost object of grammar is to formulate such principles as would serve to distinguish correct forms from incorrect (अपभ्रंश) ones. Kaiyaṭa rightly observes that by the expression शब्दानुशासन, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* sets forth the immediate object of grammar and the statement रक्षोहागमलघुसंदेहाः प्रयोजनम् enumerates only the indirect purposes that are served by the study of grammar. So far as *Adhikārī* is concerned, it is sufficient to say that one desirous of having the knowledge of correct words is alone competent to take up the study of grammar. It is known to all students of Hindu philosophy that the Indian teachers have, as a rule, discussed the question of *Anubandhas* in the very beginning of their discourses, with the obvious object of inducing people to those studies. There are reasons to believe that this was followed as a traditional practice, because Yāska too in his *Nirukta* did not fail to treat of such *Anubandhas*.

Having dealt with the *Anubandhas* of grammar, Patañjali has drawn our attention to the fact that the statement of objects (*Prayojana*) is of no use, as both the Vedas and grammar are required to be studied without having any

definite object in view. The question¹ of *Prayojana* may arise with regard to other branches of studies apart from the Vedas, because it is definitely enjoined that the unconditional duty on the part of a Brahmin is to make a study of the Vedas with the six popular *Āngas* (grammar, etymology, etc.) and acquire a thorough knowledge of them. He gives us a glimpse of the time-honoured custom regarding the ancient method of teaching in India. The Brahmins² are said to have devoted themselves in ancient times to the study of grammar just after their *Upanayana* ceremony was over; and they were allowed to study the Vedas only on their attaining a sufficient knowledge of grammar. But time has much changed. People now take up the study of the Vedas first, as their shorter span of existence does not allow them to master grammar before attempting such a vast field of study. Further, they cannot practically afford to devote the greater portion of their life exclusively to the acquisition of proficiency in grammar, since they like to turn out teachers, capable of speaking Sanskrit, in course of a short duration. This is why they take to the study of the Vedas just in the beginning of their

¹ वेदातिरिक्तविषये एव प्रयोजनान्वाप्यानं न तु वेदविषये ।

—Dhāṣya Pradīpodyota.

² पुराकल्पे ण्टदाभीतु संस्कारोत्तरकालं ब्राह्मणाः व्याकरणं आधीयन्ते । तेभ्यस्तत्स्थानकरणानुदानप्रदानश्रेष्ठो वैदिकाः शब्दा उपदिश्यन्ते, तदवले न तथा, वेदमधीत्य त्वरिता वक्तारो भवन्ति ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 6.

academic career. Grammar is called *Uttarā Vidyā* which is capable of being understood to a considerable extent by intelligent students, engaged in the serious study of the Vedas. What Patañjali has observed here is also applicable to much recent times. The present-day scholars are more or less actuated by the desire of securing recognition as *Pundits* in as short a time as possible. With this object in view, they engage themselves to the study of many Śāstras, though superficially, before they have obtained sufficient proficiency in grammar to qualify them to take up other branches of study. The statement of *Prayojana* has indeed some other reasons. Patañjali has anticipated an objection that might be raised against the so-called necessity of making a study of grammar. We know that words—both Vedic and *Laukika*—form the subject of grammar. The study of grammar as a science, some may argue, is of no importance, because the Vedic words might be learnt from the Vedas and the correctness of *Laukika* or current words from popular usages.¹ The study of grammar, if pursued for the knowledge of words, is, therefore, nothing but useless. Now it is simply to do away with such unreasonable arguments that Pāṇini wrote his famous *Aṣṭādhyāyī* clearly showing the

¹ वेदान्नी वैदिकाः शब्दाः सिद्धा लोकाच्च लौकिकाः । तस्मादनर्थकं व्याकरणमिति ।
तथैव विप्रतिपन्नबुद्धिभ्योऽध्येतव्यः सुहृद् मूला आचार्य इदं शास्त्रमन्वाचष्टे—इमानि
प्रयोजनान्यध्येयं व्याकरणम् ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 5.

objects for which grammar should be studied. The enunciation of *Prayojana*—both direct and indirect—is, therefore, necessary to show that the study of grammar is indispensable for the knowledge of the Vedic texts and the accurate discrimination of correct Sanskrit words.

The eternality of *Śabda*, as supported by the grammarians, furnishes another objection as to the usefulness of grammar. As a matter of fact, if words are held to be eternal, the science of grammar, which teaches the formation and analysis of words, should necessarily become useless.¹ The author of the *Vārttika* meets this position by holding that the principles laid down in grammar serve to put a stop to certain undesirable consequences.² One may, for instance, be led to think that the root *mṛj* always retains the form *mṛji* in all declensions (according to the wording of the *Dhātupāṭha*); but grammar in such a case brings forward certain restriction, *viz.*, grammar teaches³ that the root *mṛj* changes to *mārji* (gets *Vṛddhi*), when it is followed by suffixes other than *lit*.

By categories of Sanskrit grammar, we mean precisely the fundamental concepts of grammar. *Śabda* is pre-eminently the basis on which rests the entire structure of grammatical science.

¹ यदि तर्हि निष्ठा. शब्दाः किमर्थं शास्त्रम् ?

² किमर्थं शास्त्रमिति चेद्विबर्तकत्वात् सिद्धम् ।

— *Vār*, 10, under the rule, *J āṇ*, 1. 1. 1

³ तच्चात्र निवर्तते क्रियते । मृजेरकित्सु प्रत्ययेषु मृजिप्रसङ्गे मार्जि, साधु-
वर्ततेति ।—*Ibid*.

As *Śabda* is intimately related to thoughts and logic, the extent of *Śabda-sāstra* seems to be immensely wide. The categories of grammar, looked at from a wider point of view, comprehend almost all those that are enumerated by the Vaiśeṣikas. Mention is here made, among others, of the following grammatical concepts:—(1) Genus and individual (जातिव्यक्ति), (2) Co-inherence (सामानाधिकरण्य), समवाय (inseparable connection), (3) *Hetu* and *Karaṇa*, (4) Quality (गुण), Substance (द्रव्य), Relation (सम्बन्ध), Parts and the whole (अवयव and अवयवौ), *Prakṛti* and *Vikṛti*, and Efficiency (शक्तिः). The inclusion of *Śakti* in the grammatical categories marks, however, a departure from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika stand-points.

First, both class and individual are taken by the grammarians as the significance of all words. There is, as we know, a great controversy as to whether words denote a class or an individual. The two well-known grammarians Vājapyāyana and Vyādi held opposite views with regard to this problem, the former, like the Mīmāṃsakas, was an exponent of the Class-theory, while the latter advocated the Individualistic theory. We have elsewhere pointed out that the Naiyāyikas seem to have brought about a reconciliation between these contradictory views by holding that it is neither class nor individual alone that is usually denoted by words, but an individual qualified by the class (जात्यवच्छिन्नव्यक्ति) is the meaning of all words. As to the view of the grammarians,

Patañjali is of opinion that both class and individual are taken to be the sense of words. He particularly observes that Pānini had the same view before him while framing the rules of grammar.

It is not only in the Nyāya system of philosophy that we frequently meet with such terms as सामानाधिकरण्य or co-inherence and कारण or cause, but grammar also has these concepts and their proper expositions. The term सामानाधिकरण्य means 'the state of being substratum of two qualities' The class of compound known as *Karmadhāraya* is based upon the conception of such co-inherence. In an instance like नीलोत्पलम्, both blueness and 'the state of being lotus' inhere in a common substratum, i.e., lotus.

There is an elaborate treatment of both *Hetu* and *Karana* in Sanskrit grammar. The very conception of *Kāraka* is intimately related to that of cause (क्रियानिमित्तं कारकम्) By *Hetu* is meant the material cause. In the grammatical conception of *Hetu*,¹ we should remember, there is no room for action. *Karana* or instrument, defined as a 'cause associated with action' (व्यापारवत् कारणं करणम्) is intimately related to action. There is, however, no essential difference between *Hetu* and *Karana*, it is only the association with action that makes the difference.

The question of quality comes invariably in connection with the consideration of *Visesana*

¹ द्रव्यादिविषयी हेतु कारक नियतक्रियम् ।—Vakyapadīya

Vyañjana, *Itaravyāvartaka* and *Dharma* are generally the terms whereby *guṇa* is denoted. The grammatical conception of *guṇa*, or quality is almost the same as we find in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems. Patañjali seems to have only reproduced a Sūtra of the Nyāya philosophy while he enumerates *guṇa* as sound, touch, form, smell and taste. Under the rule 4.1.44. Patañjali has made an attempt to give a clear definition of *guṇa*. *Guṇa*, he holds,¹ is what inheres in substance, sometimes liable to destruction, found in different classes, not produced by action and essentially different from substance. Elsewhere, he explains *guṇa* as what serves to distinguish an object from others (belonging to the same class भेदका गुणाः);² as, for instance, the same entity as water is said to be either hot or cold, according to the difference of quality. Further, he continues that *guṇas* are also found to be non-differentiating (अभेदक),³ as a man, say Devadatta, retains the same name, no matter whether he is a boy, young or old. The

¹ सत्त्वे निविशतेऽपेतिष्ठगुणातिषु दृश्यते । आधेयशक्रियानस्य सोऽसत्त्वप्रकृति-
रुणः । And उपेत्यन्यज्ज्ञात्यन्यदृष्टो द्रव्यान्तरेष्वपि ।

—Mahābhāṣya under the rule, Pāṇ., 4. 144.

वाचकः सर्वलिङ्गानां द्रव्यादन्यो गुणः स्मृतः ।

² and ³ Mahābhāṣya under the *Vār*. भेदकत्वात् गुणस्य, Vol. I, p. 41.

एकोऽयमात्मोदकं नाम तस्य गुणभेदादन्यत्वं भवति । अन्यदिदं शीतमन्य-
दिदमुष्णमिति ।

उभयमिदं गुणेषूक्तं भेदका अभेदका इति ।

grammatical idea of *Piṣeṣaṇa* (इतरव्यावर्तकधर्मः) is, therefore, essentially the same as that of *guṇa*. According to the grammarians, words like श्रुत, etc., are expressive of both the quality and the object qualified. Bhartṛhari, while speaking of *guṇa*, gives much stress¹ on the differentiating character as well as on the dependent² nature of *guṇa*. Its dependent nature means that we cannot conceive of a *guṇa* or quality without considering at the same time a substance in which that particular quality might inhere (द्रव्यपारतन्त्र्यम् and भेदकत्वमत्र प्रधानगुणलक्षणम्). Much has been said with regard to the object and quality in Sanskrit grammar, specially in the *Mahābhāṣya*. According to Bhartṛhari, genus, such as गोत्व, is also included in the category of quality.

A substance is the substratum of qualities (गुणाश्च यो द्रव्यम्). Patañjali defines substance³ as what does not lose its essence even when different qualities come to inhere in it. A fruit, for instance, remains the same, when in course of time its blueness gives way to redness.

¹ संसर्गिभेदकं यद्यत् सव्यापारं प्रतीयते । गुणत्वं परतन्त्रत्वात्तस्य शास्त्रे सदाहृतम् ।—Vākyapadīya, 3, p. 145.

² द्रव्यपारतन्त्र्याच्च गुणानाम् । Helārāja भेदकत्वं चात्र मुख्यं गुणलक्षणम् ।

³ यस्य गुणान्तरेष्वपि प्रादुर्भवत्सु तत्त्वं न विहिन्यते तद् द्रव्यम् ।—Mahābhāṣya, under the rule, Pāṇ., 5. 1, 119.

Bhartr̥hari¹ holds substance to be eternal and enumerates soul, object, nature, body and the four elements as synonyms of *dravya*. We give below the sum and substance of what Helārāja has said in connection with *Dravya*. *Dravya*, he maintains, is of two kinds:²—transcendental and popular; it is the latter that are comprehended by Vyāḍi when he says that all words signify substance. Brought up in an atmosphere of sacred traditions and religious culture, the Hindu teachers are generally found to have approached all problems from a standpoint that is more or less metaphysical. Thus, while speaking of so concrete a phenomenon as *Dravya*, they have brought in the subtle question regarding the ultimate nature of substance, as conceived by different philosophers. *Dravya*, looked at from the transcendental standpoint, is the same as Soul. Those who support the non-dualistic view are of opinion that it is the all-pervading Soul alone that manifests itself in manifold object and appears to be diversified in association with different qualities (उपाधि). The Buddhist philosophers hold that an object (वस्तु) having its own identity as its own mark (स्वलक्षणम्) and capable of doing works is known as *Dravya*. The followers of the dualistic view understand

¹ वस्तूपलक्षणं यच्च सर्वनाम प्रयुज्यते । द्रव्यमित्युच्यते सोऽर्थो भेदत्वेन विवक्षितः ॥

—Vākyapadīya, 3, p. 141.

आत्मा वस्तु स्वभावश्च शरीरं तत्त्वमित्यपि । द्रव्यमित्यस्य पर्यायास्तच्च नित्यमिति स्थितिः ।—Vākyapadīya (द्रव्यसमुद्देशः), 3, p. 85.

² द्रव्यं द्विविधं पारमार्थिकं व्यावहारिकं च ।—Under the *Kārikā*, 3, p. 85

existence or nature by *Dravya*. According to the view of Cārvāka, the four elements, namely, earth, water, light and air which, in their particular combination produce the body and sense-organs, are considered to be *Dravyas*.

Sambandha or relation is of various kinds :— it may be one of *Tācya-Vācaka*, as exists between a word and its sense ; or, one representing *Bhedaka-Bhedyā*, as is to be found between *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*, and¹ as cause and effect and so on. Words and meanings are mutually both cause and effect, so far as the verbal-knowledge is concerned. Having shown that the meanings of words are either class or individual (जाति or व्यक्ति) or, an individual conditioned by the class, we now turn to the question as to how a particular word always seems to be associated with a particular sense. As this question has already been dealt with, a few words are only needed to explain the relation that exists between words and their meanings. The reason as to why a particular word always implies a particular sense points to the existence of certain relation, whether conventional² or fixed by nature, otherwise the word *gauh* might have signified a pot and so on. The Mīmāṃsakas and the grammarians held, as we know, this relation to be

¹ शब्दः कारणमर्थस्य स हि तेनोपजगच्छति ।—Vākyapadīya, p 112.

² शब्देनार्थस्याभिधाने सम्बन्धो दृष्टः ।—Helārāja.

शब्देरुचरितैस्तेषां सम्बन्धः समवस्थितः ।—Vākyapadīya (3), p 96

अनादिरर्थः शब्दानां सम्बन्धो योग्यता तथा ।— „ „ 110.

eternal, while the Naiyāyikas explained it as fixed by God's will (संकेत). The question of *Sambandha* occupies a prominent place in Sanskrit grammar. In grammar *Sambandha* is generally denoted by षष्ठी which is technically called *Śeṣa*. Under the rule *Pāṇ. 1.1.49*, Patañjali says that the meanings of षष्ठी are one hundred in number. One *Śabda* is said to be related to another when both of them have close affinity regarding their places of utterance. Besides this, words may have among themselves some such relations as proximity, posteriority, etc. (आनन्तर्य, सामीप्य).

Samavāya or inseparable connection is one in which a quality stands to the object. In *carmaṇi dr̥ṣṭvinaṁ ha.ti*—the relation of skin with the leopard is one of *Samavāya*.

Avayava and *Avayavī* or parts and the whole form another concept of grammar. The class of compound known as *Ekadeśī Samāsa*, the *Paribhāṣās*, such as, *Ekadeśavikṛtāmananyavat*, *Avayavaprasiddheḥ samudāyaprasiddhirbālīyasī*, and the particular division of *Adhikaraṇa*, as *Aikadeśika* are instances that prove the grammatical conception of *Avayava* and *Avayavī*. Like the Naiyāyikas, the grammarians do not take the whole to be a distinct entity from the parts of which it is composed, but consider it simply as an aggregate of parts.¹

¹ अभ्यन्तर्य समुदायविवक्षितः ।—M. B., 1. 23.

The grammarians have taken *Prakṛti* to be the final element of words ; it is either *Nāman* or *Dhātu*. In instances like *Yūpāya dāru* and *Kundalāya suvarṇam*, the grammarians take both post and earring as modifications of wood and gold respectively. Thus, *Prakṛti* also means the original in relation to *Vikṛti* or modification. To the Sāṃkhyaites, *Prakṛti* is the primordial substance out of which the entire universe has evolved. Bhartṛhari has also started with the doctrine that the whole world may be viewed as only *Vivarta* or modification of *Śaśda-Brahman*.

In considering the fundamental concepts of grammar, we can logically put forward what Bhartṛhari has said in connection with efficiency¹ (*Śakti*) and its different manifestations, such as, space, agent, action and time. The conception of efficiency comprehends in itself the idea of objects ; we cannot, to be more clear, conceive of any efficiency without thinking of certain objects with which it is naturally associated. We can, for instance, hardly think of the power of burning unless we think of fire at the same time. Efficiency and the efficient object, therefore, seem to be practically inseparable. It was on the ground of such inseparable connection that the Naiyāyikas did not include efficiency in their categories, as an entity distinct

¹ शक्तिरूपे पदार्थानामच्यन्तमनवस्थिताः । दिक् साधन क्रिया काल इति वस्तुभिर्धायिनः ।—Vākyapadīya, 3. 1., p 157.

from the object. The grammarians, however, admit that efficiency, though parctically dependent on the object (*dravyaparatantra*), has got its independent character too. Though inseparably connected and entirely identical with objects, efficiency has its own form (*Siddhasvabhāva*), since all objects are found to exhibit some efficiency or energy, as we may call it, when they perform some actions. What is true is that such efficiency is not directly implied by words which signify objects. Patañjali has clearly shown that the thing and its quality or efficiency, though related inseparably, are different; as, for instance, in using the comparative and superlative forms, such as, sweeter and sweetest, we do not apply the degree of excellence to the thing itself but to its quality, *i.e.*, sweetness.

Both space and time are regarded as *Dravya* by the Naiyāyikas, but the grammarians take them as efficiency inherent in objects. Space involves the notions of limit, priority, posteriority,¹ and so forth. Generally, we have the idea of space when we say 'This is prior to it;' 'This is posterior to it;' 'From this place onward,' and so on. In instances like these, we get the fifth case-endings denoting *Avadhi* or *Apekṣā*. But when the relation between the whole and the parts is meant, we have *Ṣaṣṭhī*, as in *Pūrvam Kāyasya* (the fore-part of the body). The Vaiśeṣika system also mentions space as a

¹ परापरत्वे सूचीनां दिशमेदनिबन्धने ।—Vākyapadīya, 3, p. 159.

Dravya, and takes space as one eternal entity without division. The so-called divisions of space, as north, west, east, etc., are only conventional; they are usually determined by the motion of the sun (*Ādityagatyā*).

Next we come to the second manifestation of efficiency, i.e., *Sādhana* or activity. This *Sādhana*¹ implies that energy or activity of a thing whereby actions are performed. As an instrument of actions, this *Sādhana* is of great importance, so far as the grammatical conceptions of cases, such as Nominative, Objective, Instrumental, etc., are concerned. The word *Sādhana* may be taken as a synonym of *Kāraṇa*, as both of them imply an agent or instrument of action. Patañjali has identified *Sādhana* with the combination of qualities (*Gunasamudāyah Sādhanam*). What is true of a quality is that it always appears as a distinguishing mark of the thing wherein it inheres and this is exactly the case with efficiency also. Helārāja, therefore, is of opinion that the statement *Sādhanam*² *vai Dravyam* of the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* may be explained as implying the identity of *Sādhana* with efficiency. It is by drawing an identity between the efficiency and the efficient thing that Patañjali has sometimes attributed

¹ क्रियाशक्तिमिनिष्यती सामर्थ्यं साधनं विदुः ।—*Ākṣapadīya*, 3, 1, p. 173

² यत्तु साधनं वै द्रव्यमिति भाष्ये द्रव्यस्य साधनत्वाभिधानं तच्छक्ति शक्तिगतोर्मद-
विवक्षित्यवगन्तव्यम् ।—*Helārāja* under the *Kār*, 3, 1, p. 173

Sādhana to things also. As a solution of the question as to why efficiency is considered to be *Sādhana* or active agent and not things themselves possessing such efficiency, Bhartrhari continues to say that the whole universe seems to have been made up of efficient force (*Śakti-kalā*) which reveals itself in manifold thing. The manifold aspect and diversified character of the world is due to the corresponding plurality and diversity of this efficiency. Patañjali understands by active agent 'an aggregate of quality.'

Time is held to be a kind of efficiency. The Naiyāyikas, as we know, have treated of time as a *Dravya*. Time is said to be the ultimate substratum of the world;¹ it is indivisible and eternal. In grammar, time has an important place as indicative of tenses. Patañjali² defines time as that whereby both growth and decay of objects are perceived. The division of time into day and night indicates some sorts of conjunction of actions with time; action or *Vyāpāra* means here the motion of the sun. Time is immaterial and conceived as a symbol of eternity. The popular division of time into moments, hours, etc., are only artificial. In grammar, we hear of three-fold division of time, namely, present, past, and future. Under the rule *Pāṇ.* 3.2.123, Kātyāyana³ rightly observes

¹ कालो हि जगदाधारः कालाधारी न विद्यते ।

² येन मूर्तीनामुपचयाश्चापचयाश्च लक्ष्यन्ते तं कालमाहुः ।

—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 409.

³ सन्ति च कालविभागाः ।—*Vār.* 5. तिष्ठन्ति पर्वताः । स्थास्यन्ति पर्वताः । तस्युः पर्वताः ।

that time, though essentially indivisible, is spoken of as present, past and future in the science of grammar. Patañjali has given three instances indicating the three different divisions of time, as 'Mountains exist;' 'Mountains existed' and 'Mountains will exist,' and goes on to say that in the above examples the existence is to be understood as pertaining to the action of the kings that are either present, past or would come in future.¹ Patañjali has also shown the divergent views regarding the existence of such a division of time as 'Present time.' Some say, he continues, that there is nothing like present time. Their view is thus represented :— 'The wheel does not exist, nor the arrow is thrown ; the streamlets do not flow towards the sea. The whole universe is motionless ; there is nothing that moves ; he who can realise it is not blind.' The second and third verses quoted by Patañjali remind us of the arguments whereby the *Mādhyamika*² school of the Buddhist philosophy set aside the popular divisions of time. Some,³ again, hold, on the contrary, that there is

¹ इह भूतमविष्यद्मानानां राज्ञां या क्रियास्तानिष्ठतरधिकरणम् ।

— Mahabhasya under the rule, Pan , 3 2 123

² नास्ति वर्तमान. काल इति—

“न वर्तते चक्रमिषु न पात्यने न रुन्दते सरित् सागराय ।

कूटस्थोऽयं लोको न विचिष्टितास्ति यो ह्येव पश्यति योऽप्यनय ।

³ अनागतमतिक्रान्त वर्तमानमिति त्रयम् । सर्वेषु च गतिर्नास्ति गच्छतीति किमुच्यते ।—*Mādhyamika Karika*

⁴ अस्ति वर्तमान काल इति । आदित्यगतिवन्नोपलभ्यत ।

—M. Bhāṣya, Vol II, p. 124.

present time, though it is imperceptible like the sun's movement Patañjali seems to have been a scholar of wide culture and thoroughly acquainted with the principal systems of Indian philosophy, consequently it is not unlikely that he might have studied the Buddhist philosophy as it existed in his time.

Next we come to *Kriyā* or action as the last manifestation of efficiency. The conception of *Kriyā* plays an important part in Sanskrit grammar, specially in connection with *Kāraṇas*. *Kriyā* is the meaning of verbal roots (*Dhātvarthaḥ Kriyā*). *Kriyā*, holds Patañjali, is immaterial, invisible and is only comprehended by inference.

The method followed throughout Sanskrit grammar is purely analytical: grammar does never attempt to coin new words, but dissolves words into their radical and formative elements in accordance with the principle of *Anvaya-Vyatireka* or the method of agreement and difference. The Indian grammarians, as we have said elsewhere, had a conception of scientific methodology, as is clearly evidenced by the way in which they had analysed words of so diversified character and determined their *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*. The grammarians had to experience great difficulty in the course of analysis of words. The author of the *Mahābhāṣya* gives us a clear idea as to how the grammarians, proceeding on the line of *Anvaya-Vyatireka*,

succeeded in distinguishing the radical from the formative elements. We do not like to repeat here what we have already said. It will suffice here to point out that the grammarians seem to have taken a group of similar forms such as, *ghaṣaḥ*, *ghaṣena*, *ghaṣāt* and *pacati*, *pacataḥ*, *apākṣīt*, etc., and then proceeded to find out the common and uncommon elements in them. Now the common or unaltered element, namely, *ghaṣa* and *pac*, which has not undergone any important change in all those forms is called *Prakṛti*; the uncommon elements, on the other hand, *ina*, *āt*, *ti*, *taḥ*, which are liable to variations in different forms, are termed *Pratyaya*. This is, in short, the process whereby the grammarians could successfully dissolve the words.

Though the adherents of the doctrine of *Sphoṭa* take all words to be indivisible and eternal and look upon all such disintegrations as purely artificial, we do not fail to notice the scientific value of such a procedure that furnishes an instrument to get into the meaning of words. There are three forms in which words generally appear: sentence, inflected form, and the radical and formative elements. Of these, a sentence is the logical unit or the significant part of speech. Words, as we have already said, have no independent existence apart from a sentence. According to the *Pāṇyavādins*, i.e., those who take a sentence to be real, indivisible, and the only significant unit, the analysis of a sentence into its constituents, i.e., *Padas*, is at best artificial, but

recourse is taken to this process, however imaginary, as it provides the only means of showing the meaning of a sentence. The *Padavādins*, on the other hand, hold that *Padas* are real, and seek to prove the unreality of a *Vākya*, as an indivisible unit. A sentence, so to speak, is nothing but an aggregate of *Padas*, consequently a sentence has no separate existence apart from its constituents. The aphorism of the *Prātiśākhya* defining *Sandhi*¹ is construed by the *Padavādins* in such a way as to indicate the priority of *Padas* to *Samhitā* and the reality of *Padas* is thus sought to be established. According to them, *Padas*, though essentially indivisible, are analysed into *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* in order to bring out their significance. The decomposition of words into *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* is the central problem upon which are concentrated the entire speculations on grammar. It is by such analysis or *Samskāra*, as it is often called, that the Sanskrit grammarians could exclude *Apa-bhramśas* from coming under the cognisance of their systems of grammar. The view of Pāṇini and Patañjali, as explained by Bhartṛhari and Helārāja, shows that both of them were in favour of the *Vākyavādins*, i.e., *Padas* are unreal and have no separate existence, whereas a sentence is indivisible and really significant by nature.

¹ पदप्रकृतिः संहिता ।—Prātiśākhya. पदानां संहिता योनिः संहिता वा पदाश्रया ।—Vākyapadiya, 2, 59.

The expression *Padakūra*,¹ as used by Patañjali, is a sufficient indication that *Padas* are essentially unreal. It is simply for the understanding of unintelligent people that the grammarians have taken recourse to such an artificial process, as the separation of *Padas* from a sentence.

¹ न लक्षणेन पदकारा अनुवर्त्यो, पदकारेणामवक्ष्यमनुवर्त्यम्—Mahābhāṣya, Vol III, p 117. Punyārāja under the Vākyaśāstra Kār., 2 57. अत यदि पदानां सत्यता म्यात् तदा तेषां स्वत एव सिद्धत्वात् पदानि कुर्वन्तीति पदकारा इत्येतदसङ्गतं स्यात्। तस्मान्मन्यामहे पदान्यसत्यानि। एकमभिप्रेत्यभावकं वाक्यम्। तदबुधबोधनाय पदविभागः कल्पित इति।

CHAPTER III

SAMJÑĀ AND PARIBHĀṢĀ

Samjñā or grammatical technics—Paribhāṣās or axioms of grammar—Rules of grammar.

Every system of philosophy has its particular concepts and contains necessarily a set of corresponding terms that are more or less restricted in their sense. Terms of this description, which are specialised in their significance, are popularly called *Samjñā* or technical terms. The Nyāya system, specially the Navya-Nyāya, contains a large number of such technical terms. These words, it must be remembered, are not used by the Naiyāyikas in their popular sense. To a Naiyāyika the words *Prakāra* and *Pratiyogin*, for instance, are not denotative of *kinds* and *competitive* respectively, but usually express an adjunct and anything that is non-existent.¹ The use of such technical terms has manifold advantage. *Samjñās* are often used for the sake of brevity and conciseness, and are consequently adopted in most of the treatises on science in their respective fashions.

¹ यस्याभावः स प्रतियोगी ।

A *Samjñā* generally means an enunciation or mention of something by name.¹ Vātsyāyana has used the word उद्देशः, as a synonym of *Samjñā*, and holds that the logical or scientific procedure comprehends enunciation, definition and examination, as necessary for the scientific treatment of a subject.² The grammarians also, as is evident from their method of treatment, have followed this scientific process. To enumerate something by name is what is known as *Samjñā* and those that are denoted or comprehended by such *Samjñā* are called *Samjñī*. Patañjali defines *Samjñā* as a shortest name which is adopted for the sake of brevity.

In the *Sūtra* वृद्धिरादेच् *Pāṇ.* 1. 1. 1, the word वृद्धिः is a *Samjñā* and आत् and ऐच् are *Samjñī*. But how are we to know that it is a *Samjñā*? The *Sūtra* quoted above forms the opening aphorism of Pāṇini and there is no preceding rule like *Samjñā* that may be taken as an *Adhikāra-Sūtra*. The question raised by Patañjali³ is that Pāṇini ought to have used the word *Samjñā* before the rule वृद्धिरादेच्, so as to avoid the ambiguity as to whether वृद्धि or आदेच् is to be taken as *Samjñā*. To recognise *Vṛddhi* as a *Samjñā* naturally presupposes an adequate conception of *Samjñā* itself. Patañjali further observes that even the

¹ नाममात्रवचनं संज्ञा ।

² त्रिविधा चाम्य शास्त्रप्रवृत्तिः—उद्देशो लक्षणं परीक्षा चेति ।

³ वृद्ध्यादीनां शब्दानां संज्ञेत्येष संप्रत्ययो यथा स्यात् ।

Mahābhāṣya under the rule *Pāṇ.* 1. 1. 1.

enunciation of संज्ञाधिकार is not sufficient enough to give an accurate cognition of *Samjñā* and *Samjñī*, as there is hardly any evidence in favour of accepting the word *Vṛddhi* as a *Samjñā* and आदैच् as *Samjñī*. He then refers to the ancient teachers¹ whose usage is the only criterion for the precise knowledge of a *Samjñā*. That the word *Vṛddhi* denotes a *Samjñā* (as opposed to a *Samjñī*) and not a *Samjñī* is evident from the usages of the ancient grammarians. The fact is that the technical terms like *Guṇa* and *Vṛddhi*, as used in the Aṣṭādhyāyī, are not really of Pāṇini's invention, but they are rather supposed to have been borrowed from earlier systems of grammar. Similar is the history of all proper names, both popular and the Vedic; as, for instance, the name² Devadatta, with which parents baptise their newly-born son, continues to gain currency in the society by the force of popular usage. Another view that seems to be none the less plausible is that the grammatical technics, such as, *Guṇa* and *Vṛddhi*, were too popular terms to require any exposition or even enunciation. It is probably for this reason that Pāṇini did not think it worth his while to make a distinct rule as *Samjñā* as would facilitate the knowledge of *Samjñā*.

¹ आचार्याचारात् संज्ञासिद्धिः । यथा लौकिकदैदिकेषु ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vār. 4.

² लोके तावन्मातापितरौ पुत्रस्य जातस्य संवृत्तेऽवकाशे नाम कुर्वन्ते देवदत्त इति । तथोरुपचारादपि जानन्तीयमस्य संज्ञेति ।.....इहैव तावत् केचिद्वाचक्षाणा आहुः वृद्धिशब्दः संज्ञादैचः संज्ञिनः ।—Ibid.

Patañjali continues further that some grammarians, while interpreting the rule in question, have clearly indicated that the word *Vṛddhi* is a *Samjñā* and आदैच् is *Samjñī*. In order to bring out the exact significance of the rule वृद्धिरादैच्, some grammarians, again, have (only given the examples of *Vṛddhi* as, अक्षेपीत्, अकार्षीत्) only enumerated the *Samjñīs* of *Vṛddhi*, such as, आदैच्, under the rule सिचि वृद्धिः परस्मैपदेषु and have thus made it sufficiently clear that the word *Vṛddhi* is expressive of आदैच् in grammar. The relation between the words *Vṛddhi* and *Ādāic* is, therefore, one of the indicating and the indicated. The rule serves practically a two-fold purpose: it expresses a *Samjñā* as well as makes the word *Vṛddhi* a *Samjñā*. What Patañjali¹ deduces from these facts with regard to the distinction between *Samjñā* and *Samjñī* is that what implies something is a *Samjñā* and what are so implied should be regarded as a *Samjñī*. The author of the *Vārttika* has suggested two more criteria so as to show the distinction between *Samjñā* and *Samjñī* more clearly. (1) *Samjñā* is formless,² whereas *Samjñīs* are found to have forms. It is a fact of common experience that a *Samjñā*, like Devadatta, is given to a mass of flesh having certain form

¹ ते मन्यामहे यया प्रत्याप्यन्ते सा मज्ञा ये प्रतीयन्ते ते संज्ञिन इति ।

Mahābhāṣya, Vol I, p 38

² अनाकृति .—Vār 6, Bhāṣya अथानाकृति रज्ञा । आकृतिमन् संज्ञिनः । लोके, पि आकृतिमती मांसपिण्डस्य देवदत्त इति मज्ञा क्रियते ।

Again, where there is a form, there is a difference. Moreover, *Samjñā* is one, while *Samjñīs* are more than one. (2) A *Samjñā* may be recognised by some special mark.¹ Patañjali holds further that *Samjñā* and *Samjñī*, like nouns and adjectives, seem to have co-inherence as well as equal case-terminations. To the grammarians, *Ādaic* (which is formed by the process of *Pratyōhāra* from the letters enunciated in the so-called Siva-Sūtra) is really expressive of sense. Some, again, take the word *Vṛddhi* as indicative of the forms of words, viz., the word *Vṛddhi* and *Ādaic* are mutually convertible. Patañjali has suggested a few more characteristics whereby *Samjñā* and *Samjñī* might be clearly recognised. *Samjñās*, he maintains,² like *Vṛddhi* and *Guṇa*, are repeatedly mentioned in grammar, but such is not the case with their corresponding *Samjñīs*, for it is more convenient and attended with more economisation of labour to mention a *Samjñā*, say *Vṛddhi*, than to enumerate each time *Ādaic* which contain greater number of letters. When *Samjñās* are really adopted for the sake of brevity and conciseness, the word *Vṛddhi* is preferable to *Ādaic* from a practical point of view. Further, it often comes to our notice that *Sāmjñī* is placed before the *Samjñā*³ in the rules of grammar

¹ लिङ्गेन वा । — *Vār.* 7.

² श्रावर्त्तित्यः संज्ञा भवन्ति । वृद्धिशब्दश्रावर्त्तते नादेच्छब्दः । — *Ibid.*

³ अथवा पूर्वोच्चारितः संज्ञी, परोच्चारिता संज्ञा । — *Ibid.*

(as in चदेङ्गणः). But the rule वृद्धिरादैच् forms an exception, as the word *Vṛddhi* comes here first. This anomaly is explained by Patañjali as a particular instance where the word *Vṛddhi* has been¹ given priority only to indicate a sense of auspiciousness (मङ्गलार्थम्). Both *Samjñā* and *Samjñī* being thus reciprocally convertible, a question is raised against their mutual dependence (अन्योन्याश्रयत्व). As a matter of fact, we get a *Samjñī* like *Vṛddhi* for *Ādaic* and the *Samjñā* again serves to indicate *Ādaic*. The defect of such mutual dependence is finally set aside by Patañjali on the ground of the eternality of word (मिदं तु नित्यशब्दत्वात्—Vār. 9). *Ādaic* are permanent word-forms, for the denotation of which a *Samjñā* like *Vṛddhi* is adopted, but the *Samjñā* itself does not practically bring them into existence. The eternal view of *Śabda*² does not, however, render the science of grammar absolutely useless, since grammar, as it is primarily concerned with the exposition of correct words, serves to remove all possible confusion and misinterpretation by the formulation of rules.

Bhartṛhari has even tried to show the permanent character of such *Samjñā-Śabda* and acknowledges the relation between *Samjñā* and *Samjñī* as permanently fixed.³ But this view is open

¹ भाषाणिक आचार्यो महतः शास्त्रीयस्य मङ्गलार्थे वृद्धिशब्दमादितः प्रयुङ्क्ते ।—*M. B. under the rule Pāp. 1.1.1.*

² यदि तर्हि नित्या शब्दाः किमर्थं शास्त्रम् ? निवर्तकं शास्त्रम् ।—*Ibid*

³ नित्य एव तु सम्बन्धो द्वित्यादिषु गवादिषु—*Vākya-padīya, Kār*
2 369.

to objections and is contrary to our experience. *Samjñā* or proper names are purely of human invention,¹ men giving names to objects according to their own desire. The arguments whereby Bhartrhari sought to refute this popular view are as follows: It is admitted that in certain cases *Samjñās* are restricted in their denotations by the usages of men; as, for instance, one might say, 'From this day the word *Ditha* would mean this person.' But so far as the relation between a *Samjñā* and a *Samjñī* is concerned, there is no denying the fact that the word *Ditha*, like the word *gauḥ*, is also connected with its meaning by permanent relation.² Bhartrhari has divided *Samjñās* into two classes—*Kṛtrima* (as *ti*, *ghu*, etc.) or artificial, and *Akrtrima* (as *Ditha*) or popular names current in the society. The so-called artificial *Samjñās* are of modern origin; their significance is confined to the area of those Śāstras wherein they are used, that is to say, they have no meanings popularly assigned to them.

Having thus discussed the different criteria for the recognition of *Samjñā* and *Samjñī*, we now proceed to speak a few words more on the

And ब्रह्मादीनां च शास्त्रेऽस्मिन् शक्तावच्छेदलक्षणः । अकृत्रिमोऽभिसम्बन्धो विशेषणविशेष्यवत् ।—*Kār.* 1. 370.

¹ ननु च नित्यत्वं संज्ञाशब्दानामनुपपन्नं संप्रतिक्रियमाणत्वात्—कृतकत्वाद-
नित्यत्वं सम्बन्धस्योपजायते । संज्ञायाः सा हि पुरुषैर्यथाकामं प्रयुज्यते ।—*Vākyapadīya*.

² आज्ञानिकान्नाधुनिकः संकीर्तो द्विविधो मतः ।...कादाचित्कस्त्राधुनिकः
शास्त्रकारादिभिः कृतः ।—*Vākyapadīya*. क्वचिन्ना शास्त्रीया पारिभाषिकीत्युच्यते ।

number and nature of such *Samjñās*. Different systems of grammar have their different *Samjñās*; as, for instance, Pāṇini uses *ac* and *hal*, whereas Kātantra system has *Svara* and *Vyñjana* in their stead. It will be evident from a study of these *Samjñās* that most of them are meaningless outside the short compass wherein they are used; they are neither to be found in lexicon, nor current as significant words in their specialised sense. *Samjñā-Śabda*, as a rule, are not derivable (व्युत्पन्न); and though popular words, such as, *Vṛddhi*, *Guṇa*, etc., are used as *Samjñā*, their popular significances have practically no connection with what they signify in grammar. Bhartṛhari says that the meaning assigned to such *Samjñā-Śabda* by the grammarians is to be taken as modern convention, as opposed to the divine convention. It is to be noted here that the two *Samjñā-Śabdas*, namely, *Svara* and *Vyñjana*, as are to be found in Yāska's *Nirukta* and in the Kātantra system, and which are undoubtedly older than *ac* and *hal* respectively, are really significant (स्वरं राजते इति स्वरः, व्यञ्जनमन्वक्). It is, therefore, believed that the Kātantra¹ system has preserved the old grammatical technics more faithfully than that of Pāṇini, who is rather credited with

¹ Kātantra system has also retained such old grammatical terms as *Kārita* (Pāṇini has *ṇic*), *Vartamānā* (*bhabantī* seems to have been the oldest term for *Vartamānā*), *Bhaviṣyanti*, etc.

having invented a peculiar way of enunciating letters,¹ a system of *Pratyāhāra* unknown to other grammarians, and certain technical terms like *ac* and *hal*, etc.

The word *Samjñā* means ordinarily a name. Just as an object is found to have a good many names in popular speech, so in grammar a form may have different *Samjñās*. It is to be borne in mind that excepting a few instances like *Svara*, *Vyñjana*, *Lopa*, *Dirgha*, etc., as used in grammar, there are *Samjñās* as *nadī*, *ti*, *ghu*, etc., which are absolutely meaningless and purely artificial. There are numerous *Samjñās* in grammar; they are made use of by the grammarians with a view to secure the brevity and conciseness. They may be, however, divided into two classes, according as they are significant and meaningless. The *Samjñās* belonging to the former group are almost the same as used in popular speech, though with a specialised significance, while those that come under the second group are absolutely meaningless except in grammar. There are certain *Samjñās*, such as, *Nadī*,² *Agni*,³ *Sraddhā*⁴ which are used as types to denote respectively words ending in lengthened ई, ऊ, short इ, उ, and lengthened अ. The so-called Śiva-Sūtras,

¹ वर्णसमाज्ञायः । Kātantra—सिद्धौ वर्णसमाज्ञायः ।

² Pāṇ. 1. 4. 3—यस्त्रास्त्रौ नदी ।

³ इदुदग्निः—Kalāpa. नामपाद, 8.

⁴ आ अज्ञा—Ibid, 10.

though unintelligible by themselves and entirely meaningless to others, representing a great departure from the popular order of letters, have great importance to the students of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, as they are suitable for making *Samjñās* like *aṇ*, *in*, etc. Jagadīśa understands by *Samjñā*¹ all names having convention or *Samketa* and classifies it under three classes, namely, *Naimittikī*, *Paribhāṣikī*, and *Aupādhikī*. *Samjñās* are artificial; their origin may be traced to an attempt to find out the shortest symbol to denote a group of individuals. The system of *Samjñā* is thus important for more than one reason; it is the shortest possible name for a class and consequently marked by brevity. The *Samjñās* adopted in different systems of grammar are so variant that one cannot expect to make a successful study of any system of grammar without having a thorough acquaintance with its particular sets of *Samjñās*.

Logic means agreement of facts with truth. Grammar in dealing with the formation of words and formulation of rules has sometimes shown strict conformity to truth. What is true of logic is thus true of grammar too. Science, as is well known, takes for granted certain axioms which are more or less self-evident truths and consequently require no explanation. These axioms or generalised

¹ रुटं संकेतवद्राम सेव संज्ञेति कीर्तयते,—*Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā Kār.* 17.

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statements (deductions) are freely made use of by different systems of philosophy. These are deduced from common experience. Geometry, for instance, begins with a number of such axioms (e.g., the whole is greater than its parts) and shows their applications in the exposition of problems. Logic, as a science, has also its particular axioms (a thing is what it is, *viz.*, the law of identity) which are not only applicable to logic alone but are found to be used in other departments of science for their incontestable validity. Here we find the reason why logic is popularly called the 'science of all sciences.' It has added undoubtedly to the scientific character of grammar, for it has also treated of such axioms. These axioms or generalised statements are known in grammar as *Paribhāṣās*. The fact that is established by the *Paribhāṣā*¹—'A thing does not essentially become a different one even when some of its parts get deformed,' or, more clearly, 'A dog does not become anything but a dog when its tail is cut off'—is one of common experience and equally true in ordinary life also. In grammar we find a good many *Paribhāṣās*. The *Paribhāṣās*, as used in grammar, may be explained as what represent the highest grammatical generalisation. The *Paribhāṣā* may be broadly divided into two classes: (1) *Paribhāṣās* which are not restricted in their

¹ एकदेशविकृतमन्यवत् ।

applications to grammar alone but equally hold good in other spheres of experience; (2) *Paribhāṣās* that are closely associated with grammatical operations and contain technical terms of grammar. The *Paribhāṣās* like एकदेश-विकृतमनन्यवत्, etc., which does not contain any grammatical term and are true to all sciences, belong to the former group of the *Paribhāṣās*. The *Paribhāṣās* falling under the second category are those that contain grammatical technics and are couched in grammatical terms, such as, यद्योद्देशं संज्ञापरिभाषम्, उपपदविभक्तेः कारकविभक्तिर्वर्तीयसी, etc. These cannot be explained for obvious reasons without reference to grammar. From a study of the *Paribhāṣās* belonging to the former class, it appears that they are decidedly the older and more popular than those coming under the second group. We fail, however, to trace their origin with a degree of certainty. They are sometimes presupposed by the rules of Pāṇini and sometimes deducible from the rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. Pāṇini had undoubtedly before him many axioms of this description when he composed the rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. It is clear from the statement of Nāgojī¹ (who has collected these *Paribhāṣās*—122 in number and explained them) that some of these *Paribhāṣās* were used as regular

¹ प्राचीनवैयाकरणतन्त्रे वाचनिकाव्यत पाणिनीयतन्त्रे शास्त्रकन्यायसिद्धानि भाष्यवार्तिकयोर्निर्द्धानि यानि परिभाषावपाणि तानि व्याख्यास्यन्ते ।

Sūtras by older grammarians. Pāṇini has, however, incorporated some of these *Paribhāṣās* in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī*¹ and some of them are suggested by the rules. The *Paribhāṣās* established by either *Jñāpaka* or *Nyāya* have been referred to by Kātyāyana and Patañjali. Generally speaking, there are three kinds of *Paribhāṣās* :—(1) *Vācanikī*—*verbatim* used as Sūtra by older grammarians ; (2) *Jñāpaka*—as deduced from the interpretations of Pāṇini's rules ; (3) *Nyāya* referring to the axioms either taken from the experience of ordinary life or established by logical inductions. There are, again, two different forms of *Nyāya*—*Nyāya-Siddha* and *Loka-Nyāya-Siddha*. The *Paribhāṣā*—सन्निपातलक्षणो विधिरनिमित्तं तद्विघातस्य—is an instance of *Loka-Nyāya-Siddha*, because the truth it conveys is sufficiently proved by the facts of daily life, *viz.*, 'A thing should not be the cause of destroying that wherefrom it derives its very existence.' These *Paribhāṣās* are of practical help to us for understanding the rules of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Nāgojī has not only taken notice of those *Paribhāṣās* alone which might be deduced or taken directly from the *Vārttika* or the *Bhāṣya*, but has undoubtedly treated of the *Paribhāṣās* taken from other grammarians. There is a *Paribhāṣā*² which expressly enjoins

¹ समर्थः पदविधिः ।—Pāṇ. 2. 1. 1.

विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम् ।—*Ibid*, 1. 4. 1.

² व्याख्यानतो विशेषप्रतिपत्तिर्न हि संदिग्धालक्षणम् ।

that for the removal of doubt and ambiguity in connection with a rule of grammar, the interpretations of the learned commentators are to be regarded as the only authoritative and decisive ones. Some *Paribhāṣās* with their respective meanings have been referred to in the 'Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus' under 'Logic of Grammar.'

Having shown the nature of *Samjñās* and *Paribhāṣās* according to their grammatical interpretations, we now propose to say a few words regarding the characteristics of the grammatical aphorisms. The style followed by the grammarians in constructing the rules is the same as adopted in the so-called *Sūtra* literature. This style of composition, in which most of the standard works of Hindu philosophy have been written, was adopted by the grammarians, as they unduly favoured brevity and conciseness, sometimes to the extent of unintelligibility. How much the grammarians favoured brevity and conciseness in the composition of *Sūtras* is best illustrated by the *Paribhāṣā* 'अर्धमात्रालाघवेन पुत्रोत्सवं मन्यन्ते वैयाकरणाः.' The characteristic features of grammatical rules are as follows¹:—

(1) The *Sūtras* should be so framed as to contain the least number of letters. (2) The *Sūtras* to be constructed in such a way as to avoid ambiguity and doubt. (3) The *Sūtras*

¹ स्वल्पाक्षरमसन्दिग्धं सारवत् विश्वतोमुखम् ॥ निर्दायितव्यं च सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदुः ।

must be impregnated with meanings. As Paṇini¹ is said to have composed the rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī with all religious solemnities and great caution, Patañjali strongly believes that even a letter of his aphorisms, far from speaking of the entire rule, is not likely to be meaningless. (4) The Sūtras must have widest applications. This is exactly the case so far as the general rules (उत्सर्गविधिः) are concerned. (5) The Sūtras should be free from all defects and reasonable at the same time. The Sūtras having these qualifications generally fall under six categories, namely, *Samjñā*, *Paribhāṣā*, *Vidhi* or rules that enjoin something, *Niyama* or rules that enjoin restrictions, *Pratiṣedha* or prohibitive rules, and *Adhikāra*. *Samjñā* Sūtras are those that point out grammatical technics, such as, *Vṛddhi*, *Guṇa*, *Lopa* (disappearance), *ac*, *hal*, etc. As regards the *Paribhāṣā* Sūtras, we have already pointed out that certain *Paribhāṣās* were incorporated by the grammarians in their systems of grammar as regular Sūtras. The *Adhikāra* Sūtras are of four kinds.² Patañjali has illustrated three different kinds of *Adhikāra*.

As to the principle followed in the formation of rules, it must be clearly stated that it was

¹ प्रमाणभूत आचार्यो दर्भपवित्रपाणिः शुचाववकाशे प्राङ्मुख उपविश्य महता यत्नेन सूत्रं प्रणयति स्म, तत्राशक्यं वर्णेनाप्यनर्थकेन भवितुं किं पुनरियता सूत्रेण ।

—Mahābhāṣya, under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 1. 1.

² गीयूषः सिंहदृष्टिः सङ्कल्पतिरेव च । गङ्गास्तीतः प्रवाहश्च अधिकारश्चतुर्विधः ।

indeed a great difficulty to make a thorough study of each word. We are told that Indra,¹ even under the tutorship of Brhaspati, and continuing his study for a great length of time, failed to make an exhaustive study of words. How then the grammarians had succeeded in such an arduous task? Patañjali rightly observes that the rules of grammar should be framed on the scientific basis of generalisation and particularisation,² so as to enable one to make a study of words, though so diversified and numerous, with the least amount of effort. He clearly shows that the rules कर्मण्य् Pāṇ. 3. 2. 1 and चातोऽनुपसर्गे कः Pāṇ. 3. 2. 3, were written by Pāṇini having the same object in view.

Now as to what constitutes a grammar,³ Patañjali has elaborately dealt with the question in regard to what is precisely meant by grammar. It is too well known a fact that it is the Sūtras that constitute grammar or, in other words, grammar is entirely identical with the Sūtras. We use the word *Vyākaraṇa* with reference to a number of Sūtras and do not practically understand anything else. But there are certain objections in the way of accepting this view as an accurate one. The difficulty that arises on the

¹ Mahābhāṣya, Vol I, p. 5.

² उत्सर्गाववादी। कश्चिदुत्सर्गः कर्तव्यः कश्चिदपवादः—Mahābhāṣya Vol I, p. 5

³ अथ व्याकरणमित्यस्य शब्दस्य कः पदार्थः ? सूत्रम्। सूत्रे व्याकरणपदार्थोऽनुपपन्नः।—Var 10 शब्दाप्रतिपत्तिः। शब्दे लुङर्थः। भवे। प्रोक्तादयस्य तद्विधा। व्याकरणं—Var 10 M. Mahābhāṣya

assumption of identity between grammar and Sūtras is that the question of relation, as is indicated by the expression (व्याकरणस्य सूत्रम्) 'the rules of grammar' becomes necessarily incomprehensible or incompatible, that is to say, the above expression clearly indicates that grammar is actually different from the Sūtras. Again, no cognition of words would be possible, if grammar were identified with the Sūtras, because the knowledge of words does not practically follow from the Sūtras, but rather from the interpretations and expositions of such rules. Words are then held to be constituents of grammar and this view is considered to be sufficient to meet the aforesaid objection. But this is also not absolutely free from defects, inasmuch as the identity of grammar with words would render the derivation of the term *Vyākaraṇa* (व्याक्रियन्ते व्युत्पाद्यन्ते शब्दा अनेनेति) simply inconsistent. The drift of the arguments is that words are derived by means of Sūtras and not by other words. Moreover, the rules like भवे, प्रोक्तादयश्च, तत्र भवः, तेन प्रोक्तम्, etc., will be inconsistent with their meanings, if words are held to be identical with grammar. In fine, Patañjali sets forth the conclusion that words and Sūtras in their combination form the life of grammar (लक्ष्यलक्षणे व्याकरणम्).

The word *Sandhi* literally means conjunction of two; in grammar it implies the combination of two letters having close proximity. The definition of *Sandhi* as given by Pāṇini (which

is also to be found in the Nirukta) lays stress on the extreme proximity of letters, whether vowels or consonants, as the primary condition of *Sandhi* (*Paraḥ sannikarṣaḥ Saṃhitā*).

It has already been pointed out that the word is the same as sound. A word is, again, of two kinds, namely, sound as produced by the beat of drum, and sound as distinctly audible and expressed by letters. To the former class belong those sounds which are not capable of being represented by letters and have no real expressiveness like popular words that consist of letters. These letters, whether 48 or 49 in number, represent phonologically all possible modulations of voice. There are eight different places, such as, chest, throat, nose, head, tongue, roof of the tongue, teeth and lips wherefrom letters are produced and they are named accordingly. The order in which letters are to be read is said to be fixed (*Siddhavarṇa-samāmnāyaḥ*), but Pāṇini seems to have shewn some amount of ingenuity, as he gives rather a clumsy arrangement of letters only to serve the purpose of forming the *Pratyāhāras*. The method adopted by Pāṇini may be scientifically accurate, but it really marks a departure from the popular order of letters.

The subtle form of *Nāda* having its origin in the *Mūlādhāra* proceeds upwards till it reaches the vocal apparatus and becomes audible; it develops into distinct sound when it clothes itself with letters. This is usually the process whereby letters are produced. Letters are transient and liable to

disappear just after their utterance is over. According to the time required for pronouncing, a sound is said to be short, long and protracted. Letters are broadly divided into two classes : *Svara* and *Vyañjana*. *Svara* is so called because they are distinctly audible by themselves; *Vyañjana* requires the help of vowels for their intelligibility. The use of *ac* and *hal* in the place of more popular terms *Svara* and *Vyañjana* represents one of Pānini's manifold innovation.

There are generally two different ways in which words are uttered—rapid and slow. Patañjali maintains that close proximity is to be taken as the fundamental condition of *Sandhi*. It then follows almost naturally that no such *Samhitā* or the combination of letters takes place when two words are uttered at intervals. It is said in defence, however, that proximity of letters is the same, whether they are uttered rapidly or slowly. It is practically the time, as is required by the speaker to pronounce the words, that makes the utterance either rapid or slow. Three¹ definitions have been suggested to explain *Samhitā*, but no one is found to be strictly accurate and free from defects. The last tentative definition,² which brings in the idea of order as priority and posteriority among letters, uttered

¹ शब्दाविरामः संहिता; ज्ञादाविरामः संहिता; पौर्वापर्यसकालव्यपेक्षं संहिता ।
—Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 4. 109.

² पौर्वापर्यसकालव्यपेक्षं संहिता चेत् पूर्वापरभावात् संहितासंज्ञा न प्राप्नोति—
न हि वर्णानां पौर्वापर्यमस्ति—Mahābhāṣya.

without any intervention of time, is also open to objection, because the very idea of priority and posteriority is inconceivable in regard to letters that are never uttered simultaneously. पौर्वापर्य is to be understood with reference to space, as we apply the terms *Pūrva* and *Apara* to things when they are found to exist simultaneously. But such is not the case with letters. It is practically seen that we cannot pronounce two letters at a time.¹ The vocal organ that operates in pronouncing the letter *ga* is not the same that gives rise to *au*-sound and so on. Again, for the transient character of sound, *ga* is no longer existent when *au* is uttered. It is to be carefully noted here that *Paurvāparya*, as stated here, is not to be taken as referring to time, because letters are liable to destruction after the utterance is over, and there can be no relation as priority and posteriority between the existent and the non-existent letters. Patañjali, then, arrives at the conclusion and brings the whole discussion to a close when he holds that *Paurvāparya*, as the essential requisite of *Samhitā*, pertains to intelligence, that is to say, the determination of priority and posteriority of letters is the operation of intelligence.² An intelligent man adopts the following procedure

¹ एकैकवर्णवर्तितादाय च चरितमध्वंसित्वाच्च वर्णानाम्—Var 10.

एकैकवर्णवर्तिनी वाक् । न ही युगपदुच्चारयति । गौरिति गकारि यावती वाक् वर्तते नौकारे न विसर्जनीयेMahābhāṣya

² बुद्धिविषयमेव शब्दानां पौर्वापर्यम्—Mahābhāṣya.

in ascertaining the order of *Paurvāparya* :— This word is to be used in this sense and this word consists of these letters. Then, he proceeds to determine them one after another.

There is another definition of *Samhitā* given in the *Prātiśākhya*¹ which has also given rise to a considerable discussion. The main difficulty lies in the way of disjoining the compound *Padaprakṛti* which admits of double interpretation. If we take the expression *Padaprakṛti* as meaning पदानां या प्रकृति सेयं पदप्रकृतिः, it would naturally follow that *Samhitā* or combination is the original form of speech wherefrom *Padas* are separated. It is quite evident from this exposition that *Samhitā* represents the original form, whereas *Padas* are only modifications. According to another interpretation, which treats of the expression *Padaprakṛti* as an instance of *Bahuvrīhī* and lays down that *Padas* in their combination constitute *Samhitā* : *Padas* are to be taken as *Prakṛti* and *Samhitā* as merely modified forms. The question raised here is one of great importance, as it forms the fundamental problem of the linguistic science. The point at issue is to decide which of these (*Samhitā* and *Padas*) represents the original form. Durga² has advanced arguments to show that *Samhitā* is *Prakṛti* and *Padas* represent only *Vikṛti*. He

¹ पदप्रकृतिः संहिता ।

² संहितायाः प्रकृतित्वं व्यायः ।—Nirukts, p. 135.

has based his arguments on the fact that the Vedic *Mantras* have come down to us in their *Samhitā* form (but not as isolated *Padas*); *Samhitā* or combined forms are first studied by the Vedic scholars and the *Mantras* are specially recited in their *Samhitā* form at the time of sacrificial performances. It is an established fact that we do not meet with an instance of विसन्धि in the Vedic *Mantras*.

A careful study of the rules concerning *Samhitā* will make it clear that the principles underlying such *Samhitā* are based on regular phonological basis. The rule इको यणचि, which enjoins that इ, उ, ऋ, followed by *ac*, are changed to *y*, *v*, *r*, respectively, records rather a phonetic tendency according to which इ+अ, when uttered at a stress, are apt to take the form of य and so on. The transformation of इ into य, as in दध्यन्न, is due to the fact that both इ and य are letters that originate in the same place and have necessarily natural affinity for combination. Jaimini¹ has clearly stated that in दध्यन्न letters do not undergo any modification but a new letter comes into existence. The rule स्थानेऽन्तरतमः enjoins that in case of *Ādeśa*, a letter having close affinity, either through the internal efforts or owing to the similarity of place of utterance, is to take the place and function of *Sthānī*.

¹ वर्णान्तरसंविहारः Mim. Sūtra, I. 1. 13.

These instances will suffice to show that the rules of *Samhitā* are outcome of natural tendencies, as are illustrated by phonetic laws. In popular usages, *Samhitā* is sometimes obligatory and sometimes optional. It is thus stated in a *Kārikā* : *Samhitā*¹ is obligatory in *Padas* ; between roots and prefixes and in compounds ; in all other cases *Samhitā* is optional.

There are, broadly speaking, five kinds of *Sandhi*, according to the nature of letters that enter into combination. Among these five, the so-called *Prakṛti-Sandhi* (an instance of *Sandhi* which is not attended with necessary changes and modifications) forms a peculiar group. We call them peculiar in this sense that the instances of *Prakṛti-Sandhi* are so rigid that they retain their original forms intact and do not come under the general principles of *Samhitā*. In an instance like *late ime* where no change is brought about by rules of *Sandhi*, it is really difficult to distinguish it from ordinary forms. In cases like this, *Sandhi* is to be determined only by accents. Similarly, compounds and non-compounds were distinguished in the ancient Vedic age simply through the instrumentality of accents.

When a conjunction between two letters takes place in *Samhitā*, we usually find that two individuals do not retain their separate

¹ संहितैकपदे नित्या नित्या धातूपसर्गयोः । नित्या समासे वाक्ये तु सा विवक्षानपेक्षते ।

forms but merge into one and consequently give rise to a new letter which, though practically different from them, has close affinity with those letters. In the course of combination, letters are sometimes dropped as in *Prṣodarah* and sometimes, they undergo modifications as in *Dadhyatra*. The changes and modifications brought about by *Sandhi* are natural and not artificial. In etymological¹ explanations of words we find instances of productions of letters (*Gavendraḥ*), inversion of letters (*Simhaḥ*), modifications of letters (*Ṣodaḥ*) and disappearance of letters (*Prṣodarah*).

¹ वर्णनामो गवेन्द्रादौ सिद्धे वर्णविपर्ययः । घोड्यादौ विकारः स्यात् वर्णनामः प्रयोदरे ॥

CHAPTER IV

THEORY OF SPHOTA

Theory of *Sphoṭa*—identity of *Sphoṭa* with *Pragatā*—its origin and nature—arguments against the assumption of *Sphoṭa*.

The Hindu grammarians are credited with having, for the first time enunciated the doctrine of *Sphoṭa* which forms one of the outstanding features of Sanskrit grammar. It is at once the essence and result of Indian speculations on grammar; it embodies the careful ingenuity and keen-sightedness on the part of the Indian grammarians, and ultimately proves by drawing identity between *Sphoṭa* and Brahman that *Śabda-tattva* and *Brahma-tattva*¹ are only different in name but essentially convertible with each other. The grammarians have, however, carried this theory to such an extent and traced the final germ of speech to so subtle an element as to place the dissertations on words more or less upon a metaphysical level.

The history of *Sphoṭa*, judging from the height of contemplation it discloses, is calculated to reveal a mystical vision, and shows a

¹ ब्रह्मैवेत्यक्षरं माहुरन्तस्मै पूर्णात्मने ननः ॥—*Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, *Kār.* 72. and निष्कर्षे तु ब्रह्मैव स्फोटः ।

एवादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् ।—*Yōgyapadīya*, *Kār.* 1.

peculiar pious tendency which seeks to explain all phenomena as emanating from something divine. The original conception of *Sphoṭa* goes back to the most creative period of Indian thought, we mean the Vedic, when *Vāk* was considered to be a manifestation of all-pervading *Brahman*; *Pranava* regarded as the ultimate germ of all speech-sounds and *Śabda* viewed as an imperishable and potential factor in the creation of the world. Philosophy, so to speak, begins with concrete objects of thought and finally arrives at more and more nice abstraction. The grammarians, in the same way, started with the physical analysis of words and conceived sound as what clothes itself with letters. They proceeded still further and on minute examination of internal phenomena, grasped the remotest form of speech, viz., *Sphoṭa*, that is manifested by sound, eternally existent, indivisible and really expressive of sense.¹

It is, however, difficult to ascertain as to when and with whom this theory had first originated. History does not definitely mention the name of any particular philosopher, so far as the authorship of this theory is concerned. All that we know about its history is that this theory received a strenuous support at the hands of grammarians, while almost every system of Hindu philosophy had attacked it mercilessly and rejected it as being absurd and inconsistent.

¹ अलित्वरः, लिखः, चक्रमः, वाचकः ।

We do not, however, definitely know of any grammarian who may be said to have formulated this doctrine, nor do we find any specific mention of *Sphoṭa* in the aphorisms of grammar. We only repeat that our knowledge is not permitted to proceed beyond the limit that the theory of *Sphoṭa* found much favour with the grammarians, who seem to have carried it to such an extent as to finally inter-weave *Sphoṭa* with *Brahma-tattva*, thus raising the artificial character of grammatical speculations to the dignity of theological discourses. But this is not the sufficient reason why we should take this theory as one of grammatical origin. On the other hand, it might be maintained with a greater degree of certainty, on the evidence afforded by some other popular theories of unknown origin, that the Indian grammarians had already found the nucleus of the theory in existence in some form or other. They interpreted it consistently with their views and finally made it their own by giving it a distinctly grammatical stamp. What the grammarians have practically done with regard to this theory is that they popularised it with all earnestness and ultimately incorporated it into their systems as a tenet of fundamental importance. Similar is the original history of some of the popular doctrines of Hindu philosophy. The main doctrines of the Sāṃkhya school, for instance, seem to have been transmitted through generations as a common heritage of man and current as a

distinct line of thought long before they were systematised by Kapila or Pāṇcasikha. In this process of tracing the origin of old doctrines, we may be allowed to seek for some clue as to why the Vedas are emphatically declared by orthodox teachers as works not of human origin; and why it is authoritatively laid down that the Seers, who are mentioned by names in the Vedic hymns, are far from being the real authors.¹

To give a clear idea of *Sphoṭa*, we find it necessary to start with *Pranava*. It has repeatedly been stated in the Vedic literature that the mystic syllable, i.e., *Pranava*, represents the primordial speech-sound wherefrom all forms of *Vāk* are supposed to have been evolved. This sacred combination of three particles (अ, उ, म्), which is still uttered with the utmost reverence and regarded as a positive emblem of the supreme God, is said to have flashed forth into the heart of *Brahman*, while he was absorbed in deep meditation. *Pranava* unfolded itself in the form of *Gāyatrī*, which again gave birth to the three Vedas—this is how the cosmic world came into existence from so subtle an entity as *Śabda*. When we present this orthodox view in all its bareness and accordingly maintain that the entire world of *Vāk* has *Pranava* as its ultimate source, we should

¹ स्वयम्भुरेव भगवान् विदो गीतः समातनः । शिवाद्या ऋषि पथेना अक्षरौऽस्य न कारकाः—*Mahābhāgavata Parāṇam*.

crave the indulgence of modern scholars who are likely to discard it as an unscientific and irrational theory. The *Suta-Samhitā*¹ divides *Pranava* into two kinds, namely, *Para* and *Apara*. The former is the same as *Brahman*, while the latter is identified with *Śabda*. It must be admitted at the very outset that while dealing with so mysterious a thing as *Pranava* and showing the orthodox belief in the potency of *Śabda*, we are really drifted to a land that lies far beyond the range of common experience. *Pranava* has two more aspects—external and internal—corresponding to those of *Sphoṭa*. *Vācaspati*² in his gloss under the aphorism विशोक्ता वा ज्योतिषती has attempted to show the internal aspect of *Sphoṭa*. There is a lotus, it is said, having eight petals, that resides in the region between heart and abdomen; the three constituents of *Pranava* represent in the lotus, the solar, the lunar and the fiery regions respectively. Above it, as the *Brahmavādins* are only allowed to perceive, rests the *Brahma-Nāda* assuming the form of अर्धमात्रा. This अर्धमात्रा (capable of being perceived only by the *Yogins*) which represents the *Turiya* or the fourth part of *Pranava* that resides in

¹ परः परतरं ब्रह्म ज्ञानानन्दादिलक्षणम् । प्रकर्षेण नवं यस्मात् परं ब्रह्म सभावतः ॥ अपरः प्रणवः साक्षाच्छब्दरूपः सुनिर्मलः । प्रकर्षेण नवत्वस्य हेतुत्वात् प्रणवः स्मृतः ॥

² उदरोरसीर्मध्येऽधीमुखमष्टदलं पद्मं तद्वैचकप्राणायामेनोर्ध्वमुखं कृत्वा तवालम्बने चित्तं धारयेदित्यादि ।—*Yoga Sūtra*—*Vācaspati* on the *Bhāṣya*. 1. 36,

the heart of all beings, is called *Nāda-Sphoṭa*. It is emphatically laid down that the consummation of *Yoga* lies in the positive realisation of this absolute entity. Reference is made to this *Nāda* in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*,¹ where it is identified with *Śakti* or the supreme potency that exists from eternity and is not capable of being uttered by vocal organs. The history of the Hindu 'Trinity of gods' seems to have a close connection with the theory of *Pranava*, for the three elements (अ, उ, म्) constituting the *Pranava* are popularly believed to represent the three principal Hindu deities, viz., *Brahman*, *Viṣṇu* and *Śiva*. Now it is almost safe to assert without any contention that *Sphoṭa*, taken as an imperishable unit of *Vāk* (usually manifested by sound), which finally accounts for the evolution of speech, is analogous to *Pranava*; or, to take a still more orthodox view, it is the same as *Pranava*. Moreover, the expressions like श्रींकार एव सर्वा वाक् and स हि सर्वशब्दार्थप्रकृतिः which are, strictly speaking, applicable to *Sphoṭa* also, serve to confirm our belief regarding the identity between *Pranava* and *Sphoṭa*. The analogy is so striking that Nāgeśa does not hesitate to compare *Sphoṭa* with the internal phase of *Pranava*.²

¹ अर्धमात्रा स्थिता नित्या यानुचार्या विशेषतः । 1.

² स चाद्य' स्फोटः आन्तरप्रववरूप एव ।—*Laghumañjūā*, p. 389.

In the Upaniṣads, however, we miss the term *Sphoṭa* in its grammatical significance, but we frequently meet with the words *Praṇava* and *Akṣara* as expressive of *Brahman*. Consequently, the specific term *Sphoṭa*, as understood by the grammarians, seems to have acquired a special meaning at a later period, when the grammatical speculations began to obtain more and more philosophical treatment and ultimately encroached upon the domain of pure metaphysics. The Seers of the Upaniṣads have already declared in unmistakable terms that *Brahman* is reducible to *Praṇava*, or, *Praṇava* is a living symbol of the Supreme Being. Accordingly, they have advocated the worship of *Praṇava*¹ as a form of spiritual practice that leads to a state of perpetual bliss. So much sanctity and reverence were accorded to *Praṇava* and its potency and spiritual character eulogised in such a manner that *Praṇava* came to be regarded as *Brahman* itself. What a unique place *Praṇava* occupied in the spiritual thought of India is evident from the numerous Vedic passages and from the traditions that have gathered round it from the Vedic times. In the Yoga system of Patañjali, *Praṇava* is not only held as what positively denotes the Supreme Being,² but repeated utterance of *Praṇava* is also suggested as an instrument for attaining the concentration of

¹ अविच्छेदवर्णमन्त्रः—*U. S. I. 1.*

² अक्षरं ब्रह्म—*Yoga-Sūtra, 1.27*

mind. We may thus adduce abundant evidence in defence of the sacred character of *Pranava*. All scriptural passages, specially the Vedic hymns, begin, as a rule, with this sacred syllable. The natural outcome of such speculations exalting *Pranava* to divinity accounts, if we are allowed to hold, for the evolution of the theory of *Śabda-Brahman*, so conspicuously dealt with by the reputed author of the *Vākya-padīya*. We have dilated at great length upon the unique spiritual aspect of *Pranava*, with a view to prepare the ground for the belief that *Sphota*, like *Pranava*, is ultimately convertible with *Brahman* ¹

The four forms of *Val*, denominated as *Parā*, *Paśyanti*, *Madhyamā* and *Paikharī*, may be viewed as indicating the different stages through which *Sphota* (*Nada-Vindu*) receives manifestation. Both *Parā* and *Paśyanti* are too subtle and delicate to be comprehended by sense-organs, the former residing in the *Mulādhāra* ² in the shape of motionless *Vindu*, and the latter coming up to the nasal region pushed by the internal wind. Of the four forms, it is *Madhyamā* that indicates *Sphota*. All these are, however, more or less mysterious. The popular form, *viz*, *Paikharī* is what is uttered by the vocal organs and is capable of being heard by others.

¹ अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदधरम्—*Vakyapadiya Kar. 1* ब्रह्मेदं शब्दनिर्माणं शब्दशक्तिनिवन्धनम् ।

निष्कर्षस्तु ब्रह्मे व स्फोटः ।—*Vaiyākaraṇa bhuṣaṇa* under *Kar. 72*

² परा वाङ्मूलचक्रस्याऽप्यधरौ नाभिर्मस्थिता । हृदिस्था मध्यमा त्रैया वैखरी कण्ठदेशगा ।

It is further¹ held that *Nāda* is simultaneously produced by *Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī*, but there is considerable difference between the two. We may have some cognition of *Nāda* as produced by *Madhyamā*, either at the time of counting (*Japa*)² or when ears are shut up. What is of vital importance is that this form of *Śabda*, as is manifested by *madhyamā-nāda* is what we precisely call *Sphoṭa*; it symbolises *Brahman* and has eternal existence. *Sphoṭa* is further said to be essentially one and without divisions. These are, in short, the salient characteristics of *Sphoṭa*. According to this theory, however, it is one and the same indivisible *Sphoṭa* that is represented by *Varṇa*, *Pada* and *Vākya*, just as one and the same face³ appears to be long and round when seen through stone, sword and looking-glass, or, as a piece of stone, taking reflection from red or blue flowers, seems to be either red or blue. The difference between *ka* and *ga*⁴ is not practically due to the diversity of *Sphoṭa*, but points to the peculiarities of sounds that serve to manifest *Sphoṭa*. It is to prove both the unity and indivisibility of *Sphoṭa* that it is often compared to the sky and consciousness which, though one and admits of no fractions, are said to have such attributive difference

¹ युगपदेव मध्यमविखरीभ्यां नाद उत्पद्यते—Mañjūṣā.

² मध्यमानादस्य कर्णपिधाने जपादौ च सूक्ष्मतरवायुव्यङ्गः—Mañjūṣā.

³ यथा च सुखे मणिकपाणदर्पणव्यञ्जकोपाधिवशात् दैर्घ्यवर्तुलत्वादिभानं तद्वत् ।

⁴ व्यञ्जकध्वनिगतं कत्व-गत्वादिकं स्फोटे भासते ।

as, घटाकाग, मठाकाग and *Jira*, *Īsara*, respectively. Those who take पद and वाक्य to be similarly indivisible units, express their views in the following way:¹ Just as letters are devoid of parts, so no letters are comprehended in *Padas* as their constituent elements. Strictly speaking, it is not admissible to take words separately by splitting up a sentence. To those who advocate the divisibility² of both *Pada* and *Pākya*, it is the last letter that indicates *Sphoṭa*, each preceding letter being only necessary for a cognition of the intended sense.

In view of the difference between *Madhyamā* and *Paikharī*, we may divide sound into two kinds,³ namely, natural or everlasting (inexhaustible) and unnatural or momentary. It is the natural sound only, which is generated by *Madhyamā*, that suggests *Sphoṭa*. The unnatural (*aprākṛta-dhvani*) sound is so called because it rises from *Prākṛta-dhvani* and undergoes an amount of modifications in the shape of long and short sound. *Sphoṭa* being essentially one and without any modification is not at all effected by the quick utterance of sound, which practically refers to *Vikṛta-dhvani*. Considering

¹ पदे न वर्णा विद्यन्ते सर्वेष्ववयवा इव । वाक्यात् पदानामन्यत्नं प्रविशेको न कश्चन ।—*Vākyapadīya*, 1. 77.

² पदवाक्ययोस्तु सखण्डलपक्षेऽस्मिन्मवर्णस्य स्फोट एक एव । पूर्वपूर्ववर्णस्तु तात्पर्ययादकः ।—*Māñjūśā*.

³ ध्वनिस्तु द्विविधः । प्राकृतो वैकृतयः । स्फोटस्य यद्वै हेतुः प्राकृतो ध्वनिरित्येते । इतिभेदे निमित्तत्वं वैकृतः प्रतिपद्यते ।—*Vākyapadīya*, 1. 77

Sphoṭa to be permanent, as an internal phenomenon, the grammarians have shown but scanty regard to the logical view advocating the momentary character of *Śabda*. The existence of a permanent form of *Śabda*, as is represented by *Sphoṭa* as such, proves a dubious point, so much so that it merited no support but adverse criticisms from all leading systems of Hindu philosophy. While they speak of production and destruction of *Śabda*, the Naiyāyika's seem to have *Kārya-Śabda* (as opposed to *Sphoṭa*) in their view. They refused to take a more psychological view of *Śabda* apart from what appear to be a matter-of-fact one. Consequently, they lost sight of those internal operations that are associated with the evolution of sound that goes to prove the existence of a permanent source of sound (*Sphoṭa*). Another point which is none the less important in this connection is that *Sphoṭa* alone,¹ as is evident from its derivative meaning, is really associated with the expressiveness of sense.² It is for the sake of convenience and popular practice that we assign meanings to *Śabdas*, but a closer examination of both the internal and external facts will show that *Sphoṭa* is finally the significant element of speech.

As to the reason why *Sphoṭa* is said to be one that does not admit of any division into

¹ स्फुटव्यर्थोऽस्मादिति स्फोटः ।

² वाचकता स्फोटिकनिष्ठा ।

parts, we should frankly state that the ultimate nature of *Sphoṭa*, so far as it is brought to our comprehension by sound, letters and combination of words, seems to be undifferentiated. Physical structure of words only differs by virtue of *Vikṛta-dhṛani*, but the very life of *Śabda*, or, more clearly, the original *Nāda*, is absolutely one and practically changeless. What we really mean is that, though the word *Gauḥ* differs from the word *Ghaṭaḥ* both in physical and psychological aspects, the ultimate germ giving rise to such sound is really one and the same. *Sphoṭa* being one and permanent, Bhartṛhari rightly observes that such difference, as is caused by sound, is not at all essential. The apparent difference¹ of words is thus due to that of sound whereby *Sphoṭa* is indicated. *Sphoṭa* is practically one; it is only the indicator of *Sphoṭa*, viz. sound, that differs.

It is evident from what we have noticed above that it is difficult to form a definite idea of *Sphoṭa* without a proper investigation into the internal phenomena connected with the evolution of sound. We assume the existence of such a mystic element beyond sound only through the instrumentality of external sound that serves to indicate *Sphoṭa*. But we are never allowed to demonstrate its existence with a greater degree of vividness. There is no

¹ कठोटे व्ययकधनियतकत्वादिमानान् ककारो बुद्ध इत्येवाधिको निदध्यवहारः।

doubt that the internal operations, as referred to above, and connected with the materialisation of thought into sound, are what actually take place in the utterance of sound. It can hardly be denied that in the course of such translation something that lies dormant within (*Avyakta*) gets itself manifested by degrees while passing from the innermost part of the body to the vocal apparatus. The internal wind which plays so important a part in the transformation of consciousness into sound has been alluded to in connection with the psychological aspects of language (*vide* Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus).

In oppsition to the Naiyāyika standpoint, according to which *Śabda* is momentary and consequently liable to both production and destruction, Patañjali has strongly supported the permanent character of *Śabda*. It is curious to note that the attributives whereby he usually characterises *Śabda*, or more properly, *Spṛṣṭa*, are exactly those that are often ascribed to Brahman. There is convincing evidence that Patañjali, as a representative grammarian, had early realised the distinction between two kinds of *Śabda*,¹ namely, created and permanent. It is explicitly with reference to *Spṛṣṭa* or permanent word-form that he used such expressions² as, *Nitya*,

¹ इष्ट द्वौ शब्दात्मनौ नित्यः कार्यश्च ।—Mahābhāṣya.

² नित्येषु च शब्देषु कूटस्थैरविचालिभिर्बर्णेर्भवितव्यमनपायोपजनविकारिभिः ।

—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 18.

Avikārī and *Kūṭastha*. In connection with the exposition of the class-theory of *Sphoṭa*, as opposed to the individualistic one, he has given us 'some glimpse into the salient features of *Sphoṭa*. *Śabda* is, maintains Patañjali,¹ what is perceived by auditory organs, comprehended by intellect, manifested by sound and pertains to the sky. This definition, if we are allowed to style it as such, though concise and garbed in highly philosophical language, seems to be impregnated with deep significance, and purports to bring out the exact meaning of *Sphoṭa*. Having regard to the importance of this definition, we think it worth while to take up the expressions of the *Bhāṣya* one by one and explain them in the light of Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa. *Perceptible by the sense of hearing* is used to indicate that the organ of hearing is only a fraction of ether² wherein *Śabda* or sound is directly perceived. Both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems have taken *Śabda* to be a positive quality of ether. Sound³ which has its origin in the vibration of ether is capable of being perceived only by the organs composed of the same element. Patañjali seems to have an accurate knowledge of the scientific fact in regard to the production of sound. The expression *comprehended by intellect* offers

¹ श्रीवीपलम्बिर्बुद्धिनिर्वाहः प्रयोगेणभिज्जलितः आकाशदेशः शब्दः ।

—Vol. I, 1. 1. 2, p. 18.

² शब्दो, स्वरगुणः श्रीन्यायः ।—Prajastapāda Bhāṣya.

³ आकाशप्रदेशविशेषस्य श्रीवत्तात्...आकाशदेशत्वं शब्दव्यावृत्तमनुपेयम् ।

—Kaiyaṭa, 1, p. 2.

an explanation as to how words, though consisting of letters that are liable to disappear as soon as they are uttered, are found competent to express the intended sense. The answer is the same as suggested by the Naiyāyikas.¹ It is practically from the last letter that the cognition of the entire word is derived together with the impressions produced by the preceding letters. It is evidently an intellectual operation which enables us to retain the recollection of the entire structure of a word, even when we hear the last letter 'alone. *Manifested by sound* implies that *Sphoṭa*, though permanent, is not always comprehensible, but comes under our cognition only when the vocal organs are engaged in operation for its manifestation. Nāgeśa states expressly that the oneness of ether implies similar oneness in regard to *Śabda* or *Sphoṭa*. We speak of priority and posteriority in respect of *Śabda* just in the same way, as we are apt to say *ghaṭākāśa* and *maṭhākāśa* having regard only to the difference of attributes. Of both ether and *Sphoṭa*, the so-called difference is only due to their different attributes (*upādhi*). The singular number in *Śabda* is intended, as Nāgeśa points out, to indicate both the unity and indivisibility (एकत्वमखण्डत्वञ्च) of *Sphoṭa*.

It is quite evident from what he has said of *Sphoṭa* that Patañjali recognised three prominent

¹ पूर्वपूर्वध्वन्युत्पादिताभिव्यक्तिजनितसंस्कारपरम्परापरिपक्वाव्यवृद्धिनिग्राह-

characteristics of *Sphota*, viz., unity (*Ekatva*), indivisibility (*Akhandatva*) and eternality (*Nityatva*). In considering the question of time (as is required for the utterance of a word), he rightly observes that it is sound that seems to be either long or short, but what is manifested by sound, i.e., *Sphota*, is not at all effected by the variations of sound. He takes the instance of a drum and continues to say that sounds that are produced by beat of drum¹ are not of equal velocity, some travelling 20 yds. and some 30 yds., and so on. The essential difference between sound and *Sphota*, which has proved so difficult a problem to others—is clearly brought to light by Patañjali. He declares in unmistakable terms that *Sphota* represents what is *Śabda* proper, whereas sound is only a quality, that is to say, it serves only to manifest *Sphota*. The relation is, therefore, one of the *indicator* and the *indicated*. He further elucidates the point that *Śabda* has two aspects—sound and *Sphota*; it is sound alone that is usually perceived and appears to be either long or short as the case may be, while *Sphota* remains entirely unchanged and is not readily perceptible by sense-organs.

The foregoing observations will serve to show that *Sphota*, though strictly one and indivisible, is also capable of being classified as *internal* and

¹ एवं तर्हि स्फोट शब्दा ध्वनि शब्दगुणः । कथम् ? भेदाभावात् । भेदीभावात् कथिदिशतिपदानि गच्छन्ति । स्फोटस्तानि ध्वनिगता इति । ध्वनि स्फोटश्च शब्दाना ध्वनिस्तु खलु-लक्ष्यते ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol I, p 181.

external.¹ So far as the innate expressiveness of sense is concerned, it is the internal form of *Sphoṭa* (that lies within and is only manifested by sound) that is really significant. The external form of *Sphoṭa*, as is comprehended by our hearing organs, has no such intimate relation with the meaning. In all our linguistic enquiries we engage ourselves more or less to the investigation of the external aspects of a language, but we take very little notice of the internal phenomenon which forms the very life of a language. We assign the meaning to sound, as we fail to proceed further so as to grasp the ultimate reservoir of sound that is really associated with the significance. It requires only a moment's consideration to realise that sounds or vocalised thoughts are not only produced by the operation of vocal organs, but have their origin in certain ethereal region of the body, which does not vary, though the modulations of voice are always different from one another. The grammarians have thus sought to explain the existence of an internal cause of sound. The external form of *Sphoṭa* is, again, of two kinds, denoting class and individual.

As a great exponent of the *Mahābhāṣya*, Bharṭṛhari has dwelt at length on the question of *Sphoṭa*. Bharṭṛhari begins with the enuncia-

¹ स्फोटो द्विविधः । बाह्यः आभ्यन्तरस्य । तत्त्वान्तरस्य सुखं वाचकत्वम् ।
Kuṇḍikā on the *Mañjūṣā*, p. 237. आभ्यन्तरस्फोटो वाचक इति सिद्धम् ।—
—*Mañjūṣā*.

tion of two kinds of *Śabda*,¹ as the *indicator* and the *indicated*, the former representing the ultimate germ of speech-sound, and the latter being what is really expressed by *Śabda*.

In view of the popular belief regarding both plurality and order (*krama*) of *Śabda*, he makes his position clear by pointing out that no question of order, such as priority and posteriority, and that of plurality can logically be raised in relation to *Sphoṭa*, which is essentially one and eternal. It is sound, he maintains, that passes through successive stages in course of articulation and appears to be either long or short in proportion to the exertion required for the utterance of a word. It is practically due to the varying modulations of voice, as caused by the vocal apparatus, that 'ka'-sound seems to be different from 'kha'-sound and so on. But *Sphoṭa*, it must be remembered, remains unaffected. A parallel example² is then sought to explain the relation between sound and *Sphoṭa*. It is a fact of common experience that the sun, though practically a fixed body, seems to be quivering and moving when it is seen through the agitated water of a pond. Just as the agitation of water is reflected on the sun, so (inspite of the oneness and undifferentiating character of

¹ हावुपादानशब्देषु शब्दौ शब्दविदो विदुः । एको निमित्तं शब्दानामपरोऽर्थं प्रयुज्यते ।—Vākyapadīya, p. 20.

² प्रतिबिम्बं यथान्यत्र स्थितं तोयक्रियावशात् । तत् प्रहृत्तिमिवान्वेति स धर्मः स्फोटनादयोः ।—Vākyapadīya, I, 49.

Sphoṭa) order and difference pertaining to sound are falsely attributed to *Sphoṭa*. The dual¹ aspects of *Śabda*, as referred to above, imply that *Śabda* has the potency of expressing itself as well as its meaning that is associated with it by inseparable connection. This fact is further corroborated by the epistemological evidence. His main thesis may be briefly stated in the following words : *Śabda*, like light, is supposed to possess a double function, as *grāhaka* and *grāhya*. A light is luminous by itself and serves to illuminate others. Similarly, a *Śabda* is first comprehended and then becomes expressive of meaning.

Then, he proceeds to show how *Śabda* is evolved. Reference² is first made to the view (as that of the Naiyāyikas) that does not take *Pada* to be anything but a combination of letters, and similarly does not recognise a sentence as distinct from *Padas* and letters. The grammarians, however, entertain quite an opposite view, because they maintain *Vākya-Sphoṭa* to be an indivisible unit that knows neither division nor order. It is nothing but an artificial device of grammar to analyse a sentence into parts (*Padas*) and those parts again into stems and suffixes.

¹ ग्राह्यत्वं ग्राहकत्वं च द्वे शक्ती तैजसो यथा । तथैव सर्वशब्दानामिते पृथगवस्थिते ।—Vākyapadīya, I, 55.

² तद्वर्णं यतिरिक्तेन पदमन्वन्नविद्यते । वाक्यं वर्णपदाभ्यां च व्यतिरिक्तं न किञ्चन ।—Vākyapadīya, I, 72.

There are, as the grammarian maintains, two different aspects of words, namely, *Kārya* or popular form and *Nitya* or the permanent form of speech. The former is generally produced by the exercise of vocal apparatus and serves to give a reflection of internal consciousness, the latter is what represents the ultimate germ of speech. *Sphoṭa* is identified with this latter aspect of speech.

The three views regarding the cognition of sound and *Sphoṭa* may be thus briefly summarised¹ :—(i) Sound when produced is heard by the auditory organs and becomes the positive instrument whereby *Sphoṭa* is comprehended. (ii) Having assumed the material form through the medium of sound, *Sphoṭa* is capable of being heard. (iii) Sound acts upon the organs concerned and serves to manifest *Sphoṭa*. Bhartṛhari lends his support to the last one. Sound is the outer garment of *Sphoṭa*. Though incomprehensible and inconceivable by itself, *Sphoṭa* reveals its existence through the medium of sound. Sound and *Sphoṭa* are intimately related to each other. As the scientists have found out atoms or electrons as the final factor of creation, so the grammarians started with sound and ultimately reached the subtle element of speech to which the term *Sphoṭa*

¹ यथा जवाकुसुमरूपाण्युपक्रमेव स्फटिकादीनां ग्रहणं तथा ध्वनिरूपाण्युक्त एव स्फोटस्तद्विभोगिनोपलभ्यते इति केषाचिन्मतम्, etc.—Puṇyārāja under the Vākyapadīya, Kār. I, 82.

was significantly assigned. As to how sound and *Sphoṭa*, related to each other as the indicative and the indicated, are to be comprehended, Bhartr̥hari refers to four different views on the subject. Some say that *Sphoṭa* is recognised as identical with sound, just like a piece of marble looking red in contact with a *Javā-flower*; some holding sound (though not cognisable by itself) to be indicative of *Sphoṭa*; some maintain that the exact nature of *Sphoṭa* being too subtle to be determined, it is sound only that comes under comprehension; some, again, freely admit that *Sphoṭa* is really manifested but it is indistinct and unintelligible on account of the distance wherefrom it is evolved. No doubt, Bhartr̥hari has here recorded the views of his predecessors and contemporary grammarians in order to do full justice to so important a subject. But we can hardly afford to pass over these views without taking notice of the unique advancement of grammatical speculations, as is clearly borne out by these references.

Referring to the intellectual process involved in the comprehension of *Śabda*, Bhartr̥hari¹ says that the cognition of *Śabda* practically follows from the last sound together with the impressions made by the preceding ones.

The immediate consequence of holding *Sphoṭa* to be one and indivisible was a grave

¹ नादेराहितवीजायामन्येन ध्वनिना सह । आहृतिपरिपाकायां बुद्धौ शब्दोऽवधार्यते ।—Vākyapadīya, Kār. 1, 85.

one, as it threatened to strike at the fundamental principle of grammar by making all process of analysing sentence and words purely artificial.¹ The science of grammar is primarily based upon the principle of analysis. Now, to justify the procedure of grammarians, it must be said on the contrary that they had no other alternative than to isolate words from a composite sentence, in order to make the sense of words intelligible to others. It is simply due to our inability, Bhartrhari strongly argues, that we cannot comprehend a sentence without taking it to be a combination of words and words as consisting of no parts (*Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*). An examination of facts shows that the grammatical method of analysing sentence and words into their component parts, however artificial from the standpoint of *Sphoṭa*, is calculated to afford the only scientific means, so far as the knowledge of meaning is concerned.²

The doctrine of *Sphoṭa*, as expounded by the grammarians, is not a creation of fancy and the result of idle philosophising; it is rather based on the facts that speak for themselves. A moment's notice is only required to realise the existence of some inexhaustible potency

¹ व्यवहाराय मन्वन्ते शास्त्रार्थप्रक्रिया यतः ।—*Vākya-padīya*, 2. 231.

Paṇyārāja—एवं च निरवयवेष्वपि वर्णपदवाक्येषु साक्षाद्विभागो वर्णविभागः पदविभागश्च कान्धनिको मित्येति भावः .—*Under Kār.* 93.

² शान्तीयप्रक्रियानिर्वाहकोपायः ।

lying inside the body, which is conceived to be at work at every time of utterance. Sound that we hear is not produced by the operation of vocal organs only, but has its origin elsewhere. However subjected to adverse criticisms by the opponents, the doctrine of *Sphoṭa*, with all its mysticisms, will continue to appeal to all speculators on the psychology of language, as embodying the most accurate explanation with regard to the origin of *Ṭāk*. That the principle of grammatical analysis is more or less fanciful is evident from the fact that systems of grammar have their different nomenclatures and technical terms, though they have practically kept the same object in view and treated of the same subject.

This analytical method, though at best artificial,¹ is supposed to have much utility, as it practically enables us to have an insight into the actual state of things. Starting with such unreal process as the division of sentences and words, with the obvious object of facilitating the study of words, the grammarians finally succeeded in obtaining a truer perspective while dealing with the problem of *Sphoṭa*. Bhartṛhari² rightly observes that proper attention and close enquiry are needed to arrive at the final goal, running through a passage so artificial and bewildering.

¹ शास्त्रेषु प्रक्रियामिदरेवियैवोपवर्णते ।—*Vākyapadīya*, 2. 235.

² यद्यैव दर्शनैः पूर्वैर्दूरात् सन्तमसेऽपि वा । अन्यथाकृत्य विषयमन्यथैवाध्यवस्यति ।
—*Vākyapadīya*, 1. 90.

As it is imperfect observation that makes a rope look like a serpent, and such delusion ceases to exist the moment it is cautiously examined, so the grammarians first treated of a sentence as having many parts and those parts as containing various letters. But their mode of vision is materially changed on a closer examination of facts and they finally describe *Sphoṭa* as an imperishable and indivisible unit without any reservation. The discourse on *Sphoṭa* reached its culminating point when *Sphoṭa* was regarded to be as great as Brahman itself. The doctrine of grammar has thus ultimately identified itself with the same transcendental reality which has always proved to be the *be-all and end-all* of metaphysical speculations.

The later grammarians, specially Śeṣakṛṣṇa, Nāgeśa, Bhaṭṭoji and Koṇḍabhaṭṭa, have dealt with the problem of *Sphoṭa* more clearly and elaborately but all following the line of Patañjali and Bhartr̥hari. The arguments advanced by Śeṣakṛṣṇa in defence of *Sphoṭa* are briefly as follows: An indivisible¹ unit as *Sphoṭa* should be accepted on the ground that the sense usually denoted by a word can neither be derived from an individual letter (as it would render all other letters entirely meaningless), nor from a combination of letters, for letters being liable to destruction as soon as they

¹ न प्रत्येकं न मिलित्वा न चैकस्मत्तिगोचराः । अयं वाचका वार्ताः किंतु स्फोटः स च द्विधा ।—*Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa*.

are uttered, it would be practically impossible to have a congregate of such transient letters. It is not even sufficient to say that they are cognisable by the same act of memory, because, if it were so, the undesirable consequence will be the identity between such groups of words as, *Nadī*, *Dīna* and *Rasa*, *Sara* (there being difference of order only), as they consist of the same letters and are comprehended by the same faculty of retention. The grammarians have, therefore, proceeded a step further and recognised the existence of *Sphoṭa*, which is suggested by sound, eternal and not at all divisible into parts.

We can compare this view with what Patañjali has said with regard to order in letters.¹ As two letters, Patañjali argues, cannot be simultaneously pronounced on account of their transient character, it is useless to raise the question of priority and posteriority in connection with letters. This order is to be understood as an intellectual one.² Śeṣa continues to say that the cognition of *Sphoṭa* follows from the last letter together with the impressions made by the preceding letters.³

The later grammarians have to a certain extent shown prolixity in enunciating as many

¹ न वर्णानां पौर्वापर्यमस्ति । उच्चरितप्रध्वंसित्वाच्च वर्णानाम् ।

—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 356.

² बुद्धिविषयमेव शब्दानां पौर्वापर्यम् ।

³ पूर्वपूर्वानुभूज्यभावनासत्त्विवेदन्ति मे । चेतसि स्फुरति स्फोटः ।

—*Sphoṭacandrikā*, p. 13.

as eight different forms of *Sphoṭa*, such as, *Varṇa-Sphoṭa*, *Pada-Sphoṭa*, *Vākya-Sphoṭa*, *Akhaṇḍa-Pada-Sphoṭa*, *Akhaṇḍa-Vākya-Sphoṭa*, *Varṇa-Jāti-Sphoṭa*, *Pada-Jāti-Sphoṭa*, *Vākya-Jāti-Sphoṭa*. The author of the *Śabda-Kaustubha* has clearly dealt with all these classifications. It must be, however, remembered that these varieties, with the single exception of *Vākya-Sphoṭa*, are more or less unreal and not accepted by all grammarians. Reference has already been made to two kinds of *Vākya-Sphoṭa*, viz., class and individual. An attempt is now made to see how far these standpoints (*Jāti-Sphoṭa* and *Vyakti-Sphoṭa*) are in concordance with the *Mahābhāṣya*. *Sabdatva* which pertains to all *Śabdās* is regarded to be a class, and consequently, शब्दाकृति by its very nature¹ deserves to be treated as eternal. *Bhartṛhari* has thrown some sidelight on this point. The word *Sphoṭa* in उभयतः स्फोटमात्रं निर्दिश्यते has led some to favour the view that *Sphoṭa* is virtually a class that is suggested by individual words or sounds, and that शब्दव्यक्ति receives the designation of *dhvani* by suggesting *Jāti-Sphoṭa*. Some, again, hold² on the other hand, that *Vyakti-Sphoṭa* (as opposed to *Jāti-Sphoṭa*) is one and imperishable. As to the apparent plurality of *Vyakti*, they maintain that the interval or intervention caused

¹ नित्यानेकसमवेतत्वम् ।

² व्यक्तेरेकत्ववादी तस्या नित्यत्वं मन्यते ।—*Bhāṣyapradīpodyota*.

आदित्यवत् स्युः—तद् यथा एक आदित्योऽनेकाधिकरश्मयो युगपदेश-
प्रयोजकपूज्यते ।—*M. B. 1, p 18*.

by time and words, which tends to prove the diversity of one and the same *Vyakti* as *a*, is only due to the variation of sounds whereby *Sphoṭa* is suggested. According to this point of view, it should be borne in mind, the *a*-sound in *da* is not distinct from that in *ṇda*. This view is, however, open to objections and is finally set aside by Patañjali. Those who like Patañjali advocate *Jāti-Sphoṭa*¹ advance their arguments to repudiate both unity and eternity of *Vyakti-Sphoṭa* on the ground that *a* seems to have more than one form, according as it is called *udātta*, *anudātta*, *svarita* and *pluta*. It is not even reasonable to suggest that the same *a* which is first pronounced as *udātta* is next taken to be *Anudātta* and so on, for, if it were so, *Sphoṭa* would cease to be eternal on account of its assuming diverse forms. Thus, *Jāti-sphoṭa* is finally accepted as what gives the correct solution of the problem.²

Having thus discussed the salient characteristics of *Sphoṭa* from all possible standpoints, we now proceed to see how *Sphoṭa-vāda*, which is popularly attributed to the grammarians, was received by different schools of Hindu philosophy. However carefully conceived and ingeniously nourished by the grammarians, the

¹ जातिरेव एका, शब्दव्यक्तयस्त्वनन्ता इति वादीत्यर्थः ।—Uddyota.

² आकृतियहणात् सिद्धम् ।—Mahābhāṣya, I. 1.2.

एवं व्यक्तिस्फोटपक्षे निराकृते जातिस्फोटपक्ष एवाश्रीयते ।—Kaiyaṭa.

तस्माद्भिन्ना एवानित्या एवाकाराः, प्रत्यभिन्ना त्वाकृतिनिबन्धनेति जातिस्फोटपक्षोऽव्यवस्थापितः ।—Kaiyaṭa.

theory of *Sphoṭa* seems to have a strange fate, because it failed to have any favourable treatment at the hands of reputed philosophers. What is still more regrettable is that it was rather subjected to stern and vigorous criticisms. Though it embodies, so to speak, the crowning achievement of all grammatical speculations, the theory of *Sphoṭa* unfortunately met with nothing but disapproval on all sides. The only school of Indian thought which appears to have lent support to the assumption of an invisible speech-unit as *Sphoṭa*, is, if we are allowed to hold, the Yoga system of Patañjali. It is practically on the evidence of such aphorisms, as Yoga Sūtras 1. 31 and 3. 17 and the expositions of Vyāsa thereon, and partly in consequence of the supposed identity between the authors of the Mahābhāṣya and the Yoga Sūtras, that the existence of *Sphoṭa* is said to have been recognised and supported by the author of the Yoga Sūtra. Truth to tell, there is no clear mention of *Sphoṭa* as such in the aphorisms of Yoga system; it is only in the comments of Vyāsa and the gloss of Vācaspati that some light has been thrown on the question of *Sphoṭa*.

It is too well known a fact that all objects of thought, with the exception of *Primordial matter* and Soul, are declared to be कार्य¹ or

¹ प्रकृतिपुरुषयोरन्यत् सर्वं कार्यमिति ।

products by the teachers of the Sāṃkhya school. Having taken a rather perverted view against the orthodox interpretations, they have rejected the fundamental tenets of the Mīmāṃsakas, *viz.*, eternality of sound,¹ eternality of the Vedas and eternality of the relation between sound and meanings. It requires no other evidence, hold the Sāṃkhyāites, but ordinary perception and inference to prove that *Śabda* is produced by the agency of vocal organs and has only momentary existence. The Sāṃkhya Sūtra (5.57) distinctly rejects *Sphoṭa* as practically incomprehensible. The reason of their refutation is a very simple one. As no other element apart from letters comes to our notice in the cognition of a word, it is absolutely useless to assume the existence of *Sphoṭa* (which passes our vision and comprehension) as distinct from letters.² As letters are, on the contrary, directly perceived, it is more reasonable to take them to be expressive of the sense. If, again, letters are supposed to be meaningless by themselves, we are allowed to doubt the so-called expressiveness of *Sphoṭa*. Now, the point at issue is when letters are found to be really expressive of sense, the assumption of *Sphoṭa* in addition to letters becomes a superfluity which the followers of the Sāṃkhya school are not prepared to accept.

¹ न शब्दनित्यत्वं जायताप्रतीतिः ।S—Sāṃkhya Sūtra, 5. 58.

² प्रतीतिरप्राप्तप्रतीतिर्न श्लोटावकः शब्दः ।—Sāṃkhya Sūtra, 5. 57.

प्रतीतिरप्राप्तप्रतीतिः श्लोटस्य वर्णातिरिक्तस्य, तस्मात् श्लोटः शब्दः किंतु वर्ण एव ।
—Sāṃkhya-Vṛtti.

There is another argument which also goes against the indivisible character of *Sphoṭa*. As meanings are liable to changes according to the different arrangement of letters (as in *Nadī* and *Dīna*) and as sounds are diversified in their character and have manifold significance, we cannot reasonably take *Sphoṭa* to be one and eternal. The conclusion to which this argument leads is that *Sphoṭa*, being inconceivable, is far from being *Śabda* proper. It is letters alone, no matter if they are perishable, that constitute words in the real sense of the term. *

No comment is, however, necessary to show that the Sāṃkhyāites, who profess to be rationalistic, have taken notice of only the outward aspect of speech and have totally neglected the more important side of the question, *viz.*, psychological or internal aspect. Their main difficulty is that they ascribe significance to so transient a thing as letters, but do not strive further to find out the permanent source of *Śabda*, as is manifested by sound. As to non-perception of *Sphoṭa*, it must be remembered that the *Sphoṭavādins* also were not slow to emphasise the difficulty that lies in the way of having a perceptive knowledge of *Sphoṭa*. They made no secret as to the necessity of a thorough concentration of mind in order to realise the existence of *Sphoṭa*. It requires a good deal of mystical power, or some amount of spiritual vision, as is given rise to by the awakening of *Praiñā-netra*, to grasp the *cit*-aspect (*Sphoṭa*) of the Supreme Being.

Moreover, *Sphoṭa* is not capable of being perceived by ordinary sense-organs: it is only suggested or manifested by sound.

Regarding the existence of *Sphoṭa* (as distinct from letters), the views of the Mīmāṃsakas, as ably represented by the author of the *Śloka-vārttika*, are far from being reconcilable with those of the grammarians. Having taken a purely physical view of *Śabda*, the Mīmāṃsakas, like Śaṅkara, turned to the old theory of the revered teacher Upavaśa¹ and accordingly identified *Śabda* with letters. To assume something as *Sphoṭa* apart from letters, is, as they hold, opposed to all cognition and experience. Letters are actually perceived in a word, as, for instance, the word *gauḥ* does not appear to have any other element excepting the three constituent letters—*ga*, *au* and *visarga*. It is curious to note that while so much stress is laid on the popular experience, the importance of the logical aspect of *Śabda* has altogether been ignored, so as to weaken the ground on which the grammarians sought to build the edifice of *Sphoṭavāda*. When *Śabda*, as a combination of letters, is practically seen to be expressive of the sense and as no other factor is found to be in operation in the comprehension of the meaning, it is nothing but superfluous to assume the existence of *Sphoṭa*, as distinct from letters.

¹ वर्णा एव तु शब्द इति भगवानुपवर्षः ।—V. S., I. 3. 28.

The grammarians, it must be remembered, have declared *Sphota* to be virtually distinct from letters and further held *Sphota* to be the only significant element of speech.¹ The Mīmāṃsakas² maintain that letters have no parts and that there is no such collection in the cognition of words apart from that of the component letters. In assigning meaning to words, the Mīmāṃsakas had to face one difficult problem. The question presented itself in the following form:—Are all letters individually significant by themselves, or, is it an aggregation of them whereby the meaning is expressed? The untenable character of the first view is clearly evident, since the competency of each individual letter to signify the intended sense is contrary to our experience. As regards the second view, it is not possible to have an aggregation or a simultaneous combination of letters, simply for the reason of minute intervals in the utterance of sounds. The Mīmāṃsakas make their way out of the difficulty by saying that the significance of words depends upon the convention or popular usage. As the comprehension of the meaning directly follows from the letters that constitute a word, and as nothing else is required for the purpose, it is only logical, they hold, to take letters as what express the sense. Kumārila shows further how by accepting

¹ वाचकता स्वीकृतमिष्टम् ।

² स्वीकृतवादः—Śloka.vārtika.

Sphoṭa as an entity, we are liable to make a number of unnecessary assumptions, such as, the existence of *Sphoṭa*, distinctness of *Sphoṭa* from letters and its indivisibility. It is quite clear from what we have said that the arguments advanced by the Mīmāṃsakas against *Sphoṭavāda* are, generally speaking, reducible to two only, namely, the existence of *Sphoṭa* apart from letters (i) involves a negation of perceptible facts (दृष्टानि) and (ii) is an unwarranted assumption of something that is invisible or imperceptible (अदृष्टकल्पना). The concluding verse¹ of the author reveals, however, the reason why he could not lend support to the theory of *Sphoṭa*. As a matter of fact, the assumption of *Sphoṭa*, which makes all divisions of a sentence and words merely artificial, is found to be entirely inconsistent with the main tenets of the Mīmāṃsā system, for it renders *ūha*, *prayāja*, etc. (which pertain to letters, words and sentences) absolutely conventional. It is, therefore, to retain the genuine character of the Vedic texts that Kumāṛila made such a vigorous attempt to refute the existence of *Sphoṭa*.

The Vedāntins have fully acknowledged the eternality of *Śabda*. They have, on the authority of scriptural texts, even gone to the extent of investing *Śabda* with the potency of producing the entire world. While dealing with *Śabda*

¹ वर्णातिरिक्तः प्रतिषिध्यमानः पदेषु सन्तं फलमादधाति ।

कार्याणि वाक्यावयवाश्रयाणि सत्यानि कर्तुं कृत एष यतः ॥—Sloka-vārttika. Kār. 137.

(Logos) and its 'world-producing power,' Śaṅkara has conveniently devoted considerable space under the Vedānta-Sūtra 1.3.28 to find out the exact nature of *Śabda*. With his characteristic manner of presenting arguments, he first points out the incongruities that become almost unavoidable, if letters having both production and destruction, were to be regarded as *Śabda* proper. Subsequently he continues to acknowledge *Sphota* as what represents the permanent form of *Śabda*. The way in which Śaṅkara has at first advanced arguments in defence of the existence of *Sphota*, exposing the untenable features of वर्णपक्ष, leads one to believe, though temporarily, that he entertained no antagonistic view against the grammatical interpretation of *Sphoṭavāda*. This impression is, however, of a short duration, because next we find Śaṅkara¹ more favourably examining the view of Upavarṣa almost in the same way as the Mīmāṃsakas. As to the question of production and destruction of letters, he argues that it really implies the re-cognition (प्रत्यभिज्ञान) of the same letter. What is meant is that different letters are not produced and uttered each time, but, as a matter of fact, the same sound, say *ka* (as in *kala* and *kāla*) is heard. It should be, however, noticed here that the Naiyāyikas are not prepared to take the above as an instance of re-cognition, but explain the

¹ Vedānta Sūtra, Śaṅkara Bhāṣya under the aphorism, 1.3.28.

sameness of *ka*-sounds as due to their belonging to the same class (कत्व). To sum up the two views : According to the Mimāṃsakas and the Vedāntins, the same *ka*-sound is heard again and again, whereas the Naiyāyikas do not maintain the non-differentiation of the individuals and consequently take all *ka*-sounds as belonging to the same class. This recognition, continues Śaṅkara, does not follow from the knowledge of a class ; it is individual letters that are comprehended each time. Again, we are accustomed to hold the form *gauḥ*, though it consists of three distinct letters, as one word. How is it, then, possible to have such a cognition of oneness when its component parts are far from being one ? Having attributed the diversified character of one and the same letter to the difference of sound, he proceeds to say that sometimes many things form the subject of one intellection,¹ as many trees, for instance, are denoted by one word 'forest' (*Vana*). At last Śaṅkara sums up the arguments on both sides, viz., *Varṇavāda* and *Sphoṭavāda*, and after a minute examination of facts arrives at the conclusion that the view maintained by the *Varṇavādins*² is simpler and appeals more to reason and experience, while that of the *Sphoṭavādins* is vitiated by prolixity and involves far-fetched

¹ अनेकस्याप्येकबुद्धिविषयत्वम् ।

² वर्णवादिनी लघ्वीयसी कल्पना, स्फोटवादिनस्तु दृष्टहानिरदृष्टकल्पना च वर्णशेमे क्रमेण गृह्यमाणाः स्फोटं व्यञ्जयन्तीति स स्फोटोऽर्थं व्यनक्तीति गरौयसी कल्पना स्यात्—Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya.

speculations. To hold, he observes, letters, as they are comprehended one after another, to be indicative of *Sphoṭa*, which is said to signify the intended sense, is to take a superfluous view of the whole problem.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika point of view, sound is a quality of ether, comprehended by the organ of hearing, and has only a momentary existence. It is of two kinds—(1) sound as represented by letters like *ka*, etc.; (2) sound as produced by beat of drum and blowing of conches and the like. The former, *viz.*, *वर्ण-लक्षणशब्द*, is alone significant and is generally used as a medium for communicating the ideas. Praśastapāda, the well-known commentator on the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras*, has attempted to show how words are produced. The view of this commentator regarding the origin of sound is almost the same as is to be found in treatises on *Sikṣās*. A desire is first felt within, the author says, by the conjunction of the mind with the soul, for the utterance of sound (in order to give expression to the thoughts rising in the mind); then efforts are made which bring about a movement in the region of internal air. Thus moved by causes from within, the internal air proceeds upwards till it comes in contact with the vocal apparatus. This conjunction which is followed by vibrations in ether gives rise to sound that is destroyed as soon as it is uttered. A word is, therefore, *Kārya*, as opposed to *Nitya*. The Naiyāyikas as well as the Vaiśeṣikas have thus taken a

non-eternal view of *Śabda* differing from the grammarians who assume a permanent form of *Śabda*, as is represented by *Sphoṭa*.

In his annotation on the *Bhāṣya*, Śrīdhara¹ has made an attempt to show the absence of logic in the grammatical conception of *Sphoṭa*. He first raises the question whether meaning is expressed by a sentence or by *Sphoṭa*. If a word is nothing but a collection of letters, holds the *Sphoṭavādins*, and a sentence not at all distinct from its component parts, then there would be no comprehension of the meaning whatsoever. For neither individual letter is competent to convey the entire meaning (as it would render other letters simply redundant), nor is a combination practically possible, as all letters cannot be pronounced simultaneously. The author meets this objection by holding, for argument's sake, that letters are eternal and not transitory, as in that case such an aggregate would not be incomprehensible. But this argument cannot stand for obvious reasons. It is further argued by the opponent that letters are perceived one after another and then impressions are produced in the mind. This is also untenable. For, if there is order in recollections, as shown above, there would be no co-existence of sounds to form an aggregation. As the comprehension of the meaning is otherwise impossible; the *Sphoṭavādins* have been led to acknowledge

¹ Nyāya-kandali (Śrīdhara)—Sk., p. 267.

the existence of *Sphoṭa*, as what expresses the meaning. But such an assumption has no justification to a rationalist philosopher like Śrīdhara. The following arguments, among others, are sought by Śrīdhara to refute the existence of *Sphoṭa*: *Sphoṭa* is never directly perceived, but falsely assumed by the grammarians; the denotation lies within the word and not with an imperceptible entity as *Sphoṭa*.¹ To assume *Sphoṭa*, as distinct from letters, is as fallacious as to conceive a '*flower in the sky*.'²

Before bringing this topic to a close, we have one word more. Considering what has been said about the doctrine of *Sphoṭa* by different schools of Indian philosophy, it is sufficiently clear that the main contention raised against *Sphoṭa* is based upon the fact that the assumption of *Sphoṭa* is contrary to all perception and involves far-fetched speculations. Having taken their stand on the facts established by direct perception, the opponents of *Sphoṭavāda* seem to have carried the popular view in their favour. But it would be a positive mistake to suppose that what the *Sphoṭavādins* tried to establish is nothing but fanciful. It cannot be, however, denied that the *Sphoṭavādins* made no secret as to the imperceptibility of *Sphoṭa* by ordinary means. Moreover, it is repeatedly pointed out

¹ Nyāya-Kandali (Śrīdhara), viz., Sk. series, गुणग्रन्थे संस्कारनिरूपणम् —pp. 269-270. तदेवं वर्ण्य एव संस्कारद्वारेणार्थप्रत्ययसम्भवादयुक्ता स्फोटकल्पना ।

² गगनकुसुमस्यैव स्फोटकल्पना न युक्ता ।

that the realisation of *Sphoṭa* requires a good deal of spiritual meditation as well as perfect concentration of mind. As it is not logically correct to take anything to be unreal, simply because it is not directly perceived, we do not find sufficient reason to deny the very existence of *Sphoṭa* which, though imperceptible, is said to be manifested by sound. *Sphoṭa*, to speak the truth, bears comparison with the soul, as both of them come under our cognition through the instrumentality of inference, the former being indicated by sound and the latter by volition, effort, pleasure, pain, etc. As to the other side of the contention, we should say that the upholders of *Sphoṭa-vāda* minutely examined all external aspects of words before they could grasp so subtle an entity as *Sphoṭa* by unfolding the psychological phenomena underlying the origin of sound.

To summarise what we have said about *Sphoṭa*: *Sphoṭa* is the same as *Śabda-Brahman* or *Brahman* revealed in the form of *Vāk*. *Sphoṭa* represents the internal aspect of *Pranava*; it is eternal and cannot be divided into parts (*akhaṇḍa*) and expressiveness or *Vācakatā* lies with *Sphoṭa* and not with *Padas*, isolated from the *akhaṇḍa-vākya*—the indivisible unit of speech. That there is no essential difference between *Sphoṭa* and *Pranava* has been clearly stated by the ancient seers. *Nāda*¹ or primordial sound is said to have first

¹ समाहितात्मनो ब्रह्मन् ब्रह्मणः परमेश्चिनः ।

हृद्याकाशाद्भूतान्दी वृत्तिरोधादिभाव्यते ॥—*Laghumañjūṣā*, p. 389.

originated in the spatial region of the heart (*hrdyākūṣa*) of Brahman when he was deeply absorbed in meditation. This subtle form of sound is capable of being perceived by shutting the auditory passage of the ears. Out of *Nāda* arose *Oṃkāra*, the self-radiant, creative factor, which is regarded as the positive symbol of the supreme Being. Viewed from the standpoint of Yoga, *Sphota*, *Pīanava* and *Pratibhā* are almost the same. The internal aspect of *Vāk*, as is represented by *Parā* and *Paśyantī*, is inseparable from *cit-śakti*, the fountain-source of all cognitions. *Pīanava* or *Pratibhā*, as we may call it, has its permanent seat in the heart of all sentient beings, its fourth part is what is known as *ardhamatī* or *Sphota* ¹. Further, it is held that *Sphota* which serves to manifest *Vāk* is heard by the supreme Soul (*Paramatman*), when the sense-organs lie inactive in a state of sleep ². Both *Śabda* and *Artha* are in reality the manifestation of one and the same Soul, ³ it is only to the grammarian that one gets the designation of *Vacaka* and the other as *Vacya*. *Pratibhā* or intelligence is shaped by *Śabda* and *Artha*. The inseparable connection in which *Śabda* stands to *Artha* also points to their origination from the same source, i.e.,

¹ सोऽयं प्राणिमात्रस्य हृत्स्थं प्रणवस्तुरीयाशोऽधमात्रादपो नादो वा स्फोट इत्युच्यते ।—*Laghumañjusa* p. 390

² शृणोति य इमं स्फोटं सुप्ते श्रोत्रे च शून्यदृक् ।—*Ibid* p. 391

एकस्वेवात्मनो भेदौ शब्दार्थावयवकस्थितौ ।—*Ākṣapadiya*, 2. 31

Buddhi. Durga makes this point clear when he continues to say that *Buddhi* (*Pratibhā*) residing in the heart of all in the form of knowledge (*abhidhāna*) and knowable (*abhidheya*) gets materialised into *Śabda* and *Artha* respectively.¹ Again, it is said that what is denoted by all sentences is nothing but *Pratibhā* (*Pratibhā eva vākyaārthaḥ*). According to Bhartṛhari, it is *mahāsattā* or *mahāsāmānya* (ultimate reality) that is really denoted by all *Śabdas*. It is one and without any division (*vibhāga*) and order (*krama*). To him who has not attained that spiritual vision which enables one to visualise the all-pervading reality, this *mahā-sattā* falsely appears to be manifold, as the objects possessing it are diversified in their external outlook. *Sphoṭa* is identified with this *mahā-sattā*. *Sphoṭa* is the ultimate germ of all word-forms (*Sa hi sarvaśabdāarthaprakṛtiḥ*); words may differ from one another, so far as their external aspect is concerned, but the internal or intellectual one (*Sphoṭa*) remains the same. The *Vaiyākaraṇas* used to look upon *Śabda* as the audible manifestation of Brahman and advocated constant meditation on *Śabda* or *Śabda-Brahman* as a regular form of Yoga that ultimately leads to the emancipation of the Soul (*param Brahmādhigamyate*).

The standpoint wherefrom the grammarians have viewed the ultimate germ of all

¹ श्रीरं चमिधानाभिधेयरूपा बुद्धिर्हृदयान्तर्गताकाशप्रतिष्ठिता.....
Nirukta, p. 47.

speech-sounds is materially different from those of Śaṅkara, Kumārila, Śrīdhara and others. To the grammarians, *Sphoṭa* is sacred and divine, so much so that it is finally identified with Brahman. Notwithstanding all adverse criticisms that have been heaped upon the assumption of an intellectual phenomenon as *Sphoṭa*, the theory of *Sphoṭa*, will continue to survive as embodying the most reasonable and scientific interpretation about the origin of sound.

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CHAPTER V

SENTENCE AND PARTS OF SPEECH

Sentence—its decomposition—Parts of Speech—Prakṛti and Pratyaya—Upasarga and Nipāta.

In accordance with the strict interpretation of the doctrine of *Spṛṣṭa*, as we have observed, the analytical method, though adopted by the grammarians as a cardinal principle, is liable to be regarded as purely artificial. But there is no denying the fact that the grammarians had no other alternative than to take up this process of dissolving sentences and words into their constituent elements, as the only means of getting into the meaning of words. Grammar is not a creation of fancy, nor an artificial combination of rules. Grammar is rather a popular science; the principles on which the structure of grammatical generalisations stand are more or less drawn from popular experiences. That a special rule becomes applicable in preference to a general one,¹ Patañjali observes, is a fact that is neither enjoined by a divine authority nor sanctioned by the authors

¹ नैवेत्यत्र आन्नापयति नापि धर्मसूत्रकाराः पठन्त्यपवादैरुत्सर्गा बाध्यन्तामिति । किं तर्हि ? लौकिकोऽयं दृष्टान्तः । लौकिकोऽपि सत्यपि संभवे बाधनं भवति ।

Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 1. 47.

of the religious texts, but it is a popular example which is perfectly consistent with our daily experience. Both Kātyāyana¹ and Patañjali have repeatedly drawn our attention to the most important point that the study of grammar has for its object the discrimination of correct words. Though corrupt forms are found to be as expressive of sense as their corresponding correct words, it has been stated with all possible emphasis and earnestness that the use of correct words in conformity with the rules of grammar is alone attended with religious felicity.²

Though there are eight different varieties of *Sphota*, as we have already pointed out, it is the *Vākya-Sphota* alone that is held to be real, the rest being more or less artificial.³ From the standpoint of *Sphota*, *Vākya* is not divisible into parts and is the really significant element of speech. Bhartṛhari has the following: Just⁴ as an unreal process like that of analysing words into stems and suffixes is also resorted to for the knowledge of unintelligent people, so a *Vākya*

¹ साधनुशसनेऽस्मिन् यस्य विभाषा तस्य साधुत्वम् ।—*Vār* under the rule Pan, 1 1 44

² लोकोत्तोऽर्थप्रयुक्ते शब्दप्रयोगे शास्त्रेण धर्मनियमः ।—*Vār* 1

शास्त्रपूर्वके प्रयोगेऽभ्युदयस्तत्तुल्य वेदशब्देन ।—*Vār*. 9

समानायामर्थगतौ शब्देन चापशब्देन च धर्मनियमः क्रियते ।—

Mahābhāṣya, Vol I, p 8.

³ वाक्यस्फोटोऽतिनिष्कर्षे तिष्ठतीति मतस्थितिः ।—*Vaiyakaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, Kar 59

⁴ यथा पदे विभज्यन्ते प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादयः । अपोद्धारस्तथा वाक्ये पदानामुपवर्ण्यते । *Vakyapadīya* 2 10 and अपोदधत्येव वाक्येभ्यः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादिवत् ।—*Ibid*, Kar 31.

is broken-up into *Padas* by the grammarians with a view to get into the meaning of words. This *Apoddhāra* or decomposition is the first and foremost business of grammar.

There is much divergence of views regarding the precise nature of a *Vākya*. Bhartrhari has stated as many as eight different views of the ancient grammarians in regard to the constitution of a *Vākya*.¹ These views are summarised as follows:—A *Vākya* is (1) a verbal form; (2) a collection of words; (3) a class; (4) one and individual; (5) an order; (6) an intellectual assimilation; (7) the first *Pada*; (8) all *Padas* differing from one another but having mutual expectancy. Of these only 3, 4 and 6, i.e., class, one and indivisible and intellectual assimilation of meanings are accepted as proper definition of a *Vākya* by those who maintain the indivisibility of a *Vākya*. The rest, on the other hand, are supposed to form the accurate definition of *Vākya* from the standpoint of those who uphold the dissolvability of a *Vākya* (*Padavādins*). Again, the definitions of *Vākya*, as either order or collection of *Padas*, are compatible with the view of the *Abhihitānvayavādins* and those as, verbal form, the first *Pada*, all *Padas* in their different aspects having mutual expectancy, are consistent with the view of the

¹ आख्यातशब्दः सङ्घातो जातिः सङ्घातवर्तिनी । एकोऽनवयवः शब्दः क्रमो वृत्तानुसंहतिः । पदमाद्यं पृथक्सर्वपदं साक्षाद्भवित्यपि । वाक्यं प्रति सतिभिन्ना बहुधा न्यायवादिनाम् ।—*Vākyapadīya*, 2. 1. 2.

Anvitābhīdhānavādīns. A 'Vākya' ¹ is also defined as a combination of words having mutual proximity, expectancy and compatibility. These three characteristics form the mediate causes with regard to the comprehension of the meaning from a sentence. (1) *Expectancy*—An aggregate of words that are not mutually expectant fails to give a connected idea; as, for instance, no consistent meaning is cognisable from such an unconnected group of words, as गौरश्चः पुरुषो हस्ती and घटकर्मत्वस्मनयनं कृतिः and so on. (2) *Proximity* implies that words that are uttered at intervals cannot have any inter-relation amongst them so as to constitute a significant sentence. (3) *Competency* means that we cannot construct a sentence out of words the meanings of which are mutually incompatible (as 'in वङ्गिना सिञ्चति). Jagadīśa ² is not, however, prepared to take these three as direct causes, so far as *Śābda-bodha* or verbal cognition is concerned, because they would tend to place *Śābdabodha* under the category of inference. The Naiyāyikas have, therefore, taken them to be *Sahakārī* (conditions), as opposed to direct causes. Expectancy refers

¹ वाक्यं स्याद योग्यताकाङ्क्षासन्निभ्युतः पदोच्चयः ।—S. Darpaṇa.

नियः साकाङ्क्षशब्दस्य व्यूहो वाक्यं चतुर्विधम् ।—Jagadīśa—*Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, Kār. 12.

² लिङ्गजलेनान्वयबुद्धेरनुमितित्वसिद्धावनायत्या लिङ्गशत्वमेव शब्दधियः खण्डयति ।—योग्यतार्थगताकाङ्क्षा शब्दनिष्ठानुभाविका । प्रत्येकं वा मिलित्वा वा नेते लिङ्गमसिद्धितः ॥—*Śabdaśakti*, Kār. 4.

to the physical side (शब्दनिष्ठा), whereas competency is to be understood as pertaining to the logical side of *Śabda* (अर्थनिष्ठा). We generally find that verbal expectancy is satisfied by words alone.¹ But what is logically correct is that expectancy is also connected with the meaning and not with the form alone, and consequently the expression पदसाक्षाद्भुत् means a *Pada* that is indicative of the meaning having mutual expectancy with that of another. It is sufficiently clear from what Patañjali has said regarding the interpretation of *vyapekṣā* that expectancy really pertains to meanings that are reciprocally expectant. Similarly, competency, as a *Sahakāri-kāraṇa*, is also to be understood as related to the meaning. As the cognition of *import* (तात्पर्य) alone cannot produce *Śābda-bodha* independently of expectancy, etc., Gaṅgeśa recognises the necessity of their help for obtaining the so-called verbal cognition. Proximity,² strictly speaking, is not a cause, it may be so with an unintelligent man, as it tends to help his quick understanding, but in the case of an intelligent man, proximity is not unavoidably necessary for his cognition. *Import* is also recognised to be the meaning of a sentence. Gaṅgeśa³ states clearly that

¹ शब्दी ज्ञानाद्वा शब्देनैव पूर्णते ।

² आसत्तिः शब्दबोधे न कारणम् । सन्दर्भाविलम्बेन बोधे कारणम्, असन्दर्भे तु आसत्ताभावेऽपि बोधो भवतीत्यर्थः (—Mañjūśā, Kuñjika Tīkā.

³ तात्पर्याधीनं शब्दप्रमाणम् ।—Tattvacintāmaṇi, p. 316. (Śabda-khaṇḍa.)

the cognition of *import* is a necessary condition in the matter of verbal knowledge. "This sentence¹ is uttered by the speaker with the explicit desire of expressing this sense"—is the way in which *Tātparya* is generally obtained. But Nāgeśa differs from the Naiyāyikas and does not take *import* as an unavoidable condition for the comprehension of वाक्यार्थ, inasmuch as the meaning of a sentence is also cognisable even without any reference to the particular *import* of the speaker. The cognition of *import* is essential in the case of those words which have more than one meaning, as हरि, सैन्यव, etc. Nāgeśa, however, maintains on the authority of the Mahābhāṣya that it is the knowledge of context (*Prakaraṇa*), propriety and the like that helps us in determining the particular *import* of a word when it happens to have more than one meaning.

The author of the *Vārttika*² defines *Vākya* as a verbal form having conjunction with either an indeclinable, a *Kāraka*, or an adverb, i.e., a verbal form constitutes a sentence in combination with the above adjuncts. Some say,³ as Patañjali observes, that a verbal form with its adjuncts is sufficient to constitute a sentence. It is further suggested that a verbal form alone⁴

¹ इदं वाक्यमेतदर्थप्रतीतीच्छया वक्त्रोच्चारितम् ।—Mañjūś, p. 524.

² आख्यातं साव्ययकारकविशेषणं वाक्यम् ।—Vār. 9 under the rule Pāp.,

2. 1. 1

³ अपर आह—आख्यातं सविशेषणमित्येव ।—*Ibid.*

⁴ एकलिङ् वाक्यम् ।—*Ibid.*

is competent to constitute a *Vākya*. These definitions have made it perfectly clear that a verbal form is the main constituent of a sentence. If we take a verbal form as what constitutes a sentence, the meaning of a *Vākya* will necessarily be *Kriyā* or action (*Kriyā vākyaārthah*). A sentence, in the grammatical sense of the term, cannot be framed without a verb. Jagadīśa does not, however, lend his support to this view. He maintains, on the contrary, that a *Vākya* is a combination of mutually expectant words and does not insist on the presence of a verbal form as the first and foremost condition of a *Vākya*.¹ A verbal form does not, therefore, occupy an important place in Jagadīśa's conception of *Vākya*. His contention is based on the fact that when a combination of words like कुतो भवान्, which does not contain any verbal form, is also found to be clearly expressive of the sense, it is not strictly correct to hold that a *Vākya* without a verb is practically incomprehensible. The grammarians hold the opposite view. According to them, a sentence is not at all possible without a verb. What the soul is to the body, so is the verb to the sentence. Jagadīśa has also rejected Amar Simha's definition of *Vākya*,²—'*Vākya* is a combination of words ending in *sup* and *tin*'—since it is over-lapping as well as incomplete

¹ क्रियारहितं न वाक्यमस्तीत्यादिकस्तु प्राचां प्रवादी निर्युक्तिकत्वादग्रहेयः ।

—*Sabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, *Kār.* 13

² सुप्रतिष्ठन्तचयो नैवमतिव्याप्तादिदीषतः ।—*Sabdaśakti*. *Kār.* 13.

or open to the fallacies of *Ativyāpti* and *Avyāpti*. It is to be particularly noticed that with the Naiyāyikas the form *ghaṭam* is nothing short of a *Vākya*, because it is expressive of the sense घटवृत्तिकर्मत्वम्. The way in which Jagadīśa has defined *Samāsa* makes it clear that the form *nīlam* is as good as a *Vākya* and the form *nīlotpalam* is, consequently, a *Mahā-vākya*. The grammarians cannot do away with the verb, so far as the cognition of a sentence is concerned. As no complete and consistent sense is comprehensible without a verb, the grammarians, as a rule, understand such forms as *asti* and *bhavati* in those cases where verbal forms are not actually present. To the grammarians, the expression कुतो भवान् necessarily implies such a verbal form as *āgacchati* without which neither is the sense complete, nor the proper *Kāraka* (*Apādāna*) determinable.

It is also a difficult problem to decide what is actually denoted by a *Vākya*. There is a great difference of views regarding the meaning of a *Vākya*. Some hold that the meaning of a sentence is the same as what is denoted by its component parts; others maintain that a sentence is expressive of the sense that is virtually different from those that are expressed by its constituents, either individually or collectively. Kumārila has thoroughly discussed these two contradictory views in the *Vākyaadhikaraṇa* of his *Śloka-Vārttika*. The doctrine of the eternality of both *Śabda* and

its relation to meaning, though so seriously supported by the Mīmāṃsakas in the face of much adverse opposition, was not considered to be sufficient to prove the authoritativeness of the Vedas. The validity of the Vedic injunctions, which have come down to us in the form of sentences, was questioned by the opponents on the ground that the meaning of a sentence is distinct from those of its constituents. The Mīmāṃsakas meet this argument by holding that a sentence is practically a combination of consistent words and denotes exactly what is expressed by each word, *i. e.*, the meaning of a sentence represents only a sum-total of the meanings of its constituent parts. There are, so to speak, two views, as held by the two distinct schools of Mīmāṃsā systems, *viz.*, Bhaṭṭa and Guru, in regard to the meaning of a *Vākya*: (1) *Abhihitānvayaavāda*¹—It means, as is implied by the very expression, that *Anvaya* or correlation between the meanings,² as expressed by words through their respective conventions, is what constitutes the significance of a *Vākya*. The special *import* (विलक्षणो बोधः) that is usually brought about by the particular connection of meanings and which does not practically follow from any constituent, is, according to this view,

¹ तात्पर्याद्येऽपि वाक्यार्थ इत्यभिहितान्वयवादिनां मतम् । वाच्य एव वाक्यार्थ इत्यन्विताभिधानवादिनः ।—Kūvyaprakāśa, p. 27.

² शब्दबोधैकपदार्थेऽपरपदार्थस्य सम्बन्धः संसर्गमर्थादया भासते ।

also supposed to be implied by the *Padas* themselves. What is exactly meant is that the signification of a *Vākya* is the same as is denoted by *Padas* making up a sentence ; and (2) *Anvitābhīdhānavāda*—According to this view, *Padas* are first related to one another in a sentence before they can express the consistent meanings, that is to say, the usual meaning is obtained from the particular connection of *Padas*. The grammarians not only tried to prove the indivisibility of a *Vākya*, but also attributed the same property to the meaning of a *Vākya*. Just as there are no parts in a *Vākya*, says Bhartṛhari,¹ so there is no division, so far as the signification of a *Vākya* is concerned. Some hold that the sense expressed by a *Vākya* is प्रतिभा.² To those who, like the *Sphoṭavādins*, maintain the indivisibility of a *Vākya*, the meaning expressed by a *Vākya* is nothing but *Pratibhā* or intuition. It has already been pointed out that the internal consciousness (*caitanya*) reveals itself through the medium of *Śabda* and gets the designation of *abhidheya*. Bhartṛhari has identified *Pratibhā* with the *mahā-sattā* that pervades the whole world of cognition. Though one and indivisible, Bhartṛhari continues, it appears to be manifold owing to the diversified character

¹ शब्दस्य न विभागोऽस्ति कुतोर्यस्य भविष्यति ।—*Vākyapadīya*. इति वाक्यार्थस्यापि निर्विभागत्वं प्रतिपादयति ।—*Puṇyārāja*

² विच्छेदग्रहणेऽर्थानां प्रतिभान्वेव जायते । वाक्यार्थ इति तामाहुः ।

and the *Vākyavādins* hold respectively *Padas* and *Vākya*, as expressive of the sense. The *Padavādins*, in opposition to the other, take *Padas* to be the only real elements of speech, and consider an indivisible unit like *Vākya* as practically incomprehensible. This view does not carry much weight to the grammarians. The falsity of *Padas* (they are made by the grammarians), is clearly brought to light by Puṇyarāja on the strength of an extract from the Mahābhāṣya, where the term *Padakūra*¹ (one who makes *Padas*) has been used as a designation of the grammarian.¹

All words, as a rule, consist of two parts—*Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*. *Prakṛti* is, again, divided into two classes,² namely, *Nāman* and *Dhātu*. The analysis of words into their bases and suffixes is grammatically known as *Samśkāra*; it forms, so to speak, the cardinal principle of Sanskrit grammar. We propose to show the nature of *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* before proceeding to consider the characteristics of *Padas* that go to constitute a sentence.

Whatever may be the intrinsic value of *Sphoṭavāda* from a psychological stand-point, it cannot be denied that the assumption of an indivisible unit as *Sphoṭa* is materially inconsistent with the fundamental principles of grammar.

¹ न लक्षणेन पदकारा अतुवत्ता। पदकारेणैव लक्षणमनुवर्त्यम् । यदा लक्षणे पदं कर्तव्यम् ।—Under the rule आश्रितः कर्ता, Pāṇ., 6. 1. 207.

² निरुक्ता प्रकृतिर्दधा नामधातुप्रभेदतः ।—*Śabdasaṅkṣiptaprakāśikā*, Kar. 14.

Making all words disassociated from a sentence simply unreal and meaningless and giving a stamp of falsity to the whole grammatical method of analysing words into their stems and suffixes, the doctrine of *Spṛṣṭa* is calculated to have shaken the very basis of grammatical speculations.¹ There may be reasons for accepting this doctrine inspite of its rigidity and apparent disagreement with the established method of grammar, but we must frankly admit that the principle of analysis, as adopted by the grammarians, is the only scientific means for getting into the meaning of words.

Turning to the question of analysis of words, it must be stated at the outset that all words or, more properly, *Padas*, consist of two parts, *viz.*, *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*, though such decomposition is not always possible in the case of the so-called underivable *Prātipadikas* generally coming under the *unādi* class. Yāska too has referred to two classes of words, namely, words of which both accents and formative elements are popularly known² and words whereof these elements are not directly comprehensible³ by the usual method of grammatical analysis. The analytical process involved in such grammatical device forms the most important

¹ उपायः शिचमाणानां बालानामपलातनाः । असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा ततः सत्यं समीहते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2. 240.

² समर्थस्वरमंस्कारः ।—Nirukta, p. 154.

³ असमर्थस्वरमंस्कारः ।—Ibid.

function of grammar and is almost the same as adopted by the etymologists (*Nairuktas*) for the determination of the meaning of words. This analysis which is popularly known as *Samskāra* is the criterion whereby the grammarians distinguished the words of pure Sanskrit origin from corrupt forms (*Apabhraṃśas*).

Prakṛti, as the very term implies, is the ultimate germ of speech to which formative elements (*Pratyaya*) are added for the evolution of regular forms of words. An attempt to find out two distinct elements (*Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*) in a word that does not essentially admit of any division, on account of its unity and indivisibility, is more or less fanciful, though not altogether useless, since it helps the understanding of meanings. Bhartṛhari¹ defines *Prakṛti* as that form of a word which, for the purpose of its own signification being qualified by that of the other, stands in need of certain forms immediately following it. Of these two mutually expectant forms, the former is called *Prakṛti* and the latter as *Pratyaya*. *Pratyaya*, as Umāpati² observes, is said to be, on the other hand, that form of a word the meaning of which cannot be shown to have any relation with that of the other without being conditioned by the significance of the word to which it is added.

¹ यः स्वेतरस्य यस्यायै स्वार्यन्यान्वयबोधने । यदपेक्षस्तयोः पूर्वा प्रकृतिः प्रत्ययः परः ॥—*Sabdaśakti* under *kār*, 9.

² स्वेतरार्यानिवच्छिन्नस्वार्यस्यान्वयबोधने । योऽसंमर्थः सैषशब्दः प्रत्ययोऽयं चतुर्विधः ॥—*Ibid*.

Jagadīśa has, however, rejected both these definitions as insufficient. He takes both *Prakṛti*¹ and *Pratyaya* to be significant by themselves (*Sārthaka*), but does not fail to notice their mutual dependence. The relation in which *Prakṛti* stands to *Pratyaya* is one of interdependence, for neither of them is individually competent to express its own meaning, without having invariable association with the other. On the ground of such mutual dependence, it is contended that these elements taken individually have no particular signification of their own. As a matter of fact, if they had meanings, when taken individually, each of them might have been used independently of the other.² But it is far from being the case. No meaning is, strictly speaking, conveyed by the word *gau* when it is not associated with or followed by *Pratyaya*. Moreover, *Prakṛti*³ and *Pratyaya* being connected with each other by inseparable relation, it is not grammatically correct to use them independently. Grammar does not sanction the independent use of either *Prakṛti* or *Pratyaya*. This is the train of arguments whereby Patañjali seeks to establish that a word has no parts (such as *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*), because

¹ षट्-पाचकायाः प्रकृतयः, सुप्तिङाद्याः प्रत्ययाः स्त्रीपस्याप्याद्यस्य बोधं नियमतः शब्दानां सहकृत्य जनयन्ति ।—Śabdaśakti under *Kārikā*, 6

² अर्थवत्ता नोपपद्यते केवलेनावचनात् ।—Vār. 7. Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 219.

³ नित्यसम्बन्धावैतावर्थी प्रकृतिः प्रत्यय इति ।—Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 2. 45.

meaning is conveyed by the word as an indivisible whole.¹ How, then, are we justified in discussing the meaning of *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*, as two distinct elements constituting a word? Here Patañjali takes recourse to the logical method of *agreement and difference*² and clearly indicates how both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*, as is evidenced by such forms as *vṛkṣaḥ* and *vṛkṣau*, may be shown to have separate meanings of their own. The base that remains almost unchanged denotes a thing having stem, branches, leaves, fruits, etc., and the suffixes signifying respectively singularity and duality. In a group of homogeneous words, as in the above examples, we find that the stem remains more or less constant but suffixes are only variant, whereas in *pacati* and *gacchati* the suffix is the same, it is *Prakṛti* that is only different. Sometimes the change of *Pratyaya* brings about a change in the meaning of words (as in *hariḥ* and *haraḥ*) derived from the same origin.

Bhartrhari has tried to show that the discrimination of *Padas* and the comprehension of their exact meanings are, strictly speaking, far from being real. There is of course no fixed principle so as to precisely determine the

¹ समुदायमार्थे प्रयोगादवयवानामप्रसिद्धिः ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol I, p. 219.

² Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 2. 45

Bhartrhari:—ये शब्दाः नित्यसम्बन्धा विवेके ज्ञातशक्तयः । अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां तेषामर्थो विभज्यते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2. 168.

meaning of *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*. We cannot¹ definitely say, 'this much is denoted by *Prakṛti*, and this is exactly the meaning of *Pratyaya*.' In grammar,² as a matter of fact, we meet with instances where the basic element does not sometimes actually exist, but its meaning is usually denoted by *Pratyaya* (as in *iyān*) and sometimes *Prakṛti* is found, on the contrary, to be expressive of the sense of *Pratyaya* (as in *ahan*). He continues further that in an instance like *pacanti* what is denoted (कर्तृत्व) by the two different suffixes³ (*vikarāṇa*—श्प् and तिङ्) is generally expressed by one suffix (that is, तिप् only) in the case of अत्ति (where *śap* is necessarily dropped). As to the method followed by the grammarians, Bhartr̥hari rightly observes that there is rather an absence of fixed rules regarding the process of determining the significance of both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*,⁴ because systems of grammar have no agreement amongst themselves so far as the meaning of *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* is concerned. The systems

¹ ननु यदा शब्दा नित्यसम्बन्धा विवेकेन ज्ञातशक्तयः स्वार्थस्य प्रतीतौ तदा कथमेतदवगतमयं प्रकृत्यर्थोऽयं प्रत्ययार्थ इत्याशङ्क्यापोद्धारस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकौ निमित्तमिति ।—Punyarāja under the Vākya., *kār.*, 2. 167.

² शास्त्रे क्वचित् प्रकृत्यर्थः प्रत्ययेनाभिधीयते । प्रकृतौ विनिवृत्तायां प्रत्ययार्थश्च धातुभिः ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2. 231.

³ यमर्थमाह तुभिर्नौ प्रत्ययावेक एव तम् । क्वचिदाह पचन्तीति धातुस्ताभ्यां विना क्वचित् ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2. 232.

⁴ नास्तेष्व नैयत्वं पदपदार्थानाम्—अन्वाख्यानसृती ये च प्रत्ययार्थानिबन्धनम् ।

निर्दिष्टार्थप्रकृत्यर्थः स्मृत्यन्तर उदाहृताः ॥

—Vākyapadīya, 2. 233.

of grammar, though they practically deal with the same subject, are so variant from one another in respect of nomenclatures and the method of treatment that what are shown to be the meaning of *Pratyaya* in one system are taken to be the significance of *Prakṛti* in the other. Notwithstanding such examples, as shown above, we should carefully bear in mind that the meaning of a word is really expressed by both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* in their natural but grammatical combination.

Though different views are held as to the significance of *Nipātas*, there is, however, no divergence regarding the expressiveness of *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*. The two well-known divisions of *Prakṛti*, namely, *Dhātu* and *Prātipadika*, have their meanings fixed by popular usages. Patañjali prefers to designate *Prakṛti* as *nimitta* in relation to *Pratyaya* which is called *nimittī*. What he intends to imply is that the meanings of *Prakṛti* (as are to be found in the *Dhātu-pāṭha* and *Prātipadika-pāṭha*) are more or less known, whereas those of *Pratyaya* are not exhaustively found. Though he unconditionally admits that the whole word (as an aggregate of both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*) is alone capable of denoting the sense, Patañjali shows clearly how by the application of the logical method of *agreement* and *difference*, *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*, as in वृत्तः and वृत्तौ, may be distinctly specified as having their separate meanings. The terms *Prakṛti*

and *Pratyaya* are treated in grammar as two technical words—the shortest name for a class.¹ The rule प्रत्ययः, Pāṇ. 3. 1. 1, is explained by Patañjali as an *adhikāra-sūtra* denoting a *Samjñā*. He contends further that by virtue of *adhikāra* this *samjñā* may apply to *Prakṛti*, *Upapada*, and *Upādhi* and consequently they may have all grammatical operations usually pertaining to *Pratyaya*.² There arises, therefore, the necessity of making certain restrictions. Moreover, he explains the word *Pratyaya* in two ways,³ as what either expresses the meaning, or is comprehended. He then proceeds to show how to distinguish *Prakṛti* from *Pratyaya*; ⁴ the former, it is said, is entirely comprehensible by the enumeration of roots and *Prātipadikas*, while the latter is not capable of being known exhaustively. There is another way also to bring out this distinction. *Pratyaya* is said to be more important (superior) than *Prakṛti*,⁵ its superiority or importance being due to the fact that *Pratyaya* as a class is nowhere enumerated (as significant forms of speech) except in grammar. We should not fail to notice

¹ संज्ञा च नाम यतो न लघीयः ।—M. B., Vol. II, p. 3.

² अधिकारिण्येयं प्रत्ययसंज्ञा । सा प्रकृत्युपपदोपाधीनामपि प्राप्नोति ।

Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 3. 1. 1.

³ प्रत्याययतीति प्रत्ययः ।...प्रत्याय्यते प्रत्यय इति । कट्साधनः कर्मसाधनश्च ।

—Ibid.

⁴ इह च प्रत्ययोऽनिर्ज्ञातः, प्रकृत्युपपदोपाधयो निर्ज्ञाताः । क ? धातूपदेशे प्रातिपदिकोपदेशे च ।—Ibid.

⁵ प्रधाने कार्यसंप्रत्ययाद्वा सिद्धम्—Vār. 3. किञ्च प्रधानं प्रत्ययः ।—Ibid.

here that *Pratyayas* like *sup* and *tin* are not mentioned separately with their respective meanings, whereas roots and *Prātīpadikas* (as two divisions of *Prakṛti*) are to be found respectively in the *Dhātupāṭha* and in the enunciation of *Prātīpadikas*. This view which assigns greater importance to *Pratyaya* is based on a *Paribhāṣā*.¹ The above explanation of *Pratyaya* may serve the purpose of excluding *Prakṛti*, *Upapada* and *Upādhi* from the category of *Pratyaya*, but what still demands solution is to differentiate *modification* and *augment* (विकारागमाः) from *Pratyaya*² as such. A careful study of the formation of words makes it sufficiently clear that *modifications* and *augments* (as they appertain to both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*) seem to have all the qualifications of *Pratyaya*, though they are not practically treated as such by the grammarians. The *modification* and *augment* might be included in the same class with *Pratyaya*, inasmuch as both of them are wanting in original enunciation prior to their treatment in grammar. It will not suffice to say, as Kaiyaṣa³ explicitly remarks, that

¹ प्रधानाप्रधानयोः प्रधाने कार्यसप्रत्ययः । किं च प्रधानं प्रत्ययः ।—M B under the rule Pāṇ , 3 1 1

² विकारागमेषु च परविधानात्—Vār 4 M B , Vol II, p 2 प्रत्यय परो भवतीत्युच्यते न च विकारागमा परे संभवन्ति ।—*Ibid*

³ य पर स प्रत्यय न च विकारागमा परे । तेन तेषां प्रत्ययसंज्ञा न भविष्यतीत्येव न व्याख्येयम् । न हि परत्वनिमित्ता प्रत्ययसंज्ञा, अपि तु प्रत्ययसंज्ञानिमित्त परत्वम् । तथा च परत्वाभावेऽपि बहुवचनार्था प्रत्ययसंज्ञा भवति । तस्यादेव व्याख्यायते—प्रयोजनाभावात् विकारागमानां प्रत्ययसंज्ञा न भवति । तथा हि परविधानं प्रत्यय संज्ञाफलम् ।—Kaiyaṣa on the Bhāṣya under Pāṇ , 3 1 1.

Pratyaya has its position fixed, *viz.*, it comes invariably after *Prakṛti*, while there is no such fixity of position with regard to *modifications* and *augments*. But what is grammatically sanctioned is that प्रत्ययसंज्ञा does not really depend upon the posteriority of position, because *bahuc* and *akac*, inspite of their irregular positions, are also included within the category of *Pratyaya*. Again, forms like *nibha*, *saṃkāśa*, etc., though used after *Prātipadikas* in the sense of similarity, are not grammatically regarded as *Pratyaya*.¹ It must be noted here that the suffixes like *bahuc* and *akac* form irregular instances, so far as the position of *Pratyaya* is concerned. The difference is then shown by a reference to the construction of the *Sūtras*. The *Sūtras* enjoining *modifications* and *augments* are generally found to have षष्ठी as what determines them, whereas *Pratyaya* is enjoined by the *Sūtras* containing पञ्चमी. There is another criterion to distinguish *Pratyaya* from both *modifications* and *augments*. *Pratyaya*, as the very term implies, is significant, though the so-called स्वार्यिकप्रत्यय like *ka* forms an exception, *viz.*, it has apparently no meaning apart from that of *Prakṛti* to which it is added. The *modifications* and *augments*, on the other hand, have got no signification at all.

It is quite evident that a word, taken as an indivisible whole, is what expresses the intended sense. This is the conclusion Patañjali has

¹ तिङर्थेऽस्य निभाष्यन्तः स वा प्रत्यय उच्यते ।—Śabdaśakti, Kār. 10.

arrived at. If this be the general principle that regulates the use of words, how can we logically say 'this much is the meaning of *Prakṛti*,'¹ and 'this is the meaning of *Pratyaya*?' Patañjali meets this position by referring to the method of *agreement* and *difference*² whereby the distinct meanings of both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* are generally comprehended.

The question does not come to an end here. It is further argued that instead of assigning meanings to both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*, 'it is better to hold either *Prakṛti* or *Pratyaya* alone as expressive of both the meanings; or *Prakṛti* may be supposed to be the only significant form and *Pratyaya* only indicative (*dyotaka*). This is true, Patañjali observes, so far as *Sāmānya-Śabda*, viz., word denoting a class, is concerned. It must be remembered that without reference to either context or special sense, *Sāmānya-Śabda*, as a rule, cannot express the particular meaning. But when we say *vrkṣaḥ*, what we find is that a particular sense is naturally implied. We are, therefore, bound to admit that these are not *Sāmānya-Śabda*. Now what deserves our attention is that in a word both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* have their respective meanings consistently related to each

¹ तत्र कुत एतदयं प्रकृत्यर्थोऽयं प्रत्ययार्थ इति ? न पुनः प्रकृतिरिवोभावार्थं ब्रूयात् प्रत्यय एव वा ।—Mahabhbhāṣya under the rule *Paṇ*, 1. 2 45

² चिह्नं स्वत्वव्यतिरेकाभ्याम् ।—*Vār.* 9. Mahabhbhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 219.

other so as to express one indivisible sense. The base, as Patañjali has shown, and the suffix in the word *vrkṣaḥ* means respectively (1) a material body containing roots, stem, branches, leaves, etc., and (2) oneness or singularity. Elsewhere it is said that oneness as well as *karmatva*, etc., are the meanings of the case-endings.¹

There is another difficulty with regard to the meaning of *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*. As systems of grammar have no agreement so far as the meaning of *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* is concerned, one finds it difficult to determine the meaning of them with a degree of certainty. What is said to be the meaning of a *Pratyaya* in one system of grammar is taken to be the meaning of *Prakṛti* in the other.² This is why the *Sphoṭavādins* have rejected both *Padas* and *Padārthas* as unreal. There is nothing, Bhartr̥hari argues, as *Pada* fixed by its very form,³ and no meaning follows from a *Pada*, but from a sentence. A *Pada*, in its grammatical sense, has no real existence apart from the sentence of which it forms an integral part. How, then, are we to justify the principle of grammar which treats of such unreal things as *Padas*? Bhartr̥hari continues that *Śāstras*

¹ एकत्वादयो विभक्त्यर्थाः । सुपां कर्मादयोऽप्यर्थाः ।—M. B., Vol. II, p. 58.

² ये कश्चिद्विद व्याकरणे प्रत्ययार्थत्वेनोक्तास्तेऽन्यत्र प्रकृत्यर्थत्वेनोक्ताः । तस्मात् पदपदार्थादिसत्यमेव । शास्त्रमप्यसङ्गुत्पादकमेव ।—Mañjūśā, p. 409.

³ न हि किञ्चित् पदं नाम रूपेण नियतं क्वचित् ।—Vākyapadīya.

(grammar) by their diversified methods and procedures only serve to exhibit *Avidyā* or false impressions.¹ It must be, however, admitted that the method adopted by the grammarians in the analysis of words, whether real or unreal from the standpoint of *Sphoṭarūda*, is not only scientifically perfect but immensely helpful to the beginner. Though dealing with words that are unreal and transient, the science of grammar, as we have already seen, does not fail to serve a very useful purpose. Just as one is liable to pass through many unreal phenomena in which he is born, before he reaches the final goal or reality, so the grammarian starts with a false appearance as *Padas* and is ultimately qualified to have a glance into the mystical element of *Vāk*, we mean *Śabda-Brahman*, by unveiling the screen of ignorance.²

Upasargas and *Nipūtas* or Prepositions and Particles are, as we have seen, enumerated by Yāska³ in the list of *Parts of Speech*. Their linguistic aspects, with reference to their possibility of having been once used as regular forms of words, have been discussed in the Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus. Now we propose to deal with the grammatical side of the question. We do not find any difficulty in ascertaining the meaning of *Nāmans* and *Dhātus*, but it

¹ शब्देषु प्रक्रियामिदं विद्यते बोधवर्थेति ।—*Ibid*

² असत्ये वर्तमानि स्थित्वा ततः सत्यं समीहते ।—*Vākya* 3 239.

³ चत्वारि पदजातानि नामाख्याते औपसर्गनिपाताय ।—*Nirukta*, I. 1.

is more or less a matter of doubt¹ whether *Upasargas* and *Nipātas* have the power of expressing the intended meaning in the strict sense of the term. To determine the precise significance of these two classes of parts of speech is a difficult problem over which the grammarians and the Naiyāyikas seem to have been conflicting.

The definition of *Upasarga*, as given by Śākatāyana, purports to show that *Upasargas* have 'no meanings when they are dissociated from verbal forms.'² What follows necessarily from this statement is that they are not significant by themselves. The view of such a grammarian of revered memory seems to have received approval of Yāska and later grammarians. The indicativeness (*dyōtakatva*) of *Upasargas*, as opposed to their direct expressiveness (*vācakatva*); is clearly pointed out by Yāska³ when he lays down in agreement with the grammarians⁴ that *Upasargas* are far from being expressive of sense, but serve only to qualify or specialise the meaning of *Dhātus*. *Dhātus* are said to be of various meanings. The meaning which we generally assign to *Upasargas* is really denoted by the root itself. The additional sense (as that of *perfection* in an instance like

¹ चतुर्विधपदेष्वत्र द्विविधस्यार्थनिर्णयः । क्रियते संग्रहोत्पत्तौ नोपसर्ग-
निपातयोः ॥—Quoted by Durga.

² न निर्वह्ना उपसर्गा अर्थान्निराहुरिति शाकटायनः ।—Nirukta, 1. 3., p. 57.

³ नामाख्यातयोस्तु कर्मोपसंयोगोक्तका भवन्ति ।—*Ibid.*

⁴ क्रियाविशेषक उपसर्गः—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 256.

prabhavati) which is usually assigned to *Upasargas* is said to be expressed by *Dhātus* themselves. Gārgya, on the other hand, emphatically supports the opposite view and clearly shows how various meanings are often expressed by *Upasargas*.¹ It is no wonder that Gārgya, who is said to have assigned meanings to each individual letter that enters into the constitution of a word, would differ from the majority of the grammarians in making all *Upasargas* expressive of particular meanings. Whatever be the real value of Gārgya's arguments, we cannot help admitting that his standpoint, though finally rejected by the grammarians, is not absolutely unreasonable. The way in which *bhavati* differs from *prabhavati* and *tiṣṭhati* from *pratiṣṭhate* (stoppage of motion and motion being respectively meant) in their respective meanings is calculated to show how roots like *bhū* and *sthū* in their pure and compounded forms are distinctly different in respect of meanings. The method of *agreement* and *difference*, when applied to such cases, makes it sufficiently clear that the additional sense, as is obtained from the use of roots combined with *Upasarga*, is due to the presence of *Upasarga*, that is to say, the special meaning is directly implied by *Upasargas*. We meet with many instances of verbal forms to which the addition of *Upasargas* materially changes the meaning

¹ उदाववाः पदार्था भवन्तीति गार्ग्यः ।—Nirukta, 1 3, p. 57.

of roots—a fact which may be adduced to confirm the position taken by Gārgya. This is the reason which led Gārgya and his followers to maintain the expressiveness of *Upasargas*.

Those who, on the contrary, advocate the indicativeness, argue in the following strain : *Upasargas* have no specific meanings of their own apart from those of roots to which they are added ; the additional or special signification that is apparently given rise to by the presence of an *Upasarga* is, strictly speaking, denoted by the root itself. *Upasargas* serve only as a symbol of indication. That *Upasargas* are merely suggestive and not expressive of sense is best illustrated by the expression उपास्येते हरिहरौ. *Upāsana* or worship cannot be taken as the sense of *Upasarga* (*upa*), for in that case there could be no passive voice in उपास्येते, as the root *ās* is intransitive. Neither is it possible to consider a combination of *anu* and *bhū* as a root, because it is not so mentioned in the *Dhātupāṭha* ; nor the process of reduplication and the addition of augment (*a* and *ā*) affect *Upasargas* at all. The verbal roots are said to have various meanings. Those that are given in the *Dhātupāṭha* are not at all exhaustive, but in most of the cases they are simply indicative. For the verbal form *bhabati* in 'यागात् स्वर्गो भवति' is found to imply *production* instead of denoting simply *becoming*. Thus, the meaning usually expressed by सोपसर्गधातु, such as *anubhavati*, *parābhavati*, *abhibhavati*, etc., are all

capable of being denoted by the simple root *bhū*. What useful purpose is, then, served by *Upasargas*, if they have nothing to signify? Their function, so to speak, is to manifest or give prominence to the latent meanings of roots (which are not ordinarily expressed when the root is simply used). The analogy of a lamp, as shown by Durga,¹ is a well-conceived one, for it illustrates the part played by *Upasargas* in the comprehension of meanings. Just as certain properties (as height, length, etc.) belonging to a thing are rendered visible through the instrumentality of a lamp, and those properties, as a matter of fact, appertain to the thing itself and not to the lamp, even so the addition of *Upasargas* serves to bring out the meaning of roots. The particular sense, usually assigned to *Upasargas*, is essentially what is expressed by the root itself.

Patañjali² explains the *Upasarga* as what particularises the action; the verbal form *pacati*, for instance, implies the action, *viz.*, cooking, and when *pra* is prefixed to it, it serves only to qualify the action, adding the special sense of *perfection* (प्रकर्षः) to the meaning of the root. He did not, however, fail to notice that in instances like *tiṣṭhati* and *pratisthate* the addition of an *Upasarga* materially changes the meaning

¹ यथा प्रदीपसंयोगे द्रव्यस्य गुणविशेषोऽभिव्यज्यमानो द्रव्याय एव भवति न प्रदीपायः।—Nirukta, p. 59.

² क्रियाविशेषक उपसर्गः।—Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ., 1.3.1. पचतीति क्रिया गम्यते तां प्री विशिष्टि।

of the root. What follows from this is that it is the presence of *pra* that causes such changes in the meaning (e.g., 'stoppage of motion' and 'motion'). The above is an instance in which there is apparent opposition between the meanings of *Dhātu* and *Upasarga*. The *Kārikā*, as quoted by Puṇyarāja,¹ clearly brings out the characteristics of *Upasargas*, as will be evident from the substance given below : Sometimes the so-called denotation of *Upasargas*, as in the above instance, seems to be in opposition with the meaning of *Dhātus* ; some follow the meaning of the root without any disagreement, and some only serve to specialise the signification of the root. Having recourse to the theory that a verbal root admits of more than one meaning,² Patañjali lays down clearly that *Upasargas* have no direct expressiveness (like *Nāmans* and *Dhātus*) and that their supposed meanings, as perfection, proximity etc., are, strictly speaking, derivable from the root. Accordingly, *tiṣṭhati* alone (without having connection with any *Upasarga*) is capable of denoting both motion as well as stoppage of motion.³

Bhartrhari is not satisfied with the remark that *Upasargas* are only suggestive, but

¹ धात्वर्थं बाधते कश्चित् कश्चित्तमनुवर्तते । तमेव विशिनध्यन्य उपसर्गगतिसिद्धा ॥

² बह्वर्था अपि धातवो भवन्ति ।—M. B. under Pāṇ., 1. 3. 1.

³ तिष्ठतिरेव व्रजिक्रियासाह, तिष्ठतिरेव गतिक्रियाया निवृत्तिम् ।—Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ., 1. 3. 1.

has discussed all possible standpoints wherefrom *Upasargas* might be viewed. It is not sufficient, he holds,¹ to take *Upasargas* only as suggestive, because some of them, as *pra* in *pratiṣṭhate*, seems to be quite good in expressing the sense. Again, when the special meaning is practically expressed by the root and *Upasarga* in their combination,² it is not unlikely that *Upasargas* also have their contribution, so far as the expression of the intended sense is concerned. Thus, we find that *Upasargas* may be viewed from three different standpoints, namely, *vācaka* or expressive, *dyotaka* or suggestive and *sahakāri* or auxiliary ; these three correspond to the three classes, as shown in the *Kārikā* referred to above.

So far as grammatical operations are concerned, *Dhātus* are generally found to be categorically distinct from *Upasargas*. In the *Dhātupāṭha* mention is only made of roots and not of *Upasargas*. Again, the process of reduplication (*dvirvacana*) and the augment *aṭ* (*adāgama*) are functions that pertain to a *Dhātu* alone. Bhartṛhari³ here supports the non-difference of verbal forms (*abheda-pakṣa*)

¹ स वाचको विशेषाणां सम्भवाद्गोतकोऽपि वा । श्रुत्याधानाय धातोर्वा सहकारौ प्रयुज्यते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2 190

² धातूपसर्गां सम्भूयैवार्थविशेषं ब्रूत इति धातोर्वाभिधाने सहकारिण उपसर्गाः ।—Puṣyarāja under Vākyapadīya, Kār. 2. 161.

³ अडादौना व्यवस्थार्थं पृथक्केन विकल्पनम् ।—Vākyapadīya, 2, p. 153. Puṣyarāja under it—अडदिवचनव्यवस्थार्थं केवलं धातवः पृथगुपदिष्टा वस्तुतः सोपसर्गाणामिव धातुत्वम् ।

and maintains that *Dhātus*, though not capable of being differentiated from *Upasargas*, are separately mentioned only for the sake of *reduplication* and *aḍāgama*, but they are virtually expressive of the specific sense which is sometimes assigned to *Upasargas*. By *Dhātu* we should, therefore, understand *Dhātu* with the necessary *Upasarga* (*Sopasargāṇāmeva dhātu-tvam*). This view is strengthened by the existence of such root as *saṃgrām*,¹ which is inseparably united with (*Upasarga*)-*saṃ* and gets both reduplication and *aḍāgama*, as in *asaṃgrāmayat* and *sisaṃgrāmayiṣate*. The particular action, according to this view, is denoted by the combination of *Dhātu* and *Upasarga*. Their undifferentiated character is made clearer when Bhartṛhari continues that it is the specialised action (*Kriyā-viśeṣa*), as is signified by a *Dhātu* jointly with an *Upasarga*, that gets itself connected with a *Kāraka*.² This is why the root *bhū*, preceded by *anu*, becomes transitive and is capable of being used in the passive voice (*karma-vācya*) as *anubhūyate*.

There arises a considerable difficulty in deciding whether a root is first joined with an *Upasarga* and is afterwards associated with *Kāraḥ* or *vice versa*. The conjunction of

¹ तथा हि सङ्ग्रामयतेः सोपसर्गाद्विधिः स्मृतः ।
क्रियाविशेषाः संघातैः प्रक्रम्यन्ते तथाविधाः ॥

—Vākyapadiya, 2, p. 154.

² साधनेर्याति सन्बन्धं तथाभूतेव सा क्रिया ।—*Ibid*.

Upasargas with roots is a question of grammatical importance. Under the rule Pāṇ., 6. 1. 135, Patañjali has referred to two *Paribhāṣās*: (i) a root is first joined with an *Upasarga* and then gets itself connected with *Sādhana* (*Kāraka*); (ii) a root is first added to a *Sādhana* and is next related to an *Upasarga*.¹ The second *Paribhāṣā* seems to be more acceptable on the ground that an *Upasarga* serves to specify the action that is accomplished by *Sādhana*. The action is not fully accomplished until it is related to a *Kāraka*. Though more reasonable than the former, the second view is not entirely free from objections. Those who lend support to the view, Patañjali holds, that a *Dhātu* is first connected with a *Kāraka* and then with an *Upasarga*, will find some difficulty in explaining the transitive use of the root *ās* in the expression *upāsyate guruḥ*.² It is really the presence of *Upasargas* like *upa*, *anu* and the like that accounts for such uses. Bhartṛhari also has not totally discarded the first view, but has adduced a few arguments supporting the priority of relation between a *Dhātu* and an *Upasarga*. The drift of his arguments is as follows :³—A *Dhātu*

¹ पूर्वं हि धातुरपसर्गेण युज्यते पर्यात् साधनेनेति । नैतत् सारम् । पूर्वं धातुः साधनेन युज्यते पर्यादुपसर्गेण ।—*Maṭābhāṣya*, Vol. III, p. 93.

² यो हि मन्यते पूर्वं धातुः साधनेन युज्यते पर्यादुपसर्गेणिति, तस्य चाप्यते शर्कृत्यकर्मक उपपत्त्यते गुरुरिति केन सकर्मकः स्यात् ।—*Maṭābhāṣya*, Vol. III, p. 94.

³ धातोः साधनयोग्यस्य भाविनः प्रक्रमाद् यथा । धातुत्वं कर्मभावश्च तथान्य-दपि दृश्यताम् ॥—*Vākyapadīya*, 2. Kār. 186.

is so called because of its relation to a *Kāraṇa*. But how is it justifiable to get the designation as such (*Dhātu-samjñā*) before the action (*kriyā*) is completed by actual connection with a *Kāraṇa*? The action (the meaning of a root) is not likely to be accomplished before it is related to a *Kāraṇa*. In order to justify *Dhātu-samjñā* in a similar case where the root gets itself first connected with an *Upasarga* before actually coming in touch with a *Kāraṇa*, we must be prepared to assume that even the possibility of having future relation to a *Kāraṇa* is considered to be sufficient to indicate the relation of *Kriyā* to *Kāraṇas*. This sort of assumption is not altogether unwarranted and rare in Sanskrit grammar. The rule *Dhātoḥ karmanāḥ samāna-karṭṛkādicchāyām vā* is an instance where the expression *Dhātoḥ karmanāḥ* is justified on the possibility of a root having future connection with the objective case (of the root *iṣ*). The grammarians take it to be an established fact that roots admit of more than one meaning. The special meaning (as is supposed to be the denotation of *Upasargas*) is necessarily considered to be what is actually denoted by the root itself.

Having shown the three distinct classes of *Upasargas*, Bhartṛhari proceeds to maintain the suggestiveness of *Upasargas* (*dyotakatva*) on the ground of logical inference.¹ The three views

¹ स्यादिभिः केवलैश्च गमनादि तु गम्यते । तत्रानुमानाद्विविधात्तद्वर्मा प्रादिरुच्यते ॥—*Vākyapāṇīya*, 2. 191.

in regard to the meaning of *Upasargas* are as follows : (1) *Upasargas* are only suggestive of the sense ; (2) *Upasargas* are sometimes expressive of particular meanings ; and (3) the root and *Upasargas* jointly express the sense. The conclusion to which Bhartṛhari has finally come is that *Upasargas* are only suggestive of the sense. According to popular usage, it should be remembered, the form *tiṣṭhati* is always used to mean stoppage of motion and, consequently, *tiṣṭhati* alone (without *pra*) is found to be incapable of denoting 'movement.' Here arises the necessity of taking recourse to inference.¹ It is to get rid of this anomalous position that the grammarians have sought to establish the dictum *anekūrthāḥ dhātavaḥ*, so as to render *tiṣṭhati* alone competent to express the sense of movement. It is to be noted that the so-called suggestiveness of *Upasargas* can also be logically supported. Bhartṛhari proceeds further to show how the method of logical inference called सामान्यतोदृष्ट² lends support to both the suggestiveness of *Upasargas* as well as to the plurality of meanings of the verbal root.

Before concluding this discourse on *Upasargas*, we propose to give here the substance of what Gaṅgeśa has said in this connection. Quite in keeping with the grammarians, he begins with the statement that *Upasargas* are

¹ धातुरनेकार्थं सप्तसर्गस्य द्योतक इत्यनुमानेन व्यवस्थाप्यते ।—Panyarāja, p. 158.

² धातुस्य सामान्यतोदृष्टेनानुमानेनानेकार्थः ।—*Ibid.*

only suggestive¹ and not expressive of the sense independently of verbal forms. When we take *Upasargas* to be suggestive, what is necessarily implied is that they help us in understanding the specific sense of the root. But it may be argued on the contrary that *Upasargas* are, in accordance with the principle of agreement and difference,² as good as significant forms of words like *Nāman* and *Dhātu*, inasmuch as *pra* in *prajayati* gives the idea of perfection (*prakarṣa*) and 'abhi' in *abhyāgacchati* brings out the sense of 'proximity' and so on. Moreover, if the plurality of meanings on the part of roots is brought forward in support of the suggestiveness of *Upasargas*, they, it may be argued, might also be taken as possessing manifold meaning.³ To these contentions Gaṅgeśa gives his answer in the following way:—That roots admit of numerous meanings is accepted by all grammarians, but there is no such consensus of views so far as the meaning of *Upasargas* is concerned. The sense of *perfection* and *proximity* is also denoted by the root, *Upasargas* like *pra* and *abhi* being only तात्पर्यग्राहक. The expression तात्पर्यग्राहक, as applied to *Upasargas*, is

¹ उपसर्गास्तु द्योतकाः न वाचकाः । द्योतकत्वं च धातोरर्थविशेषे तात्पर्यग्राहकत्वं तदुपसन्दानेन तत्र शक्तिर्वा ।—Tattvacintāmaṇi—Śabdakhaṇḍa, p. 854.

² उपसर्गान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानात् पदान्तरवदत्रापि शक्तिः ।—Tattvacintāmaṇi, p. 854.

³ धातोरिव तस्याप्यनेकार्थत्वात् ।—Ibid.

an indication that the Naiyāyikas have recourse to *lakṣanā*¹ when they take *jayati* to be expressive of 'to be in a state of perfection.' Next, he draws a fine distinction between *Dhātu* and *Upasarga* by holding that the root *sthā* preceded by *pra* has the power of denoting movement, whereas *pra* (*Upasarga*) is not (*śakta*) expressive of the sense by itself but appears like an adjunct (*śaktatāvacchedaka*).² That *Upasargas* are nowhere used as *vācaka* may be further proved with reference to an instance like *vyatise*³ (where the radical element is dropped); it is not *ri* and *ati* that are to be regarded as expressive of the sense, but we are compelled to recall to mind the root which is really significant.

Thus the grammarians have agreement with the Naiyāyikas so far as the suggestiveness of *Upasargas* is concerned. That *Upasargas* have no power of expressing the sense like *Nāman* and *Dhātu* is clear from the fact that we are not allowed to use शोभनः प्रः with the same breadth of meaning as is denoted by the expression शोभनः प्रकपः. Moreover, neither *Upasargas* nor *Nipātas* are capable of being qualified by adjectives. It should be, however, remembered that the capacity for independent use is not the only criterion for discriminating the

¹ प्रतिष्ठ । इत्यत्र विरोधिलक्षणाया धातोर्गमनोपस्थितिः प्रशब्दस्तु तात्पर्यवाचकः ।

—Tattvacintāmaṇi, p. 856

² शोभनस्थलेन गमने शक्तिरिति प्र शब्द शक्तावच्छेदको न शक्तः ।—*Ibid.*

³ 'व्यतिसे' इत्यादौ लुप्तः स्मृतो धातुरेवार्थप्रत्याक्षकः ।—*Ibid.*, p. 857.

expressiveness of words; for *Pratyayas*,¹ though they are never used by themselves, are regarded to be expressive of sense. The rule Pāṇ., 1.4.93 may be cited as an indication of the meaninglessness of *Upasargas*.

What gave rise to much controversy² between the Naiyāyikas and the grammarians³ is the question of *Nipātas*. The ground of disagreement is that the Naiyāyikas seem to have drawn a specific line of demarcation between *Upasargas* and *Nipātas*. They included *Nipātas* in the category of *sārthaka*⁴ to the exclusion of *Upasargas*, whereas the grammarians have not made such whimsical distinction. Yāska⁵ has, however, shown that *Nipātas* have a good many meanings—similarity, collection, etc. According to the interpretation of grammar,⁵ *Upasargas* form only a special class of *Nipātas* having connection with the verb. As both of them belong to the same class of indeclinables, one is hardly justified to take *Nipātas* as expressive of sense and the other as merely suggestive. The so-called *Nipātas* only form a class of *Aryayas*. Words like *pra* and *ca*, which have no power of denoting a substance (*dravya*), are called

¹ अर्थवत्ता नोपपद्यते केवलीनावचनात् ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, 219 and प्रकृतिप्रत्यययोः सम्युयार्थबोधकत्वनियमात्—Tattvacintāmaṇi.

² प्रादयो द्योतकाद्यादयस्तु वाचका इति न्यायसते स्थितं वैषम्यमद्युक्तं युक्तिसाम्यात् ।
—Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa.

³ प्रकृतिः प्रत्ययश्चैव निपातश्चेति स त्रिविधा—Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, Kār. 6.

⁴ उच्चावचेष्वर्थेषु निपतन्ति—Nirukta.

⁵ उपसर्गाः क्रियायोगे—Pāṇ., 1. 4. 59.

Nipātas. The same reason ¹ whereby the suggestiveness of *Upasargas* is evidently established may be put forward to prove the equal suggestiveness of *Nipātas*, there being nothing to account for their differential treatment. The Naiyāyikas recognise the expressiveness of *Nipātas* for the following reasons : In instances like अनुभूयते, साक्षात्क्रियते, अलंक्रियते, etc., the addition of *Nipātas* is attended with a special significance, as cannot be obtained from the simple root *kr* and *bhū*. Moreover, *Nipātas* like *sākṣāt*, *namah*, etc., is found to have their respective meanings fixed by lexicon and popular usage. The grammarians refute this position. They hold, on the contrary, that the usual meanings expressed by *anubhavati*, *sākṣātkaroti*, etc., i.e., feeling and interviewing, are really denoted by the roots (*bhū* and *kr*), and *Upasargas* as well as *Nipātas* are only suggestive or तात्पर्यवाचक. As a matter of fact, we might have used the expression शोभनस्य in the sense of a beautiful collection, if a *Nipāta* like *ca* were really expressive of the meaning. As the word *vrkṣaḥ* alone cannot give the idea of a collection (समुच्चय), the Mīmāṃsakas take the particle *ca* as expressive of collection. They do not recognise it to be merely suggestive. But the grammarians are not prepared to take *Nipātas*

¹ श्रोतकाः प्रादयो धेन निपातायादयस्तथा—Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa, Kār.

as well as *Upasargas* as capable of expressing the sense independently of *Nāman* and *Dhātu*. It is on the principle of *Anvaya-vyatireka* that the Mīmāṃsakas have proceeded to maintain the expressiveness of *Nipātas*. Their arguments are open to criticism, since they have unduly attributed the significance to *Nipātas*. When the meaning (collection, etc.) is actually obtained from words other than *Nipātas*, the assumption of *Śakti* or significance is nothing but unnecessary, so far as the expressiveness of *Nipātas* is concerned. If we are allowed to have an assumption of this nature, the word *Gaṅgā* might have denoted 'bank' (without the help of *lakṣaṇā*) by means of its primary significance or *Śakti*.

The negative particle *na* (*nañ*) is also a *Nipāta*. Generally speaking, the particle *nañ* has got six meanings—similarity, non-existence, difference, smallness, imperfection, contradiction. But Koṇḍabhaṭṭa has tried to show that the sense of imposition (आरोपितत्वं¹) is also suggested by *nañ*. Accordingly, the word अत्राक्षय does not only mean 'a man other than a Brāhmin,' but one who pretends to be a Brāhmin² (say a *Kṣatriya*). Following the line of arguments of the Bhāṣya,³ Koṇḍabhaṭṭa has also suggested another view, according to which non-existence

¹ आरोपितत्वं नञ्-दीप्तम्—Vaiyākaraṇa, Kār. 40.

² One to whom the quality of a Brāhmin is falsely attributed.

³ अभावी वा तदर्थोऽस्तु भाष्यस्य हि तदाशयात्—Ibid, Kār. 41.

is the sense that is denoted by *nañ*. The expression *nivṛttapadārthakaḥ*¹ (as in the Bhāṣya) is explained by him as implying the idea of 'non-existence.' Nāgeśa, however, does not agree with Koṇḍabhaṭṭa on this point. The negative particle appears to be either substantive or attributive in relation to its *pratiyogin*.² असर्वम् (as a pronoun) is an instance where *nañ* is used as an adjective and the negative particle is used as a noun in a word like असः meaning शिवः. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi³ is of opinion that both reciprocal negation and negation of association are denoted by the negative particle.

Karmapravacanīya is also regarded as a class of *Pada*. Some grammarians, as Bhartṛhari maintains,⁴ have treated of *Karmapravacanīyas* as a special class of *Padas* categorically distinct from *Upasargas*. According to this view, there are five different kinds of *Padas* including *Karmapravacanīyas*. Those who strictly support the four-fold classification of *Padas*,⁵ as enumerated by Yāska, are likely to argue that *Karmapravacanīyas*, often used as *adjunots* to the relation between *Kriyā* and *Kāraka* or, simply

¹ Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇ., 2 2. 6. इहापि तस्मिं नञ्-विशेषकः प्रयुज्यते ।

² यस्याभावः स प्रतियोगी ।

³ संसर्गाभावोऽन्वोन्वाभावश्च नञोऽर्थः ।

—Śiromaṇi, *Nañ-Vāda*, pp 1-10.

⁴ विधा कैयित् पदं भिन्नं चतुर्धा पञ्चधापि वा ।—Vākyapadīya, 3. Kār. 1.

⁵ कर्मप्रवचनीयान् क्रियाविशेषोपजनितसम्बन्धावच्छेदहेतव इति सम्बन्धविशेष-
-तत्त्वद्वारेण क्रियाविशेषप्रकाशना उपसर्गेष्वेवान्तर्भवतीति चतुर्थं पदम् ।

—Holārāja under Vākyapadīya, 3. Kār. 1.

as indicative of relation, deserve to be treated as *Upasargas*. There is hardly any justification for recognising them as a different class of *Padas*. In some cases *Karmapravacanīyas* like *anu*, *prati* and *su* exactly look like *Upasargas*, though they cannot be grammatically treated as such. So far as grammatical operations (specially the rules enjoining *ṣatva*) are concerned, it is clearly laid down that the very name (*saṁjñā*) *Karmapravacanīya* is an indication that *Karmapravacanīyas* are excluded from the categories of both *Gati* and *Upasarga*.¹ *Karmapravacanīyas* being thus categorically different from *Upasargas*, we are not allowed to have *ṣatva* in examples like *pari-siñcati* and *su-siktam*.

Now what is a *Karmapravacanīya*? It is a class of words which is generally used as an adjunct to *sambandha* or relation between *Kriyā* and *Kāraka*.² In grammar *sambandha* is usually denoted by *Kriyā* or action.³ In some cases, *Kriyā*⁴ by its very nature gives rise to a kind of relation and then disappears without leaving any trace behind. The expression *rājapurusaḥ*, for instance, though apparently

¹ गत्युपसर्गसंज्ञापवादः—Bhaṭṭoji.

² सस्वन्वस्य भेदका इति । सस्वन्वस्य सर्व्वः क्रियाकारकपूर्व्वको भवति ।

—Puṇyarāja under Vākyapadīya, 2. 199.

³ तथा हि सर्व्वः सस्वन्वः क्रियाकृतः—Helārāja.

⁴ तत्र क्वचित् सस्वन्वं जनयित्वा क्रिया विनिवर्तते यथा राजपुरुष इति । अत्र हि राजः पुरुषोऽयं ; यस्मात् स राजा पुरुषं विभर्त्ति, अतो भरणलक्षणा. क्रियाग्रथाग्रथि-भावलक्षणं सस्वन्वं जनयित्वा निवृत्ता ।—Puṇyarāja under Kār. 2. 199.

devoid of any *Kriyā* or verbal form, grammatically means 'here is a man who is supported by the king.' Here the action *bharaṇa* (to support) which denotes a relation between the king and his man as one of the supporter and the supported is no longer existent. In some instances, on the other hand, *Kriyā-pada* is practically present (as in *mātuh smarati*) and there is no such difficulty in comprehending the intended relation. Logically speaking, a verbal form serves as a link between two concepts, i.e., establishes some sort of relation between them. *Sambandha* is thus shown to be a product of *Kriyā*. But there arises some difficulty with regard to the knowledge of such *sambandha*, when the verbal form is not actually present. When the verbal form or *Kriyā-pada* is practically absent,¹ one may doubt whether the intended *sambandha* is really given rise to by *Kriyā* or by other agents. In cases of doubt like this, says Puṇyarāja, *Karmapravacanīyas* serve to determine the proper relation. The main function of *Karmapravacanīyas* is thus to point out the particular relation denoted by a *Kriyā*. The author of the *Mahābhāṣya* takes the word *Karmapravacanīya* as a significant one (*anvarthasamjñā*). He understands by *Karmapravacanīyas* those words that are

¹ यदा क्रियापदं कश्चिन्न श्रूयते, तदा क्रियाजनितोऽयं स्यादिति संदेहे कर्म-
प्रवचनीयेन तत्र तस्यां क्रियायां नियम्यते इति सख्यभिरुपेयः कर्मप्रवचनीयैः प्रख्यायते ।

no longer expressive of *Kriyā*, but indicate the relation given rise to by a *Kriyā*, whether present or absent. The difference between *Upasargas* and *Karmapravacanīyas* is that the former directly indicates *Kriyā* or specifies the action denoted by a verbal root, whereas the latter only qualifies the particular relation given rise to by a *Kriyā*.

What we have learnt from the foregoing discussion is that *Karmapravacanīyas* are not indicative (*dyotaka*) of *Kriyā* like *Upasargas*. But one may, however, argue¹ that the verbal form that is absent (*Kriyā-pada*), as we have already shown, is deducible from the use of *Karmapravacanīya*. According to this view, *Karmapravacanīyas* should be regarded as *ākṣepaka*, i.e., as what serve to derive by inference a *Kriyā-pada* that is not actually present. Bhartṛhari² has set aside this argument by holding that words whereby such verbal forms are inferred are generally found to have case-terminations, but never designated as *Karmapravacanīyas*. The second case-ending in *prādeśam*,³ as in *prādeśam vipa-
:ilikkhati*, is due to its connection with the word *vi* which practically suggests the act of measuring (*māna*) and is only a shortened form of

¹ अश्रूयमाणायाः क्रियाया आक्षेपकाः कर्मप्रवचनीयाः कस्मान्नाश्रीयन्त इत्याह ।

—Punyarāja.

² येन क्रियापदाक्षेपः स कारक-विभक्तिभिः ।

युज्यते विधया तथ लिखावनुपसर्गता ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2, Kār. 202.

³ अत्र विशब्दो मानक्रियाया आक्षेपकः । प्रादेशं विमाय परिलिखतीत्यर्थावगतेः ॥

—Punyarāja.

rimāya. Thus, we have *dcitiyā* in *prādeśam* as a case-termination (*Kāraka-vidhakti*) and not one obtained in conjunction with a *Karmapravacanīya*. Panyarāja further observes that *dcitiyā* available in connection with *Karmapravacanīyas* is generally found in cases where *saṣṭhi* in the sense of *sambandha* in general would have been otherwise applicable. In some cases,¹ a *Karmapravacanīya* like *anu* becomes a bar to the third case-ending denoting *hetu* or cause.

From what has been said regarding the characteristics of *Karmapravacanīyas*, it is almost clear that they are not indicative (*dyotaka*) of *Kriyā* like *Upasargas*, not directly expressive of *sambandha* which is rather denoted by the second case-ending used in substitution of *saṣṭhi* and not suggestive of a verbal form like the word *ci*, as in *prādeśam riparilikhati*. Having thus rejected the three views, namely, indicativeness, denotativeness and suggestiveness of *Karmapravacanīyas*, Bhartṛhari² has finally arrived at the conclusion that *Karmapravacanīyas* are those that qualify the relation brought about by a *Kriyā*, whether present or absent.

¹ चारभाषाभ्यन्ते प्राप्ता दतीया दितुल्यवशा ।—*Vākyapadīya*, 2. 205.

² क्रियाया दितकी नायं सम्बन्धश्च न बाधकः ।

नापि क्रियापदादौप्ये सम्बन्धश्च तु भेदकः ॥—*Ibid*, 2. 206.

CHAPTER VI

PRAKṚTI AND PRATYAY.

Prātipadika—derivable and underivable—its meaning,—Gender—
Dhātu—a division of *Prakṛti*—*Pratyaya*—its classifications
—*Sup* and *Tiñ*—*Taddhita* and *Kṛt*—*pratyayas*—
their meanings.

Prakṛti is of two kinds—*Nāman* or *Prātipadika* and *Dhātu*. This classification of *Prakṛti* is accepted by Jagadīśa. He observes particularly that what is called *Prātipadika* by Pāṇini and others is essentially the same as *Nāman*. *Nāman* is defined by Yāska as what denotes an object—*Sattvapradhānāni nāmāni*. Jagadīśa defines *Nāman* as that crude form of a word which requires to be invariably followed by *prathamā* (*vibhakti*) for the expression of its own meaning. Objects are generally denoted by such pronouns as अद्, etc. While giving a definition of objects, Bhartrhari has explained what is really meant by Yāska's statement 'ada iti sattvānāmupadeśah.' Durga¹ observes that *Nāman* and *Dhātu* are not really different and entirely unconnected with each other. There is, on the other hand, an idea of object hidden in the meaning of a *Dhātu* and consequently *Kriyā*

¹ नानि धो धातुः सकृत्प्रत्ययोपजनितेन...प्रातिपदिकान्तर्लानहन्तिरेव...द्रव्य-
प्रधान एव भवति—Nirukta, p. 40.

is indirectly implied by *Nāman*. It has already been pointed out that *Nāman* too has *Dhātu* as its ultimate base. Now this radical element which exists in *Nāman* develops into a *Prātipadika* while followed by *kṛt*-suffixes. In this process of transformation it loses its power of directly expressing *Kriyā* and necessarily comes to denote a substance having number and particular genders.

Prātipadika or *Linga*, as it is called in the Kātantra system, is defined as that crude form of word which, though significant by itself, is other than roots and detached from *vibhaktis*.¹ What is really implied by holding *Prātipadika* to be significant² is that each of those letters that go to constitute a word is not allowed to have the designation of *Prātipadika* (simply because of their meaninglessness). It is needless to repeat here as to how letters, though meaningless by themselves, give rise to words that are found to be significant. Śrīpati,³ the author of the Kātantra Pariśiṣṭa, explains the term *arthavat* as expressive of both existent and non-existent things, and states emphatically that by 'significant words' one should understand those words only which have the power of

¹ अर्थवदधातुरप्रत्ययः प्रातिपदिकम्—Pāp., 1. 2. 45.

² अर्थवदिति व्यपदेशाय वचनानां च ना भूदिति ।

—Mahābhāṣya under Pāp., 1. 2. 45.

³ अर्थवदिति सतो,सती वार्थव्याभिधायकमुच्यते । यस्येतरनिरपेक्षयाभिधान-
शक्तिरस्ति, तदिद्वार्थवत्त्वस्येवं संज्ञा (नामप्रकरणम्).—Pariśiṣṭa.

expressing the intended sense independently of others. But *Pratyayas*¹ from their very nature are only significant when they come in contact with *Prakṛti*. It is, therefore, inconsistent with the view that makes *Prakṛti* dependent on *Pratyaya* for its expressiveness.

The well-known commentator Gopīnātha has raised an important question in connection with the import of the word *arthavat*. In an instance of absolute negation as, *śaśa-viṣāṇa*,² (the horns of a hare), he contends, there will be no *Prātipadika-samjñā*, as the expression does not convey any sense that is materially existent. But what we actually find is that the expressions like *śaśa-viṣāṇaḥ* and *ākāśa-kusumam*, etc., are used as regular *Padas* having *sup* added to them. This anomaly is afterwards explained by him in the following way:—There are two kinds³ of objects having transcendental or absolute and practical existence, according to the Vedānta standpoint; it is only *Brahman* that has real existence (*Pāramārthika-sattā*), the cosmic world exists only in our experience (*vyāvahārika-sattā*). Words like *ghaṭaḥ*, *paṭaḥ*, etc., signify objects that have popular existence, whereas the expressions, referred to above, denote things that have practically no material existence. In

¹ प्रत्ययास्तु नियोगतः प्रकृतौ रज्जुगच्छन्तस्तदर्धानपेक्ष्यैव स्वार्थानभिदधानाः ।

—Kāt. Parīṣiṣṭa.

² शशविषाणादावभिधेयस्याभावात् लिङ्गसंज्ञा न प्राप्ता ।—*Ibid*.

³ अर्थो हि द्विविधः—परमार्थसन् परमार्थासंघ, तान्यभयान्यपि लिङ्गान्यभिधायकत्वात् ।—*Ibid*.

grammar, we should remember, both of these classes of words are held to be significant, and as such, there is no bar to apply the *Prātīpadika-samjñā* to them. The reason is this. It is not absolutely correct to say that the expression 'śaśaviṣāṇah' is absolutely meaningless, because the two constituents, namely, *śaśa* and *viṣāṇa*, when taken separately, are found to have their own meanings as hare and horns, but what makes the sense inconsistent is the relation between the parts and the whole.¹ It must be, however, admitted that the above expression is not altogether meaningless, inasmuch as it might be appropriately used as an instance of 'absolute negation' or utter impossibility. Bhartṛhari² seems to have realised the fact when he says that words, no matter whether its meaning is existent or non-existent, are always found to produce certain cognition. Gopīnātha cites in support of his view the authoritative statement of Durgasiṃha and arrives at the conclusion by holding that meanings of words are cognisable objects, whether existent or non-existent.³

Patañjali has expressly made mention of two classes of *Prātīpadikas*⁴—derivable and

¹ अनवीयावयवावयविव्यवहारीऽसन्नपि विप्रलिसादिना वक्तुं पार्यते ।
—Parīśiṣṭa.

² अत्यन्तासन्नहितेऽप्ये ज्ञानं शब्दः करोति हि ।—Vakya
अतो बन्धासुतादिशब्दानां प्रातिपदिकत्वम् ।—Laghu
—apadīya
—mañjūṣā

³ अतएव टीकाकारोऽपि प्रतीयमानं वस्तुमात्रमर्थ
सदसचेति मज्जयाह ।—Parīśiṣṭa (Nāmaprakaranam)
इति सावपद प्रदाय

⁴ उणादयोऽव्युत्पन्नानि प्रातिपदिकानि ।—Mahābhāṣya
A, Vol. III, p. 211

underivable. The words formed by the so-called *unādi* suffixes are generally called underivable words. The underivable words are those that are not capable of being derived from the recognised roots according to the rules of grammar. That words formed by the *unādi* suffixes are underivable, is, as the *Vārttikas* maintain, known by the way in which Pāṇini has comprehended the *Prātipadikas*. To keep up the scientific character of his system intact, Pāṇini did not think it worth while to make provision for supporting the correctness of this class of words that are too rigid and diverse to come under any grammatical generalisation. The so-called *unādi-sūtras* are not of Pāṇini's making, but usually attributed to the authorship of Śākaṭāyana, who is credited with having enunciated the doctrine of 'reducibility of all words to verbal roots.' Śākaṭāyana seems to have been a grammarian of great reputation whose doctrine was accepted by Yāska and some of the grammarians. As he was not in favour of such a doctrine that tends to make all *Nāmans*, without exception of even *Samjñā-śabda*, derivable from roots, Patañjali had but scanty regard for this old grammarian. This is clear from the way in which he has derived the word Śākaṭāyana (*Sakaṭasya tokam*). According to the interpretation of Yāska, the underivable words are as good as *asamvijñāta-śabda*, because their accents, grammatical analysis and the radical elements cannot properly be determined by the

usual method of derivation. Of the three classes of words recognised by Durga, the so-called underivable words come under the category of *Prakalpyakriya-śabda*, as opposed to *Pratyakṣa-kriya*, inasmuch as in cases like these the radical element or the meaning thereof has to be supplied by means of inference. The words of this description, as they do not admit of regular derivation, should be derived on the analogy of words having likeness with them, either physically or psychologically. In deriving words like these, observes Patañjali, one is to supply either *Prakṛti* or *Pratyaya*, as the case may be.

The Naiyāyikas have classified *Nāman* into four classes, namely, *rūḍha*, *lakṣaka*, *yoga-rūḍha*, and *yangika*. The *rūḍha* or *saṃjñā-śabda* is a *Nāman* the meaning of which is fixed by *sanketa* or divine convention. The words belonging to this class are generally found to be restricted in their particular meanings, which are somewhat different from their derivative significance. The word *gauḥ*, for instance, though derived from the root *gam*—to go, does not mean 'one that moves,' but restricted to a particular sense (an animal possessing dewlap, hoofs, horns, etc.). Jaṇadīśa has made a further classification of *Samjñā*, such as, *naiṣittikī*, *pāribhāṣikī* and *aupādhikī*. Words, when they are used in a secondary significance distinct from the primary or natural one, are called *lakṣaka*. Generally, we have

recourse to *lakṣaṇā* or assume a special significance when the import of a sentence seems to be inconsistent with the primary significance (*mukhyārtha*). The usual meaning of the word *Gaṅgā*, as in the expression *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*, is practically incompatible with that of *ghoṣa*, for *the current of water* is not likely to be the habitation of people. The word is, therefore, not used in its literal sense in the above instance. The word is necessarily taken to indicate the *bank* so as to render the import perfectly consistent with our experience. It must be carefully noted here that there is not a distinct class of words that are always used as *lakṣaka* and enumerated as such either by the grammarians or rhetoricians, the same word being used as *vācaka* in one expression and as *lakṣaka* in the other. There are certain words, as we have pointed out elsewhere, like *pravīṇa*, *kuśala*, etc., which are seldom used in their primary or original sense (skilful in playing on lyre and one who takes the *kuśa*-grass), but have acquired a more generalised meaning (i.e., expert). The *yoga-rūḍha* words are those that possess in themselves two-fold significance—derivative and conventional. The word *paṇkaja*, taken as a whole (*saṃudāya-śakti*), means a lotus; by the force of grammatical derivation (*avayava-śakti*) it means almost the same thing i.e., ‘anything growing in the mud’ (*paṇkajaṇi-kartṛtva*). Though substances other than lotuses are also found to grow in mud, the force

of convention has so restricted the sense of the word *paṇḍya* as to mean a lotus and not the aquatic moss. The *yaugika* words are so called because their meanings are the same as is expressed by their constituents, i.e., *prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*. The *yaugika* words, such as *kāṇḍa*, *paṇḍya*, etc., denote the same meaning as is usually signified by their component parts to which they might be dissolved by means of grammatical analysis. In view of the words like *mandapa*, *maṇḍapata*, etc., some have recognised another class of *Nāman* called *īṇḍha-yaugika*. The word *mandapa*, unlike *paṇḍya*, has got two distinct meanings. When dissolved into parts, the word means 'one who drinks scum,' and when taken as a whole (*īṇḍha*), it means 'a house'. Here the derivative meaning is materially different from the conventional one. In treatises on poetics we find a special class of words known as *vyāñjaka*, viz., suggestive. The Naiyāyikas as well as the older school of grammarians have not recognised *vyāñjana* as a separate *vṛtti*.

There is another way of classifying *Nāmans*, i.e., according as they are restricted in their use in regard to numbers. There are some words in Sanskrit which are never used in the singular number, there are some having neither singular nor plural forms, again, there are others that have neither singular nor plural forms. Thus, number also has been made a criterion for the classification of words. Jagadīśa

has already shown the five ¹ different varieties of *Nāmāns* (according to their numbers), as suggested by Patañjali: (1) There are words like *eka*, *vimśati*, etc., which are always used in the singular number. (2) Words like *ubha*, *dvi*, *puṣpavant* (which means both the sun and the moon), *aśvin* (heavenly physicians), *rodasī* (meaning both earth and heaven) are used to denote dual number only. (3) Words like *prāṇa*, *tri*, *kaṭi*, etc., are found in plural number only. (4) The word *ubhaya* is used in both singular and plural. (5) Words like *ghaṭa*, *paṭa*, *vṛkṣa*, etc., are allowed to have all the three numbers.

Having shown that all words are expressive of *Pratibhā* or ultimately serve to bring out *intuition*,² Bhartrhari proceeds to discuss the meaning of words and refers to more than one philosophical view in this connection. The utterance of a word, some hold, brings out the sense of a thing only and not its particular form and inherent properties. No qualified cognition is possibly derivable from a word, *i.e.*, what is signified by a word is only a thing without any qualifications. Just as certain words, namely, *dharma*, *svarga*, *devatā*, etc.,³ fail to present

¹ एकैकेन तथा द्वाभ्यां वचनैस्त्रिभिरेव च । साकाङ्क्षत्वप्रयुक्तानु नाम पञ्चविधं स्मृतम् ॥—*Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, *Kār.* 35.

² अथासात् प्रतिभाहृतः शब्दः सर्वोऽपरे स्मृतः ।—*Vākyapadīya*, 2. 119.

³ अपूर्वदेवतास्वर्गैः समसाहुर्गीवादिषु ।—*Ibid.*

before us any material form, so words like *gauḥ*, *aśvaḥ*, etc., do not convey the idea of any particular forms. But difficulty arises when we actually consider the meaning of words like *gauḥ*, and *aśvaḥ* which, as we know, denote objects along with their respective forms. The upholder of the view says in defence that the idea of a being having hump, hoofs and horns does not really follow from the word *gauḥ* itself, but cognition of the particular form is drawn from some other sources,¹ viz., common experience obtained from the use of words. The qualified knowledge (i.e., knowledge of the form) is far from being the meaning of a word. Some, again, hold the opposite view. As in some cases words are found to denote a class and sometimes individuals, it is only plausible to maintain that the meaning of a word cannot be an unqualified one. This view, however plausible, is rejected on the following grounds. There are no words that denote only a 'class, because the idea of individuals invariably comes in, as a class is inconceivable without a substratum (individuals). Again, a word denoting a class alone is not competent to convey the sense of individuals. The word *gauḥ*, for instance, is capable of denoting a class (*gotva*), but fails to bring out the particular

¹ प्रयोगदर्शनाभ्यासादकारावयद्वस्तु यः ।

न स शब्दस्य विषयः स हि यद्वान्तराश्रयः ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2.

form of a cow-individual.¹ Similarly, the word *ghaṭaḥ*² signifies only a thing (a pot) and does not imply the particular form with which the object generally comes to our cognition. Some hold, on the contrary, that the meaning of a word comprises in itself all possible cognitions about the thing denoted.³ According to this view, the meaning of a word is *savikalpaka*. The particular knowledge (*viśiṣṭa-jñāna*) of a thing presupposes a knowledge of its qualifications. Some philosophers have tried to show that knowledge of all descriptions is likely to be more or less qualified. Finally, a way is made out of these conflicting views. Some words are really found to be denotative of objects having particular forms and some (words like *devatā*, *svarga*, etc.) producing only formless or immaterial notions.⁴ Another point is then raised. There is no fixed meaning that is always signified by a word. The meaning of a word is so variant that we are hardly allowed to say *this is exactly the meaning of this word*.⁵ Just as a thing, though retaining its form unmodified, appears to be a different one owing to the defective organs through which it is perceived,

¹ न तान् व्यक्तिगतान् भेदाज्जातिशब्दोऽवलम्बते ।—Vākyapadīya, 2.

² घटादीनां न चाकारान् प्रत्याययति वाचकः ।—*Ibid*.

³ ससुदायोऽभिधेयः स्यादविकल्पसमुच्चयः ।—*Ibid*.

⁴ आकारवन्तः संवेद्या व्यक्तवृत्तिनिबन्धनाः ।

ये ते प्रत्यवभासन्ते संविन्मात्रं त्वतोऽन्यथा ॥—*Ibid*, 2, *Kār*. 135.

⁵ नास्ति कश्चिन्नियत'एकः शब्दस्यार्थः—Punyarāja.

so the meaning of a word seems to be variant according to the knowledge of the speaker and the person spoken to. It is not unfrequently that we meet with words which are taken in various senses by different men. The word *ghaṭah*, for instance, might be used by the Vaiśeṣikas in the sense of *whole* (*avayavi*).¹ The Sāṃkhyaūites may take it as implying a *combination of qualities* and the Buddhists and Jainas as an *aggregate of atoms* and so on. What should we then do under these anomalous circumstances? Human knowledge is limited by nature. It is not possible for a man to know anything in its entirety. To realise the ultimate essence of a thing lies practically beyond the range of human intelligence and what is almost incontestable is that our knowledge and experience, as Bhartṛhari rightly observes, are in most cases liable to be inaccurate and imperfect. Arguing from an orthodox point of view one may say that the knowledge of ancient seers² (*Ṛṣis*), who are supposed to have visualised the ultimate reality underlying all phenomena, is free from all limitations and imperfections and that we should do well to know everything according to their observations, so as to get rid of this stupendous anomaly. But this is far from being the actual state of things. One cannot possibly use words strictly in conformity to the manner

¹ Puṇyārāja under the Vākyapadīya, Kār. 2 137.

² ऋषीणां दर्शनं यच्च तत्त्वे किं विद्वद्विहितम्—*Ibid*, 2 141.

of these seers. But what experience goes to prove is that they are not even above imperfection and illusion, so far as the use of words is concerned. Puṇyarāja has quoted a verse¹ which seeks to establish similarity between a child and a learned man, since both of them, depending more or less on popular usage and figurative use, are liable to reveal the same ignorance in regard to the use and knowledge of words. Human knowledge, it must be remembered, is bound to be of different types, the same object being variously perceived by different men. Truth does not reveal itself to all persons. A man's intelligence, however sharp and far-reaching, does not help him in getting into the real nature of things. If we closely examine our experience, drawn from personal observations, we do not fail to see how often we are deceived by it. Knowledge, as it comes from experience (*cf.* Locke), is subject to error. Some concrete examples are put forward by Bhartṛhari to show a number of striking inaccuracies involved in our observations or experience.² To give one of them. Even those who are gifted with clear vision are found to say 'nīlam gaganatalam,' though the idea of *tala* or lower surface is not at all compatible with an entity like sky that pervades the entire sphere.

¹ रूपण-व्यपदेशाभ्यां लौकिके वर्त्मनि स्थितौ ।

ज्ञाने प्रत्यभिलाषे च सदृशौ बालपण्डितौ ॥

² तलवद्द्रश्यते व्योम खद्योते हव्यवाडिव ।

न चेन्नास्ति तलं व्योम्नि न खद्योते हुताशनः ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2. 142.

What course should, then, be adopted? As our observations are likely to be false and defective in most of the cases, we should not treat them as the basis of our experience, without examining their validity by means of reasoning.¹ Thus what is perceived directly by sense-organs requires to be fully determined by reasoning. Observations unaided by reasoning are not to be relied on as evidence at all. With regard to words the meaning whereof is indeterminable (*asamākhyeyatattva*), we must depend on popular usage² and use them accordingly. The meaning of words in general, says Puṇyarāja, is determined by one's own range of knowledge. The way in which he has brought this lengthy discussion to a close deserves particular notice. From an extreme *Advaita* point of view, *Padārtha*³ has no material background and the relation in which a *Śabda* stands to its meaning (*artha*) is nothing but a false one (*adhyāsa*). This being the actual state of things, it is only idle to dilate upon a question like *Śabdārtha*.³

The determination of the precise meaning of *Nāman* is really difficult. The sense that is usually conveyed by the utterance of a word is regarded to be the denotation of *Prātipadikas*. A word and its meaning seem to be inseparably connected with each other; and whenever that word is uttered, the particular meaning is at

¹ तस्मात् प्रत्यक्षमप्यर्थे विद्वानीचेत युक्तिः—*Vaṅkyapadiya*, 2.

² अथासः सम्बन्धः पदार्थस्तस्य एवेति निर्णयः—*Puṇyarāja*.

³ इत्यलं निर्वस्तुवद्विकल्पप्रदर्शनेनेति—*Ibid*.

once comprehended. Now, what is actually denoted by the so-called *Prātipadikas*? The views that are held to solve this question may be brought under three distinct classes: (i) It is class that is denoted by all words. (ii) It is individual. (iii) It is an individual qualified by the class. It should be noted here that the Mīmāṃsakas are the upholder of the class theory. They maintain that all words signify class alone, the usual meaning of an individual arising on account of the mutual dependence of the class and the individuals. Among the grammarians, Vājapyāyana and Vyāḍi, as we find in the *Mahābhāṣya*,¹ held respectively class and individual as the meaning of words. The Naiyāyikas have, however, brought about a reconciliation between these two discordant views. They hold that it is neither class nor individual alone but individual qualified or conditioned by the class is what is really denoted by a word. The defect of the class theory, as pointed out by Jagadīśa² and others, lies in the fact that the cognition of an individual is not produced at all, if class alone is taken to be the meaning of all words. The individualistic theory is, on the other hand, open to such fallacies, as *endlessness* and *vagueness*.³

¹ *Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 2. 64.

² जातिमात्रे हि संकेताद्वक्तेर्भाजनं सुदुष्करम्—*Śabdaśakti*, *Kār.* 19.

³ आनन्याद्वभिचाराच्च तत्र सङ्केतः कर्तुं न युज्यते—*Kāvyaaprakāśa*, under *Kār.* 10.

In view of the rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī,¹ Patañjali observes, it appears that both the class and the individual were held to be the meanings of words by Pāṇini. It is further² held by some that gender, number, and *Kāraṅgas* are also signified by *Prātīpadikas*. There are, therefore, practically six different views with regard to the meaning of *Prātīpadikas*. Koṇḍabhāṭṭa³ has made reference to five different views—(i) class, (ii) class and individual, (iii) class, individual and gender, (iv) class, individual, gender and number, (v) class, individual, gender, number and *Kāraṅgas*. Gadādhara has also alluded to these five views. While we take such a wide view in regard to the denotation of a *Prātīpadika*, we cannot afford to lose sight of the fact that *Pratyayas* necessarily become only indicative (*dyotaka*), if all possible meanings were assigned to *Prātīpadikas* alone. The second view, i.e., both the class and the individual are meant by words, is explained by Patañjali in the following way: it is⁴ not at all reasonable

¹ किं पुनराकृतिः पदार्थ आहोस्त्रिद्वयम् ? उभयमित्याह । कथं ज्ञायते ? उभयथा ह्याचार्येण सूत्राणि पठितानि । Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 6.

² स्वार्थं द्रव्यं च लिङ्गं च संख्या कर्मादिरेव च । अमी पक्षेव नामार्थास्त्रयः किपाचिदयमाः ॥—Quoted by Gadādhara in his Vyutpattivāda.

³ एकं द्विकं त्रिकं चाय चतुष्कं पञ्चकं तथा । नामार्था इति सर्वेऽमी पक्षाः शास्त्रे निरूपिताः ॥ Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa, Kār. 25.

⁴ न ह्याकृतिपदार्थिकस्य द्वे न पदार्थो द्रव्यपदार्थिकस्य वाकृतिर्न पदार्थः । उभयोरुभयं पदार्थः । कस्यचित् किञ्चित् प्रधानभूतं किञ्चिद्गुणभूतम् । आकृतिपदार्थिकस्यावाकृतिः प्रधानभूता, द्रव्यं गुणभूतम् । द्रव्यपदार्थिकस्य द्रव्यं प्रधानभूतमाकृतिर्गुणभूता । Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pān., I. 2. 64, p. 246 (Vol. I).

to maintain that words denoting a class are never found to express the sense of an individual and *vice versa*. But what appears to be exactly true is that both the class and the individual are signified by words. Examples are not wanting to show that a word which has a class as its meaning is also capable of denoting an individual, with this difference that in one case the sense of a class is directly obtained and that of an individual is only indirectly implied. Similar is the case with regard to words denoting individuals. Some grammarians have also explained this view from the Naiyāyika standpoint. They hold that the meaning of all words is *an individual qualified by the class*. There arises, however, some difficulty when one attempts to maintain gender, number and *Kāraka* also as the meanings of *Prātipadikas* themselves. It is almost like a grammatical fallacy to include gender, number and *Kāraka* within the meaning of *Prātipadikas*. According to this view, nothing is left to be expressed by *Pratyaya*. If we take *liṅga* as pertaining to word and explain the rules Pān. 1.2.47. and 4.1.3. as referring to *Prātipadikas* denoting both masculine and feminine genders, *liṅga* also appears to be denoted by *Prātipadikas*. It is definitely stated in the *Liṅgānuśāsana* that *Prātipadikas* are expressive of *liṅga*. Nāgeśa also holds the same view. The way in which the rule Pān. 4. 1. 4. has been explained by Patañjali makes it clear that *liṅga* is also denoted

by *Prātīpadikas*, the suffixes like *ṭāp*, *nīp* being only indicative. The real difficulty arises in connection with number and *Kāraka*. Patañjali has explicitly stated elsewhere that oneness, duality, plurality, etc., as well as *Kāra*kas are signified by case-endings. Moreover, the method of agreement and difference, as applied to the analysis of words into base and suffixes, shows that number and *Kāraka* should be taken as the meaning of *Pratyaya*. We have already pointed out the difficulty of arriving at a solution whether the entire meaning of a word is denoted by the base itself and the suffix serves only as an indicative or *vice versa*. Bhartṛhari seems to have doubt with regard to this position. He maintains that the case-endings are either indicative or really expressive of sense,¹ or the meaning is expressed by both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* in their combination.

An examination of the grammatical treatment of gender has been made in the Linguistic Speculation of the Hindus. *Prātīpadikas*² form the base to which *Pratyayas* like *ṭāp*, *nīp*, are added. The grammarians³ failed to make a scientific treatment with regard to the problem

¹ द्योतिका वाचिका वा स्तुद्धित्वादीनां विभक्तयः । *Vākyapadiya, Kār.*
2 165.

² प्रातिपदिकप्रकृतिकाः स्त्रियामित्यनेन विहिताष्टावाच्यः कश्चित् स्त्रीत्वं प्रकृत्यर्थविशेषणतया बोधयन्ति । *Vyutpattivāda, p. 118.*

³ हरितक्यः फलानौति फलेष्वपि स्त्रिया इति । शब्दानामेकार्थेऽपि लिङ्ग-
वचनभेदः, दाराः कलत्रं भायति । *Durga Sipa* on the rule लोकोपचारात्
ग्रहणसिद्धिः—*Kalāpa, 23.*

of gender. The popular conception of gender¹ had its origin in the distinctive features of sexes such as male and female. But it is very difficult to justify the grammatical use of genders simply on the evidence of physical characteristics. A *vrkṣa* or a *khaṭvā* does not possess, as Patañjali rightly observes,² such physical features as would justify its gender. Grammar had to depend so much on popular usage with regard to the determination of gender that it failed in most cases to give a scientific explanation. One turns to grammar in vain to explain the question of sex in words like *jyotsnā* and *nadī*. The fact that accounts for such usage should be sought elsewhere. It is rather a poetical fashion, which represents all that excite pleasurable sensations and exhibit female virtues (tenderness, loveliness, submissiveness, etc.) as females, that is to a certain extent responsible for attributing the female characteristics to the 'moon-beams' and 'current of water.' The word *uśas* seems to have its gender similarly fixed by a poetical outlook of nature. The seers of the R̥k Veda,³ as they are often called *kavi* or *krāntadarśin* (one who has visualised the finality of a thing), were not wanting in poetical idealism when they described

¹ स्तनकेशवती स्त्री स्याल्लोमशः प्ररूपः स्मृतः । Mahābhāṣya, Vol. II, p. 196.

² खट्वावची न सिध्यतः । Ibid.

³ सूर्यो देवीमूकसं रोचमानां नयति योपानयेति पश्चात् । R̥k Veda.

Uṣas (dawn) as the beautiful wife of the Sun-god. This is, however, a tentative explanation, as it does not apply to all similar cases. Though a flower appears to be tender and graceful to our sentiment, the word *kusuma* is used in neuter gender only. There is so much laxity of the idea of sex in the use of gender that it would be a positive mistake to look upon grammatical genders strictly as an indication of sex. The words ¹ *dāra* and *kalātra* form another instance of the irregularity of gender. Though denoting the same thing, viz., wife, they are so sanctioned by popular usage as to be used in masculine and neuter genders respectively. As in respect of our knowledge of *laukika līṅga*, we are guided more by popular usage than by conception of sex, Patañjali has repeatedly drawn our attention to the fact that the determination of genders from a scientific point of view lies almost beyond the jurisdiction of grammar.

Patañjali² has said it more than once that the popular use of gender is too rigid and fanciful to come under any general principle. The popular conception of sex has, therefore, very little to do with the grammatical use of gender.

¹ एकार्थे शब्दान्यत्वाद्दष्टं लिङ्गान्यत्वम्। *Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. II, p. 190
शब्दानामेकार्थेऽपि लिङ्गवचनभेदः, दाराः कलत्रं भार्येति। *Durga Siphā* under
the rule लोकोपचाराद्, दृष्टमिति;—*Kalāpa*, 23.

² तस्मात्त्र वेयाकरणेः शक्यं लौकिकलिङ्गमाप्यातुम्। *Mahābhāṣya* on the
rule *Pāp.*, 4.1.3.

Patañjali has, however, suggested two characteristic features of males and females on a more or less physiological ground.¹ According to this view, a female being is one wherein something is developed ; a male serves as the agent of production ; and that which represents an intermediate stage between these two aspects (development and production) is known as *napumsaka*. The popular conception of sex does not help us in the least when we try to explain the propriety of gender in *vrkṣa* and *khaṭvā*.² These criteria are not even applicable to all cases, since production and development refer to qualities and not to persons.³ Both males and females are found to be the substratum of these qualities. What, then, should be the standard of making such a distinction between sexes ? Patañjali finally says that the desire of the speaker⁴ is what accounts for such use, *viz.*, when development or growth is intended to be implied, we take it as female and so on. Gadādhara is of opinion that the suffixes like *tāp*, etc., enjoined by the rules *striyām*, *ajādyataṣṭāp*, etc., are sometimes found to express *strītvā*, as an adjunct to what is denoted by the base. The grammatical use of *strītvā*

¹ संख्यानप्रसवी लिङ्गमास्थेयौ खल्लतान्तः । M. Bhāṣya., Vol. II, p. 197.

² खट्वाहचौ न सिध्यतः । *Ibid.*

³ कस्य पुनः ख्यानं स्त्री प्रवृत्तिर्वा पुनान् ? गुणानाम् । *Ibid.*

⁴ विवक्षातः । संख्यानविवक्षायां स्त्री प्रसवविवक्षायां पुनानुभयोरविवक्षायां नपुंसकम् । *Ibid.*

does not necessarily bring out the idea of a female being. It is not logically correct to say that *strīva* is directly meant by such suffixes. The words *khaṭvā* and *ṛkṣa*, etc., form exception to the popular conception of gender. The addition of an adjective as *human being*¹ does not even remove the difficulty. The word *devatā* (though it means divine being—both male and female) is found to be used in feminine gender only. According to the grammarians,² *strī-pratyayas* are only indicative (*dyotaka*) and not expressive. The grammarians have comprehended gender also in the meaning of *Prātipadikas*. But Gadādhara does not fully agree with the grammarians. He maintains on the contrary that *strī-pratyayas* are only expressive of *strīva*. It is why *linga* has been specially mentioned as distinct from *Prātipadikārtha* in the rule Pāṇ. 2. 3. 66. He is quite right when he says that the *strī-pratyayas* in words like *khaṭvā*, *aṭavi*, and *devatā* are absolutely meaningless.³

Just as in the Sāṃkhya doctrine of evolution, *Prakṛti* is held to be the primordial substance out of which the entire world, both material and intellectual, has sprung up, even so in grammar

¹ प्राणित्वेन विश्वेषोऽपि देवतादौ व्यभिचारात् । Vyutpattivāda, p. 118.

² स्त्रीप्रत्ययान्तु द्योतका एव । Ibid.

³ पुंस्त्वस्य प्रातिपदिकार्थत्वेऽप्यनन्तानां प्रातिपदिकपदानां स्त्रीत्वार्थकत्वे गौरवात् । नाद्येनान्यौयसां स्त्रीप्रत्ययानां सदर्थकत्वकल्पनीयत्वात् । Vyutpattivāda, p. 119, and प्रत्ययानां तु तद्व्यञ्जकतामात्रमिति वैयाकरणैरुक्तं तत्र युक्तम् । Śabdasākti under Kār. 54.

Dhātu represents the ultimate element wherefrom all possible forms of words have evolved. The verbal roots are the last result of grammatical analysis and form the real foundation of all verbal structure. The roots, very much like the atoms of the chemist, do not admit of further division; it is to such roots or phonological types that the *Nairuktas* and grammarians look for the starting-point in their process of derivation.

According to the *Root-theory*, as expounded by Śākaṭāyana,¹ all words, even without the exception of proper names, are derivable from roots. *Dhātu* is significant by itself and is said to be the final germ of all word-forms. It denotes *Kriyā* or action (*dhātvārthaḥ kriyā*). Jagadīśa's classification of *Prakṛti* is essentially reducible to one, i.e., *Dhātu*, for *Prātipadikas* or *Nāmans* too have roots as their final elements.

According to Yāska, the meaning of a verbal root is *bhāva*, i.e., action or becoming. *Bhāva* or *Sattā*, as we have already said, is the meaning of all roots. It is one and all-pervading, but seems to be manifold on account of its association with different *upādhis*. This *sattā*, though intrinsically one, has got such potency as to reveal itself into manifold form.²

¹ सर्वाण्याख्यातजानि नामानि । Nirukta.

² एवमुक्तास्तस्याः काश्चन शक्तयो विद्यन्ते येनैकैव सती तथा तथा विचित्रेण रूपेण प्रतिभासते ।.....तथाहि सर्वशक्त्यात्मभूतत्वाद्ब्रह्मणोऽनेकविकारप्रदर्शनसामर्थ्यलक्षणा अविद्याख्याः शक्तिः कार्यभेदादुपचरितनानात्वा समस्तौघागमविदः ।

According to the followers of the *Āgama*, Brahman, as Helārāja says, comprises all *Śakti* as its own self. *Avidyā*, which is only a *Śakti* of Brahman, is capable of showing innumerable modifications and appears to be manifold owing to its diversity of actions. The doctrine of *Vārṣṇāyani*, as elucidated by Yāska,¹ shows clearly how *bhūta* or *mahū-sattā* manifests itself in six different aspects, namely, *jāyate*, *asti*, *viparinamate*, *varddhate*, *apakṣiyate* and *vināśyati*. We must remember that every thing is liable to pass through these stages. These successive stages from production to final destruction are to be regarded as *vikāra* or modifications of *bhūta* which, under different *upādhis*, is called by so many different names. Helārāja² maintains that a thing by its very nature is first produced before it is said to be existent. The question of *vikāra* only comes in connection with *bhūta* or objects that are already existent. One *vikāra* or modification of a state into another does not retain its nature unchanged for a moment; *pariṇāma* or modification is immediately followed by growth and growth by decay and so on. This is exactly harmonious with the Sāṃkhya doctrine of

¹ पञ्च भावविकारा भवन्तीति वार्ष्णेयवि आद्यते इति विपरिणमते वर्धते उपक्षीयते विनश्यतीति ।—*Nirukta*, p. 41.

² स्वशक्तिमाहात्म्यात् पूर्वं आद्यत इत्यवक्षीयते पश्चादस्तीति । अवस्थितस्य विकारापत्तिरिति विपरिणमते तत्र विपरिणमन् मुहूर्तमपि नावतिष्ठते इति वर्धते यावदनेन वर्धितञ्च ततोऽपक्षीयते ।

—Helārāja under *Yākyapadiya*, *Kār.* 3. 36.

pariṇāma. The whole world is in a flux of constant changes and nothing, as Patañjali¹ observes, remains in its own form unchanged for a single moment. There is no growth that is not followed by decay and no decay that is not attended with destruction. In this way everything undergoes a series of changes and loses its nature every moment.

Patañjali has suggested two definitions of *Dhātu* as *kriyāvacaṇo dhātuḥ* and *bhāvavacaṇo dhātuḥ* which practically mean the same thing, i.e., (i) a root is expressive of action; (ii) a root denotes *becoming* (*bhāva*). He observes further that the meaning of a root, i.e., action, is invisible and is only comprehended by inference. That a root signifies action is clear from the fact that the verbal forms like *pacati*, *gacchati*, etc., are found to have co-inherence (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) with *karoti*.² To be more clear, the meaning of all roots is capable of being expressed by the term *karoti*.

By the meaning of a root, Nāgeśa understands 'action that is attended with efforts and leads to the fruit.'³ In pursuance of the view of Patañjali, Koṇḍabhaṭṭa⁴ says that

¹ न होह कश्चित् स्वस्मिन्नात्मनि सुहृत्तमवतिष्ठते । वर्द्धते वा यावदनेन वर्द्धितव्यमपायेन वा युज्यते ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. II, p. 191.

² कथं पुनर्ज्ञायते क्रियावचनाः पचादय इति ? यदेतेषां करोतिना सामानाधिकरण्यम् । किं करोति ? पचति । किं करिष्यति ? पच्यति ।—Mahābhāṣya, under the rule Pān. 1, 3, 1.

³ फलानुकूलो यत्सहिती व्यापारो धात्वर्थः ।—Mañjūsā,

⁴ फलव्यापारयोर्धर्मतुराग्रये तु तिङः स्मृताः ।—Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa, 1, 1.

both the action (favourable to the result) and the fruit are expressed by roots and that the substratum alone is denoted by the suffix *tin*. The Mīmāṃsakas hold, on the contrary, that the fruit alone is denoted by the root, the action being denoted by the suffix. But this view goes quite against that of the grammarians. The rule *Pāṇ.* 3.1.69., clearly shows that the suffixes like *tip* have nothing to do with the action (*vyūpāra*), but they simply indicate the agent, the object, number, etc. The followers of the Navya-Nyāya school maintain that the meaning of a root is *action favourable to the fruit*. According to this view, the verbal form *gacchati* means 'an action, i.e., movement, leading to the conjunction' (*samyoga*).¹

There is, however, certain difference in regard to the way in which the grammarians and the Naiyāyikas construe a sentence for the sake of deriving the verbal cognition (*śābda-bodha*). Both the Mīmāṃsakas and the grammarians arrange the words of a sentence in such a way as to render the action (*kriyā*) principal in a *vākyārtha*, with this difference that the former take action to be the meaning of suffixes, while the latter comprehend action as the signification of roots. The grammarians are expected to put the expression *Caitraśtanḍulam pacati* in the form of a logical

¹ संयोगानुक्लेष्यापारी गमनात्पर्यः ।

proposition which will run thus: *Caitra-kartṛka-taṇḍula-karmaka-pūkaḥ*, viz., 'the act of cooking which has Caitra as the subject and rice as the object.' The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, will bring out the meaning of the expression by such an arrangement of words as would make the meaning of *prathamānta-śabda* (words having first case-ending after them) as the principal one. According to their construction, the sentence will mean: *taṇḍula-karmaka-pūkānukūla-kṛtimān Caitraḥ*: viz., 'Caitra is the substratum of action that is favourable for cooking rice or which has rice as its object.'

Pratyayas are held to be significant by the grammarians, though their expressiveness depends on their association with the base. *Pratyayas* are of different kinds and numerous. Jagadīśa has classified them under four heads: ¹ (i) *vibhakti* (*sup* and *tin*), (ii) *pratyayas* like *nic*, *san*, *yañ*, etc., that form part of the root, (iii) *taddhita*, (iv) *kṛt*-suffixes. Of these, the *vibhaktis*, viz., *sup* and *tin*, are primary suffixes and the rest are only secondary, the former being added to *Prātipadikas* and roots to denote number, whereas the latter, though coming after *Prātipadikas* and roots, have special signification. Both *sup* and *tin* generally denote

number. *Sup* is, again, of two kinds¹—(i) *sup* as denoting *Kāraḥ*; (ii) *sup* as specially enjoined in conjunction with certain words (*Upapada-vibhakti*).

The author of the *Ṭārttika* has expressly stated that subject, object, instrumental, etc., as well as number (singular, dual and plural) are denoted by *sup*-terminations.² Patañjali has also lent his support to this view which is directly based upon such rules of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* as *Pān.* 2.3.2. and *Pāṇ.* 2.3.18. The author of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*³ enumerates substratum, limit, object, relation or efficiency alone as the meanings of *sup*. It must be, however, remembered that the expressions current in a language are so varying and numerous that the above enumeration of meanings is found to be far from being accurate and exhaustive. The Naiyāyikas and the grammarians have tried their utmost in forming the definitions of *karmatva*, *kartṛtva*, etc., so as to render them applicable to all possible instances. But they could not successfully cope with the immensity of the task. A careful examination of some

¹ कारकार्थतरार्था च सुप् द्विधा च विभज्यते ।—*Śabdasakti*, *Kār.* 67.

² सुपा कर्मादयोऽप्यर्थाः संख्या चैव तथा तिङात् ।—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. II, p. 58. सुपा सख्या चैवार्थः कर्मादयश्च ।

कर्मादयो विभक्त्यर्थाः (and एकत्वादयो विभक्त्यर्थाः) ।

³ आश्रयोऽवधिरद्देशः सम्बन्धः शक्तिरेव वा ।

यथायद्यं विभक्त्यर्थाः सुपा कर्मेति भाष्यतः ॥

—*Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, *Kār.* 24.

instances will make it clear that the meanings of the *sup*-terminations are manifold. We may hold without going into minute details that the *substratum* is the meaning of the accusative, the instrumental and the locative. *Karman* is the substratum of the fruit resulting from action. In connection with *Kriyā* and *Kāraṇa* two things are to be specially noticed—action (*vyāpāra*) and the fruit resulting from it (धातूपत्तव्यापार-जन्यफलम्).

In an expression like 'Devadatta is going to the village', the action, *i.e.*, movement, resides in Devadatta, while the fruit produced by such action, *viz.* conjunction, accrues to the village. In the same way *Karāṇa* and *Adhikarāṇa* may also be shown as what denote the substratum of action. Now what we like to impress is that the second case-ending, as shown above, does not only denote *substratum* but has manifold significance. In the *Vyutpattivāda*, Gadādhara has elaborately dealt with the meaning of *vibhaktis*. We propose to give here only a few instances from the *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* and the *Vyutpattivāda*.

On the strength of the rule *Pāṇ.* 2.3.2., Gadādhara observes that the second case-termination signifies *karmatva*, *i.e.*, the state or quality of possessing the fruit resulting from an action (*kriyājanyaphalaśālītvam*). Generally speaking, *ādheyatva* or the state of being the subsistent is the meaning of the second case-termination, as shown in the foregoing examples,

but it has other meanings also. In the sentence¹ *ghaṭaṃ jñāti, viśayatva* or 'the state of being the object of cognition' is directly implied by the second case-termination, while *limit* is denoted by the same case-ending in *ūrabhya tasyāṃ daśamīm ca yāvat*. Again, the second case-ending is also found to signify *vidheyatva* or *uddeśyatva* in connection with roots meaning 'to infer,' as is evident from the example *cahniṃ-anuminomi*.² In *taruṃ tyajati khagaḥ*, the *drīṭyā-vibhakti* means separation (*vibhāga*), and *ādhika-
ranatva* in an instance like *Kāśīmanurasati*. Thus we find that *ādheyatva*, *uddeśyatva*, *avadhitrā*, *vidheyatva*, *nirūpitatva*, (as in *māmantareṇa*), *pratīyogitva*, *anuyogitva* (as in *dandam vinā*) are all denoted by the second case-ending.

It should be also noticed that *vibhaktis* fall under two classes in grammar. *Kāraka* or case-terminations and *Upapada-vibhakti*, the former denoting *Kāraka* and the latter coming only when certain words are added and have no connection with *Kriyā*. When these two classes of *vibhaktis* are simultaneously applicable in regard to an instance like *namaskaroti devān*, the *Paribhāṣā*⁴ enjoins that case-terminations will have preference to *Upapada-vibhaktis*.

¹ घटं जानातीत्यत्र विषयत्वं विप्रयिता वा द्वितीयाद्यः—*Śabdaśakti*.

² अनुमित्यर्थकधातुयोगे विधेयत्वमुद्देश्यत्वं वा द्वितीयाद्यः—*Vyutpattivāda*,
p. 55.

³ अन्तरालरेण-युक्ते इति द्वितीयाया निरूपितत्वमर्थः—*Ibid* p. 77.

⁴ उपपदविभक्तिः कारकविभक्तिर्बलीयसी ।

The rule *Pāṇ.* 2.3.18. implies that both the agent and the instrumental having relation to *Kriyā* are primarily denoted by the third case-ending. Durgasiṃha observes that in sentences like *prakṛtīyā cāru* (beautiful by nature) the word *prakṛti* may be taken as denoting the instrumental (*karaṇa*) in connection with such a verbal form as *bhavati*¹ that is to be supplied to make the sense complete. In *dandena ghaṭaḥ* (which is admittedly an instance of *hetu*) the third case-ending, as Jagadīśa² maintains, indicates *karaṇatva*, though it is not regarded as a *Kāraṇa* on the ground of its having no relation with action. In *ghaṭatvena jānāti*, *trītiyā* implies *prakāratā* or the state of being an adjective. As both subordination³ to the action of the agent as well as a cause⁴ associated with action are denoted by the third case-ending, Gadādhara arrives at the conclusion that it has a two-fold⁵ signification. This view is quite analogous to the statement of Bhartrhari.

Substratum or recipient is said to be the general meaning of the third and seventh

¹ प्रकृत्यादीनामपि करणत्वमस्ति भवतेर्गस्यमानत्वात् ।—*Trīkā* under the rule येन क्रियते तत् करणम्—*Kalāpa*, 218;

तथा ह्यभिरूपभवने प्रकृतिः करणम्—*Ibid.*

² दण्डेन घट इत्यत्रापि तृतीयार्थः करणत्वम् । परन्तु तत्र कारकं क्रियानन्वयित्वान् ।—*Sabdaśaktiprakāśikā*.

³ व्यापारि कर्तृव्यापाराधीनत्वं निवेशनीयम् ।—*Vyutpattivāda*, p. 85.

⁴ करणत्वं तृतीयार्थः, तच्च व्यापारवत्करणत्वम् ।—*Ibid.*

⁵ वस्तुतः समभिव्याहृतकर्तृव्यापाराधीनत्वे व्यापारवत्करणत्वे च तृतीयाद्याः शक्तिद्वयम् ।—*Vyutpattivāda*, p. 86.

case-endings. From the very definition of *karṣṭva* and *adhikarṇatva*, it appears that both the agent and *adhikarṇa* are, as a rule, regarded as the substratum of action (*kriyāśrayatva*). The difference between them lies in the fact that the agent is directly connected with a *Kriyā*, while *Adhikarṇa* connects itself with a *Kriyā* only indirectly, i.e., through the medium of either the subject or the object. This is quite clear from the definition of *Adhikarṇa* as suggested by Bhartṛhari.¹

The fourth case-ending denotes *Sampradāna*, i.e., implies the purpose (*uddeśya*). This sense is obtained from the expression *yanabhipraiti* in the rule Pāṇ. 1. 4. 32. The fourth case-ending also indicates *ādheyatva*, as in *maitrāya rocate* and *viṣayitva* in such instances as *Caitrāya kupyati*, *puṣpebhyah sprhayati*.

The fifth case-ending denotes *avadhi* or limit of separation. It also means *janyatva* or the state of being a product, as in *dharmādutpadyate sukham*. Here virtue is the cause that produces happiness as its effect. Sometimes it implies substratum and place of origination as, in *valmīkāgrāt prabhavati* and *himavato Gangā prabhavati*. It is not grammatically correct to use the word *dhruva* in its literal sense, i.e. 'motionless,' as in that case one fails to support *Apādāna-kāraka* in the example

¹ कर्तृकर्मव्यवहितानसाचादधारयत् क्रियाम् ।

उपकुर्वत् क्रियासिद्धौ शब्देऽधिकरणं द्युतम् ॥—Vākyapadīya.

dhāvato aśvāt patitaḥ where the *limit* of separation is far from being motionless. But Patañjali has taken a peculiar position. He maintains that in *dhāvato aśvāt patitaḥ* (fallen from a running horse) 'the state of being a horse' and the swift motion are to be considered as *dhruva*.¹

The genitive implies *sambandha*; it is said to have various meanings. The relation is of various kinds. It is to be particularly noticed here that *sambandha*, as is denoted by the genitive, is excluded from the category of *Kāraka*² and *ṣaṣṭhī* is not treated as a case-termination (as it has no direct connection with the action).

After showing the different meanings of case-terminations, the grammarians have finally arrived at the conclusion that efficiency or *Śakti* alone is denoted by all case-endings.³ It has already been pointed out in these pages that all objects of thought, as are denoted by words, represent but different manifestations of *Śakti*,⁴ and that time, space, action, and *Kāraṅkas* are only various forms of *Śakti* which pervades the entire world of thought. The inconceivable

¹ यदर्थेऽश्वत्वमायुगानित्वं तदङ्गुवं तच्च विवक्षितम्—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I. p. 327.

² सम्बन्धो न कारकं, न वा तदर्थिकापि षष्ठी कारकविभक्तिः—Śabdaśakti-prakāśikā, under *Kār.* 67.

³ शक्तिर्विभक्तिवाच्या ।—Helārāja on the *Vākyapadīya*, *Kār.* 3. 13.

⁴ निमित्तमेदादेकैव भिन्ना शक्तिः प्रतीयते । योदा कर्तृत्वमेवाहुस्तत्प्रवृत्ति-निबन्धनम् ॥—*Vākyapadīya*, 3. 37, p. 199.

force that brought this universe into existence and whereby everything is being regulated is considered to be an inexhaustible and perpetual reservoir of *Śakti* or efficiency revealing itself through diverse objects. What is called life or conscious principle is ultimately an emblem of this all-pervading force. According to this view, therefore, everything is made up of *Śakti* or essentially a congregate of efficiency. This *Śakti* is, again, said to be either identical with, or different from, the object wherein it inheres.

Substratum¹ (i.e., the agent and the object) is said to be ordinarily meant by *ākhyāta*-terminations. We have already said that *action* as well as *fruit* are expressed by roots (*phala-vyāpārayordhātuḥ*). Udayana² maintains that *effort* (*yatna*) *favourable to action* is the meaning of all *ākhyātas*. A root, some hold,³ signifies only *effort* and *ākhyāta* denotes the favourable action, the sense of effort being derivable by means of inference. Some hold that *tin*-terminations express action (*vyāpāra*) and do not actually signify the agent. The grammarians, however, do not agree with them; for whenever a verbal form is used, the subject is at once comprehended. The

¹ धातुप्रकृतिकतिडां कर्तृकर्मरूप आश्रयोऽर्थः । तच्च कर्तरि व्यापाराश्रयः, कर्मणि फलाश्रयः । धातुयन्मातानुवादकस्तु भावे तिङ्—*Mañjūśā* (तिङ्श्रयनिरूपण) again आश्रये तु तिङः स्मृताः—*Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*.

² भावनेव हि यदात्मा सर्वाध्यातव्य गोचरः ।—*Kuṣumāṇjali*, 5. 9.

³ धातुना यवः प्रतीयते, आध्यातव्य चानुकूलव्यापारमावार्थकत्वमादिपादेव च यत्र लाभः ।—*Ibid.* *Tikā*.

Mīmāṃsakas ¹ hold that *bhāvanā* or action is practically denoted by *tin*-suffixes, ² the subject being cognisable by means of *arthāpatti*. The grammarians have rejected this view on the following ground :—if action or *bhāvanā* is to be regarded as the meaning of terminations, there would be no idea of action in *bhoktavyam* which has got no *ākhyāta* suffix immediately following it. The rule Pāṇ. 1.3.9. is also an indication that roots are expressive of action. According to Kātyāyana, it is the root that expresses action and not the termination ; for in *pacati* and *apāksīt* the meanings of the suffixes are varying, whereas the root *pac* with its significance remains practically the same. By the application of the method of agreement and difference it is possible to determine the distinct signification of both bases and suffixes. ³ It is further held that number, time, *Kāraṅgas* and action are generally denoted by *ākhyātas*. The expression ⁴ ‘*Caitra* is going to the village’ means accordingly an action favourable for the present conjunction of the agent who is one and non-different from *Caitra* with the object that is non-different from (or identical with) the village.

¹ नख्ठननित्याः—फलमात्रं धात्वर्थः व्यापारः, प्रत्ययार्थः ।

² संख्यायां कारको बोधो विभक्त्या हि प्रवर्तते ।

उभयं चात्र तत् सिद्धं भावना तिङ्-विभक्तिः ॥ (Kartradhikaraṇa).

³ सिद्धं तन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्याम्—*Pār*.

⁴ एकत्वावच्छिन्नचैवाभिन्नकर्तृको वर्तमानकालिको यासाभिन्नकर्मनिष्ठो यः संयोगस्तदनुकूलो व्यापारः ।

According to the Naiyāyikas, *lakāras* imply the agent, time and number. *Laṭ* means present time (*varṭamāna*). There is also doubt whether the sense of *lakāras* is expressed (*vācya*) or suggested only. Bhaṭṭoji seems to be in favour of the expressiveness of *lakāras*. *Liṭ* is used to denote *pāroḥṣya*, viz., the state of being invisible, or imperceptibility of action. When *liṭ* is used in the first person, sometimes we have a peculiar meaning. The expressions सुप्तोऽहं किं विचिन्ताय, नाहं कलिङ्गं जगाम, etc., are intended to show that the speaker was either in a sleeping mood or in a state of oblivion. *Loṭ* means almost the same as *lin*, that is, injunction, invitation, etc., or, in one word, inducement (*pravarttanā*).

There are certain suffixes like *kyac*, *kyan*, *kāmyac*, *san*, *yan*, which appear to be the last part of a root. These are called secondary suffixes ; they have either *Nāman*¹ or *Dhātu* as their bases. The suffixes like *kyac*, *kyan* are added to *Nāmans* (*nāmadhātu*), while *san*, *yan*, etc., come after roots (*dhātvantāvayavarūpaḥ*).

It is not correct to say that the *taddhita*-suffixes, as a rule, have *Nāman*² as their bases, because case-endings as well as suffixes like *kyac*, etc., are also added to *Nāmans*. By *taddhita*,³ Jagadīśa understands those suffixes

¹ नामप्रकृतिकथायं धातुप्रकृतिकस्तथा—*Śabdaśakti*, Kār. 109.

² नामप्रकृतिको नैवसतिव्याप्तादिदोषतः— *Ibid.* 110.

³ विभक्तिधातुशब्दयोऽन्यः प्रत्ययस्तद्वितम्— *Ibid.*

that are distinguished from *vibhaktis* (*sup* and *tin*), suffixes that form the last part of roots and *kṛt*-suffixes. The *taddhita* suffixes are of different kinds. We give below only a few specimens of these suffixes :—(i) some of them are patronymic suffixes (*apatyārtha-pratyaya*), as, *aṇ*, *iṇ*, etc. (*kaurava*, *aupagava*) ; (ii) some express modification as, *āśma* (modification of stone) ; (iii) some express colouring ; (iv) some denote one's deity (*sāśya devatā*) as, *Śaiva* (one who has Śiva as his adorable deity) ; (v) some denote one's place of residence ; (vi) some express one's possession, as, *gomān* (one having cows) ; (vii) some denote a collection, as *yauvatam* (an assemblage of young ladies) ; (viii) some are expressive of time, as *māsika* (continued for a month). From a grammatical point of view, the *taddhita*-termination *aṇ* in *aīndram harīḥ* is used to express (*sāśya devatā*) the clarified butter which is offered to Indra as the deity. Kōṇḍabhaṭṭa says that the suffix *aṇ* in such a case means 'what is to be offered to a deity' (*devatā-viśiṣṭam deyam*). In the above instance, *deyam* or what is to be offered is used substantively and the deity to whom such an offering is made appears to be attributive.² According to another view, both the deity and the substance to be offered are the meanings of the suffix.

¹ तद्विभक्तिः इति प्रत्ययः ।—Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa.

² प्रत्ययः, कर्तुः प्रत्ययः विविधम् ।—Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa, Kār. 52.

It is also held that the base denotes the deity and the suffix expresses the offering.¹

Bhāva (*Sattā*) or existence is what is expressed by all *Prātipadikas*. This *sattā* is the same as *sumnum genus* (*mahāsāmānya* ²) which permeates through the world, only cognisable as differentiated in different individuals. It is expressed by all words; it is signified by all *Prātipadikas*, roots and suffixes like *tra* and *tal*. These two suffixes generally express the idea of a class and sometimes indicate existence or the ultimate reality of things. Patañjali has clearly shown what is precisely denoted by the suffixes *tra* and *tal* while commenting on the two *Vārttikas* on the rule Pāṇ. 5. 1. 119. Konda-bhaṭṭa says in the beginning that the signification of the two *taddhita* suffixes, i.e., *tra* and *tal* (expressing 'the state of becoming,' or quality, or property) has been fully discussed by Bhartṛhari in his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* (which is no longer available). The drift of his statement is as follows: the suffixes *tra* and *tal* are added to *kṛdanta*, *samāsānta* and *taddhitānta* as expressive of relation.³ 'The expression of relation' is the sole purpose that is served by the addition of these two suffixes. The following

¹ देवतायां प्रदेये च खण्डशः शक्तिरस्तु वा।—*Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*.

² सम्बन्धिभेदात् सत्तैव भिद्यमाना गवादिषु। जातिरित्युच्यते तस्यां सव शब्दा व्यवस्थिताः। तां प्रातिपदिकार्थं च धात्वर्थं च प्रचक्षते। सा नित्या सा महानात्मा तामाहुस्तत्तादयः॥—*Vākyapadīya*, 3. 34.

³ कृत्तद्धितसमासेभ्यः सम्बन्धाभिधानं भावप्रत्ययेनाश्रित दृश्यभिन्न—
रूपायभिन्नरितसम्बन्धेभ्यः।—*Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, under *Kār.* 49.

instances will make the point clear. In *rājapuruṣatva* a relation between the king and the servant; in *pācakatva* a relation between an action and the agent; in *aupagavatva* a relation between the father and the son is denoted and so on. Kaiyaṭa observes that when the word *gauḥ* is used to denote only a class (*gotva*), these suffixes would then imply only 'the form of a word' (*Śabda-svarūpe bhāva-pratyaya*),¹ but when it is used to express only an individual, the suffixes would then necessarily imply a *class* that would serve as an attributive. The terminations denoting an abstract idea, as in *sato bhāvaḥ sattā*,² are generally used to indicate a class. Kaiyaṭa³ finally concludes that *sattā* or existence is the only meaning of such suffixes (*bhāva-pratyaya*).

There are two *Vārttikas* which throw much light on the meaning of *bhāva*. The first *Vārttika*⁴ is intended to imply that the suffixes *tva* and *tal* are used to express that outstanding property (*guṇa*, *jāti*) or the ultimate reality of a thing) by virtue of the possession of which a thing generally gets its particular designation or name. According to this interpretation, what accounts for the use of a word in a particular

¹ गवादयः शब्दा यदा जातिमात्रवाचिनस्तदा तेभ्यः शब्दस्वरूपे भावप्रत्ययः ।

—Kaiyaṭa.

² सत्तेति जातावेव भावप्रत्ययः ।

³ तस्मात् सर्वेषु पदार्थेषु नित्यसमवायिनी सत्तेव भावप्रत्ययवाच्या ।

⁴ सिद्धं तु यत्तु गुणस्य भावाद्भवे शब्दनिवेशस्तदभिधाने त्व-तलौ ।

—Vār., under the rule Pāṇ., 5. 1. 119.

sense is the inherent properties (*guna*, *jāti*, etc.) of the object denoted (*pravṛttinimitta*). The Naiyāyikas hold that these suffixes are added to words (as *ghatatva*, *manuṣyatra*, etc.) to express the idea of a class. As the Naiyāyikas usually comprehend the individual with direct reference to the class to which it belongs, they are apt to speak of a *ghata* as *ghatatāvacchinna*, i.e., the concept of *ghaṭa* as conditioned or qualified by that of the genus (*ghatatva*). It is almost evident that the meaning expressed by *tva* and *tal* seems to be as good as a qualifying attribute in relation to the meaning of the base to which they are added. This is exactly what is meant by Kondabhaṭṭa when he states *prakṛtyartha-prakūratām* ¹ According to the second *Vārttika*,² the meaning of a word is exactly what it signifies by the force of its natural expressiveness. The word *gauḥ*, for instance, has *gotva* as its *pravṛttinimitta*, or the object for which it is used. Here *śabda* itself, with its meaning as denoted by the suffixes *tva* and *tal*, acts as an attributive. The sense denoted by a word serves as an instrument so far as the use of that word (for the purpose of expressing the sense) is concerned. That it is the same with the knowledge of the meaning is also sufficiently clear from

¹ प्रकृतिजन्यबोधे प्रकारो भावः ।—Bhaṭṭojī under the rule Paṇ, 5 1
119

² यद्वा सर्व भावा स्तेन भावेन भवन्ति स तेषां भावस्तदभिधाने ।—Vār. under
Paṇ, 5 1. 119

Gaṅgeśa's definition of *Śabdaprāmāṇya*¹ or the trustworthiness of *Śabda*.

Kṛt-suffixes have roots as their bases. Those that are used in the active and passive voices denote respectively the *agent* and the *object*.² The suffixes like *ghañ*, *ktin*, etc., generally express *bhāva* (action). *Bhāva* denoted by a suffix like *ghañ* is accomplished (*siddha*). The word *pākaḥ* is found to require a verbal form as *bhavati* and has both number and gender. Patañjali³ has shown two-fold *bhāva*—*bāhya* and *ābhyantara*. *Bhāva* denoted by suffixes like *ghañ* is called *bāhya* and that denoted by suffixes as *tumun*, etc., is denominated as *ābhyantara*. *Kriyā* or action manifests itself in two different forms, namely, *siddha*⁴ or accomplished and *asiddha* or unaccomplished; the former means an action like *gamana* that is accomplished, *i.e.*, cessation of movement, and the latter indicates the continuity of action as *gacchati*. A *bhāva* when accomplished and followed by a *kṛt*-suffix seems to be as good as a substance and in consequence of such materialisation it comes to have gender

¹ प्रयोगहेतुभूतार्थतत्त्वज्ञानजन्यः शब्दः प्रमाणम्—Tattvacintāmaṇi—*Śabdakhaṇḍa*, Vol. I, p. 1.

² कर्तृकर्मविहितकृतां कर्तृकर्मणी वाच्ये—Mañjūṣā, कृदर्थानिरूपणम्, p. 108.

³ *Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. II, p. 177.

⁴ क्रियायाः सिद्धतावस्था साध्यावस्था च कीर्तिता ।

सिद्धतां द्रव्यमिच्छन्ति ततैवेच्छन्ति घञ्-विधिम् ॥—*Vākyapadīya*.

साध्यत्वेन क्रिया तत्र धातुरूपनिबन्धना ।

सिद्धभावस्तु यस्तस्याः स घञादिनिबन्धनः ॥—*Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*.

and number and is finally treated as a *Kāraka* in relation to some other verbal forms, as *gamanam karoti*. This is the import of the grammatical dictum¹ (कृदभिहितो भावो द्रव्यवत् प्रकाशते) which clearly states that an action (*bhāta*) expressed by *krt* suffixes appears to be just like a substance and thus deserves all the functions of a *Prātīpadika*. *Kṛtya* (*tavya*, *antya*, etc.) and *lhalārtha-pratyayas*, when used to express *bhāta*, denote an action that is unaccomplished. Similar is the case with the suffix *lta* when used to denote *bhāva* only. In an instance like *edhitavyam*, it must be borne in mind that there is no desire for any other verb to make the sense complete. Patāñjali² has clearly shown the difference between *bhāva* as expressed by *tin* and *kṛt* suffixes, the former suggesting the idea of time and person and the latter producing the sense of a thing. There is another way of distinguishing them, as *bhāva* denoted by *tin* is generally connected with the agent, while *bhāva*, as expressed by *kṛt*, is not similarly related to the agent (*pacati* gives the idea of an agent but *pākaḥ* simply means the action, i. e., cooking). Words formed by a number of *krt* suffixes such as, *tumun*, *ltvāc*,

¹ Mahābhāṣya under the rule Paṇ., सार्वधातुके यक्—3. 1. 67

² अस्मि विक्षेप. कृदभिहितस्य भावस्य तिङभिहितस्य च। तिङभिहितेन भावेन कालप्रयोगगृह्य अभिव्यज्यते, कृदभिहितेन पुनर्न व्यज्यते...तिङभिहितो भावः कर्त्ता संप्रयुज्यते, कृदभिहितः पुनर्न संप्रयुज्यते।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol II, p 57. and क्रियाभिनिवृत्तिवशापञ्चात् कृदन्तशब्दाभिहितो यदा ग्यात्।

सख्याविभक्तद्रव्यतिङ्गुक्तो भावस्तदा द्रव्यमिवोपलभ्यते ॥—Brhaddevata

namul, etc., are grammatically treated as indeclinable (*avyaya*). These forms,¹ better known as *avyaya-kṛt*, denote *bhāva* as distinct from substance (*asattvabhūta-bhāva*) and have no regular number and gender. The verbal forms having *ktvā* and *tumun* are generally used as adjunct in relation to those that follow them. So far as the suffix *ktvā* is concerned, the two *kriyās* are related to each other, as both of them have got the same subject and stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority. On the authority of the rule Pān., 3. 3. 10, Nāgeśa holds that *tādarthya* as implying a purpose is also indicated by *tumun*. In accordance with this view, the expression *Kṛṣṇam draṣṭum yāti* will mean *one's movement for the purpose of seeing Kṛṣṇa*.

¹ Mañjūṣā, Kṛdathanirūpaṇam, pp. 1083-84.

CHAPTER VII

KĀRAKA

Kāraḥ—its definition—*Śakti* manifested as *Kāraḥ*—
different forms of *Kāraḥ*.

Closely connected with the meaning of case-terminations is the function of *Kāraḥ*. *Kāraḥ*, as the very term implies,¹ is intimately related to *Kriyā* or action. The idea of *Kāraḥ* is dependent on that of *Kriyā*. It is its relation with *Kriyā* that determines the nature of a *Kāraḥ*. *Kriyā*, which plays so important a part in the determination of *Kāraḥ*, is, as Patañjali² observes, denoted by roots and is invisible, formless and only comprehensible by means of inference.

Generally speaking, *Kriyā* means action (*vyāpāra*). *Kriyā* implies, some hold, action, effort (*kṛti* or *yatna*) and result (*phala*). There is a peculiar combination of these three in the grammatical conception of *Kriyā*. *Kriyā* is, after the grammarians, an action accompanied with effort and leading to the result. According to Udayana,³ the meaning of a root is

¹ क्रियां करोतीति कारकम् and क्रियान्वयित्वं कारकत्वम् ।

² धात्वर्थः क्रिया । क्रियावचनो धातुः । क्रिया नामेयमव्ययतापरिदृष्टा . . सासावन्तुमानगम्या ।—*Mahābhāṣya* under the rule Pāṇ., 1.3.1.

³ यत् एव कृतिः पूर्वा, परकिन् सैव भावना ।—*Kusumāñjali*, *Kār.* 5. 8.

effort (*yatna*) producing an action. When this exertion is directed towards the production of the result, it is called *bhāvanā*, as is denoted by the *ākhyāta*-suffix. Durga¹ has defined *kriyā* as what appears to possess both prior and posterior parts. The process of inference whereby *Kriyā* is usually comprehended has been clearly illustrated by Patañjali.² Sometimes, when all the requisites of cooking, such as pot, fuel and fire, are actually present, we are not allowed to say *pacati*, until there is a particular effort indispensably necessary for the purpose. This sort of effort (*sādhana*) without which nothing is accomplished is called *Kriyā*.³ A *Kriyā*, like *pacati*, consists of many parts all of which, viewed as an undifferentiated whole, tend to produce the same result.⁴ From a grammatical point of view, *pacati* means a group of actions, namely, to place a pot on the fire-place, to set fire to, to throw fuel on and the like. As synonymous with *ihā*, *yatna*, etc., *Kriyā* comes within the scope of quality and as such pertains to things.

There are various agents (*sādhana*) whereby actions are generally performed; these agents, whether directly or indirectly related to action

¹ क्रियत इति क्रिया सा च पूर्वोपरौ सूतावयवैव ।—Under the rule *Kalāpa*, 9 (*ākhyāts*).

² इह सर्वेषु साधनेषु सन्निहितेषु कदाचित् पचतीत्येतद्वति कदाचित् भवति ।

—Mahābhāṣya under Pāp., 1. 4. 23.

³ यस्मिन् साधने सन्निहिते पचतीत्येतद्वति सा नू क्रिया ।—*Ibid.*

⁴ गरुतेरवयवैः सद्रूपः समग्रत्वनात् ।

इहाम प्रकल्पितसिद्धेः सा क्रियेत्यभिधीयते ॥—*Vākyapadīya*.

(*Kṛiyā*), are grammatically called *Kārahas*. There are, therefore, as many *Kārahas* as there are *sūdhanas* in relation to a particular action. In conformity with the interpretation of Durga,¹ *Kṛiyā* is immaterial and formless ; it comes under our comprehension only through the medium of *Kārahas*. *Kṛiyā*, like *guna*, is an inherent property lying dormant in all things, but gets itself manifested when objects are in operation to produce some sort of result. As the action denoted by the verbal form *patati* comprehends four things, namely, tree, leaf, ground and wind, we have in such a case as *rayunā rksāt parnam patati bhūman* precisely four *Kārahas*, according to their relation to the particular action (falling). The tree, for instance, which indicates the limit wherefrom the leaf falls down is called *Apādāna-kāraha*, the leaf that falls down and is thus primarily associated with the action is named *karṣ-lōraha*; the ground which forms the *substratum* of action is known as *Adhikarana-kāraha*, the wind that causes the leaf to fall is termed *Karana-kāraha*, or instrumental. The name of each *Kāraha*, as shown above, is thus suggestive of the relation in which a *Kāraha* stands to a *Kṛiyā*. Nāgesa² has dwelt at length on the definition of *Kṛiyā* as suggested by

¹ अमृता हि क्रिया निदधाना सा हि कारकेरभिव्यक्तमाना कारकवशेरेवमन्ती भवति निदधम् ।—*Nirukta* p 98

² सवकारकाणां धावघ इत्ययं ।—*Laghbumaṭṭī* p 514

Bhartṛhari. He begins with the statement that all *Kārakas*, as a rule, get themselves connected with *Kriyā*.

Turning to the definition of the term *Kāraka*, we meet with considerable difficulty owing to the difference of views on the subject. First, the term *Kāraka* seems to have been too popular to deserve any definition; Pāṇini accordingly speaks of *Kārake* as only an *adhikāra-sūtra*. Patañjali takes the word *Kārake* as indicating a *saṃjñā*¹ and goes on to say that grammatical *saṃjñās* are generally made by such words as are popularly found to be denotative of sense.² With the object of pointing out that the term *Kāraka* serves to indicate both *saṃjñā* and *saṃjñī*, he has defined it in the following way : ‘*sādhakam nirvartakam kāraka-saṃjñam bhavati*,’ which means that an agent gets the designation of *Kāraka* by virtue of performing some action. He has clearly shown the difficulty that becomes almost unavoidable,³ if the *saṃjñins* are not specifically indicated by the *saṃjñā*. Patañjali takes *Kāraka* as a *mahā-saṃjñā* with a view to show that the derivative meaning of the word (*karotīti kārakam*) is exactly harmonious

¹ किमिदं कारक इति ? संज्ञानिर्देशः ।—Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 4. 23.

² इह हि व्याकरणे ये वेते लोके प्रतीतपदार्थकाः शब्दास्तैर्निर्दिष्टाः क्रियन्ते ।—*Ibid.*

³ इतरथा ह्यनिष्टं प्रसज्येत । अकारकस्याप्युपादानसंज्ञा । ग्रामस्य समीपादा-गच्छतीति ।—*Ibid.*

with what it usually signifies.¹ But we cannot take *karotīti kārakam* as an accurate definition of *Kāraka* from a grammatical point of view. To define *Kāraka* simply as 'what performs an action' will serve to exclude all *Kārakas*, excepting *kartṛ-kāraka*, from the category. As a matter of fact, it is *kartā* alone that acts as the direct agent, so far as the performance of action is concerned; but *Kārakas* like *Karana* and *Adhikarana* are only indirectly (i.e., through the agency of *kartṛ*) related to *kriyā*.

Patañjali next proceeds to show how *Karana*² and *Adhikarana* may also be used as *kartṛ-kāraka* consistently with the etymological signification of the word *Kāraka*. The meaning of the roots like *pac* seems to be different in relation to different *Kārakas*.³ We say *Devadattah pacati* when Devadatta is found to pour water in the pot, to throw fuel into the fire-place and so on. This is, so to speak, the instance where the main agent of action is treated as *kartā*.⁴ But *kartṛtva* is sometimes transferred to *Karana* and *Adhikarana*, as in *kāsthāni pacanti* and *sthālī pacati*, respectively.

¹ महत्याः संज्ञायाः करण एतत् प्रयोजनमन्वयसंज्ञा यथा विज्ञायते, करोतीति कारकमिति ।—Mahabhasya under the rule 'Kārake'

² सिद्ध. करणाधिकरणयोः कर्तृभावः ।—*Ibid.*

³ पचादीनां हि प्रतिकारक क्रिया भिद्यते ।—*Ibid.*

⁴ एतत् प्रधानकर्तुः कर्तृत्वम् ।—*Ibid.*

Under the rule Kalāpa, 221 (*kār.*), Durgasimha is found to have given a definition ¹ (*kriyā-nimittam Kāraṇam*) which means 'Kāraṇa is the cause of action.' This definition, we are told, is sanctioned by the popular usage. We have other definitions as well—*kriyājanakatvam kārakatvam*, *kriyānvayitvam kārakatvam* and so on. There is, however, some difficulty with regard to the definition as suggested by Durga, because the word *nimitta*, as synonymous with *kāraṇa*, means *cause* and, consequently, it must have antecedence to *kriyā*.² But in an instance of *nirvarttaya-karman* such as, *ghaṭam karoti*³ (making a pot), the pot is not logically supposed to have existence prior to the action, and, therefore, it is not strictly correct to take *ghaṭa* as an example of *karma-kāraṇa*. Having raised this objection, Suṣeṇa proceeds to support it by holding that the antecedence of the knowledge of pot is here attributed to the pot itself by a process of transference (*upacāra*).

Sambandha, though indirectly connected with *kriyā* as a remote cause of action, is grammatically excluded from the category of *Kāraṇa*, inasmuch as the term *Kāraṇa* is used by the

¹ क्रियानिमित्तं कारकं लोकोक्तः सिद्धम् ।

² अन्यथा सिद्धिश्च्युते सति नियतपूर्ववर्तित्वम् ।

³ घटं करोतीत्यत्र निर्वर्त्यकर्माणः कथं क्रियानिमित्तत्वम् ? क्रियासिद्धौ घटस्य नियतपूर्ववर्तित्वाभावात् । सत्यम् । क्रियासिद्धौ घटज्ञानस्य पूर्ववर्तित्वसिद्धत्वात्, घटस्यापि पूर्ववर्तित्वमुपचर्यते इत्यदोषः ।—Kāraṇa, Kavirāja on the rule 221.

grammarians as a technical name¹ (*rūḍha-śabda*) applicable only to six cases. The way in which Jagadīśa has discussed the definition of *Kāraka* and specially the nature of *sambandha* deserves special consideration for logical accuracy. He defines *Kāraka*² as what is denoted by *sup* or case-endings and is apparently used as a qualifying attribute in relation to *kriyā*. As to the exclusion of *sambandha* from the category of *Kāraka*, he observes that neither *śaṣṭhi*³ (as expressive of relation) is regarded as a case-termination (*Kāraka-vibhakti*), nor is *sambandha* grammatically treated as a form of *Kāraka*, simply for the reason that *sambandha* does never directly qualify the action. Consequently, an expression like *tanḍulasya pacati*, directly connecting the verbal form with a word indicating *sambandha*, is not at all sanctioned by the popular usage. The word *śeṣa*, which is a grammatical name denoting *sambandha*, is an indication that *sambandha* is excluded from *Kārakas* as such. Instances like (i) *durgatānām pratikurvīta*, (ii) *padmasyānukaroti*, (iii) *Lakṣmīrupakurute pareṣām*, etc., where the genitive is directly connected with *Kriyā*, present, so to speak, an

¹ सङ्ख्येय क्रियानिमित्तत्वेऽपि षट्सु कारकशब्दस्य दृढत्वात् न कारकत्वमिति संक्षेपः—Kavirāja (Kalāpa).

² धात्वर्थान्ते प्रकारो यः सुबन्धः सोऽत्र कारकम्—*Śabdaśakti.*, *Kār.* 67. and क्रियाप्रकारोभूतोऽर्थः कारकम्।—*Ibid.*

³ सम्बन्धो न कारकं न वा तदर्थिकापि षष्ठी कारकविभक्तिः।—*Ibid.*

anomaly. Jagadīśa¹ makes his way out by holding that the above instances, like *mātuḥ smarati*, *caurasya hinasti*, are special cases where the genitive is optionally used (in place of *dvitīyā*) in connection with some particular verb, viz., the accusative of the verbal form *karoti* preceded by the *Upasargas* as *prati*, *anu*, *upa* getting *ṣaṣṭhī* instead of *dvitīyā*.

Reference is further made to such instances as *daṇḍena ghaṭaḥ* and *bhūtaḥ ghaṭaḥ*² in order to show that the *instrumental* and the *locative* in these cases are not, from a strictly grammatical point of view, indicative of *Kāraṅkas*, since they have no relation to *Kriyā*. The primary condition of a *Kāraṅka* in general is to have a direct connection with *Kriyā*. *Karṇa*, as a class of *Kāraṅka*, is thus differentiated from *hetu*, for it has no necessary or indispensable connection with the action. But what has proved a stumbling block to Jagadīśa is an instance like *mama pratibhāti*,³ where the genitive seems to be irreconcilable with the verb. On the strength of such popular usage as *sā me pratibhāti*, we hold that the plausible view in support of these expressions and the like is to comprehend certain words (*idam* or

¹ क्रियाविशेषयोगे कारकार्थेव षष्ठी । प्रयोगदृष्ट्या प्रत्यनूयेभ्यः करोतिः कर्मण्यपि वैकल्पिकस्य षष्ठीविधेर्वैकल्यात्वात् ।—*Śabdaśakti*.

² दण्डेन घट इत्यादौ तु तृतीयादर्थः करणत्वादिकं न कारकं धात्वर्थान्वितत्वात् ।—*Ibid*.

³ प्रतिभादिक्रियायानसदादिः सम्बन्धः षष्ठा कथं बोध्यतामकारकविभक्तित्वादिति नि. पावनीयम्—*Śabdaśakti*., under the *Kār*. 67.
घटस.

etad) agreeing with the verbal form *pratibhāti* and to explain the genitive in *mama* with reference to such words as *sannidhan* or *sakāṣe* understood.

While considering the different manifestations of *Śakti* or efficiency, we have seen that *Sādhana* which means an active agent in relation to an action also comes within the domain of *Śakti*.¹ Having taken an extreme view of *Śakti*,² some have tried to show that the entire universe is intrinsically made up of *Śakti*. 'How are we to know that it is *Śakti* and not *dravya* that is to be regarded as *Sādhana*? A thing is composed of a collection of *Śakti*. A *ghaṭa*, for instance, is essentially a combination of such *Śakti* as the capacity for fetching water; a seed has the power of producing a sprout and so on. Thus, all objects are found to be *efficient* for performing some actions. As *Śakti* is sometimes discriminated from *dravya*, as a distinct entity, Bhārtrhari understands *Sādhana* by *Śakti*, which is perceived to have direct association with actions. A thing, on the other hand, is not identified with *Sādhana* in accordance with this point of view, because a thing, limited as it is by its form, is not practically competent to perform all those diverse actions which naturally presuppose some kind of *Śakti* as the real active principle. Every

¹ क्रियाशानभिनिष्पत्तौ सामर्थ्यं साधनं विदुः—*Vākyapadīya*, 3. 1.

² शक्तिनातासमृद्धस्य विश्वस्यानेकधर्मणः—*Ibid.*

thing¹ has its inborn *Śakti* that is manifested when it is at work. *Śakti* always comprehends things as its substratum, and consequently, it cannot have its existence independently of things. The relation in which *Śakti* stands to objects is one of co-inherence (*samavāya*). Having thus shown *Sādhana* as a form of all-pervading *Śakti*, Bhartṛhari continues that *Śakti* is said to have six distinct but permanent divisions or forms corresponding to six *Kāraṅkas*.² A question may, however, arise here as to the precise number of *Śakti*, since *Śakti* appears to be numerous and diverse in its aspects, according as things wherein it inheres are manifold and seem to be different from one another in several aspects. Bhartṛhari takes recourse to the argument that a close examination of the various activities is sure to prove the reducibility of *Śakti* to six only. As an alternate view, it is further suggested on the analogy of *Kāraṅkas*, which, having either direct or indirect connection with actions, express but *karṣṭva* in its different aspects, that one and the same *Śakti*³ may be said to have six different forms just in proportion to the number of causes that serve to manifest it. The point

¹ सर्वत्र सहजा शक्तिर्यावद्दृश्यमवस्थिता ।—Vākyapadīya.

आययसमवेतास्तु शक्तयः ।—Helārāja.

² नित्याः षट् शक्तयः—Vākyapadīya,

and द्रव्याकारादिभेदेन तादापरिमिता इव ।

दृश्यन्ते तत्त्वमासां तु षट् शक्ती नान्विवर्तते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 36.

³ निमित्तभेदादेकैव भिन्ना शक्तिः प्रतीयते ।—Vākyapadīya, 3. 37.

that deserves particular notice in this connexion is that the term *Kāraka* is, strictly speaking, applicable to *kartṛ-kāraka* alone,¹ the other *Kārakas* (such as *Karāṇa*, etc.) getting their particular designation only as indicative of the different aspects of *kartṛtva*.

After dealing with the views with regard to both unity and diversity of *Śakti*, Bhartṛhari next takes up the question whether *Śakti*² is undifferentiated from things or has a distinct character of its own apart from the object. The grammarians, as Helārāja observes, are in favour of the latter point of view, as it is supported by both popular usage and grammar. Referring to the method of agreement and difference, Hari further attempts to strengthen his standpoint that *Śakti*, as represented by *Kārakas*, is virtually distinct from things. The burden of his arguments is as follows: as the meanings of case-terminations indicating *Kārakas* (*Karāṇa* and *Adhikarāṇa*) in forms like *vrkṣeṇa* and *vrkṣe* are actually different from those of the stem (*vrkṣa*), it is but reasonable to take *Śakti* as a distinct object of thought to which the grammatical term *Kāraka* is generally applied. It is almost incontestable that the standpoint

¹ निष्पत्तिमात्रे कर्तृत्वं सर्वत्रैवास्ति कारके । and तदधीनप्रवृत्तित्वात् प्रवृत्तानां निवर्तनात् ।—*Vākyapadiya*, 3, 99, again—घोडा कर्तृत्वमेवाहुस्तत्प्रवृत्तिनिवर्तनम् ।
—*Ibid*, 3, 37, कर्तृत्वमेवान्तरव्यापारविवक्षया करणादिव्यपदेशरूपतां भजते—

Helārāja.

² तत्त्वे वा व्यतिरेके वा व्यतिरिक्तं तदुच्यते—*Vākyapadiya*, 3, 38.

thing¹ has its inborn *Śakti* that is manifested when it is at work. *Śakti* always comprehends things as its substratum, and consequently, it cannot have its existence independently of things. The relation in which *Śakti* stands to objects is one of co-inherence (*samavāya*). Having thus shown *Sādhana* as a form of all-pervading *Śakti*, Bhartṛhari continues that *Śakti* is said to have six distinct but permanent divisions or forms corresponding to six *Kāraṅkas*.² A question may, however, arise here as to the precise number of *Śakti*, since *Śakti* appears to be numerous and diverse in its aspects, according as things wherein it inheres are manifold and seem to be different from one another in several aspects. Bhartṛhari takes recourse to the argument that a close examination of the various activities is sure to prove the reducibility of *Śakti* to six only. As an alternate view, it is further suggested on the analogy of *Kāraṅkas*, which, having either direct or indirect connection with actions, express but *kartṛtva* in its different aspects, that one and the same *Śakti*³ may be said to have six different forms just in proportion to the number of causes that serve to manifest it. The point

¹ सर्वत्र सहजा शक्तिर्यावद्द्वयमवस्थिता ।—Vākyapadīya.

आययसमवेतास्तु शक्तयः ।—Helārāja.

² नित्याः षट् शक्तयः—Vākyapadīya,

and द्रव्याकारादिभेदेन तावत्परिमिता इव ।

दृश्यन्ते तत्त्वसाक्षां तु षट् शक्ती नान्तिवर्तते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 36.

³ निमित्तभेदादेकैव भिन्ना शक्तिः प्रतीयते ।—Vākyapadīya, 3. 37.

that deserves particular notice in this connexion is that the term *Kāraka* is, strictly speaking, applicable to *karṭṛ-kāraka* alone,¹ the other *Kārakas* (such as *Karāṇa*, etc.) getting their particular designation only as indicative of the different aspects of *karṭṛtva*.

After dealing with the views with regard to both unity and diversity of *Śakti*, Bhartṛhari next takes up the question whether *Śakti*² is undifferentiated from things or has a distinct character of its own apart from the object. The grammarians, as Helārāja observes, are in favour of the latter point of view, as it is supported by both popular usage and grammar. Referring to the method of agreement and difference, Hari further attempts to strengthen his standpoint that *Śakti*, as represented by *Kārakas*, is virtually distinct from things. The burden of his arguments is as follows: as the meanings of case-terminations indicating *Kārakas* (*Karāṇa* and *Adhikarāṇa*) in forms like *vrkṣeṇa* and *vrkṣe* are actually different from those of the stem (*vrkṣa*), it is but reasonable to take *Śakti* as a distinct object of thought to which the grammatical term *Kāraka* is generally applied. It is almost incontestable that the standpoint

¹ निष्पत्तिमात्रे कर्तृत्वं सर्ववैवास्ति कारके । and तदधोमग्रहणित्वात् ग्रहणानां निवर्तनात् ।—*Vākyapadīya*, 3, 99, again—घोटा कर्तृत्वमेवाहुस्तत्प्रहतिनिवन्धनम् ।
—*Ibid*, 3, 37, कर्तृत्वमेवान्नरव्यापारविवक्षया करणादिव्यपदेशरूपतां भजते—

Helārāja.

² तत्त्वे वा व्यतिरेके वा व्यतिरिक्तं तदुच्यते—*Vākyapadīya*, 3, 38.

taken by the grammarians goes directly against that of the Naiyāyikas who refuse to take *Śakti* as a separate entity. According to the Naiyāyikas, fire and the power of producing burning sensation (*dāhikā-śakti*) are not materially two distinct objects. They do not recognise any difference between *Śakti* and the object possessing it (*śaktimān*). What we practically learn from a careful study of the various aspects of *Śakti* as such and what proves to be of vital importance from the grammatical point of view may be thus briefly summarised : *Sādhana*, which is only a name for *Kāraka*, is nothing but a form of *Śakti*, and, accordingly, *Kāraḥ* like *Karman*, *Karaṇa*, etc., so far as they are denoted by particular case-endings, are only indicative of *Śakti*, or the power of performing actions as we may call it. Moreover, a mere grammatical derivation of the terms *Sādhana* and *Kāraka* is sufficient to show that they are synonymous for all practical purposes and are expressive of *Śakti*, viz., efficiency or efficient object (if efficiency is held to be undifferentiated from the efficient object).

Gopīnātha, the well known commentator on the *Kātantra-pariśiṣṭa*, has also elaborately dealt with the grammatical aspect of the problem. He seems to have arrived at the same conclusion, i.e., identity of *Śakti* with *Kāraka*. The question ¹ is first

¹ अथ द्रव्यादयो वा द्रव्यादिशक्तयो वा शक्तिमन्तो वा कारकाणि ।—*Parīśiṣṭa*, *Kāraḥprakarāṇam*.

raised whether substance, quality, action, class, etc., or the potency inherent in them, or, 'things possessing such potency' are to be taken as *Kārakas*. Next, he proceeds to show that none of these standpoints are free from objections. The defect underlying the first view is as follows: if substance,¹ quality, etc., which have their essential character, as is represented by the class, unalterable by nature, are identified with *Kārakas* as such, we cannot possibly justify the instances² like *sthāli pacati*, *sthālyā pacati*, *sthālyām pacati*, and *sthālm pacati* where one and the same substance (*sthāli*) appears to be different so far as its connection with the action is concerned. *Sthāli pacati*, for example, where *sthāli* is used as the direct active agent, is distinguished from *sthālyā pacati* where *sthāli* is no longer *kartā* but only an instrument of action (cooking). But as a matter of fact, *sthāli*, as is conditioned by its essential aspect (*sthālitva*), is one and knows no diversity at all. The second view is also untenable, for if it were so (i.e., if only activities of things were *Kārakas*), it would be unjustifiable to use the term *Kāraka* with direct reference to things³ (as we take *ṛkṣa* to be an instance of *Apādūna-kāraka* in *ṛkṣāt parṇam patati*).

¹ स्वप्नेदिमावादेकव्याख्यादानादि-मानार्थमात्रसङ्गात्—*Parīkṣā*.

² अपादानादिकारकव्यपदेशो भोषयति सर्वकारकाणां परस्परव्यावर्तकत्वात्—
Ibid.

³ न द्वितीयः । वृषादावपादानादि-कारकव्यवहारविलोपापत्तेः—*Parīkṣā*,
Kāraka.

The third ¹ one is also open to criticism on the ground that *Śakti* can neither be taken as an attributive (*viśeṣaṇa*), nor as an *upalakṣaṇa* (characteristic) with regard to things, the former giving rise to mere prolixity and the latter rendering the assumption of *Śakti* entirely futile. Having thus shown the untenable features of the above-mentioned standpoints, Gopīnātha then puts forward his own views. *Kāraṇa*,² he holds, is the same as *Śakti*, which is supposed to have different forms; substance, etc., are to be understood as the substratum of such divergent *Śakti*. As to the application of the term *kāraṇa* to a thing like *vrkṣa*, etc., Gopīnātha explicitly states that it is simply to imply the non-difference between *Śakti* and the object possessing *Śakti* that things are popularly comprehended by *Kāraṇas*.

He has further raised an important point. There is, strictly speaking, no such rigid principle as to restrict the use of certain *Kāraṇas* to particular things, because the subjective element, such as the intention of the speaker, appears to be a prominent factor that often regulates the use of *Kāraṇas*. Thus one and the same thing, such as *aśi* (sword) may be either used as *kartā* or *karana*, according as the

¹ न तृतीयः । विकल्पासहत्वात् । तथा हि शक्तिमतः कारकत्वे शक्तिर्विशेषण-
मुपलक्षणं वा ।—*Parīśiṣṭa*.

² शक्तिः कारकम् । भिन्नाश्च भवन्ति शक्तयः । भिन्नानां शक्तीनामाधारो
द्रव्यादयः ।—*Ibid*.

येन येन स्वरूपेण या या शक्तिर्विच्यते । तेन तेन स्वरूपेण सैव शक्तिस्तु कारकम् ॥

speaker intends to imply by the operation of the active agent or that of the instrumental (*asiśchinatti* and *asinā chinatti*) with regard to the action (*cutting*).

A word is only needed to ascertain the precise number of *Kārakas*. Hari has referred to six manifestations of *Śakti* corresponding to the six *Kārakas*. *Śakti* is essentially one and indivisible. It is *avidyā* or falsity that makes it look like different. The ultimate unity of *Śakti*¹ is only cognisable on the disappearance of *avidyā*. The whole world with all its diversities is only a materialised image of the infinite *cit-śakti*. Viewed from a transcendental standpoint, the so-called division of the world as *external* and *internal* has no real meaning. The word *Kāraka*, as used in grammar, seems to be an underivable one (*avyutpanna-śabda*)² that is restricted to the neuter gender only. That *Kārakas* are six in number requires no further explanation. But Gopīnātha seems to have shown some ingenuity in pointing out the possibility of reducing this number to five and ultimately to two only. *Kārakas*,³ he suggests, may be divided into five classes, according as

¹ अविद्याव्यवहारदशायां पृथक्त्वेन प्रकाशते, अविद्याविलये त्वेकत्वेन प्रकाशते इति बोद्धव्यम् ।—Helārāja, under the Vākyapadīya, Kār. 8. 89.

² कारकशब्दोऽयमव्युत्पन्नो निमित्तपर्यायः स्वभावात्तत्पञ्चकलिङ्गम्—Pañjī (Kalāpa) on the rule 231 (Kāraka).

³ कारकं पुनर्द्रव्यगुणक्रियाजातिस्वरूपमेवात् पञ्चविधम् । भूयश्च द्विविधं स्वशब्दवाच्यं परशब्दवाच्यं च—Parīśiṣṭa, Kāraka.

they are represented by substance, quality, action, class and the essential property. They may, again, fall under two categories, *viz. svaśabda-vācya* and *paraśabda-vācya*, as they are denoted by their respective technical terms or by some other words.

Of all *Sādhana*s, *kartṛ-kāraka* or the nominative case is taken up first, as one having direct connection with the action. Considering all those qualities that go to constitute a *Kāraka*, *kartṛ-kāraka* alone seems to be primarily connected with *kriyā*, and as such, is the *kāraka par excellence*. The aphorism of Pāṇini defining *kartṛ-kāraka* lays much stress on the independent character (*svātantrya*) of *kartṛ* by virtue of which the agent is distinguished from the rest. Patañjali expressly takes the word *svatantra* as an equivalent of *prādhāna* and explains such *prādhānya* with reference to the characteristic non-dependence of the agent on any accessories, so far as the performance of an action is concerned. It is to be particularly noticed ¹ that cases like *Karaṇa* and *Adhikaraṇa* are but auxiliaries that bring about the completion of the action under the direct operation of the subject. The agent, on the other hand, is not similarly subservient to those instruments of actions in the strict sense of the term. This is why *kartā* is called *svatantra* or self-dependent in opposition to the rest, that

¹ करणादीनां तु कर्तृविनियोगादेव स्वव्यापारि स्वातन्त्र्यम्।—Helārāja on Nīkyā., 3. 99.

are more or less *paratantra* or dependent on the agent. Patañjali has referred to both *svatantra* and *paratantra* and rightly observes that the entire question of dependence and independence is practically based upon the intention of the speaker.¹ Thus, as a matter of fact, one and the same object may be treated either as the limit of separation (*aradhi*, i.e., *Apādāna*) or as the agent of action (*valāhakāt vidyotate* and *valāhako vidyotate*²). We now draw an example from common experience. Just as the representatives of a king³ appear to be subordinate in the presence of their king, though they are independent for all practical purposes when they work independently of the king in their respective spheres of activities, so *sthālī* may be taken either as *svatantra* or *paratantra* according as it is intended to be spoken of either as *pradhāna* or merely as an auxiliary in relation to the action. *Vivakṣū* or the intention of the speaker being thus an important factor that determines the nature of a *Kārika*, we are allowed to use the word *sthālī*, for instance, as *Kartā*, *Karma*, *Karṇa*, and *Adhikarṇa*. From what we have seen above, it is sufficiently clear that in view of the preponderance of *vivakṣū*, the word *svatantra* in the rule *svatantraḥ kartā* should be taken as

¹ सर्वत्रैवात्र स्वातन्त्र्यं पारतन्त्र्यं च विवक्षितम्—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol I, p. 325.

² *Mahābhāṣya*, Vol I, p. 325.

³ अमात्यादीनां राज्ञा सह समवाये पारतन्त्र्यं, व्यवये स्वातन्त्र्यम्—*Ibid*, p. 326.

implying *vivakṣita-svātantrya*, as opposed to the inherent or natural non-dependence. When the speaker, Bhaṭṭoji says,¹ intends to transfer the usual operation of the agent to *Kāraṇas* other than the agent, it is not unlikely that cases like *Karāṇa*, and *Adhikarāṇa* may be grammatically used as *Kartā* having *svātantrya* in their respective functions. How are we to understand the super-independence of *Kartṛ*?² The answer is not far to seek. It is a matter of ordinary experience that even when all the requisites (fuel, utensils, water, fire. etc.) for cooking are brought together, we are not practically allowed to say *pacati*, i.e., 'cooking is going on,' unless and until the cook is at work. This is an indication that accessories of action, such as are represented by *Karāṇa* and *Adhikarāṇa*, etc., have to depend on the agent so far as regards the completion of the action. Though there is no contention regarding the independence of the agent, we should not lose sight of the fact that cases like *Karāṇa*, etc., have an independent aspect also, so far as their respective efficiency is concerned. Wherein, then, lies the superiority of the subject?³ The

¹ यदा सांकर्यातिशयं द्योतयितुं कर्तरि कर्तृव्यापारो न विवक्ष्यते तदा कारकान्तराण्यपि कर्तृसंज्ञां लभन्ते स्वव्यापारे स्वतन्त्रत्वात्—Siddhānta Kaumudī. Bhāṣya has—स्यात्सी पचतीति अधिकरणस्य कर्तृत्वम्, काष्ठानि पचन्तीति कारणस्य कर्तृत्वम्—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 325, and पर्याप्तं करणाधिकरणयोः कर्तृभावः—Mahābhāṣya.

² कथं पुनर्ज्ञायते कर्ता प्रधानमिति? यत् सर्वेषु साधनेषु सन्निहितेषु कर्ता प्रवर्तयिता भवति—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I., p. 326.

³ करणादीनामपि स्वव्यापारे स्वातन्त्र्यात् कोऽतिशयः कर्तुः?—Helārāja.

subject has certain special features or properties, as are clearly shown by Hari,¹ which serve to distinguish it from other *Kārakas*. As an efficient cause of action by itself, the agent does not derive its specific function from any other accessories whatsoever, but renders such instruments only subservient to its operation. The so-called independence of cases like *Karāṇa* and *Adhikarāṇa* is only borrowed from that of the agent; the accessories are employed by the agent desirous of attaining the accomplishment of action, and their functions are liable to be stopped as soon as the agent ceases to work. The supreme independence² of the agent is also clear from the fact that the agent, like *Karāṇa*, etc., cannot have a substitute without a change of action. Moreover, the agent is allowed to have its operation unimpaired even when no other instrument of action is sought for, but the reverse of the case is impossible, that is to say, *Karāṇa*, etc., are not competent to accomplish the action independently of the agent. *Helārāja*³ makes an important observation here. He says that the independence of the agent is

¹ प्राग्व्यतः शक्तिलाभात् न्यग्भाषापादनादपि । तदधीनप्रवृत्तित्वात् प्रवृत्तीनां निवर्तनात् । अदृष्टत्वात् प्रतिनिधिः प्रविवेकि च दमेनात् । आगदप्युपकारित्वे स्वातन्त्र्यं कर्तुंरुच्यते ॥—*Vākyapadīya*, 3. 99-100.

² करणादीनां प्रतिनिधिरुक्तः । कर्तुः समाप्तः—*Helārāja* and सम्भूयकारिभ्यो विप्रियते कर्ता ।

³ एतेन हेतुकलापेन कर्तुः करणपेक्षया क्रियासिद्धौ विप्रलटोपकारकत्वेऽपि—स्वातन्त्र्यं प्राधान्यनिवन्धनमुच्यते इति तस्यैव कर्तृसंज्ञा न तु करणादिः स्वभावादि स्वतन्त्रस्यापीत्यर्थः—*Helārāja* on the *Vākyapadīya*, 3. 99-100.

so prominent that the instrumental or *Karana*, though more closely connected with the action than the agent itself, is not popularly designated as such.

While *independence* (*svātantrya*) is explained with such a breadth of implication and the agent made a repository of so many properties,¹ we can hardly preclude the apprehension as to how inanimate objects such as *agni* and *ratha* in *agniḥ dahati*, *ratho gacchati*, etc., can legitimately be taken as the agents. Bhartṛhari seems to have his answer ready. It does not necessarily follow, he says, that objects possessing those properties are only capable of being regarded as agents, but what is plausible from a grammatical point of view is that anything, whether animate or inanimate, may be used as the agent, only if such properties are verbally attributed to the object in question.² It is from the use of words that the *agent* is comprehended. It does not matter much if such grammatical agents are found to have no innate relation with those properties which are usually ascribed to them. Further, as a system of study entirely devoted to words and their popular signification, grammar does not care so much for strict adherence to reality or

¹ घनैरभ्युदितैः शब्दैः नियमो न तु वस्तुनि । कर्तुर्धर्मविवक्षायां शब्दात् कर्ता प्रतीयते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 101.

² शब्देन यस्यैते घर्माः प्रत्याव्यन्ते स कर्ता—Helārāja.

agreement of thought with truth,¹ but takes words and then meanings as they are popularly used. The real factor that accounts for such transference of properties to inanimate objects, is, as we have already pointed out, the desire of the speaker himself. As the independence of the agent is a matter of *matlakṣā*, one and the same thing (as the soul) may be used, as in the example *ātmānamātmanā hanti*, either as the subject, the object, or the instrumental. Under the Varttika, *ātma-samyoge l aī mal artuh l arma-darśanāt*, Patañjali has clearly shown how one and the same soul may become both the subject and the object (*atmātmānam hanti*) according to the desire of the speaker. The differentiation of the soul, as in such a case, is far from being real, but is only comprehended by different forms of the word (*ātmānam*, *ātmanā* and *ātmā*). As there is hardly any contention regarding the unity of the soul, of course from the Vedānta standpoint, we are justified to raise the question what destroys the soul and what is really destroyed by the soul.² It is curious to note how Patañjali has advanced arguments in support of the duality of the soul. Self has, he holds, two distinct forms,³ namely, corporal soul (*śarīratmā*) and intellectual

¹ न तु वस्तुविषयतया धर्माणामेषां सम्बन्धोऽन्विषणीयः । येनास्तेषामविषयेऽभिर्देहति नदी वहतीत्यादी च कर्तृत्वं न स्यात् ।—Heḷārāja

² Cf. माय इति न हन्यते ।—Gītā

³ कः पुनरात्मान इति की वाग्मना हन्यते ? हावात्मानावन्तरात्मा शरीरात्मा च ।
—Mahābhāṣya, Vol II p 68

soul (*antarātmā*); the corporal soul performs those actions whereby the intellectual soul enjoys either pleasure or pain and *vice versa*. Kaiyaṭa's observation on this point :¹ difference of souls is here actually meant and not the agency and objectivity of one and the same soul. According to the Sāṃkhya system, *antarātmā* is the same as (*antaḥkāraṇa*) intellect, which is said to be active; the Naiyāyikas, on the contrary, take *puruṣa* to be *antarātmā* on account of its being the active agent, unlike the *puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhyaites.

The instance *aṅkuro jāyate* (a sprout is growing) presents another difficulty. There is much controversy regarding the question whether it is really existent (*sat*) or non-existent (*asat*) that comes into being. This question, as is well known, embodies the first philosophical enquiry² about the genesis of the universe that had early engaged the attention of the Vedic Ṛṣis in the remotest period of the intellectual history of mankind.

The reference is to the well-known *Sat-vāda* and *Asat-vāda*. According to the *Sat-vādins*, it is *sat* or something having existence that is produced (*sadeva jāyate*); the *Asat-vādins* hold, on the contrary, that it is *asat*

¹ वस्तुत एवात्रात्ममेदो न त्वेकस्यैव कर्मत्वं कर्तृत्वं च । सांख्यपक्षे अन्तःकरण-
मन्तरात्मा तस्यैव कर्तृत्वात् । पुरुषस्याकर्तृत्वात् । नैयायिकादीनां मते तु पुरुषस्य
कर्तृत्वात् स एवान्तरात्मेति विवक्षितः ।—Kaiyaṭa on the Bhāṣya.

² सद्वा इदमय आसीत्, असद्वा इदमय आसीत् ।—(Cf. Nāsadīya Sūkta)
Taittirīyopaniṣad, 2. 7.

that comes into existence. A thing seems to be non-existent before it is actually produced. This kind of non-existence is called *prāgabhāva* by the Naiyāyikas. Again, what is *sat* is not liable to destruction, and it is equally true that nothing comes out of nothing.¹ *Sat* is one of the three aspects with which Brahman is usually conceived by the Vedāntins. *Asat* or *abhāva*² is also maintained to be the ultimate cause or final principle by a section of the Buddhist philosophers.

The sprout is found to have no existence before it grows;³ and it is not therefore strictly correct to assume a non-existent thing as the agent of the verb *jāyate*. To get rid of this difficulty we should either explain the production of the sprout on the assumption of existence however unreal, or depend entirely on the desire of the speaker as what accounts for such transference of existence. Moreover, the word 'sprout' is used in like instances by the speaker, as if the sprout were already existent. The order in which the six *bhāvavikāras* have been arranged by Vārṣṇyaṇi evidently shows that *asti* presupposes *jāyate*,⁴ i.e., a thing cannot be said to be existent before it is produced. But it does not strictly represent a correct view.

¹ नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः ।—Gītā, 2, 16.

² अभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिर्नानुपपद्य प्रादुर्भावात् ।—Nyāya Sūtra, 4, 1, 14.

अभावाद्भावो जायत इति कस्यचिद्दृशेणम् ।—Nyāya-vārttika.

³ उत्पत्तेः प्रागसद्भावो बुद्ध्यवस्थानियन्धनः । अविशिष्टः सतानेन कर्ता भवति जन्मनः ।—Vākyapadīya, 3, 103.

⁴ न ह्यजातोऽस्तीति ज्ञायते ।—Durga, under Nirukta, p. 45.

In course of explaining the expression *jāyata iti pūrvabhāvasyādīmācaṣṭe*, Durga does not fail to observe that *jāyate* also comprehends existence.¹ The reason is quite obvious. A thing that is non-existent is not capable of being produced. We can, however, assume a causal connection that serially links one *bhāva* with another. The ultimate reality (*bhāva*) is the final cause of which these *vikāras* are only different manifestations. There is only one *bhāva* or *sattā* that permeates through the entire sphere of existence. *Kriyā* implies an action having both prior and posterior stages. *Paurvāparya* is to be understood with relation to time and space. *Vrajati* means accordingly a collection of actions all tending to produce the same result (conjunction with a particular space). *Jāyate* and *asti*, *vipariṇamate* and *vardhate* and the like are all related to each other. A thing first comes into being and is then said to be existent and so forth. Having shown their mutual relation, Durga concludes with the remark that *jāyate* means only *production*² and not the next stage (existence), which invariably comes in association with the idea of *jāyate*.

According to the Buddhist philosophers,³ a *kāraṇa* has to destroy itself before it can bring into existence a *kārya*. The sprout is

¹ न अविद्यमानो जायते ।—Durga, under Nirukta, p. 45.

² जायते इत्येव शब्दो अस्तीति निवर्तते ।—Hj.

³ * विनाशितो जायते कर्तुमुद्यमे इति ।—Nyāya-vārttika under ३. १. १२, १. १. १४.

found to grow only when the seed is destroyed. As long as a seed remains a seed, there does not grow a sprout as such. The destruction of the seed is, therefore, the immediate cause that gives rise to a sprout.¹ What we gather from this trend of arguments is that a sprout grows from non-existence of the seed² (*abhāva*). As it seeks to trace the origin of all things to a huge nothingness or nihilism, this view was rejected by all orthodox teachers.

The Naiyāyikas argue in the following way : it is really out of a seed and not out of its final destruction that a sprout is produced.³ A change of physical composition is brought about in a seed when it is about to give birth to a sprout. The seed is not essentially destroyed but some cells are developed in it wherefrom the sprout is formed.⁴ The seed is, therefore, to be considered as the material cause of a sprout. Here the agency is to be understood as pertaining to *lārya*, i.e., what is produced (sprout). The sprout is supposed to have intellectual existence before it is actually produced. As a matter of fact, the material existence of the sprout before it is actually produced is contrary to all experience; but it must be admitted that the

¹ बीजविनाशोऽदुरकारणमिति ।—Nyāya-vārttika

² अभावाद्वाची जायते ।—*Ibid*

³ एवं च बीजीपादान युक्तम् ।—*Ibid*.

⁴ बीजावयवानां पूर्वव्यूहनिवृत्ती व्यूहान्तरसुत्पद्यते इति व्यूहान्तराददुर आविर्भवतीति ।—*Ibid*

solution suggested by the grammarians refers more to the use of words than to the actual state of things. The grammarians¹ have repeatedly drawn our attention to the fact that they unhesitatingly take the meaning usually denoted by a word as its real signification and do not insist upon the material validity of such meanings. Here the science of grammar bears close comparison with the deductive logic which, as we know, is more or less concerned with the formal side of the proposition (as opposed to the material truth). An expression like *golden mountain*, though the material existence of what it denotes is really questionable, does not practically lie beyond the scope of the deductive logic.

Bhartr̥hari seems to have approached this question from a different point of view. It is shown with reference to the Vṛttacaryā how the cause is changed into the effect and is said to be *jāyate* in the shape of *kārya*. He seeks to establish the non-difference² between the cause and the effect as well as between *prakṛti* and *vikṛti* (substance and its modification). This is another problem of much philosophical importance to decide whether it is the cause or the effect that is to be considered as *sat*. Some hold, as the

¹ व्याकरणे हि शब्दार्थोऽर्थः—Helārāja.

² कारणं कार्यभावेन यदा वा व्यवतिष्ठते । कार्यशब्दं तदा लब्ध्वा कार्यत्वेनाप्यजायते ॥ Vākyapadiya, 3. 104. Helārāja has the following :—परिणामदर्शने त्वमेदप्यत्र इदं कथ्यते । कार्यकारणयोः प्रकृतिविकाररूपतया चौरं दधि सम्पद्यते, वीजमङ्कुरो जायते इत्यमेदेन व्यवहारादेकस्याप्यवस्थानुरवस्थाविशेषस्वीकरणमात्रं स्वतन्त्रमिति ।

Naiyāyikas, the *cause* to be *sat* and look upon the *effect* as essentially different from it (*asat*). The Sāṃkhyaites take the *effect* to be real (*sat*), i.e., as what represents the cause only in a changed form. According to this view, *kāraṇa* and *kārya* are the same as *prakṛti* and *vikṛti*. In contradiction with the view that an effect is virtually different from its cause, Hari maintains identity between *kārya* and *kāraṇa* and *prakṛti* and *vikṛti* on the ground of such instances as 'milk is turned into butter,' and 'the seed is transformed into a sprout' in order to show that the cause and the effect are not distinct entities, but represent only different phases of one and the same object. In accordance with this standpoint, the expression 'a sprout is growing' should necessarily imply that the cause which has existence is what gets transformed (in the form of *kārya*) at a later time. This explanation seems to be based on the so-called *pariṇāma-vāda* as expounded by the Sāṃkhyaites.

Referring to the difference of the cause and the effect,¹ Bhartṛhari has attempted to show how *ankura* may be viewed as the agent. It is an indisputable fact that the sprout, as an individual (*vyakti*), cannot be supposed to have existence before it is produced ; but it is equally true, we must admit, that the sprout,

¹ कार्यकारणयोर्भेदवादेऽपि वास्तवेन रूपेण जनिकर्तृत्वमाह ।—Helārāja.

विभक्तिधीनिं यत् क्वापि कारणेभ्यः प्रवर्तते । स्वा जातिव्यक्तिरूपेण तस्यापि व्यवतिष्ठते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 106, and जातिरूपेण कर्तृत्वं व्यक्तिरूपेण जन्मत्वमिति ।—Helārāja.

viewed as a class, is comprehended to have perpetual existence (*cf.* the Nyāya conception of class as an eternal entity). What we learn from Bhartṛhari and Helārāja regarding this point is that the sprout (a sprout is growing) appears to be the agent when taken as a class, and that it is said to be a product when it is viewed as an individual. The agent and the object that grows are, according to this interpretation, not different from each other, the former representing a class, and the latter representing an individual. The seed develops into a sprout or assumes a formal change in the shape of an effect. Moreover, the class and the individual being mutually dependent, we are not justified in taking one as distinct from the other.

The discussion on such a nice point does not, however, end here, but has practically given rise to a far more complicated question. It is really difficult to say whether *prakṛti* or *vikṛti* should be taken as the agent of production, because there is no consensus of opinions with regard to this problem. A careful examination of facts,¹ it must be remembered, goes to show that both the cause and the effect might be treated as the agent according to the nature of *vivakṣā*. In an instance like 'milk is turned

¹ प्रकृति-विकृतिविषयपर्यायतः कर्तृत्वं कार्यकारणयोः प्रयोगमिदं ।

—Helārāja.

विकारो जन्मनः कर्ता प्रकृतिर्वैति संशये । भिद्यते प्रतिपत्तृणां दर्शनं लिङ्ग-
दर्शने; ॥—Yākyapadīya, 3. 112.

into curd' (*kṣīram dadhi sampadyate*) we find that the relation in which *prakṛti* stands to *vikṛti* is one of co-inherence (*sāmānādhikaranya*). An expression like *bijamankuro jāyate* is sanctioned only to show the non-difference between *kārana* and *kārya* or *prakṛti* and *vikṛti*. A sprout is not materially different from the seed wherefrom it grows; it is only an aspect of the seed or development from a crude form into a bulky one. *Ankuro jāyate*, therefore, means that the cause (seed) which is *sat* gets a new life (*janman*) or reveals itself in the form of a sprout. Now there arises a doubt as to which of them is predominant in relation to the other. It is necessary to find out the dominant one, as it is dominant or *pradhāna* alone that is to be regarded as the agent in connection with the verbal form. There are practically two different views, namely, one supporting the agency or *karṭṛtva* in favour of *vikṛti*, and the other upholding the agency of *prakṛti*. *Vikṛti*¹ comes to be regarded as the agent, when there is absence of co-inherence and the words denoting *prakṛti* and *vikṛti* are found to have different case-endings (as in *bijāt ankuro jāyate*). The rule *janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ*, Pāṇ. 1.4. 30, which undoubtedly ascribes the agency to *vikṛti*, may be explained here to show not only the formal but also the material difference between *prakṛti* and

¹ भेदविवक्षाया तु जनिकर्तुः प्रकृतिरित्यपादानपक्षमेषां कारकविभक्तिः ।
अभेदविवक्षाया तु चतुर्थ्या अवकाशः...विकारस्य कर्तृत्वावसायः—Helārāja.

vikāra. The agency of *vikāra* is also clearly pointed out by such expression as *mūtrāya sampadyate yavāgūḥ*, i.e., *mūtram jāyate*. What is deducible from these popular instances of grammar¹ is that *vikāra* is directly connected with the action, and, consequently, treated as the agent; and that *prakṛti* has only indirect connection with the action and is generally used in the ablative case in order to prominently bring out its difference from *vikāra*. The expression² *suvarṇapīṇḍaḥ kuṇḍale bhanataḥ*, where the number of the verbal form agrees with that of *vikāra*, serves to strengthen the view that *vikāra* alone should be used as the agent. But examples are not, however, wanting to show also the agency of *prakṛti*. The expressions *saṅghībhavanti Brāhmaṇāḥ* and *atvam tvam sampadyate* clearly indicate how *prakṛti* is used as the subject. Now it is almost clear that both *prakṛti* and *vikāra* are entitled to be regarded as the subject, according to the nature of the examples.³

The discussion on *Kāraṅkas* in general, and *karṭṛ-kāraṅka* in particular, will be hardly complete and exhaustive without an adequate reference to the logical method of interpretation. The Naiyāyikas, specially the followers of the Navya-nyāya, such as Jagadīśa and Gadādhara, have supplemented the study of grammar in a

¹ यवागूर्मूत्रं जायते—प्रकृतेरत्र विकारद्वारेण क्रियासमन्वयो न साक्षात् ।

Helārāja.

² Mahābhāṣya, 1. 1. 1, Vol. I, p. 7.

³ Vākyapadīya, *Kārikās*, 3. 114-115.

large measure ; they have dealt with the problems of grammar in their characteristic fashion with the result that niceties of an incomprehensible nature were sometimes allowed to mar the perspicuity of the subject to such a degree that the study of grammar ultimately passed through a completely different channel at their hands.

To do full justice to their labour, it must be said, however, that they have practically given, as it were, the finishing touch to the interpretation of certain problems of grammar and have undoubtedly shown a new line of thinking and approaching a problem. The advent of the Navya-nyāya, with its characteristic tendency to abstrusities and a peculiar stock of technical terms, opened the portal of a new realm of thought which has more or less influenced all later philosophical speculations. This influence, as is quite evident, is nowhere so prominent, as in the case of later commentaries on philosophical treatises and grammar. The last phase of grammatical literature, both in language and mode of interpretation, seems to have been moulded by this process of thinking. Such well-known grammarians, as Nāgeśa, Bhaṭṭōji, Koṇḍabhaṭṭa, Durgasiṃha, Gopinātha, Susana and others, are supposed to have been thoroughly acquainted with the Navya-nyāya line of arguments.

As the logical method of definition is free from all defects and scientifically accurate, the grammarians have conveniently followed it in forming

the definitions of grammatical categories and concepts with the obvious object of getting rid of the so-called *ativyāpti* and *avyāpti*. How far the grammarians have assimilated and absorbed this particular process of thinking and the line of arguments is borne testimony to by the fact that if any modern grammarian is asked to give an accurate definition of *Karma-kāraka*, he would not possibly say *karturīpsitatamam karma* or *yat kriyate tat karma*, but would give his answer in the strictly logical form, i.e., *kriyā-janya-phala-sālitvam karmatvam* and so on. Jaga-dīśa's *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* and Gadādhara's *Vyutpattivāda* are two important works that give us purely logical interpretation of the grammatical problems; Durga and Suṣeṇa (two well-known commentators on the Kātantra system) have also dealt with the problems of grammar from a strictly logical point of view.

The logical definition of *kartṛtva*¹ is *kriyā-śrayatvam kartṛtvam*, i.e., the agent is the substratum of action. This is based on the assumption that the action is generally denoted by the root, and the idea of a substratum follows from the suffix *tip*. As this definition is likely to prove the agency of time also which is the final substratum of the world (*kālo hi jagadā-dhārah*), Suṣeṇa² has made some improvement

¹ प्राधान्येन धातुवाच्यव्यापारवत्त्वम्—Durga (Kalāpa-Tīkā) and धातूपात्त-व्यापाराश्रयः कर्ता ।

² कालस्यापि कर्तृत्वं स्यात् तस्य सर्वाश्रयत्वेन क्रियाया अप्याश्रयत्वात्—Kavirāja under the rule 220 (Kalāpa).

by adding *prādhānyena* to the aforesaid definition. The state of being a *substratum of action* is not a correct definition from a grammatical point of view. If so, the objective case, affected as it is by the action, may also be treated as *kartā*. The definition finally suggested by Susena is as follows *prādhānyena dhatuvācya-vyāpāravattvam* (*kartā* is the main substratum of action as is denoted by a root).

To show an instance how the logical process of arguments has its application in grammar, we give below the summary of a discussion on the definition of *Kartr-karaka*. There arises some difficulty with regard to the definition of *kartṛtva* as given by Saivavarman (*yah karoti sa kartā*, *Kalapa* 220), because this rule is not, strictly speaking, applicable to such instances as *ghato bhavati*, etc. (the pot does not do anything but is simply brought into existence by the agency of the potter). The logical definition is not even sufficient to solve this anomaly, inasmuch as the adjunct *kriyāsāyatvam* is equally applicable to *Kartr* and *Adhikarāṇa*. It is, therefore, necessary to add the expression *sahsat sambandhena* (by direct association) to the above definition in order to differentiate *Kartr-kāraka* from *Adhikarāṇa*. The reason is that both the agent and *Adhikarāṇa* are used as the substratum of the action (*kriyāsāyā*), the difference lies in the fact that the subject is directly or primarily connected with the action, while *Adhikarāṇa* has only indirect association with the action.

(through the operation of the agent). But the train of arguments and counter-arguments does not end here. The additions of *sākṣāt sambandhena* is not, however, sufficient to make the point clear, because in an instance like *gale baddhvā gaurṇīyate*, the locative is found to have been the direct substratum of action (binding). Now it is necessary to make further addition to the definition (*ananya-prayojyatva*) for the purpose of eliminating both *ativyāpti* and *avyāpti*. The special characteristic,¹ which serves to distinguish the subject from the cognate cases, like *Karāṇa* and *Adhikarāṇa*, is the super-independence² of the agent, *i.e.*, the agent is capable of accomplishing the action without depending on the so-called accessories.³ The agent presents itself in three forms, namely, *suddha*, *prayojaka* or *hetu*, and *karmakartā*.

Both *Karāṇa* and *Adhikarāṇa* are intimately related to the agent; they help the agent in the accomplishment of the action. In accordance with the definition of Pāṇini, *Karāṇa* is held to be the most important or indispensable of all accessories that help the agent in bringing about a completion of the action.

¹ कर्ता त्वनन्यप्रयोज्यः स्वतन्त्र इत्युच्यते...फलकासौ हि कर्ता करणादीनुपार्जयते, तथा च पूर्वमेव शक्तिमान् स्वतन्त्रः, करणादीनां तु कर्तृविनियोगादेव स्वातन्त्र्यम्—*Helārāja*.

² कारकचक्रव्यापारप्रतिबन्धकीभूतव्यापाराभाववत्त्वं स्वतन्त्रत्वमिति ।—*Kavirāja* (*Kalāpa*).

³ स्वतन्त्रत्वं च कारकान्तरानधीनत्वे सति कारकत्वम् ।—*Ibid.*

Patañjali in his characteristic fashion has anticipated certain objections against the desirability of retaining the suffix *tanap* after the word *sādḥika* in *sādḥakatamanī lānaṁ*. If *Karana* is said to be, Patañjali argues, merely an accessory and not the most important one, the undesirable consequence will be that all *Kāraḥas*, by virtue of their direct or indirect association with the action, will be entitled to receive the designation of *Karana*¹. It needs hardly be pointed out that all *Kāraḥas*, as the very term implies, are practically so many accessories (*sādḥakas*) with reference to the accomplishment of the action. The use of *tanap* (superlative degree) is not therefore meaningless, because it serves to differentiate *Karana* from other *Kāraḥas*. Again, it may be further argued that the sense usually conveyed by the suffix (*atīṣayya*) i.e., excessiveness, is also comprehensible even in the absence of that word. We can justify this point of view by an illustration drawn from popular experience. As, for instance, when one says 'a daughter² should be given in marriage to a handsome person,' what we necessarily understand is that the person spoken of should be 'perfectly handsome' (*abhiṣūpatama*), though the word denoting excess or *super-excellence* is not explicitly mentioned. Similarly, the word *sādḥaka*

¹ सर्वेषां कारकाणां कारणस्य प्रसञ्जेत and सर्वेषां हि कारकाणि साधकानि—Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ 1.4.42

² अभिरुपाय कन्या देया तत्राभिरुपतमादिति गम्यते—Ibid

might be alone sufficient to denote as much meaning as is usually expressed by *sādhakatama*. Now what follows from this discussion is that the suffix *tamap* is redundant. The rule *sādhakatamam karaṇam* might be reduced to *sādhakam karaṇam* without any alteration of the meaning. But it cannot be denied that Pāṇini had some particular object in view so far as the use of this suffix is concerned. What Pāṇini¹ likes to indicate by the use of *tamap* is that the suffixes (denoting degrees of excellence) *tarap* and *tamap* should have no application in the rules defining *Kāraka-samjñās*, or, in other words, the *Paribhāṣā* (*gauṇa-mukhyayormukhye kāryasampratyayaḥ*) should have its application restricted to this rule and not to any other rules belonging to the section of *Kāraka*. This is why the grammarians do not insist upon *apāya* or physical separation alone (according to the strict interpretation of the rule), but also acknowledge the validity of intellectual separation (*buddhi-kṛtāpāya*) in the determination of *Apādāna*.² Similarly, the rule *ādḥāro'dhikaraṇam* is not only applicable to *tileṣu tailam*, but comprises such instances also where the entire substratum is not pervaded by the thing inherent.³

¹ कारकसंज्ञायां तर-तस्योगो न भवतीत्यत्रापि सिद्धं भवति—Mahābhāṣya, under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 4. 42.

² सांकाश्यकेभ्यः पाटलीपुत्रका अभिरूपतराः ।

³ गङ्गायां घोषः, कूपे गर्गकुलम् ।

यव कृत्स्न आधारात्मा व्याप्ति भवति । तेनैव स्यात् तिलेषु तैलं दधि सर्पिरिति । गङ्गायां गावः, कूपे गर्गकुलमित्यत्र न स्यात् ।—Mahābhāṣya, under the rule 1. 4. 42.

Wherein lies the superiority or relative importance of *Karana*? Those that help the agent in the accomplishment of the action are grammatically called *upakāra*; of all such *upakāras*, *Karana* is decidedly the most indispensable accessory ¹ that comes in close contact with the agent (*sannipatyopakāri*) in course of operation. The relative superiority of *Karana* is mainly due to the fact, says Bhartṛhari,² that the accomplishment of the action actually takes place immediately after the operation of *Karana*. The part played by *vivaksā* or the desire of the speaker in the use and determination of *Kāra* in general has already been referred to. Bhartṛhari³ emphatically lays down with special reference to the *Instrumental* case that it is not possible to say (with regard to a thing) that this is always *Karana* and this is not, as if it were fixed by the rules of grammar. It is the desire of the speaker that practically accounts for the use; as, for instance, one and the same thing (as *sthālī*) might be used both as the substratum (*sthālyām pacati*), and as the instrumental (*sthālyā pacati*) according to the desire of the speaker.

¹ यद्यपि क्रियासिद्धौ बहूनि साधनानि व्याप्तिन्ते तथापि यत् प्रकृष्टोपकारक-
मनन्तरं विवक्षितं तदेव करणमित्यर्थः ।

² क्रियायाः परिनिश्चितिर्यथापारादनन्तरम् । विवक्ष्यते यदा तदा करणत्वं
तदा स्मृतम् ।—Vākyapadīya, 3. 89

³ वस्तुतस्तदनिर्देश्य न हि वस्तु व्यवस्थितम् । स्यान्वा पश्यत इत्येवा विवक्षा
दृश्यते यतः ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 90.

In accordance with the definition as suggested by the Naiyāyikas, *Karaṇa* is the same as *Kāraṇa* (*vyāpāravat kāraṇam karaṇam*) only with this difference that *karaṇa* is closely associated with the action, i.e., cause, when it is actually in operation to bring about the accomplishment of the action, is what is called *karaṇa* in grammar. Gadādhara maintains that the words *karṭṛ-vyāpārādhīnatva* should be added to the above definition (*vyāpāravat kāraṇam karaṇam*) so as to clearly indicate the subserviency of *Karaṇa* to the agent. An accessory (as *Karaṇa*), as we find, cannot accomplish the action unless and until it is set to work by the agent (*karṭṛ-viniyoga*). This being the actual state of things, one may possibly bring forward the argument that it is more plausible to attribute the adjunct *sādhakatama* to the agent itself in preference to *Karaṇa*.¹ Bhartṛhari² meets this objection by saying that the primary function of the agent is to employ the accessories to operation³ which, thus engaged, immediately accomplish the action. This is to show how *Karaṇa* comes between the agent and the action, and, consequently, has greater proximity to the operation than the agent itself.

¹ कर्तृविनियोगोत्तरकाले साधनानां प्रवृत्तेस्तदपेक्षया कर्तरेव साधकतमत्वं न्यायमिति—Helārāja.

² स्वातन्त्र्येऽपि प्रयोक्तारसारादिवोपकुर्वते। करणेन हि सर्वेषां व्यापारो व्यवधीयते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 93.

³ विनियोगो हि कर्तृव्यापारः।

Now it is sufficiently clear why *Karāṇa* is said to be *sādhakatama* in relation to other accessories. Bhartṛhari has again alluded to the preponderance of *vivakṣū* and the difference between the agent and *Karāṇa* by referring to the example *asiśchinatti* (where the function of the agent has been attributed to the instrumental, viz., sword, with a view to indicate the independent activity or excessive power for accomplishing the action on the part of *Karāṇa*). In the above example, it should be noted,¹ the sharpness of the sword comes to be regarded as *Karāṇa* when the sword itself is used as the agent.

Though apparently synonymous, *hetu* and *Karāṇa* are, however, distinguished² by the grammarians, the criterion of such difference being 'the invariable association with the action' on the part of *Karāṇa*. The first and foremost thing necessary for a *Kāraka* is to have close relation with the action. *Hetu* generally gives the idea of a substance and has practically no invariable connection with the action. Bhaṭṭoji³ has clearly elucidated this distinction. A substance unconnected with action is called *hetu*, but *Karāṇa*, as a form of *Kāraka*, is

¹ अस्यादीनां तु कर्तृत्वे तैष्यादि करणं विदुः—*Vākya-padīya*, 8. 94.

² द्रव्यादिविषयो हेतुः कारकं नियतक्रियम्—*Ibid.*

³ द्रव्यादिमाधारणं निर्व्यापारमाधारणं च हेतुत्वम् ।

करणत्वं तु क्रियामात्रविषयं व्यापारनियतं च ॥—Bhaṭṭoji under the rule

necessarily found to have connection with the action. *Hetu*, to speak the truth, is the cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) pure and simple, and continues to be so as long as it does not come in close touch with the action, but the moment it does so, it ceases to be a *hetu* and becomes a *Karāṇa*. The Naiyāyikas have agreement with the grammarians on this point. Gadādhara takes *dhanena kulam*, *vidyayā yaśaḥ*, etc., as instances of *hetu*, since *dhana* and *vidyā* have no direct association with the action (*kriyāyogābhāvāt*). Jagadīśa has, however, taken a slightly different view. He insists that even the third case-ending in *daṇḍena ghataḥ* is really indicative of *Karāṇa*, though *daṇḍena* is not grammatically regarded to be a *Kāraka* as such,¹ obviously for the absence of relation with the action. On the ground of having close proximity with the action, *Karāṇa* is virtually the same as cause (*īanaka*).²

Under the rule *hetvarthe*, Durgasirṅha has clearly shown what is meant by *hetu* in an instance like *annena vasati*. So far as the popular usage is concerned, Durga maintains, a thing, though not actually connected with an action that leads to the final result, is called *hetu* simply on account of its having capacity for the accomplishment of action (*phalamaniṣpādayannapi kriyāyogyatayā heturucyate*). *Hetu* is of

¹ दण्डेन घट इत्यत्रापि तृतीयार्थः करणत्वं, परन्तु तत्र कारकं क्रियानन्वयित्वात् ।
व्यव.

—*Sabdasaktiprakāśikā* under *Kār.* 71.

² विानरगशब्दन्तु व्यापारप्रत्यासत्त्या जनकस्य वाचकः—*Sabdasaktiprakāśikā*.

various kinds. One that intimately connects itself with the accomplishment of the action is termed *Karana*. *Suseṇa* has referred to two-fold *hetu*—grammatical as well as popular. The nominative case of a verb used in a causal form (as *lārayati*) is an instance of grammatical *hetu* (*lārayati yah sa hetuśca—Kalāpa*). A *hetu*, in its popular sense, is an object that is capable of performing the action favourable to the result (*phalasādhana-yogya-padārtha*). *Hetu* means *capacity* and not actual connection with *kriyā*.

Adhikarana is the substratum of action. What is popularly known as *ādhāra* or substratum of action is technically called *Adhikarana* in grammar. There is, however, some difference between the popular and grammatical conception of *Adhikarana*. According to the popular usage, substance,¹ quality and action are all comprehended by *Adhikarana*, but in grammar the word is often used in a specific sense, i.e., *Adhikarana* is said to be an accessory (that indirectly helps the accomplishment of the action) that forms the substratum of action only indirectly. *Bhartrhari* lays much stress on the dependence of *Adhikarana* upon both the agent and the object and defines *Adhikarana*² as an *upakāra* or accessory that becomes the substratum of action only

¹ लोकिऽधिकरणमविशिष्य द्रव्यगुणक्रियाविषयमभिधीयते—*Helārāja*

² कर्तृकर्मव्यवहितमसाचाद धारयत् क्रियाम् । उपकुर्वत् क्रियाविही शान्ते
धिकरणं भूतम् ॥—*Vākyapadīya*

through the intervention of the agent or the object, and serves, though indirectly, to accomplish the action.

We actually find that the effort or the action principally inheres in the agent and partially in the object; consequently they form the real substratum of action in the strict sense of the term. This is why Bhartṛhari¹ has used the expression 'through the medium of the agent and the object,' and has thus made it sufficiently clear that *Adhikaraṇa* is only indirectly related to the action. Intimately related to *ādhāra* is *ādheya* or what inheres in the substratum. The relation in which the inherent stands to the substratum is manifold, such as conjunction, inherence and so on. But Gadādhara² has here raised his voice of objection so far as 'conjunction' is concerned. He argues in the following strain:—the relation between *ādhāra* and *ādheya* cannot be one of conjunction (*samyoga*), for, if it were so, there would be no criterion to distinguish the one from the other, that is to say, *ādheya*³ also might be treated as *ādhāra*, as the very idea of conjunction comprehends two things (*samyogasya dviṣṭhatvāt*).

Patañjali has divided *Adhikaraṇa* into three classes, namely, *vyāpaka*, *aupaśleṣika*, and *vaiṣayika*. Of these, *vyāpaka* is the principal

¹ कर्तृकर्मण्यवहिताम्—क्रिया कर्तरि कर्मणि वावतिष्ठते—Helārāja.

Vākyapadīya, 3. 1. अधिकरणाधिकारः ।

² आधारावैयभावश्च न संयोगादिरूपसम्बन्धात्मकः—Vyutpattivāda.

³ कुण्डादिसंयोगिनो वदरादेरपि कुण्डाधारताप्रसङ्गात्—*Ibid*.

form of *Adhikarāṇa*. An expression like *tilesu tairāṇa* constitutes an example of *vyāpaka*. The special feature of this class of *Adhikarāṇa* is not only that the inherent (*adheya*) and the substratum are related to each other by co-inherence (*samavaya*), but also that the entire space of the substratum is pervaded by the inherent. 'Devadatta is sitting on a mat' is an instance of *aupaslesika*, because here the agent sits only on a part of the mat and does not occupy the whole space. Here the relation between the *inherent* and the *substratum* is one of simple conjunction. *Vaisayika* is expressed by such example as *mokṣe icchāsti* (there is a desire for salvation). Helaraja has cited *khe sakunayāḥ* as an instance of *vaisayika*, and observes that it does not strictly come under *aupaslesika*, because the sky being one and indivisible cannot possibly have any parts. The so-called division of *Adhikarāṇa* as *sāmīpika* denoting proximity does not really form an additional class. Helaraja has explained the sentence *Gangayām ghosaḥ* as an instance of *aupaslesika* that indicates the residence of *ghosa* in certain parts of the bank having close proximity with the current of the river.

Adhikarāṇa is generally denoted in grammar by the seventh case ending. Both Jagadisa and Gadadhara¹ hold that *saptamī* indicates *adheyatva* (as is implied by the *Adhikarāṇa*) or

¹ आधारसप्तम्या अधेयत्वमर्थ — Vyutpattivada

the state of being the inherent.¹ *Saptamī* has more than one meaning in grammar. In an instance of *bhāve saptamī*, the seventh case-termination precisely signifies 'contemporaneousness of action' (*samakālīnatva*); in *carmaṇi dvīpinam hanti*, *saptamī* denotes *nimittatva* or 'the state of being the cause' and so on. There is, however, some inconsistency with regard to such examples as *vīṇāyām śabdaḥ* and *karṇe śabdaḥ*, etc., because there is no verbal form so as to clearly give the idea of a *Kāraka*. Gadādhara rightly observes that in cases like these, where the verbal forms denoting an action are not explicitly used, we are forced to understand such verbs as *bhavati*,² etc., in order to explain the *Kāraka-vibhakti*. But the grammarians also seem to have the same answer, as they have taken recourse to the dictum³ according to which a verb, though not expressly mentioned but only understood, is even said to be competent to account for the case-ending.

From a grammatical point of view, *Kārakas* are denoted by *sup*. A question is, however, raised by Bhartṛhari,⁴ if *vibhaktis* have any signification of their own so as to indicate the nature

¹ आश्रयत्वं सप्तम्यानुभाव्यते ।—Vyutpattivāda.

² एषु कारकतानिर्वाहय भवतीत्यध्याहारः । अवच्छेद्यताविशिष्टोऽप्याधारसप्तम्यर्थः ।
—Vyutpattivāda.

³ गन्धमानापि द्विधा कारकविभक्ती प्रयोजिका ।

⁴ इत्याद्यान्वयसु आदिभक्तयोऽन्य इत्यते ।—Vākya-padīya, Kār. 3. 43.

of *Kārakas*. The meaning¹ is expressed by a word taken as a whole and not as a composite of two parts, i.e., *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*. Attention has already been drawn to the fact that the meaning of *Prakṛti*, as in *vrkṣe* and *vrkṣeṇa*, remains the same, while the sense usually denoted by the case-endings, i.e., *substratum* and *instrumentality*, only seems to be different. But the decision of the grammarians is of a peculiar nature. Since they hold that the meaning is expressed by a word as an indivisible whole (*akhaṇḍa*), the grammarians have given their verdict in support of the unreality of *pratyayārtha*, as distinct from *prakṛtyārtha*. It is, however, contrary to the usual principle of grammar, because we find that the meaning of a *Pratyaya* is related to that of a *Prātipadika* in order to determine the nature of a *Kārika*. What is, therefore, plausible is that the meaning of *Pratyayas*, as distinguished from those of *Prātipadikas*, is a fact that can hardly be denied. As the whole discussion on *Kārakas* depends on the assumption of meanings on the part of the case-endings, the meaning of each *vibhakti* has been specifically shown by the grammarians.

Pāṇini defines *Karman* as what is sought to be obtained by the agent as the most desirable

¹ अभेदेऽपि प्रकृत्यर्थस्य इति वृत्ताद्येत्यादौ विभक्त्यर्थस्य साधनलक्षणस्य व्यतिरेकः । तया तदा च विभक्त्यर्थस्यासत्यत्वम् । येन प्रातिपदिकार्थेऽस्यान्वये अनुगतो दृष्टस्ततो मन्यामहेऽस्ति कश्चिद्व्यतिरिक्तः प्रत्ययार्थभूतीऽनपक्रमण्यः साधनलक्षणमक्तिशब्दवाच्योऽर्थ इति साधनसिद्धिः ॥—Helārāja under the Vākyapadīya, Kār. 3. 43.

thing. According to the logical conception, *Karman* forms the substratum of the result as is produced by the action (*kriyājanyaphalaśālitvam*). As it is not always the most desirable thing alone that the agent likes to obtain, Pāṇini had to frame another rule (Pāṇ., 2.4.50) to make provision for such cases as *viṣam bhunkte*, where an undesirable thing like poison is even used as the object. But Patañjali thinks that this rule might be done away with, as the preceding rule is capable of being interpreted in such a way as to apply to all these instances. His arguments stand on the following facts :¹ sometimes swallowing of poison also happens to be desirable on the part of a certain man. It is not unlikely that a man suffering from various kinds of distress (as poverty, bereavement, etc.) may be compelled to take to poison as a desideratum or relief; the swallowing of poison is as desirable to him as other eatables. Patañjali has finally arrived at the conclusion that the negative particle² in *anīpsita* does not indicate simply the opposite, viz., undesirable, but denotes anything other than the desirable.

In the Kātantra system, *Karman* is defined as what is done by the agent (*yat kriyate tat*

¹ विषभक्षणमपि कस्यचिदीप्सितं स्यात् । कथम् ? इह य एष मनुष्यो दुःखार्त्तो भवति सोऽन्यानि दुःखान्यनुनिश्चस्य विषभक्षणमेव ज्यायो मन्यते ।—Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 4. 50.

² पर्युदासीयं यद्व्यदीप्सितात्तदनीप्सितम् ।—*Ibid*,

karma), and neither Sarvaśvarman nor Durga has spoken of such divisions of *Karman* as *desirable* and *undesirable*. Suseṇa has made some important observations in connection with the interpretation of *Karman*. Following the method of the Naiyāyikas, he defines *Karman* as forming the substratum of the fruit produced by the action (*kriyājanyaphalabhāgitvam*). A careful examination of examples will, however, show that this definition is only a tentative one, and is not absolutely free from defects (*alīryāpti*). According¹ to the strict wording of the definition, the extent of the objective case would be so wide as to comprise even the agent, for, in an instance like 'Devadatta is going to the village,' we find that the fruit of the action, *i.e.*, *conjunction*, does not accrue only to the object (village), but goes to the subject also as equally partaking of the fruit. It is, then, necessary to make further addition to the definition so as to render it applicable exclusively to the object.² The additional words *parasamaveśatva* would serve to distinguish the object from the agent in this respect that the former is the recipient of the fruit of the action that relates to others, *viz.*, the agent (that is to say, the action is first brought into existence by the agent, the fruit

¹ यामं गच्छति द्विदश इत्यादौ गतिक्रियाजन्यभूयोगदुपफलभागित्वात् यथा यामस्य कर्मत्वं तथा कर्तुरपि स्यात् । इति चेत् परसमवेतक्रियाजन्यफलभागित्वमिति
 * नूनः ।—Kavirāja (Kāraka) on 219.

² परसमवेतक्रियाजन्यफलभागित्वं कर्मत्वमिति ।—*Ibid.*

whereof next accrues to the object). This is, however, not sufficient to preclude possible vagueness and misinterpretation, for, if the word *para* in *parasamaveta* is taken to imply something different from the substratum of the fruit (*phalāśrayābhinnatva*), the village, as in the above example, would not have legitimate claim to be treated as the object. When this definition also proves insufficient for reasons stated above, Suṣeṇa at once suggests another which runs thus :¹ *Karman*, though it does not directly form the substratum of the action (like the agent), comes to partake of the result produced by that action. But the example *parvatādavarohati* (descending from a mountain) furnishes an obstacle in the way of accepting this definition as the most accurate one. Because in the above example (*i.e.*, descending from a mountain) the mountain, though unaffected by the act of moving, is practically found to be the substratum of the fruit of the action (*vibhāga*), *i.e.*, separation. Consequently, it should be treated as the object and not as *Apādāna*.² But grammar does not sanction such an usage.

Prompted by a strong desire to suggest a definition that would not involve any defect whatsoever, and aided by his intimate acquaintance with the logical method of argument,

¹ तत्क्रियानाश्रये सति तत्क्रियाजन्यफलभागित्वमिति ।—Kavirāja.

² पर्वतस्यापि स्पन्दनक्रियानाश्रयेन स्पन्दनक्रियाजन्यविभागरूपफलाश्रयत्वात् कर्मत्वं स्यादिति ।—*Ibid.*

Suṣeṇa has afterwards said the last word on the subject.¹ He says that though it does not comprise in itself the action, *Karman* is the recipient of the fruit of that action as it is qualified by the meaning of the root. Here *qualified by the meaning of the root* is to be taken as an adjunct of the 'fruit.' *Avacchedaka* means something like *attribute* or the object for which the action is resorted to (*yaduddiṣya kriyā pravartate*). The act of descending has *conjunction with the posterior place* as its result, which does not pertain to the mountain (*uttaradeśasamyogastu parvate na vidyate eva*) so as to make it the object of the verb *avarohati*. The mountain, so to speak, is the substratum of separation (*vibhāgāśraya*), and is not consequently entitled to get the designation of *Karman*. This is, therefore, the most accurate definition conceivable, from both the logical and grammatical points of view, that applies to all examples of *Karman*.

The association with the fruit is the criterion whereby roots are divided into two classes,² namely, *sakarmaka* and *akarmaka* or transitive and intransitive. A root is said to be *sakarmaka*, when it denotes an action leading to the fruit, and *akarmaka*, when it denotes

¹ तत्क्रियानान्यथले सति धातुर्यावच्छेदकीभूत-तत्क्रियान्यफलभागित् कर्मत्वमिति ।—Kavirāja.

² धातूनां फलावच्छिन्नव्यापारवाचित्वे सति सकर्मकता, केवलव्यापारवाचित्वे सत्यकर्मकता । and

क्रियावच्छेदकं यस्य फलं कर्वा विवक्षितम् ।

तदेव कर्मधातुस्तु फलानुक्तावकर्मकः ॥—Kavirāja.

only an unqualified action. Thus, when we minutely follow the line of thinking, as revealed here, and consider the cogency of those arguments whereby definitions after definitions were rejected till one was found acceptable, our wonder is really excited to a great extent for what has been done by the Indian logico-grammarians.

Karman, it must be remembered, has got the widest and most varied applications in grammar. Just as *ṣaṣṭhī* is allowed to be used as a substitute for most of the *vibhaktis*, so *Karman* is the only case that may grammatically replace all the rest.¹ It is expressly enjoined by the rules of grammar that *Karman* should have the preference to other cases (when it is so intended by the speaker). The examples of the so-called *dvikarmaka-dhātu* (viz., roots having double objects) furnish evidence how *Karman* might be used in the place of *Apādāna*, *Sampradāna*, and *Adhikarāṇa*.² The indirect objects in such cases as *gām dogdhi payaha* might be treated quite as good as an *Apādāna-kāraka* and so on.

There are, broadly speaking, seven different forms of *karman*,³ namely, *nirvartya*, *vikārya*,

¹ अकथितं च—*Pāṇ.*, 1. 4. 51.

² गां दीग्धि पयः, कथितात् पूर्वापादानसंज्ञा । पुत्रं ब्रूते धर्मम्, कथितात् पूर्वा संप्रदानसंज्ञा । अन्ववरुणद्धि गां व्रजम्, कथितात् पूर्वाधिकरणसंज्ञा ।

—*Maḥābhāṣya* under the rule *Pāṇ.*, 1. 4. 51.

³ निर्वर्त्य च विकार्यं च प्राप्यं च त्रिविधं मतम् ।

तत्रेक्षिततमं कर्म चतुर्धाऽन्यत्तु कल्पितम् ॥—*Vākyapadiya*, *Kār.*, 3. 45.

prāpya, andāsīnya, anīpsita, samjñāntarā-nākhyāta and *anyapūrvaka*. According to Bhartṛhari, the first three are to be regarded as principal varieties and the rest are more or less fanciful (*kalpita*). (i) *Nirvartya* generally means what is brought into existence by an action. We have a *nirvartya-karman* when the word denoting *prakṛti* or material cause,¹ whether existent or non-existent, is not expressly mentioned. *Ghaṭam karoti* is an example of *nirvartya-karman*. Here we find that *prakṛti* or material cause, whether existent or non-existent, is not expressly mentioned. We notice that *Prakṛti* or material cause (*i.e.*, earth) of the *pot* is not expressly said to have assumed the shape of a pot (as *mṛdo ghaṭam karoti*) by way of modification, so as to show the non-difference (*abheda*) between the cause (earth) and the product² (pot). Now, what is desired by the speaker is to show as if clay and pot were different (as in *mṛdā ghaṭam karoti*) or the product were not a modification of the cause. *Prakṛti* is existent, but is not actually said to have undergone any change so as to re-appear in the

¹ सती वा विद्यमाना वा प्रकृतिः परिणामिनी ।

यस्य नाशोयते तस्य निर्वर्तित्वं प्रचक्षते ॥—Vākyapadīya.

² यस्य निर्वर्त्यस्य घटादेः प्रकृतिः सती वा यथा मृदादिका अविद्यमाना वा परिणाममापादिता अमेदेन नाशोयते, मृदो घटं करोतीत्येवंरूपतया न विवक्षिता ; किं तर्हि ? मृदा घटं करोतीत्यादिभेदेनैव ॥—Helārāja.

form of *kārya*. When the modification (*pariṇāma*) of *prakṛti* or cause is intended to be expressed, we have *vikārya-karman*, as in *mṛdā ghaṭam karoti*, *kāśān kaṭam karoti*, *aṅgārān bhasma karoti* and so on. It should be, however, remembered¹ that *ghaṭam karoti* may also prove to be an example of *vikārya-karman* to those who take the product or the effect only as a transformation of *prakṛti* or the material cause. It is difficult to determine what really comes in existence (*sat* or *asat*). The question of *production* and *existence* with particular reference to their mutual dependence has already been discussed. What is now produced, some hold, was non-existent previous to its production (*asat*). Again, some hold that it is really existent (*sat*) that is produced (*sadeva jāyate*).

According² to both these views, *Karman*, as manifested or brought into existence by the activity of the agent, might be regarded as *nirvartya*. Those who are *satkāryavādins* like the Sankhyaitees are likely to support *nirvartya-karman*. A thing that comes into being by some sort of action or is simply manifested by its birth (*janmanā yat prakāśate*) is called

¹ घटं करोतीत्यत्रापि प्रकृतेः परिणामित्वेन विवक्षायां विकार्यमेव ।

—Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa.

² यदसञ्जायते सद्वा जन्मना यत् प्रकाशते । तन्निर्वर्त्तय विकार्यं च कर्म हेधा व्यवस्थितम् ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 49.

nirvartya. Here *janman* implies the manifestation of something that was previously existent, as *putram prasūte* (giving birth to a son) necessarily means the birth of a son that was existent before delivery in an embryonic stage. But when *prakṛti* is intended to be expressed by the term *janman*, what is produced may be looked upon as *vikāra* or modification in relation to *prakṛti*.

Vikārya-karman is so called because it appears to be a modification of *prakṛti* or material cause. *Vikāra* means a change from one state to another and presupposes existence, i.e., modification pertains to things that are already existent (*labdhāsattūkamevāvasthāntaramūpadyate*). It is principally of two kinds,¹ namely, (i) as produced by the entire annihilation of the material cause (*prakṛtyuccheda-sambhūtam*), as in *kūṣṭhaṃ bhasma karoti* (reducing the fuel to ashes); and (ii) as characterised by some different properties or qualities (distinct from those of *prakṛti*), as *suvarṇam kaṇṭhalāṇaṃ karoti* (earrings are made out of gold).

Quite in agreement with the definition of *nirvartya*, the expression *bhasma karoti* is to be taken as an instance of *nirvartya*, since *prakṛti* or material cause (fuel), of which ashes are only modification, is not expressly

¹ प्रकृत्युच्छेदसम्भूतं किञ्चित् काष्ठादिभक्ष्यवत् । किञ्चिद् गुणान्वीतपण्या सुवर्णादिविकारवत् ॥ —Vākyapadiya, B. 50.

mentioned. In the first case *prakṛti* is found to have entirely lost its own self in course of modification. That the difference between *prakṛti* and *vikṛti* is only formal¹ and not material is made clear by the example *suvarṇam kuṇḍalām karoti*. Those who support the view² that product or *vikāra* has its existence in the cause (fuel) in the shape of efficiency are not likely to differentiate *prakṛti* from *vikṛti*, assuming *ashes* to be already existent in the fuel.

From a strictly Vedāntin point of view, *kuṇḍala* is *vivarta*, as opposed to *vikāra*, because it differs from gold only in form but not in essence. From what we have seen above, it is clear that there is, strictly speaking, no remarkable difference³ between *nirvartya* and *vikārya*, as the instance *ghaṭam karoti* has been explained in both the ways; the difference is mainly created by the desire of the speaker. A *Karman*, as Helārāja clearly points out, is called *nirvartya* when *prakṛti* is not directly mentioned (by the speaker), and the same is called *vikārya* when *prakṛti* is expressly mentioned.

¹ काचित् प्रकृतिरत्यजन्तौ स्वरूपं संस्थानान्तरापत्त्या विकृतेत्युच्यते ।—Helārāja.

² सांख्यमते काष्ठावस्थायासपि शक्तिरूपेण भस्मनः सम्भवात् । ते हि कारणेषु शक्तिरूपेण कार्यावस्थितिर्नित्याहुः ।—Kavirāja (Kālāpa).

³ काष्ठानि भस्म करोति, निर्वर्त्तयति कर्म प्रकृतेरविवचनात् । विवचायां तु विकार्यम् ।—Helārāja.

(3) *Prāpya, i.e., prāpya-karman*¹ is that where-
in the action of the agent does not produce or
give rise to any special feature or quality.
Usually we have a *prāpya-karman* when the
action does not produce any *viśeṣa* or change
comprehensible either by direct observation
or inference. A *karman* in its ordinary gram-
matical sense is known as *prāpya*. In *ādityam
paśyati*,² mere perception serves only to suggest
a relation between the action and the object
observed, and nothing like *viśeṣa* is cognisable.
In the case of a *nirvartya-karman* as *ghaṭam
karoti*, the speciality that is (*kriyākṛta-viśeṣa*)³
perceptibly brought about by the action is the
production of the pot. But sometimes inference
also helps us to get a specific cognition,
as one can easily determine through the help
of inference whether a man is enjoying plea-
sure or not only by observing his facial features.
But in an instance of *prāpya-karman*, such
as *ādityam paśyati*, we find that the action
(seeing) does not bring about any change or
special feature in the sun.

Some, however, do not recognise any-
thing like *prāpya-karman* on the ground

¹ क्रियाकृतविशेषाणां सिद्धिर्यत्र न गम्यते । दर्शनादनुमानाद्वा तत् प्राप्यमिति
कथ्यते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 51.

² निर्वर्त्ताकर्मणि निवृत्तिरात्मलाभ एव क्रियाकृतो विशेषः, विकार्ये तु विकार
एव क्रियाकृतो विशेषः ।—Helārāja.

³ कर्तुः क्रियाविषयभावमात्रेणोपसृततमत्वात् प्राप्यं कर्म । प्रमाणाभ्यां क्रिया-
सम्बन्धमात्रं तु लक्ष्यते, न च स एव विशेषः ।—Ibid.

that the action is invariably followed by some sort of changes, whether directly perceptible or comprehensible by inference only.¹ Even the simple act of seeing is sometimes attended with *vikāra*. Snakes² are proverbially said to have poisonous look; whoever is eagerly seen by them, though not actually bitten, is sometimes found to be in an agony of pain.

(4) *Audāsīnya*.—It is what is done by the agent through indifference; as, for instance, a man while going to a village may happen to touch a straw on his way (*grāmam gacchan tṛṇam sprśati*), though in so doing (touching) he has got no particular object in view. The author of the *Mahābhāṣya* has illustrated this class of *Karman*.

(5) *Anīpsita* or undesirable *karman*.—This has been explained in connection with such examples³ as *viṣam bhuñkte* (taking poison).

(6) *Anākhyāta*.—This, too, has been explained with reference to the rule *akathitam ca*.

(7) *Anyapūrvakam*.—This refers to those cases where *karma-kāraṇas* are specially sanctioned by the rules of grammar in the place of other *kāraṇas*, as in *krūramabhikrudhyati*, etc.

The objective case also admits of other divisions, such as direct and indirect, in

¹ नास्तेव प्राप्यकर्म सर्वत्र क्रियाकृतविशेषावधारणात् ।—*Helārāja*.

² दृष्टिविषैरहिभिर्निर्नीचितो विषयो ज्वलनज्वालादीदो लक्ष्यते ।—*Ibid*.

³ *Pāṇ.*, 1. 4. 50.

connection with those roots that comprehend two objects. We have already alluded to the condition (the desire of the speaker) under which *Karāṇa* and *Adhikarāṇa* might be used as the subject. There are instances like *pacyate odanaḥ*, *lūyate kedāraḥ*, etc. where the objects are found to have practically changed into the agent. The so-called agent is known in grammar as *karmakartā*.

Helārāja has spoken of two more divisions of *karman*, namely, *antaraṅga*, as denoting things, and *bahiraṅga* as comprehending such objects as time. Some intransitive verbs ¹ (*āste*, *svapiti*) are allowed to be governed by only such objects as denote particular *time*, *country*, *path* and *action*. Therefore, in grammar ² intransitive verbs are those that can have no other objects excepting time, country, etc. Bhaṭṭhari is not prepared to take these as regular objects ; his contention is that it is impossible to conceive of any objects in connection with the intransitive verb. What appears to be reasonable on a minute examination ³ of such examples as *māsāmāste*, *kurūn svapiti*, etc., is that their *karmatva* is,

¹ कालभावाध्यगन्तव्याः कर्मसंज्ञा ह्यकर्मणाम् ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 336.

² येषां देशकालादिभिर्ज्ञं कर्म न संभवति तेऽतःकर्मकाः, न त्विवचित्कर्माणोऽपि ।—Siddhāntakaumudī under 1. 4. 52.

³ क्रियान्तरापेक्षया तेषां कर्मत्वम् ।—Helārāja. व्याप्तादिक्रिययातुमिष्यमाणत्वात् कालादीनां स्फुटमेव कर्मत्वम् ।—Helārāja.

strictly speaking, due to their implied relation with some other verbs as *vyāpya* meaning *lasting for* (understood). According to this interpretation, the expression *māsamāste* really means *māsam vyāpyāste* (staying for a month).

Patañjali has referred to another form of *Karman*, namely, *kalma*,¹ which means 'an unaccomplished object' (*aparisaṁāptam karma*). These irregular *Karman*s (as are illustrated by the rule *akathitam ca*) take *dvitīyā* as their only characteristic feature, but do not generally receive all those grammatical operations which are applied to the regular objects alone.² Kaiyaṭa observes that the term *kalma* was used by the ancient grammarians as a technical name for those objects that are sanctioned and recognised as such by the rule *Pāṇ.*, 1.4.51.

Apādāna is that form of *Kāraka* which denotes the limit of separation. The definition of Pāṇini (*Pāṇ.*, 1.4.24) deserves careful examination, specially with regard to the word *dhruva* as occurring in the *sūtra*. The word *dhruva* generally means 'motionless,' but this sense is hardly compatible when the limit of separation is also found to be in motion,³

¹ विपरीतं तु यत् कर्म तत् कल्य कवयो विदुः ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 336.

² न वास्मिन् सर्वाणि कर्मकार्याणि क्रियन्ते, किं तर्हि, द्वितीयैव ।

³ गतियुक्तेष्वपादानसंज्ञा नोपपद्यतेऽध्रवत्वात् ।—Vār. on the rule *Pāṇ.*, 1. 4. 24.

as we say 'fallen from a running horse.' Here both the horse and the rider are equally in motion and, consequently, it is not possible to have the cognition of a fixed limit so far as the act of separation is concerned. How, then, are we justified in taking the word *aśva* in a sentence like 'fallen from a running horse' as an instance of *Apūdāna-kāra*ka? Patañjali¹ holds that there are also some stationary or permanent elements in the horse, such as the genus (*aśvatva*) or the state of being a horse and 'the swift motion' which are said to be the implication of the speaker in a sentence like *dhāvato'śvāt patitaḥ*. He thus makes it clear that in like cases what the speaker desires to indicate refers really to *dhruvatva* or motionlessness and not to the opposite.

The word *dhruva* should not be taken in its strictly literal sense,² i.e., motionless. Of two things, namely, the limit and the object that is actually separated, the former, i.e., tree, as in *vrkṣāt parṇam patati*, is more or less unaffected by the act of separation; consequently, it is grammatically called *dhruva* in relation to the leaf that falls down as the result of separation.

Bhartrhari has stated clearly that *Apūdāna* forms the limit of separation, whether movable

¹ इह तावदद्यान्नस्तात्पतितः—इति यत्तदर्थेऽश्वत्थमायुगामित्वं तद् घृवं तच्च विवक्षितम् ।—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 327.

² द्रव्यस्वभावे न धीव्यमिति सूत्रे प्रतीयते । अपायविवक्षं प्रीव्यं यत्तु तावद्विवक्षितम् ।—*Vākyapadīya*, 3. 3. भ्रुव' कूटय' निक्षिप्यमिति द्रव्यस्वभावे धीव्यमिति न सूत्रे प्रत्येतव्यम् ।—*Helārāja*

or fixed (*calam vā yadi vācalam*) and that the limit, though the substratum of separation, is not practically affected by the operation of the wind which is the direct cause of separation. In the example *kudṛyāt patato'svāt patitaḥ* both the wall and the horse are to be regarded as *dhruva*, the former constitutes the limit of separation in regard to the falling of the horse, and the latter in regard to the man who falls down from the falling horse. The word *dhruva* is thus used as a relative one; it does not necessarily mean an absolutely motionless thing, but generally what remains more or less unaffected in the course of separation. When separation is brought about by the reciprocal action of the two, as in *apa-sarato meṣādapasarati meṣaḥ*, each of them is to be considered as *dhruva*¹ in regard to the action of the other.

It is necessary to make one point perfectly clear. In the oft-quoted instance of *Apādāna*, viz., 'a leaf is falling from a tree,' the relation, it must be remembered, between the tree and the leaf is one of simple conjunction and not of co-inherence (*samavāya*), that is, we have *Apādāna* only when the leaf happens to be brought over the tree either by the wind or by birds, but not when the leaf stands in an inseparable connection with the tree.

¹ नैयान्तरक्रियापेक्षमवधित्वं पृथक् पृथक् । नैषयोः स्वक्रियापेक्षं कर्तृत्वं च पृथक् पृथक् ।—Vākyapadīya, 3. 6.

When, on the other hand, co-inherence is intended to be expressed, we get *śaśīhī* instead of *pañcamī*, as in *vrl.śasya parnam patati*.¹

As the act of separation equally affects the tree as well as the leaf (the very idea of separation comprehending two objects), Suṣeṇa argues that the leaf also may have the designation of *Apādāna* in such a case. But it is against the desire of the speaker. Moreover, *pañcamī*² in *yatah* is indicative of *limit*, which, in the fitness of things, applies to the tree and not to the leaf. Suṣeṇa³ then suggests a logical definition of *limit*—‘though practically unaffected by the operation (of the wind) that relaxes the connection, the limit or *Apādāna* forms the substratum of separation.’⁴

Separation may be either physical or intellectual. Patañjali has recognised the desirability of acknowledging the intellectual separation and has, consequently, rejected some *sūtras* and *vārttikas*, such as Pāṇ, 1.4.25, 1.4.26, 1.4.27, 1.4.28, as superfluous. In accordance

¹ हचस्य पथे पततीत्येवं भाष्ये निदर्शितम् ।—Vākyapadīya हचसम्यग्भिन्नः पथेऽप्य पातो वाक्यार्थो विवक्षितः, इति हचस्यावधिना विवक्षा न नास्ति ।—Helārāja

² यतोऽपेति भयमादत्ते वा तदपादानम् ।—Kulāpa, Kāraka, 214

³ Suṣeṇa has the following —नन्वपायो विद्वेषः, विभाग इति यावत् । स च पथेऽपि हचनिष्ठः, ततो यथा हचस्यापादानसञ्ज्ञा तथा पथेऽपि कथं न स्यात् ? इति चेन्न, अभिप्रायापरिज्ञानात् ।

⁴ अवधित्वम्—विभागजनकौभूतस्यन्दनादिक्रियानाश्रयत्वे सति विभागायत्वम् ।

with his view,¹ the rule *dhruvamapāye'pādānam* is quite sufficient to explain all those instances that are usually supported by the additional rules.

Bhartṛhari speaks of three kinds of *Apādāna*,² namely, *nirदिष्टविषयम्*—when the limit of separation is fixed, or, where the sense of separation is directly denoted by the verbal form, as in *grāmādāgacchati* (coming from a village) and *aśvāt palitaḥ* (fallen from a horse); *upāttaviṣayam*—when the sense of another verb appears to be either principal or subordinate, as in *valāhakāt vidyotate* (lightning flashes forth from the cloud); *apekṣitakriyam*—when the act of separation is to be understood, as in *kuto bhavān* (wherefrom do you come)? Here the verb like *āgacchati* is to be supplied.

Sampradāna is that form of *Kāraka* which is desired (by the agent) to be the recipient of the fruit of ownership (*svatva*) pertaining to the object of the root *dā* (to give). Suṣeṇa explains *yamabhipraiti* as what is connected with the action (*dadāti*) by the instrumentality of the objective case. *Abhipraiti* gives the idea of a relation which is, in the logical terms, thus expressed: a recipient of the fruit, i.e., ownership pertaining to the object of the action (*kriyājanya-karmanistha-svatvaphalabhāgitvam*).

¹ य एव मनुष्यः प्रेषापूर्वकारी भवति न पश्यति दुःखोऽधर्मो नानेन कृत्यमस्तीति । न दुःखा नप्राप्य निवर्तते । तत्र द्रुवमप्राप्योपादानमित्येव चिदम् ।

—Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāp., 1. 4. 24.

² निर्दिष्टविषयं किं विदुषात्तविषयं उच्यते ।

अपेक्षितकियं चेति विधापादानमर्थम् — Vākyapadīya, 3, p. 133.

According to the interpretation of the Vyutpattivāda,¹ the example *viprāya gām dadāti* (giving a cow to a Brahmin) will mean 'a Brahmin who is the object (*uddeśya*) of the desire for gift which is made with the intention of making him the recipient of the ownership of the cow, as is effected by the act of giving.' *Sampradāna* is, therefore, the same as *uddeśya*,² i.e., a person to whom something is made over. This is clear from the language of the rule *yasmai ditsā*, etc. (Kalāpa, 216).

The word *sampradāna* is treated as an *anvarthasamjñā*, i.e., it means exactly the same thing as is denoted by its derivative meaning (*sampradīyate yasmai*). It is a gift³ (*dāna*) by which the previous owner transfers his legal right to another. *Prayer*,⁴ *acceptance* and *inducement* are considered to be the causes that persuade a man to make a gift of his own right. A gift⁵ in the religious sense of the term should proceed from a desire for either worship or favour as in *devatāyai puṣpam dadāti* (offering flowers to a deity) and *bhṛtyāya vastram dadāti* (giving clothes to a servant), when in so doing the person to whom something is made over is entitled to the actual ownership.

¹ त्यागरूपक्रियाजन्यगोनिष्ठस्वत्वभागितया दातुमिच्छाविषयो ब्राह्मणः ।

² व्यक्तुम्यव्यमानद्रव्यस्य स्वत्वभागित्वेनीदृष्टस्वत्व' संप्रदानत्वमिति ।

³ स्वस्वत्वध्वंसपूर्वकपरस्वत्वापादानं ददातेत्यर्थः ।—Kavirāja.

⁴ अनुमन्त्रनिराकृतप्रेरक' त्यागकारणम् ।

⁵ संप्रदानं तदैव स्यात् पूजानुग्रहकाम्यया । दीयमानेन संयोगात् स्वामित्वं सम्भते यदि ॥—Kārikās quoted by the Pañjikāra.

The word *Karman*, as in *Pāṇ.*, 1.4.32, is used to exclude the objective case from getting the designation of *Apādāna*, since *what is desired by the agent* (*yam-abhipraiti*) is a qualification that also applies to the object. It is generally explained as particularly implying the object of the root *dā* (to give), but the author of the *Bhāṣya* has taken it in the sense of *action* (*kriyā*) in general. He has also cited popular instances to show that the word *karman* is used with the same signification as *kriyā*.¹ *Kriyā* is sometimes called *karman*. As there is no difference of meaning between the two expressions, namely, *kām kriyām kariṣyasi* (what action will you do ?) and *kim karma kariṣyasi*, one is allowed to use the word *karman* in place of *kriyā*. *Patañjali* calls it a kind of artificial (*krtrima*) *karman*. It is called *artificial*² because its use in this particular sense is not sanctioned by the grammarians in general. If *karman* is taken to be synonymous with *kriyā*, one may apprehend some difficulty in explaining the rule *Pāṇ.*, 1.4.49, since it is impossible for one *kriyā* to render another as the most desirable one (*katham ca nāma kriyayā kriyepsitatamā syāt*).

¹ क्रियापि कृत्रिमं कर्म—Mahābhāṣya.

² क्रियापि कृत्रिमं कर्म। न सिध्यति। कर्तुरीक्षिततमं कर्म इत्युच्यते। कथं च नाम क्रियया क्रियेक्षिततमा स्यात्? क्रियापि क्रियेक्षिततमा भवति। कया क्रियया? इह य एष मनुष्यः प्रेक्षापूर्वकारी भवति स बुद्ध्या तावत् किञ्चिदर्थं संपश्यति संहृष्टेः प्रार्थना प्रार्थनायामध्यवसायोऽध्यवसाय आरम्भ आरम्भे निर्वृत्ति निर्वृत्तौ फलावाप्तिः।—Mahābhāṣya, under the rule 1. 4. 32.

How minutely Patañjali¹ used to observe the logical sequence of facts is clearly seen from the way in which he has shown the successive stages through which one *kriyā* or action may become the most desirable by means of another action. The usual order is as follows: a man first conceives something by his intellect, then he feels a desire to have it, next comes the effort which is followed by the actual commencement of action, then the completion or accomplishment of the action, and finally the attainment of the desired end.

As it is not always the case that *Sampradāna* should be invariably connected with the object of the root *dā* alone, Kātyāyana has added a *Vārttika*² obviously to widen the scope of *Sampradāna*. On the strength of this supplementary *Vārttika* we are allowed to explain *Sampradāna* even in the case of an intransitive verb like *patye śete*, where the root being an intransitive one, we cannot grammatically expect to have an object that might be connected with *Sampradāna* as such.

Patañjali seems to have minutely scrutinised every part of the *sūtra*, *Pāṇ.*, 2.4.32. He does not take the root *dā* in its strictly literal sense (to give), nor does he lay much stress on

¹ Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 330.

² क्रियया यन्मिप्रैति सोऽपि संप्रदानम् । Patañjali has क्रिययाङ्गणमपि कर्तव्यम्, इहापि यदा स्यात्—आशय निगर्हते, युदाय संनद्यते ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 330.

the derivative meaning (*sampradīyate yasmai iti*), but considers *Sampradāna* to be one to whom something is actually given. The instance *śiṣyāya capetam dadāti* (gives a slap to the pupil), as cited by Patañjali, is a clear indication that he held a far wider view of *Sampradāna*. It is not evidently the use of the root *dā* that always gives the idea of *Sampradāna*, because in the example *rajakasya vastram dadāti* (where the genitive is intended by the speaker) the explicit mention of *dadāti* is not even attended with *caturthī* (*Sampradāna-kāraka*).

Suśeṇa explains the rule Pāṇ. 2.4.32 in the following way :—*Sampradāna* is what is desired by the agent through the instrumentality of the object. It is neither ¹ the object of the verb in general, nor virtually the object of *dadāti* in particular wherewith *Sampradāna* is really connected; for, according to the first view, the village, as in *ajām grāmam nayati* ('brings a goat to the village') would be quite as good as *Sampradāna*; according to the latter, the designation *Sampradāna* might be applied to the 'washer-man' in the example 'clothes are given to a washerman.' The anomaly presented by the above instances received an ingenious solution at the hands of Suśeṇa. The drift of his argument is as follows: as the sense of *giving* naturally follows from the very

¹ क्रियामात्रस्य कर्मणा यं संबन्धाति, ददाति: कर्मणा वा ? नाद्यः, अजां ग्रामं नयति—इत्यादौ ग्रामस्यापि संप्रदानत्वप्रसङ्गात् । नापि द्वितीयः, रजकस्य वस्त्रं ददातीत्यादावतिप्रसङ्गात्—Kavirāja (*Kāraka*).

construction of the word *Sampradāna* (*anvārtha-samjñā*), the definition is not vitiated by the fallacy, viz., *ativyāpti*,¹ that is to say, the village cannot grammatically have the designation of *Apādāna* owing to the absence of any connection with the root *dā*. Similarly, as the preposition *sam* in *Sampradāna* serves to indicate that *dadāti* does not mean merely giving, but signifies gift in its legal sense, i.e., the waiving of one's own right (in regard to a thing) so as to allow another to enjoy the same as his own possession, the washerman cannot be treated as *Apādāna* even in connexion with the verbal form *dadāti* (*dadāti* means here 'to make over' [*arpaṇa*], and not actual giving [*dāna*]).

Suśeṇa, therefore, explains *dāna* as a kind of 'desire'² to transfer one's right to another after the entire cessation of one's own right, and gives the accurate definition of *Sampradāna* in the following terms—*tyāgajanya-svatvaphalabhāgitvam*, i.e., *Sampradāna* is the recipient of the result of right or ownership that is transferred to one by formal gift. He further asserts that the principal³ or direct instances of *Sampradāna* are

¹ चक्षते, संप्रदानमित्यन्वये संज्ञायां दा-धातोः श्रवणाद्ददातिर्लभ्यते... तथा समुप-सर्गेण सम्यक् प्रदीयते यद्ये तत् संप्रदानमिति व्युत्पत्त्या स्वस्वत्वध्वंसपूर्वकपरस्वत्वापादानं ददातिरर्था लभ्यते ।—Kavirāja.

² स्वस्वत्वध्वंसद्वारा परस्वत्वजनकोभूतः संकल्पतिशयो दानम् ।—Kavirāja.

³ एतत् सर्वं यच्च वास्तविकं तच्च मुख्यमेव संप्रदानम् । अवास्तविकं तु विवक्षामात्रेण प्रयोगस्तु साधुत्वम् ।—Kavirāja.

those where the transference of right actually takes place, and that in regard to other cases, it is generally the desire of the speaker (*vivakṣā*) that accounts for the use.

The validity¹ of *Sampradāna* in *pradīyatām Dāśarathāya Maithilī* (as Rāvaṇa had no legal right over Sītā so that he might be entitled to make a gift of her to Rāma) depends upon the desire of the speaker, *i.e.*, it is said as if Rāvaṇa had transferable right over Sītā. The fact is that one cannot give anything to another in the legal sense of the term, if he does not own it actually.

Bhartrhari has spoken of three kinds of *Sampradāna* :—(i) *anirākartṛ*—it means a kind of *Sampradāna* that does neither accept nor refuse what might be offered to it ; as, for instance, *Sūryāya argham dadāti* ; the sun neither solicits worship nor is likely to refuse it ; (ii) *prerakam*—*i.e.*, what induces others to make over something to him, as in *viprāya gām dadāti*. Here the Brahmin is supposed to have induced the man to make a gift of the cow to him ; (iii) *anumantr*—who approves of a gift, *i.e.*, permits a man to make over something (though he does not actually request him to do so) as in *upādhyāyāya gām dadāti* (presenting a cow to the teacher).

¹ इत्यत्र रावणस्य मैथिल्यां स्वत्वाभावेऽपि स्वत्वविवक्षया प्रयोगस्य साधुत्वम् ।—Kavirāja.

CHAPTER VIII

SAMĀSA

Samāsa—definition—The meaning of *samartha*, *ekārthibhāra*
and *vyapekṣā*—Classification of *Samāsa*—Power of
expressing the additional sense.

The psychological principle underlying the formation of compounds and the unity of sense denoted by *Samāsa* has been considered in my "Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus." An attempt will be made here to show the grammatical side of the problem with particular reference to the conflicting views held by the *Naiyāyikas* and the grammarians on the question of the additional denotating power of *Samāsa*.

The word *Samāsa* literally means brevity,¹ i. e., condensed or concise expression. This grammatical device has the advantage of condensing a sentence without any change of signification. It must be, however, remembered that it is not only words, or more properly *nāmans*, that combine with each other in a compound, but their meanings, too, are so consistently related to each other (as noun and

¹ समसं समासः संक्षेपः ।

adjective) as to give rise to one qualified idea. Though composed of two or more *padas*, a *Samāsa* produces only one idea in the mind.

According to the rule *samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ*, *Pāṇ.* 2.1.1, which is quite as good as a *Paribhāṣā*, words are allowed to form a compound when they are found to be mutually expectant and their meanings compatible with each other. Sarvavarman has *nāmnām samāso yuktārthaḥ*, which means that a compound represents the 'consistent unification of the meanings of two or more *nāmans*.' A combination of *nāmans* expressing a *united sense* is what is grammatically called *Samāsa*. The meanings are consistently united when the words forming a compound are related to each other as substantive and attributive. The *kārikā*¹ quoted by Durga goes to show that *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* in their harmonious association are only competent to form a compound. *Samāsa*, holds Durga,² is distinct from a sentence. But it is generally expressed by a sentence (*vigraha*) only to help the understanding of unintelligent people. The word *samartha*, as used in the *sūtra*, is of considerable importance and has given rise to various interpretations.

Patañjali has explained *sāmarthyā* from two different standpoints, namely, *vyapekṣā* or mutual

¹ 'विशेष्यस्य विशेषेण मिलितं युक्तमुच्यते । समासाख्यं तदेव स्यात्तद्धितोत्पत्तिरेव च ।

² स पुनः स्वभावादाक्याद्भिन्नः तत्तुल्यरूपावयव इति कृत्वा अनुधर्माधनाय नानां युक्तार्थं इत्युच्यते ।—*Kalāpa, Tīkā.*

connection and *ekārthībhāva* or the oneness of meanings. He has made it abundantly clear with reference to all forms of compounds that no *Samāsa* whatsoever is grammatically admissible in the absence of such *sāmarthya* or competency. He has also suggested various meanings of the word *samartha* in order to show how the word might correctly be used to imply both *vyapekṣā* and *ekārthībhāva*.

According to his interpretation,¹ the word *samartha* may be used in the following senses, namely, consistent or mixed up (*sangatārtha*), united (*samsr̥ṣṭārtha*), visible (*samprekṣitārtha*) and connected (*sambaddhārtha*); the first two meanings indicating united into one (*ekībhūtam*) are agreeable with the *ekārthībhāva* point of view, and the last two indicating connection of meanings being harmonious with the *vyapekṣā* standpoint. So far as the *ekārthībhāva*² view is concerned, the word *samartha* should be taken as implying united meanings (*ekībhūtam*), and it brings out the sense of 'connected meanings' (*sambaddhārtha*) or 'reciprocally expectant meanings,' when *vyapekṣā* is considered to be the essential condition of *Samāsa*. The word *samartha* indicates that words are not allowed

¹ *Mahābhāṣya* under the rule Pāṇ., 2. 1. 1.

² तद् यदा तावदेकार्थोभावः सामर्थ्यं तदेव' विग्रहः करिष्यते संगतार्थः समर्थः संछट्यार्थः समर्थ इति । एकौभूतमिति गम्यते ।—*Mahābhāṣya* under the rule Pāṇ., 2. 1. 1.

to form a compound unless they are *samartha*, i.e., have either mutual connection or compatibility of meanings.

Patañjali then proceeds to bring out the full import of *sāmarthyā* and clearly shows why *Samāsa*¹ does not usually take place in expressions like *bhāryā rājñāḥ puruṣo devadattasya* and *mahat kaṣṭam śritaḥ*. What he means to say is this: no compound is possible between two words when one of them is grammatically connected with another word that does not form a part of the compound; in *mahat kaṣṭam śritaḥ* the form *kaṣṭam* is *asamartha* (incompetent) to be compounded or consistently united with the word *śritaḥ* on account of its having relation with the word *mahat* that qualifies it. Here *asāmarthyā* for a regular combination in order to form a *Samāsa* is due to the fact that the words *mahat* and *kaṣṭam* are mutually expectant as noun and adjective.² To use the logical phraseology, *sāpekṣatva* implies the state of having relation with a word that is not a member of the compound.³

The grammarians, as a rule, are not prepared to allow the formation of compounds in cases of such *sāpekṣatva*.⁴ This is what is actually meant by the dictum *saviśeṣaṇānām*

¹ असामर्थ्यात् ।—Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 2. 1. 1.

² सापेक्षसमर्थं भवतीति ।—*Ibid.*

³ युक्तार्थघटकीभूतपदातिरिक्तपदसम्बन्धित्वं सापेक्षत्वम् ।

⁴ न सापेक्षे क्वचिद्विज्ञेयमासाः ।—Mahābhāṣya.

crittirna, that is, a word cannot enter into combination with another word (in a *Samāsa*) if it happens to have an adjunct. A question may arise at this stage as to how compounds are admissible in instances like *rājapuruṣo abhirūpataṛaḥ* and *rājapuruṣo darśanīyaḥ* (a beautiful officer of the king), because the word *puruṣa* is here compounded with the word *rājan* in spite of its relation with the adjective *abhirūpa*. Now Patañjali¹ comes forward with his argument to justify the formation of a compound in such cases. When the principal member and not the subordinate one, he holds happens to be *sāpekṣa* or connected with some other word (as adjective), there is practically no restriction for the formation of a compound. What we actually find in *rājapuruṣaḥ abhirūpaḥ* is that the principal member, i.e., *puruṣaḥ*, is connected with the adjunct *abhirūpa* and, therefore, *Samāsa* is grammatically admissible.

But sentences like *Devadattasya gurukulam* and *caitrasya dūsabhāryā* (the wife of the servant of Caitra), etc., which are avowedly correct in popular usage, present further difficulties. Patañjali first tried to get rid of this anomalous position by explaining the genitive in *Devadattasya* as implying relation with the whole and not with the

¹ Mahābhāṣya, p. 360 : प्रधानस्य सापेक्षं, भवति च प्रधानस्य सापेक्षस्यापि समासः ।

word *guru* alone, but this argument also proved futile, because, the sentence is really intended to express particularly *Devadattasya yo gurustasya yat kulam* and so on. He then finally concludes that *Samāśas* are admissible in these cases (even inspite of *sāpekṣatva*) on account of *gamakatva* or power of expressing the intended sense. A compound is said to be *gamaka* when it is capable of expressing the very same sense (no matter if there is *sāpekṣatva*) as is implied by the words that go to form such a compound. This is exactly what is meant by the statement *sāpekṣatve'pi gamakatvāt samāsaḥ*. As to why *Samāsa* is not admissible in *mahat kaṣṭam śritam*, there is no denying the fact, says Patañjali,¹ that the signification of the sentence in this case is not necessarily the same as is expressed by the compound. This is the way how Patañjali relaxed the rigidity of his previous statement (*sāpekṣa-masamartham bhavātīti*).

Jagadīśa² ventures to differ from the grammarians. He has little regard for the view that a compound and its *vigraha* (the sentence to which the compound might be

¹ इह समानार्थेन वाक्येन समासेन च भवितव्यम् । यश्चेदार्थो वाक्येन गम्यते महत् कष्टं श्रितं इति न जातुचित् समासेनासौ गम्यते महत्कष्टश्रितं इति । यत्र गमको भवति भवति तत्र वृत्तिः, यथा देवदत्तस्य गुरुकुलम् ।—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 361.

² विग्रहे एव समासलभ्यार्थस्य बोधकत्वं तत्त्वं, न तु समासे विग्रहार्थस्य, विग्रह-लभ्ययोर्लिङ्गसंख्ययोर्व्यञ्जकवैधुर्येण प्रायशः समासावोध्यत्वात् ।—*Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, under the *Kār*, 33.

dissolved) must have the same meaning,¹ and holds in opposition that the *vigraha*, as a rule, should bring out the sense of the compound but it is not equally binding that a compound should necessarily express the entire meaning of the sentence. He has, accordingly, disjoined the compound *sphuradvāṇī* (articulate speech) as *sphurantīm vāṇīm* without having any regard to the equality of case-terminations between *vyūsa* and *Samāsa*.²

The two views—*ekārthībhāva* and *vyapekṣā*—correspond respectively to *jahatsvārthā vṛtti* and *ajahatsvārthā vṛtti* : the former means that when a compound is formed, its component parts cease to retain their individual meanings, and give rise to only one united sense ; and the latter implies that such constituent parts do not, as a rule, give up their meanings (as in a sentence) as a necessary condition of *Samāsa*.

According to the first view,³ *samartha* implies the oneness of meanings (i.e., the members of a compound having different significations are made to signify only one sense). A sentence, on the other hand, is made up of different *padas* that continue to retain their own meanings as *rājñah puruṣah*. We have to deal here with a problem of great importance.

¹ व्याससमासयोस्तुल्यार्थकत्वम् ।

² Śabdasaṅkīrti—Samāsaprakaraṇam.

³ पृथगर्थानामेकार्थीभावः समर्थवचनम् ।—Vār.

पृथगर्थानां पदानामेकार्थीभावः समर्थमित्युच्यते ।—Mahābhāṣya

As a matter of fact, there is no material difference between a sentence and a compound so far as the meaning is concerned,¹ for instance, the compound and the sentence like *rājñah puruṣa ānīyatām* and *rājapuruṣa ānīyatām* grammatically mean the same thing, viz., 'fetch an officer of the king.' It, therefore, goes against the assumption of Jagadīśa who made a distinction between *Samāsa* and *vigraha* with reference to their meanings.

Wherein, then, lies the difference between *vyāsa* and *Samāsa*? The criterion to distinguish a *Samāsa* from a sentence is that the former is characterised² by *aikapadya* and *aika-svarya* from the grammatical point of view. The prominent points of difference are as follows³ :—(1) there is no elision of case-endings in a sentence as in a compound; (2) in a sentence other words (adjectives) are allowed to intervene between such mutually expectant words as *rājñah ṛddhasya puruṣa iti*, but such is not the case in regard to the compound *rājapuruṣah*; (3) in a sentence there is hardly any restriction as to the syntax or order of words, but one cannot possibly alter the order of a compound without substantial change of meaning; (4) in a compound

¹ इह समानार्थेन वाक्येन भवितव्यं समासिन च ।—*Mabūbhāṣya*.

² एकपद्यमैकस्वर्गमैकविभक्तिकत्वं च सर्वदैकार्थीभावे दृश्यते ।—*Kaiyaṭa*.

³ सुबलीयो व्यवधानं यद्येष्टमन्यतरेणाभिसम्बन्धः स्वर इति ।—*Mabūbhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 162.

there is only one accent and not two as in the sentence *rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*. It might be, however, observed here that these special features, as enumerated above, are not really brought about by *ekārthībhāva* or oneness of the sense, but they, strictly speaking, represent the result of Patañjali's interpretation.

Then, Patañjali continues to point out other points of difference between *vyāsa* and *Samāsa*¹ : (i) there is difference of number in a sentence, as *rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*, *rājñoh puruṣaḥ*, *rājñām puruṣaḥ*, but no such difference is comprehensible in the compound (*rājapuruṣaḥ*); (ii) the meaning of a sentence is clear, while that of a compound is sometimes ambiguous (the reverse of the case is also possible, viz., a compound appears to be sometimes more clear than a sentence); (iii) an *upasarjana* or subordinate member is allowed to have a qualifying adjunct (*ṛddhasya rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*) in a sentence, whereas there is a positive restriction that a member of the compound cannot have grammatical connection with an adjective lying outside the compound. This also, to speak the truth, does not constitute a special feature of *Samāsa*, because compounds in *Devadattasya gurukulam*, etc., have already been declared admissible on the ground of expressiveness (*gamakatva*); (iv) *ca* is used in a sentence

¹ संख्याविशेषो व्यक्तानिधानमुपसर्जनविशेषश्च यथोक्तः ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 362.

(in the sense of collection), but not in a compound.

Some explain, on the other hand, 'mutual connection' as the proper implication of *sāmarthyā*; ¹ the expression 'mutual connection' should not be, however, misunderstood as referring to words (reciprocally expectant words), but as pertaining to their meanings.² When, *vyapekṣā* (mutual connection) pertaining to the meaning is thus held to be the denotation of *sāmarthyā*, both the king and the man, as in *rājñah puruṣah*, seem to be related to each other. The king³ is connected with the man as the master (*mamāyamiti*), and the man also gets himself related to the king on account of his being dependent on him (*ahamasya*). The genitive is thus indicative of the relation between them. The older grammarians are supposed to have been in favour of *vyapekṣā* as an indispensable condition of *Samāsa*.

In course of interpreting the rule 2.1.1 (Pāṇ.), Patañjali has referred to various standpoints regarding the characteristics of *Samāsa*. If *Samāsa* is considered to be a *vṛtti* (i.e., if it, as a rule, always brings out a specific signification),

¹ परस्परव्यपेक्षां सामर्थ्येनेके ।—Mahābhāṣya.

² Mahābhāṣya, p. 365. का पुनः शब्दयोर्व्यपेक्षा ? न वृत्तः शब्दयोरिति ; किं तर्हि ? अथेयोः ।—Mahābhāṣya, p. 365.

³ इह राज्ञः पुरुष इत्युक्ते राजा पुरुषमपेक्षते ममायमिति, पुरुषोऽपि राजानमपेक्षतेऽहमस्येति । तयोरभिसम्बन्धस्य षष्ठी वाचिका भवति ।—Mahābhāṣya, under the rule Pāṇ., 2. 1. 1.

these views, holds Koṇḍabhaṭṭa,¹ are, by minute examination, reducible to two only, namely, *jahatsvārthā* and *ajahatsvārthā*.

The three views mainly discussed in the *Mahābhāṣya* are as follows;² (i) *ekārthībhāva* or the unity of meanings takes place in a compound as the salient characteristic, but a *vigraha* (sentence) comprehends *vyapekṣā* or *vyapekṣā* is found to be the primary condition of a sentence; (ii) on the assumption of *vṛtti*, *Samāsa* will fall under the category of either *jahatsvārthā* or *ajahatsvārthā*; (iii) just as *vyapekṣā* or mutual connection is necessary in a sentence, so it is in a compound, i.e., some hold *vyapekṣā* (as the real meaning of *sāmarthyā*) to be the main factor that goes to form a compound.

Kaiyaṭa, like Patañjali, supports *ekārthībhāva* as the most plausible view from the standpoint of the grammarians who ascribe eternality to *śabda*. He argues further that the question of *vṛtti*, as shown above, is absolutely immaterial to those who take a sentence as containing no parts (*niravayava*), and look upon *śabda* as eternal. The division of *vṛtti* into *jahatsvārthā* and *ajahatsvārthā* represents the view of those who take *śabda* to be *kārya*.

¹ *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, Kār. 30.

² इत्थं तावद्भाष्ये पचसृष्टिः प्रतीयते । समासादाधिकार्थीभावः, विग्रहवाक्ये च व्यपेक्षकः पचः । अथ ये वृत्तिं वर्तयन्ति इत्यारम्भे जहत्स्वार्थाजहत्स्वार्था चेति पचभेदेन मतान्तरम् । समासादावपि वाक्यवद्व्यपेक्षैव सामर्थ्यमिति चापरं मतम् ।—

*Samāsa*¹ is a *vṛtti*, that is to say, *Samāsa* is attended with a special significance. *Vṛtti* is of two kinds, namely, *jahatsvārthā* and *ajahatsvārthā*. According to the standpoint of *jahatsvārthā-vṛtti*, the members constituting a compound generally give up their particular meanings and the compound necessarily acquires a special signification. This special sense may be produced either by *śakti* (denotation) or by *lakṣaṇā* (implication), the former helps us in getting the *united meaning* (*ekārthābhāva*) and the latter is resorted to in case of *vyapekṣā*. Patañjali has here made use of a very well-chosen example to show the nature of *jahatsvārthā*. 'A carpenter,² for instance, when engaged to perform the work of a king, is compelled to give up his own work to a certain extent.' So far as the other form of *vṛtti* is concerned (*ajahatsvārthā*), the members of a compound continue to retain their respective meanings ; as, for instance, 'a beggar³ does not necessarily leave off what he procured first even when he happens to secure alms for the second time.' But there is some difficulty in accepting this standpoint as a reasonable one. The compound form should necessarily have the dual number, if each of the members

¹ परार्थाभिधानं वृत्तिः । परस्य शब्दस्य यीर्त्यस्तस्याभिधानं शब्दान्तरेण यच्च सा वृत्तिरित्यर्थः ।—Kaiyaṭa.

² तच्चा राजकर्मणि प्रवर्तमानः स्वं कर्म जहाति ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 364.

³ भिच्छुकोऽयं द्वितीयां भिचामासाद्य पूर्वां न जहाति ।—*Ibid*, p. 365.

(*rājan* and *puruṣa*) were allowed to retain their respective meanings.

Patañjali has thus examined the validity of several views in regard to the exposition of *sāmānyā* and advanced arguments as well as counter-arguments either to support or to reject them. But the question that still awaits solution is to determine which of these two views is really acceptable from the standpoint of grammar, and appeals more to reason. In view of the emphasis laid on the *ekārthibhāva*, it is clear that Patañjali accepted it as the most correct explanation. From what we have been able to gather from his lengthy discourse on the rule *sāmānyā padavidhiḥ*, it appears that Patañjali, whose decision is held to be authoritative on all problems of grammar, was in favour of the *ekārthibhāva*¹ point of view (or *jahatsvārthā*). The *ekārthibhāva* view, it must be remembered, is also the only reasonable explanation so far as the psychological aspect of *Samāsa* is concerned. According to Haradatta, both *vyapekṣā* and *ekārthibhāva* are necessary in a compound. In the absence of *vyapekṣā* or mutual connection, words are not allowed to form a compound.

Patañjali² has, however, drawn attention to the fact that *jahatsvārthā* does not mean

¹ इह व्यपेक्षायां समासो न भवति, एकार्थीभावे वाक्यं नेति ।—Kaiyaṣa on वाचनानर्थक्यम् ।

² जहद्व्यसौ स्वार्थं नात्यन्ताय जहाति । यः परार्थविरोधी स्वार्थस्तं जहाति ।
—Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ, 2. 1. 1.

that the constituents of a compound are liable to give up their respective meanings altogether. But only that sense which is found to be inconsistent with the specific signification (*parārthavirodhī*) as denoted by a compound, is forsaken. This is why the expression *rājapuruṣo ānīyatām*¹ does not simply mean the bringing of a man, but particularly *the* man having relation with the king.

Sāmarthya has been explained by some as pertaining to *vṛtti*. According to this view,² difference (*bheda*) as well as association (*saṁsarga*) are the meanings of *sāmarthya*.

Patañjali has raised another question which is not less important in connection with *Samāsa*. A compound is generally said to be optional, that is to say, we may have either a *Samāsa* as *rājapuruṣaḥ* or a sentence like *rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ* without any change of meaning. To form a compound, or to use the compound-form depends upon the desire of the speaker. This view does not carry much weight with Patañjali. What he means to say is this : there are practically two views, namely, *vṛttipakṣa*, i.e., compound and *avṛttipakṣa*, i.e., sentence. Both the sentence and the compound have their distinct characteristics fixed by nature, and there is nothing to confuse the one with the other.³

¹ राजपुरुषमानयेत्युक्ते 'पुरुषमात्रस्यानयनं' प्राप्नोति । नैष दोषः ।—

Mahābhāṣya.

² भेदसंसर्गौ वा सामर्थ्यमिति अपर आह ।—*Ibid.*

³ स्वभावतश्चैतद्वति वाक्यं च समासश्च ।—Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 2. 1. 1.

Kaiyaṭa¹ clearly shows the difference between a sentence and a compound by stating in clear terms that no compound is admissible in case of *vyapeksā*, and, therefore, a sentence is impossible when *ekārthībhāva* is intended to be implied.

It must be noticed that the view held by Haradatta goes against such a rigid distinction. Some hold, on the contrary, that *ekārthībhāva*, *vyapekṣā* and *ajahatsvārthā vṛtti* are all that is required in the formation of a compound.² Those who hold the non-eternality of *śabda*³ are of opinion that compounds are capable of being formed optionally out of sentences, the formation of compounds being a matter of option with them. Those who, like the grammarians, maintain that *śabda* is a permanent entity⁴ (*naitya-śabdika*) opine that sentences and *Samāsas* are materially different, that is to say, *Samāsas* represent a permanent combination of words, for they are so fixed by usage that they do not admit of any decomposition. To be more clear, the drift of Patañjali's argument is that the so-called process of disjoining a compound into *vyāsa* or *vigraha* (whereby a compound is dissolved into its elements) is at best

¹ इह व्यपेक्षाया समासो न भवति, एकार्थीभावे वाक्ये नेति ।—Kaiyaṭa

² तथादेकार्थीभावोव्यपेक्षाऽजहत्स्वार्था चेति त्रयं समुचितं परिभाषाप्रवृत्तिहेतुः ।
—Vāyākaraṇabhūṣana, under *Kar.* 30

³ कार्यशब्दिका वाक्यादिव विकल्पो न इति निष्पाद्या मन्यमाना ।—Kaiyaṭa

⁴ नैत्यशब्दिकास्तु इतिवाक्ये नित्ये विविक्तविषये मन्यन्ते ।—*Ibid.*

artificial, and that recourse is taken to such a method only for the purpose of bringing out the signification of a compound which is really an indivisible unit of speech. This view is analogous to what we have already referred to in deciding the priority of *saṃhitā* to *padas* (*padaprakṛtiḥ saṃhitā*). Further light is thrown upon this view by the so-called *nitya-samāsa*, because we are not allowed to disjoin a compound like *kṛṣṇasarpaḥ* (as we cannot do so without altering the sense); this class of compounds is not capable of being broken up into parts without necessary change of meanings. They do neither admit of *vigraha* in the usual way, nor are their meanings directly expressed by their component parts, but some other words are required to bring out their signification (*avigraha* or *asvapada-vigraha*).

Bhartṛhari¹ has also shown the difference between a sentence and a compound. *Samāsa* is held to be an indivisible unit and the so-called *vigraha* is after all an artificial method that serves to bring out the meaning of a compound to unintelligent people. Durga has *tato'nyat vākyamiti*, which implies that a compound is distinct from a sentence by its very nature. There are, so to speak, two

¹ अत्रुधान् प्रत्युपायाश्च विचित्राः प्रतिपत्तये । शब्दान्तरत्वादित्यन्तं भेदो वाक्य-समासयोः ।—Vākyapadiya.

different views on *Samāsa*,¹ namely, (i) a compound is a permanent unit of speech; (ii) a compound² is only a condensed form of a sentence, or, in other words, a sentence is reduced to a compound-form for the sake of brevity or conciseness. Patañjali and his followers seem to have supported the first view. Others hold that there is no material difference between a compound and a sentence, that is to say, *Samāsa* is a designation that may be optionally applied to a sentence under certain conditions.

Samāsa depends more or less on current or popular usage. According to Durgasiṅha, *Samāsa*³ is sometimes permanent or obligatory (as in *kṛṣṇasarpah*), optional in the majority of cases, and is not admissible in some instances (*Rāmo jāmādagnyah*). A *Samāsa* is called *nitya* or obligatory, when its constituents fail to express the intended sense, as, for instance, the members of the compound *kṛṣṇasarpah* mean simply *a black serpent* by their respective powers of denotation, but it is far from being the actual sense, viz., 'a snake that cannot be subdued either by medicinal herbs or by snake-charmers.'⁴ An optional

¹ समासात् स्वभावादेव वाक्य भिन्नमिति नित्यसमासवादिना मतम् ।—Durga's Tīkā on the rule 'नाम्नां समासो युक्तार्थः' ।

² वाक्यमेव समासीभवतीति मतं दर्शयितुमाह—संग्रथैव वा विधिरन्वाख्यात इति ।
—Durga.

³ कचिन्नित्यः कचिद्विहितः कचिन्न स्यात् ।—*Ibid.*

⁴ मेघजडैद्यादनिवार्यः सर्पविशेषः ।

artificial, and that recourse is taken to such a method only for the purpose of bringing out the signification of a compound which is really an indivisible unit of speech. This view is analogous to what we have already referred to in deciding the priority of *saṃhitā* to *padas* (*padaprakṛtiḥ saṃhitā*). Further light is thrown upon this view by the so-called *nitya-samāśas*, because we are not allowed to disjoin a compound like *kṛṣṇasarpah* (as we cannot do so without altering the sense); this class of compounds is not capable of being broken up into parts without necessary change of meanings. They do neither admit of *vigraha* in the usual way, nor are their meanings directly expressed by their component parts, but some other words are required to bring out their signification (*avigraha* or *asvapada-vigraha*).

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different views on *Samāsa*,¹ namely, (i) a compound is a permanent unit of speech; (ii) a compound² is only a condensed form of a sentence, or, in other words, a sentence is reduced to a compound-form for the sake of brevity or conciseness. Patañjali and his followers seem to have supported the first view. Others hold that there is no material difference between a compound and a sentence, that is to say, *Samāsa* is a designation that may be optionally applied to a sentence under certain conditions.

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¹ समासात् स्वभावादेव वाक्य भिन्नमिति नित्यसमासवादिनो मतम् ।—
Durga's Tīkā on the rule 'नाम्ना समासो युक्ताय' ।

² वाक्यमेव समासोभवतीति मत दर्शयितुमाह—सञ्ज्ञैव वा विधिरन्वाग्यात इति ।
—Durga.

³ क्वचिन्नित्यं क्वचिद्विकल्प क्वचिन्न स्यात् ।—*Ibid*

⁴ भेषजवैद्याद्यनिवार्यं, सर्पवैशेष्यं ।

compound means that we are allowed to say either *rājapurusaḥ* or *rājñāḥ purusaḥ*, the former having only the advantage of conciseness. According to this point of view, most cases of compounds are simply dependent on option. *Samāsa* is grammatically inadmissible in those cases where *padas* are so related to each other that they cannot give rise to any special signification (*parārthābhidhānā*).

It should be particularly explained here what is really meant by holding *Samāsa* to be a *vṛtti*. *Vṛtti* means, as Patañjali maintains, 'the power of expressing the sense that is different from those that are denoted by the members of a compound,' that is to say, *Samāsa* is expressive of some special or additional signification.

Patañjali has dealt with the problem of *Samāsa* with such elaboration and in such minute details that his successors have had no room for making further contributions to the subject. In a number of popular *kārikās*, Śrīpati¹ has carefully summarised all that can be said concerning *Samāsa* in general. Jagadīśa's² definition and exposition of *Samāsa* are such as to show that the followers of the *Navya-nyāya* considered a compound to be the same as a sentence, though

¹ प्रतियोगिपदादन्यत् यदन्यत् कारकादपि । वृत्तिशब्दैकदेशार्थं सम्बन्धस्तेन नेष्यते ॥—Kāt. Pariśiṣṭa.

² यादृशस्य महावाक्यस्यान्तत्वादि निर्जात्यन्ते । यादृशार्थस्य धीहेतुः स समासस्तदर्थकः ॥—Śabdaśakti., Kār. 31.

in a condensed form, and, unlike the grammarians, they did not necessarily recognise the special signification of *Samāsa*.

In course of showing the applicability of his definition to all cases of *Samāsa*, and dealing particularly with certain irregular forms of compound, Jagadīśa has made some important observations which one can hardly afford to pass over for an adequate knowledge of the subject. We give below only a few instances of *Samāsa* where Jagadīśa has given a stamp of his originality of exposition.

(i) 'The *rigraha*' (the sentence whereby the meaning of a compound is usually expressed) should be such as would bring out the entire meaning of a compound, but there is no such rigid condition in the case of a compound. It is generally found that a compound-form does not contain anything to give an exact idea as to the precise number and gender of the *rigraha*. Thus, Jagadīśa refutes the view that 'both *vyāsa* and *Samāsa* are exactly expressive of the same sense'

(ii) In cases other than those of *Nipūtas*, the meanings of two *Namans* (words) are related to each other as if they were identical.¹

(iii) As the genitive (denoting relation) is dropped in a compound like *rājapurusaḥ* (as a

¹ विद्यते एव समासज्ज्ञापकं बोधकलं तत्र, न तु समासो विवक्ष्यते ।—
Śab laśakti

² निपातातिरिक्तस्यैव नामादयोरभिधान्यस्यान्युत्पन्नस्य ।—*Ibid*

necessary condition of *Samāsa* in general), the Naiyāyikas¹ have taken recourse to *lakṣaṇā* to expressly indicate the relation of *puruṣa* with *rājan*.

(iv) Though *Karmadhāraya* compounds having pronoun like *yad* and *tad* as their last members are not generally recognised by the grammarians,² Jagadīśa has supported the validity of such a compound as *paramasaḥ* on the authority of Jumarānandī.

(v) If a compound is allowed to be formed by the combination of more than two *padas*,³ it should be either *Dvandva* or *Bahuvrīhi*, i.e., excepting these two compounds no other compounds are generally found to consist of three or more members.

(vi) An anomaly is presented by the expression *karmacāṇḍālayogottham*, because *yogottham* (resulted from the conjunction) cannot be grammatically taken here as an adjunct qualifying *pāpa* (sin) which forms a part of the compound *pāpakṣayaḥ*. Jagadīśa meets this position by suggesting that *yogottham* should be taken in the sense of *yogaprayojyam* (i.e., resulting from a conjunction of *Rāhu* with either the sun or the moon) which might be

१ राजपुरुष इत्यादौ पूर्धपदं पष्ठार्थसंबन्धे लक्षणेति सणिकदुक्तमपि संगच्छते ।—

Sabdasakti.

२ तदाद्युत्तरपदकः कर्मधारयः प्रायशो नेष्यते, तथापि नीलयद्रस आस्वाद्य इत्यादि प्रयोगात् कचिदिष्यते, प्रयुक्तं च जुमरानन्दिना 'परमः स' इत्याद्यर्थे परमसः परमतावित्यादि ।—*Ibid*.

३ बहुपदे बहुव्रीहिरिव नेतरो द्वन्द्वान्वः समासः ।—*Ibid*.

consistently connected with the meaning¹ of *pāpakṣaya* by the relation of identity.

(vii) As *Dvigu*² and *Karmadhāraya* compounds are found to have a striking similarity between themselves from both physical and psychological aspects (each having the first member as an adjective and both indicating the relation of identity) only with this difference that in cases of *Dvigu* the first *pada* is a numerical adjective, Jagadīśa has no objection in including *Dvigu* within the category of *Karmadhāraya*.

On the evidence of the rule *Pāṇ.* 2.1.23, Bhaṭṭoji³ also speaks of both *Dvigu* and *Karmadhāraya* as two special classes of *Tatpuruṣa*, taking a wider view of the latter.

(viii) According to Jagadīśa,⁴ a *Tatpuruṣa* compound, with an adverb as its first member, is also admissible. He recognises *stokapaktū* as an instance of *Karmadhāraya*. But there is some difficulty in explaining the compound as such, because the meaning of the adverb *stoka* (little) is not such as may have the relation of identity (*tādātmya-sambandha*) with that of

¹ योगोत्थमित्यथ योगप्रयोज्यमित्यर्थः, स चाभेदेन पापक्षयेऽस्त्वितः ।—

Śabdasākti.

² द्विगो. कर्मधारयात्कर्मत्वोऽपि न क्षतिः ।—*Ibid*, under the *Kār.* 38.

³ तत्पुरुषविशेषः कर्मधारय स्तद्विशेषो द्विगुः ।

⁴ स्तोत्रपक्तेत्यादौ क्रियाविशेषणैः कर्मधारय एव । महाकविर्महाविश्व
इत्यादौ कवित्वादाविध.....नामार्थकदेशे पचनादावपरनामार्थग्याभिदान्यबोधकतया
तथात्वसम्भवात् ।—Śabdasāktiprakāśikā under *Kār.* 39. ✓

paktṛ (one who cooks). As a matter of fact, the adverb is really connected with the action (cooking) and not with the agent. Here Jagadīśa has been compelled to admit the validity of *nāmārthaikadeśānvaya*, that is, the relation with a part of the meaning of a *Nāman*, and, accordingly, suggests on the strength of such examples as *mahākavi*, *mahāvijña* (where *mahattva* or greatness refers respectively to the state of being a poet and that of being wise, that the adverb *stoka* is related to *pacana* (cooking) which forms part of the meaning of *paktā*.

(ix) By supporting such expressions as *stokanamrā stanābhyām* (as used by Kālidāsa), Jagadīśa has sought to refute the view that 'no compound' ¹ whatsoever is admissible with an adverb.'

(x) Jagadīśa has thoroughly rejected the grammatical definition of *Avyayībhāva* compound, as it involves the fallacy of *avyāpti*. It is not strictly correct to say that an *Avyayībhāva* compound has always an indeclinable as its prior member, for, in instances like *śalākāpari*, *akṣapari*,² etc., we find an indeclinable as the last member; again, *trijamunam* (a collection of three Jumnas),

¹ क्रियाविशेषणैः समास एवाव्युत्पन्न इति तु न दिश्यम् ।—*Sabdasakti* under *Kār.* 39.

² अक्षपरि शलाकापरि—इत्याद्यव्ययीभावेऽव्याप्तिसंख्याव्ययगर्भत्वेऽपि तत्पूर्वकत्वाभावात् ।—*Sabdasakti*.

lohitaṅgam (the country where the Ganges is red) are examples of *Avyayībhava* where no indeclinable is traceable¹

There is evidence to believe that it was accent that determined *Samāsa* in the early stage of the Sanskrit language. A slight defect² in the use of accents is said to have proved fatal to the sacrificer himself. What an important part was played by the variation of accents in the determination of *Samāsas* is best illustrated by such examples as *trimum* (*vyākaranam*) which with slight difference of accents may be taken either as *Avyayībhava* or *Bahuvrīhi* compound.

The ancient grammarians³ are said to have divided *Samāsas* into four classes according to the predominance of the meanings of members forming the compound. The principle underlying these classifications, as we shall see later on, is connected more with the meaning than with the physical aspects of *Samāsas*. They are as follows: (1) *pūrvapadānīthapradhāna* as *Avyayībhūva*—in this class of compounds the meaning of the first member (indeclinable) seems to be principal in relation to that of the last, (2) *uttarapadānīthapradhāna*, i.e., *Tatpuruṣa*—it is so called because in all varieties

¹ एतेष्वव्ययैर्गर्भत्वस्याप्यभावात् ।—*Śabdaraṅga* p. 52

² दुष्टं शब्दं स्वरतो वर्णतो वा निष्ठया प्रयुक्तो न तमर्थमाह । स वाग्वक्तुं यजमानं हिनस्ति यद्येन्द्रश्च स्वरतोऽपराधात् ॥ *Sikṣā*

³ इह कश्चित् समासं पूर्वपदार्थप्रधानं, कश्चिदुत्तरपदार्थप्रधानं, कश्चिदन्यपदार्थप्रधानं, कश्चिदुभयपदार्थप्रधानं, ।—*Mahabhāṣya* Vol I p. 370

of *Tatpuruṣa* compounds the meaning of the last member appears to be predominant ; (iii) *anyapadārthapradhāna*, i.e., *Bahuvrīhi*—the characteristic feature of this class of compounds (*anekamanyapadārthe*) is that the sense of a word that does not actually enter into the combination comes to have the predominance ; (iv) *sarvapadārthapradhāna* as *Dvandva*, where the meanings of all members are of equal importance. Following the classifications of earlier grammarians such as Vābhata¹ and others, Jagadīśa has made an addition (*madhyapadapradhāna*) to the aforesaid division of *Samāśas* as given by Patañjali. *Tatpuruṣa* compounds like *ghaṭānadhikaraṇam* and *prati-yogitānavacchedakaḥ*, etc., are explained by Jagadīśa as instances wherein the sense of the middle *pada* (i.e., non-existence—as denoted by the negative particle *na*) is predominant, and he, accordingly, calls them *madhyapadārthapradhāna*. On a close examination of facts it is, however, found that these classifications of the earlier grammarians are neither sufficient to cover the entire field, nor free from the fallacies of *ativyāpti* and *avyāpti*. Bhaṭṭoji² has clearly pointed out how the principle underlying such divisions cannot be applied to instances like *atimālaḥ*, *unmattagaṅgam*,

¹ पूर्वसंख्यान्यसर्वान्यपदप्राधान्यतः पुनः । प्राचैः पञ्चविधः प्रोक्तः समासो त्रयमष्टादिभिः ॥ Śabdaśakti, Kār. 33.

² समासश्चतुर्विध इति तु प्रायोवादः ।—Bhaṭṭoji.

etc., from a strictly grammatical point of view. In conformity to the rules of grammar, *atimālaḥ* is taken to be an example of *Tatpuruṣa*, though the sense of the first member in this case appears to be the principal one. Thus, the predominance of the sense of the first member of a compound cannot be grammatically regarded as the only criterion for determining an *Avyayībhāva* compound.

According to the popular divisions, *Samāśas* are six in number, or seven by the inclusion of the so-called *Upapada* compound. Some grammarians, however, interpreted the rule सह सुपा, Pāṇ., 2.1.4, in such a way (applying the principle of *yogavibhāga*) as to establish six¹ different kinds of *Samāśas*; the peculiar among these being the compound made of two verbal forms as *khādatamodatā* on the strength of the *gaṇa-sūtra*—*ākhyātamākhyātena kriyāsūtatye*.

According to Jayāditya,² *Samāśas* are capable of being divided into two well-known classes, namely, *nitya* and *anitya*. *Anitya-samāśas* are those where the addition of the case-terminations to the members of the compound is sufficient to bring out the sense, as, for instance, the genitive and *prathamā* respectively in *rājñāḥ* and *puruṣaḥ* are competent to express the meaning of the compound *rājapuruṣaḥ*. In the case

¹ सुपां सुपा तिङा नाम्ना धातुनाथ तिङां तिङा ।
सुबन्तेनेति विज्ञेयः समासः षड्विधो बुधैः ॥

² विभक्तिमात्रप्रचेपान्निजान्तर्गतनामसु ।
स्वार्थस्वाधीधोधार्या नित्यानित्यौ समासकौ ॥

of *nitya-samāsa*s, on the other hand, the mere addition of the case-endings to the constituent elements cannot fully bring out the sense of the compound, for by simple analysis of the compound *kṛṣṇasarpāḥ* as *kṛṣṇaścāsau sarpāśceti* (meaning any and every kind of black serpent) one cannot get into the meaning of the compound (*i.e.*, a snake irresistible either by medicinal herbs or physicians).

The most important question that deserves to be particularly considered in connection with the problem of *Samāsa* is to decide whether the sense denoted by a compound is virtually the same as is expressed by the constituent members, or a compound has by nature the power of expressing a special signification distinct from those of its members. This is a problem over which the grammarians and the Naiyāyikas hold different views. Jagadīśa¹ has referred to Patañjali and his followers as *samāsa śakti-vādins*, who do not take number to be the denotation of a compound, specially *aluk-samāsa*, in spite of the presence of the case-endings that indicate number (as in *kanṭhe-kālāḥ*).

Reference has already been made to the two views—*ekārthibhāva* and *vyapekṣā*; the grammarians evidently uphold the former (as it is quite clear from the interpretation of the *Mahābhāṣya*), while the Naiyāyikas and the

¹ व्यञ्जकसुपः सत्त्वेऽपि संख्या न बुध्यते इति समासशक्तिवादिनः पातञ्जलाः । — *Śabdaśakti*.

Mīmāṃsakas seem to have supported the latter. The main point at issue is that the *ekārthībhāvavādins*¹ are of opinion that a compound as a whole has the distinct power of expressing a sense in addition to the meanings usually signified by the members,² whereas the *vyapekṣāvādins* have either taken recourse to *lakṣanā* wherever the members of a compound are not likely to bring out the full signification or have taken the sense of a compound as exactly equivalent to those of its members.

The arguments usually advanced in favour of the *ekārthībhāvā* view are as follows :—a compound-form like *citrāguh* (*Bahuvrīhi* naturally indicates 'the owner of handsome cows ;' *rāja-purusah* means 'one having relation with the king ;' *upakumbham* gives the idea of 'proximity with a pitcher' and *pāṇipādam* expresses the sense of a 'collection of hands and feet' (*samāhāra*). These meanings, to speak the truth, are not directly expressed by the members of those compounds; as, for instance, the sense of the 'owner' is not denoted by either *citrā* or *go*, the idea of 'relation' is not brought out by either *rājan* or *puruṣa*, and 'collection' by either *pāṇi* or *pāda*

¹ एकार्थीभावे समास एक संगृहीतो न व्यपेक्षायामिति भाष्यादिकार्योभाव एव सिद्धान्तसम्मतः । राज्ञ पुरुष इति वाक्यात् प्रतिपादार्थस्य विशिष्टरूपेण शक्त्या प्रतिपादनं च तत्त्वमिति समाधिं हृदि निधाय भाष्यकारमत समासेऽतिरिक्ता शक्ति साधयन् समर्थयते ।—*Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣana*

² समासे खलु भिन्नेव शक्ति पदजन्यवत् । बह्वना वृत्तिधर्माणा वचनैरेव साधने । स्यान्महत् गौरवं तद्धादिकार्योभाव आश्रितः ॥—*Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣana*, Kār 31

and so on. The grammarians have, therefore, assigned the power of expressing such special or additional senses as those of 'owner,' 'relation' and 'collection,' etc., to the compounds, taking *Samāsa* as a whole or an indivisible unit of speech.

The word *pañkaja* admits of double meanings—one as 'lotus' signified by *samudāyaśakti* and the other as 'something that grows in the mud' (*avayavaśakti*) denoted by its parts. Similar is the case with a *Samāsa*; it has one meaning as is denoted by its parts and the other as expressed by the whole. According to the Naiyāyikas, the word *pañkaja* falls under the category of *yoga-rūḍha*, that is to say, it has two-fold signification as denoted by the parts and the whole. The grammarians have recognised such a *samudāyaśakti* in order to arrive at the additional sense of a compound.

Moreover, the *ekārthībhāva* view is not vitiated by prolixity or *gaurava* as is the case with the *vyapekṣāvāda*. The Naiyāyikas¹ or the *vyapekṣāvādins*, on the contrary, are not prepared to admit of such *śakti* or power of expressing the additional sense so far as compounds are concerned. They have rather taken recourse to *lakṣaṇā* whenever they failed to get the intended sense directly from the members of a compound. They have, for

¹ व्यपेक्षावादिनो नैयायिकादयः । न तावद्बहुव्रीही शक्तिर्लक्षणयैवोपपत्तेः ।
—Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa.

instance, resorted to *lakṣanā* in the case of *citraguh* so as to obtain the sense of the 'owner.' Kondabhaṭṭa maintains that in such cases the assumption of *śakti*¹ is almost unavoidable, since *lakṣanā* in regard to either *citrā* or *go* is not sufficient to bring out the full signification, i.e., the owner of beautiful cows. But there is some difficulty in the way of applying such *lakṣanā*,² for, if the word '*citrā*' were indicative (*lakṣaṇa*) of 'the owner of the beautiful cows,' it would have no consistent relation with the meaning of the word *go*; again, if the word *go* were to indicate the same sense, the meaning of the word *citrā* would not be compatible with that of 'the owner' (because it is not the owner who is *citra* or handsome but his possessions—the cows). In a *Tatpuruṣa* compound such as *rājapurusaḥ*,³ Gaṅgeśa says that *lakṣanā* is to be attributed to the relation as is denoted by the genitive in *rājñah*. According to the Mīmāṃsakas,⁴ the whole sentence should be taken as *lakṣanā* or indicative (as Gaṅgeśa has clearly pointed out).

¹ चित्तगुरित्यादौ स्वाभ्यादिप्रतीतये शक्तिरावश्यकौ, न च लक्षण्या निर्वाहः ।
—Vaiyākaranabhūṣaṇa under *Āḍr* 31

² न च चित्रापद चित्रगोस्त्रामिलक्षक, तत्र गोपदार्थानन्वयात् । नापि गोपद लक्षक गोस्त्रामिनि चित्रापदार्थानन्वयापत्तेः ।—*Tattvacintāmaṇi*—*Śabdakhaṇḍa*, p 702

³ राजपुरुष इत्यादौ पूर्वपदे यष्टायंसम्बन्धे लक्षणेति अधिकदुक्तमाप सङ्गच्छते ।
—*Śabdaśakti*, p 41

⁴ तस्मादाव्यर्थचित्रगोसम्बन्धितया पुरुषस्य प्रतीतेर्बहुगोही वाक्ये एव लक्षणेति ।—*Tattvacintāmaṇi*—*Śabdakhaṇḍa*, p 737.

The Naiyāyikas have, however, resorted to *lakṣaṇā* in regard to only one *pada*, either *citrā* or *go*, and taken the other as only suggestive or *tātparya-grāhaka*, as in *rājapuruṣaḥ* the word *rājan* is said to be indicative of the relation with the king and so on. They do not, therefore, agree with the Mīmāṃsakas so far as the indicativeness of the whole sentence is concerned.¹ It is specially in the case of *Bahuvrīhi* and *Tatpuruṣa* compounds that they have taken the help of *lakṣaṇā* for the purpose of getting the intended sense. It is not necessary to resort to *lakṣaṇā* in a *Karmadhāraya* compound,² where the sense of *identity* is derivable from the very relation of meanings.

The expressions *niṣādashapatiṃ yājayet*, *varṣāsu rathakāro'gnimādashīta* have given rise to considerable difficulties. The Mīmāṃsakas do not take *niṣādashapati* as an instance of *Tatpuruṣa* (as in that case *lakṣaṇā* is to be resorted to) but construe it as a *Karmadhāraya* compound (*niṣāda eva sthapatih*) identifying *sthapati* with *niṣāda* (the architect who is one and the same as *niṣāda*).

¹ बहुव्रीहौ न वाक्ये लक्षणा, किन्तु पदे...समुदायशक्तौ मानाभावात्।—Tattva-cintāmaṇi. न हि बहुव्रीहौ संमेलनपदानां लाक्षणिकत्वम्...एकपदनात्रलक्षण्यापि बहुव्रीहैर्व्यवस्थाप्यत्वात्।—Śabdasaktiprakāśikā—Samāsa, p. 50.

² कर्मधारये न लक्षणा, पदार्थयोः पदाभ्यामभेदस्य संसर्गतया लाभात्।—Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa, समासशक्तिनिर्णयः, p. 159.

CHAPTER IX

GRAMMAR IN OTHER SYSTEMS OF THOUGHT

Language and Grammar—problems of grammar in the
Mīmāṃsā—*Nyāya* and treatises on *Alaṅkāra*.

Grammar is a popular branch of study. Consciously or unconsciously, every one makes use of grammar or follows certain principles in the verbal expression of his thought. Man as a speaking animal is first acquainted with grammar, though he does not know that the way in which he combines one word with another presupposes a number of principles upon which is based the science of grammar. Grammar has its origin in the popular mode of expression, and derives its vital essence from the popular usage. Grammar, particularly Sanskrit grammar, is indispensably necessary for an adequate knowledge of all branches of literature. Bhartṛhari calls it *adhividyā*¹ in order to point out that grammar is intimately connected with all branches of learning, and in consequence of this intimate relation it is held to be the most useful of all departments of studies.² One

¹ पवित्रं सर्वविद्यानामधिविद्यं प्रकाशते ।—*Vākyapadīya*, *Kār.* 1. 14.

² तदेव लोके विद्यानामेवा विद्यापरायणम् ।—*Ibid.*

can hardly expect to make a profitable study of any branch of Sanskrit literature without having a thorough knowledge of grammar. Grammar, Patañjali rightly observes,¹ is a useful companion to the study of the entire Vedic literature.

Speculations on grammar naturally presuppose the existence of language; and the relation in which the study of a language stands to that of its grammatical system is an intimate one. The grammar of a language generally makes its appearance when that language in particular has reached a certain stage of development and produced literary records comprising a vast field of knowledge. Based as it is on the strictly scientific method of generalisation (*utsarga*) and particularisation (*apavāda*) on the one hand, and that of agreement (*anvaya*) and difference (*vyatireka*) on the other, Sanskrit grammar is found to have thrown much light upon what are known as the fundamental problems of philology. Moreover, the rules of Sanskrit grammar, as they unfold the laws that regulate the growth, formation and correctness of the recognised linguistic forms, are in themselves short formulæ of the science of language. Again, the rules, such as *paraḥ sannikarṣaḥ saṃhitā* (Pāṇ., 1.4.109) and *akāḥ savarṇe dīrghaḥ* (Pāṇ., 6.1.101), which

¹ सर्ववेदपारिषदं ह्रीदं शास्त्रम् ।—Mahābhāṣya. under the rule Pāṇ., 6. 3. 14.

virtually show the tendency of two vowels having close proximity and homogeneity to lengthening, are as much phonological as grammatical. There was, as we have already pointed out, a period in the history of the Sanskrit language when, in the absence of such technical devices of grammar, *Samāsa* had to be determined by different modulations of voice. The division of sound into *udātta*, *anudātta* and *svarita*, the transformation of sounds as is illustrated by the rules of *sampra-sāraṇa*, and the principles of euphonic combination (*sandhi*) are indication how intimately grammar is related to phonology.

The study of Sanskrit from a philological basis and that of the methodology of its grammatical systems present before us problems of *Semantics* which, as a cognate science, deals with the psychological aspects of language. 'The science of meaning,' though of comparatively modern growth in the domain of western philological researches, seems to have already developed into a scientific branch of study at the hands of the Nairuktas or etymologists. 'The antecedence of ideas to words,'¹ the relation between the sign and the object signified, the eternal² connection between *śabda* and *artha*,

¹ अर्थगतस्य शब्दप्रयोगः । अर्थं समत्याययिष्यामीति शब्दः प्रयुज्यते ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol II, p 16 सर्वो हि शब्दोऽर्थप्रत्ययनार्थं प्रयुज्यते—Tantra-vārttika, under 1, 3 8

² श्रोतृपत्तिकृद् शब्दस्थायैव सत्त्वं,—Mīm Sūtra, 1 1 5 सिद्धे शब्दाय-सत्त्वमे and नित्यो द्यवतामर्थैरभिसत्त्वम्;—Mahābhāṣya, Vol I, p 7.

the derivability of words¹ from verbal roots, the method of naming objects, the origin of certain words (as *kāka*, *kokila*, *dundubhi*, etc.) from an imitation of natural sound,² and the way how words change their meanings (as *kavi*, *mṛga*, *kuśala*, *pravīṇa*, etc.) are facts that have been scientifically dealt with by the Nairuktas and the grammarians. The etymological explanations of words, as they occur in the Brāhmaṇa and Nirukta literature, is an evidence that investigation in the science of meaning was not only necessary for the proper understanding of the Vedic texts, but formed an important part of the study of Sanskrit grammar. Though an independent branch of study mainly devoted to the psychological side of language, the Nirukta, as Yāska maintains, is materially akin to grammar, the former serving as a complement of the latter.³

In course of foregoing discussions on grammatical problems, we have had occasion to make reference to certain philosophical views, mainly from the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya systems, having direct bearing upon problems of purely grammatical interest. As a department of study intimately connected with the process of thinking, grammar, like

¹ नासान्याख्यातजानीति शाकटायनो नैरुक्तसमयश्च ।—Nirukta, 1. 12.

² काक इति शब्दानुक्रितिरुद्दिष्टं शकुनिषु बहुलम् ।—Ibid,

³ तदिदं विद्यास्थानं व्याकरणस्य कातृत्वात् स्वार्थसाधकं च ।—Nirukta, p. 115.

logic, deals with a subject (*śabda* and *artha*) that forms the very basis of knowledge. The supreme importance of *Śabda-śāstra* lies in the fact that it deals with words whereby we think, know and express our thoughts to others. Every word is a symbol of intelligence. No knowledge whatsoever, says Bhartṛhari,¹ is possible without words; knowledge of all denominations is materialised through the medium of words. Panyarāja² particularly points out that the use of words (*śabda-bhāvanā*) acts as an important factor in the manifestation of qualified knowledge (*savikalpakajñāna*). An attempt is made here to show the extent to which grammar is related to other philosophical systems, specially the *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Nyāya*.

Certain *Mīmāṃsā* doctrines are found to have close relationship with those of grammar. (i) The eternality of *Śabda* (*Śabda-nityatāvāda*): The *Mīmāṃsakas* have not only accepted the eternality of words with all earnestness but have made it a fundamental tenet for defending the eternal character of the Vedas. It seems to have been on the part of the *Mīmāṃsakas* a pious necessity to maintain the eternality of words inspite of the arguments advanced by the *Naiyāyikas*. Unless words are held to be eternal, it is not

¹ न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादते ।

अनुविज्ञमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते ॥—*Vākyapadiya*, *Kār.* 1. 124.

² सा हि वादुपता प्रत्यवमर्शः सविकल्पकज्ञानं तत्सम्प्रादिकेत्यर्थः—*Panyarāja* under *Vākyapadiya*, *Kār.* 1. 125.

possible to establish the authoritativeness or trustworthiness of the Vedas which, as we find, consists of a huge collection of words representing the *Mantras* and *Brāhmaṇas*. The *Mīm. Sūtras* 6-11 are those that are usually put forward by the *Naiyāyikas* against the eternal character of words. The *Mīmāṃsakas* had their arguments ready to refute those attacks one after another (*Mīm. Sūtras* 12-19) in a manner that reflects much credit on them. The final conclusion is arrived at by the statement ¹ *darśanasya parārthatvāt* which means that words are held to be *nitya* on account of their being used for the purpose of signifying the sense. Words ² do not, as the *Naiyāyikas* hold, exist only for a moment and totally disappear after the utterance is over, but continue to exist so as to express the intended meaning.

Grammar, as we have already shown, though based on a purely analytical method, has also established the eternality of *śabda*. But there is some amount of difference regarding the standpoints from which the eternality (*nityatva*) has been conceived by the *Mīmāṃsakas* and the grammarians. The *Mīmāṃsakas* take sound to be eternal, ³ as it is manifested by the utterance

¹ नित्यस्तु स्याद्दर्शनस्य परार्थत्वात्—*Mīm. Sūtra*, 1. 1. 18.

² दर्शनमुच्चारणं तत्परार्थं परमर्थं प्रत्याययितुम्। उच्चरितमात्रे हि विनष्टे शब्दे अर्थं प्रत्याययितुं न शक्नुयात्—*Śabara-bhāṣya*.

³ केचिद् ध्वनिव्यङ्ग्यं वर्णात्मकं नित्यं शब्दसाहः—*Kaiyaṭa*. केचिदिति सौमांसकाः—*Pradīpodyota*.

and is represented by the letters, whereas the grammarians have gone a step beyond sound as such and sought to find out the subtle element which is exactly manifested by sound, that is to say, they realised the existence of *Sphoṭa* as the final cause of sound. The grammarians understand *Vākya-Sphoṭa*¹ as representing the true type of *nitya-śabda*. A glance into the characteristic attributes with which *nitya-śabda*² is comprehended by Patañjali is sufficient to corroborate the view that *Sphoṭa* to the grammarians was the same as Brahman to the Vedāntins.

(ii) The Mīmāṃsakas have agreement with the grammarians in regard to the relation of words with their meanings. The Mīmāṃsā Sūtra, 1. 1. 5, states expressly that a word (preferably those that represent the Vedic *mantras*) has inborn or eternal relation (relation that is permanently fixed) with its signification.³ The first *Vārttika* of Kātyāyana⁴ and the exposition of Patañjali thereon purport to establish the very same view so far as the relation of words with their meanings is concerned. The view of Kātyāyana as incorporated in the opening *Vārttika* goes to show that the grammarians used to look upon words, meaning and the relation as

¹ वाक्यस्फोटमपरे (वैयाकरणः) संगिरन्ते ।—Kaṣyaṭa.

² भ्रूवं कूटस्थमविचाल्यनपायोपजनविकार्यनुत्पत्त्यदृशस्ययोगि यत्तन्निश्चयमिति ।
—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 7.

³ श्रौतुपपत्तिकस्तु शब्दसार्थेन सम्बन्धः ।

⁴ सिद्धे शब्दार्थसम्बन्धे ।

permanently fixed (*siddha*). Patañjali¹ has expressly stated that a significant word is permanently related to its meaning. The relation of a word with its meanings is called *nitya* in this sense that it is found to be current in popular usage from time eternal² (*anādi*). This relation is grammatically known as *śakti*³ or may be viewed as one of identity; a word is *śakta*, i.e., capable of denoting the sense, the meaning is *śakya* and the relation subsisting between them is called *śakti* or *yogyatā*.

(iii) The Mīmāṃsakas agree with the grammarians in respect of the denotation of a word. The Mīm. Sūtra, 1.3.33, lays down that all words denote a class (*ākṛti*), the individual being comprehensible by means of mutual dependence⁴ between the class and the individual or *avinābhāva*. The author of the Bhāṣya has clearly pointed out the difficulty that arises, if an individual only is held to be the denotation of a word. The two well-known grammarians, Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana, held opposite views, the former advocating the class-theory and the latter supporting the individualistic one. The view of Pāṇini,⁵ as explained by

¹ नित्यी ह्यर्थवतानर्थैरभिसम्बन्धः ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 7.

² सम्बन्धस्यापि व्यवहारपरम्परयानादित्वान्नित्यता ।—Kaiyaṭa.

³ शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धश्च शक्तिरूपं तादात्म्यमेवेति ।—Pradīpodyota.

⁴ आकृतिर्हि व्यक्ता नित्यसम्बन्धा ।—Śabara-bhāṣya.

⁵ उभयथा ह्याचार्येण सूत्राणि पठितानि ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 6.

Patañjali, is that both the class and the individual are denoted by words.

(iv) In the *Śloka-vārttika*, Kumārila has devoted a lengthy chapter to refute the theory of *Sphoṭa* as expounded by the grammarians. As the theory of *Sphoṭa* is apprehended to destroy the glorious edifice of the Vedas by declaring all divisions of sentences and words as merely artificial, the Mīmāṃsakas could not recognise the existence of *Sphoṭa* apart from sound. The assumption of *Sphoṭa* is thus untenable from the Mīmāṃsā point of view. So far as experience goes, letters that constitute a word are found to be significant,¹ and it is, therefore, nothing but unreasonable to acknowledge an incomprehensible thing as *Sphoṭa*, which is materially distinct from letters.

(v) There is a distinct section in the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras called *vyākaranādhikarana* dealing mainly with the problems of grammatical interest. The subject discussed in this particular section is almost the same as dealt with by Patañjali in the first *āhnika* of the *Maṇabhāṣya*. The question² that presents itself for solution is to ascertain the reason for using words of purely Sanskrit origin. While correct forms (as *gauḥ*)

¹ दीपवद्वा गकारादिर्गोवादेः प्रतिपादकः ।

प्रु, वं प्रतीयमानत्वात्तत्पूर्वं प्रतिपादनात् ॥—*Sloka-vārttika*, Kār. 136.

² गोशब्दो यथा साक्षादिमति प्रमाणं, किं तथा गान्धादयोऽप्युत नेति सन्देहः ।—*Śabara bhāṣya*, under 1. 3 25.

as well as the incorrect ones (as *gāvī*, *goṇī*, *gopó-talikā*, etc.) are found to be equally expressive of sense, it is really difficult to understand the import of the scriptural injunction¹ which unconditionally prohibits the use of corrupt words (*apabhraṃśas*). This prohibition seems to have been strictly followed by Sanskrit-speaking Brāhmins, particularly at the time of sacrificial performance, lest the purity of their rituals might be vitiated by the utterance of corrupt words. These incorrect words, hold the grammarians, are distorted forms of Sanskrit, this distortion or mutilation of forms being due to wrong imitation or inability of pronouncing the correct words of Sanskrit origin.² The grammarians have drawn a clear line of demarcation between these two classes of words as the first and foremost function of the science of grammar.³ As it helps the discrimination of correct words, the science of grammar has been elevated to the dignity of *Smṛti* by the Mīmāṃsakas.

Though the meaning is equally expressed by correct and corrupt words, it is the use of correct words alone, holds Patañjali,⁴ that is attended with religious merits. It must be,

¹ ब्राह्मणेन न स्नेच्छितवै नापभाषितवै । स्नेच्छो ह वा एष यदपशब्दः ।

² तदशक्तित्वानुरूपत्वात्—Mim. Sūtra, I. 3. 28. गोशब्दमुच्चारयितुकामेन केनचिदशक्त्या गावौल्युच्चारितम् ।—Śabara-bhāṣya.

³ अनुशिष्यन्तेऽसाधुशब्देभ्यो विविच्य ज्ञाप्यन्तेऽनेनेति शब्दानुशासनम् ।—Nāgeśa.

⁴ समानायामर्थगतौ शब्देन चापशब्देन च धर्मनियमः क्रियते शब्देनैवार्थोऽभिधेयो नापशब्दे नेत्येवं क्रियमाणसम्युद्घकारि भवतीति ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 8.

however, remembered that this principle of preferring the use of words strictly in conformity with the rules of grammar to those that do not come under the cognisance of grammar, is based on a purely religious consideration. How, then, are we to distinguish correct words from incorrect ones? According to the Mīmāṃsakas, it is grammar or *Vyākaraṇa-smṛti* that serves as the helping guide for such a discrimination. The rules of grammar are, therefore, held to be authoritative and a kind of trustworthy evidence.

(vi) The Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra, 1.3.28, makes it clear that the origin of corrupt forms should be traced to natural inability to pronounce the correct words, and that the meaning is expressed by such distorted forms on account of their structural similarity¹ with correct words. This view is exactly analogous to what is held by the grammarians in regard to the origin of *apabhraṃśas*. Patañjali² maintains that *apaśabdas* or perverted forms are the result of imperfect imitation and inborn ineptitude. Bhartṛhari has the following: Sanskrit is a divine tongue current from time immemorial;³ it has undergone distortion at the hands of those who failed to give utterance to the correct Sanskrit word by reason of their natural

¹ अनुदूषो हि गात्रादिर्गोष्ठ्यस्य ।—Sāhara-bhāṣya.

² अशक्तिजानुकरणात् ।—Maṣābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 10.

³ दैवो वाग् अथकोर्ण्यमशते रभिधत्तभिः—Vākyapadīya, Kār. 1. 156.

incompetency. They are also significant like correct words, but their signification is a matter of inference,¹ that is to say, they become significant only by recalling the corresponding correct words with which they have close resemblance.

(vii) In the *bhāvārthādhikaraṇa*, there is a discussion as to whether noun or verb is related to the result (*apūrva*). As it is produced by the action, *apūrva* is connected with the word indicating the verb and not with words denoting either substance or qualities.² The Mīm. Sūtra, 2.1.1, enjoins that all verbs should signify action. This view bears close comparison with the statement of Patañjali (*kriyāvacanā dhātuh* and *bhāvavacanā dhātuh*). The view of the Mīmāṃsakas regarding the meaning of the root and of the suffix (result and action respectively) is different from that of the grammarians.³ The Mīm. Sūtras, 2.1.3 and 2.1.4, give the definitions of *nāman* and *ākhyāta* respectively, which⁴ remind us of the definitions suggested by Yāska. The Mīm. Sūtra, 2.1.6, speaks of a twofold division of action, namely, primary and secondary, and the subsequent rules give their definitions.⁵

¹ ते साधुष्वनुमानेन प्रत्ययीत्पत्तिहेतवः ।

तादात्म्यसुपगम्यैव शब्दार्थस्य प्रकाशकाः ॥—Vākyapadīya, Kār. 1. 151.

² कर्मशब्दा एवापूर्वस्यविधायकाः, न द्रव्यगुणशब्दा इति ।—Sabara-bhāṣya.

³ मण्डनमिश्राः—फलभावं धात्वर्थः, व्यापारः प्रत्ययार्थः ।

⁴ सत्त्वप्रधानानि नामानि, भावप्रधानसाख्यातम् ।—Nirukta.

⁵ यैर्द्रव्यं न चिकीर्ष्यते तानि प्रधानभूतानि द्रव्यस्य गुणभूतत्वात्—and यैस्तु द्रव्यं चिकीर्ष्यते गुणसत्त्वं प्रतीयते तस्य द्रव्यप्रधानत्वात् ।

The Nyāya system, specially the Navya-nyāya has made valuable contributions to the study of grammar. The Naiyāyikas are credited with having expounded the most scientific theory about the origin of sound. To the Naiyāyikas, *śabda* is a quality of the sky, i.e., space (*śabda-guṇamākāśam*). Though they have taken *śabda* as the product of human effort, the Naiyāyikas have included *śabda* or, more properly, verbal cognition, within the category of *pramāṇas*.¹ In accordance with their view, *śabda* is liable to production and destruction²—two important characteristics of all things that are *kārya* or non-eternal. They have sought to explain the relation between *śabda* and its meaning with reference to the will of God. *Śakti* or primary signification of a word is not determined, hold the Naiyāyikas, by social convention, but seems to have been fixed by the volition of God (*saṅketa*) expressed in the following strain: 'let this word be denotative of this sense' (*ayam śabdo'mumartham pratipūdayatu*). According to the Naiyāyikas, *Śabda-bodha* or verbal knowledge is derivable from a sentence³ and not from individual words; and so far as verbal cognition is concerned, the knowledge of

¹ प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानि ।—Nyāya-Sūtra, 1. 3.

² प्रागुत्पत्तेरभावोपपत्तेश्च and आदिमत्त्वादेन्द्रियकत्वात् कृतकवदुपचाराच्च ।—Nyāya-Sūtras, 2. 2. 12 and 2. 2. 14.

³ वाक्यभावमवाप्तस्य सार्थकत्वावबोधतः ।

सम्पद्यते शब्दबोधो न तन्मात्रस्य बोधतः ॥—Śabdaśakti., Kār. 12.

*viśeṣaṇa*¹ (adjective) must have precedence to that of *viśeṣya* (noun). They have made a distinction between *Upasargas* and *Nipātas*, holding the former to be indicative (*dyotaka*) and the latter as directly expressive of sense (*vācaka*).

Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* is an epoch-making work, remarkable throughout by its originality of thought; it ushered in a new order of thinking that was readily assimilated by the later grammarians. The *Tattvacintāmaṇi* is, indeed, a valuable record marking the height of perfection which the Indian thought had reached at that time. Scholars of outstanding genius such as Raghunātha, Mathurānātha, Jagadīśa and Gadādhara tried their level best to popularise this new school of logic following in the wake of Gaṅgeśa. This work is divided into four parts dealing with perception, analogy, inference and *śabda*.

The *śabda-khaṇḍa* deals, among other things, with all important problems of grammar: (i) it has established the trustworthiness of *śabda* as a *pramāṇa*; (ii) it has advanced arguments in support of the non-eternal character of *śabda*; (iii) it has shown how to determine the *śakti* or primary signification of words;

¹ नाटहीतविशेषणा बुद्धिर्विशेष्येषूपजायते and शब्दबोधे प्राक्प्रतीयमानत्वं विशेषणत्वम् ।

(iv) it has given an adequate treatment of *Dhātu*, *Upasarga*, *Nipāta* and *Samāsa*; (v) it has elaborately dealt with *expectancy*, *compatibility*, *proximity* and *import* as important factors of verbal knowledge, and (vi) it has discussed the question of the origin of corrupt words (*apabhraṃśas*). How indispensable Jagadīśa's *Śabdasaṃskṛti* and Gadādhara's *Vyutpatti-vidā* are for the proper study of the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar has already been pointed out.

In Grammar lies the origin of the science of Poetics. The *Alaṃkāra-śāstra* is not less akin to Grammar than is the *Nirukta*. The contribution of grammar is nowhere so prominent as in this particular branch of study. The science of poetics may be said to have been principally based on grammar. *Śabda* and *artha* not only form the subject of grammar but have also provided the fundamental basis upon which stands the whole fabric of the *Alaṃkāra-śāstra*. *Vyākaraṇa* and *Alaṃkāra* are organically connected and used to be studied in India as cognate departments of study.

The rhetoricians or *Ālankārikas* have extensively dealt with poetical compositions with special reference to their merits and defects. Having regard to what constitutes the essence of poetry, they have expounded the doctrine of *vyāñjana* and made an elaborate treatment of *rasa*.

Poetry is the outcome of joy. Endowed with the power of articulating his voice and born in the midst of magnificent beauties of nature, man feels naturally inclined to clothe his emotions in a rapturous and rhythmical language, seeking proper expression for the music of his heart and tending to give a poetic touch to his thought, when he is in an ecstasy of joy. Whether it is 'a spontaneous overflow of powerful emotions' or whether it 'makes us inhabitants of a world to which the familiar world is a chaos,' poetry appears to be the living manifestation of the internal storehouse of joy. Poetry has been rightly called *hlādaikamayī*, that is to say, 'comprehending joy alone, rising from a source that is often represented as the sea of joy (*ānandābdhi*).

The three attributes generally ascribed to Brahman are *Being* (*sattā*),¹ *Consciousness* (*cit*) and *Joy* (*ānanda*). To a Vedāntin, the transcendental self is an inexhaustible source of joy. The expression *raso vai sah*² is explained by the Vedāntins in such a way as to identify the supreme self with *rasa*—the joy of all joys. A religious devotee, particularly a *Vaiṣṇava*, adores a deity who is the repository of all

¹ आनन्दस्योऽभ्यासात् ।—Vedānta-Sūtra, 1. 1. 12.

² आनन्दस्य प्रभुत्वं 'रसो वै सः' इति तस्यैव रसत्वमुक्तौच्यते 'रसो ह्येवायं यं लब्ध्वा आनन्दी भवति ।—Śaṅkara-bhāṣya.

beauty, full of joy and the bestower of all blessings. Śrī Kṛṣṇa, as depicted in the Bhāgavata, is an incarnation of joy and love, characterised by things that are not only exceedingly beautiful but serve to excite the most pleasant emotions in a moment of deep devotion. If the supreme Godhead has any conceivable form, or, to put the idea in a different way, if the formless is at all cognisable in any particular form, it is joy and joy alone. He is, to speak the truth, the embodiment of joy. The ṛṣis of the Upaniṣads have called him *rasa* and *amṛta*—the fountain source of perpetual joy.¹ One that dwells in us all is joy² itself, serene and supreme; it is the immortal (*amṛta*) in all beings that makes us sometimes joyful even in the midst of cares, and anxieties. What is called *mukti* or final emancipation is only a state of everlasting joy, what the *yogins* yearn to attain is a serene joy that knows no bounds; what the artist designs to paint is the image of the one that is most beautiful and joyful; what the poets of all ages have been eager to depict with all their resources of imagination is the figure of perfect beauty and joy. The ultimate motive of all arts is to find out this eternal source of joy, the attainment of which quenches all thirsts and satisfies all mundane desires. To

¹ सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म and आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् ।—Taittirīyopaniṣad.

² आनन्दमयस्य सव्योत्तरत्वात् ।—Śaṅkara-bhāṣya.

those who have visualised the *Beautiful* in themselves, the whole world appears to be dancing in an ecstasy of divine joy.

Poetry is the expression of such joy. The mission of a poet is to reveal this thrill of joy hidden in the storehouse of nature, touching those tender chords of the heart that are naturally moved by emotions. The poet is a creator in the idealistic sense of the term, his creation being a world of ideal beauty—a dream-land shining with touches of fine imagery. *Rasa* which forms the life of poetry is brought into existence by the genius of the poet through the *suggestiveness* of his composition. The imaginative pictures drawn by the poet are different from those that are found in the world of experience.¹

The art of poetry seems to have been cultivated in India from a very long time. The hymns of the Vedas, which embody the most ancient literary records, are specimens of beautiful poetry with considerable amount of rhetorical embellishment here and there. The hymns in their simple flow represent the genuine outburst of a heart seized with extreme joy and wonder, excited by the awe-inspiring splendour of nature on all sides. More poetical

¹ नियतिकृतनियमरहितां ह्लादैकमयीमनन्यपरतन्त्राम् ।
नवरसरुचिरां निर्मितिमादधती भारती कवेर्जयति ॥

—Kāvya prakāśa, Kār. I.

एतद्विलक्षणा तु कविवाङ्निर्मितिरिति—*Ibid.*

in outlook are the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata—two great monumental works in Sanskrit epic poetry, written in simple but elegant style, and preserving a brilliant record of Indian culture in all its phases. These two epoch-making works prepared the ground for the advent of a more advanced type of classical poetry as is evident from the works of Kālidāsa and others. The sweet melody and high-flown similes of Kālidāsa, the pathetic touches of Bhavabhūti and the beautiful expressions of Śrīharṣa will continue to keep the poetical horizon of India reverberated for ages to come.

Turning to the definition of *Kāvya*, we find that it is *śabda* and *artha* that go to constitute a *Kāvya*.¹ The body² of a *Kāvya*, to use the language of the rhetoricians, is composed of two elements, namely, *śabda* and *artha*, or a combination of words capable of expressing the intended sense.³ A word, some hold,⁴ expressive of a beautiful sense is *Kāvya*. Viśvanātha has laid greater stress on *rasa*, comprehending it to be the vital element of poetic compositions. To quote his definition, *Kāvya*⁵ is a combination of words possessing *rasa* in an appreciable extent.

¹ तददीष्टौ शब्दार्थौ सगुणवत्तद्वत्तौ पुनः कावि ।—*Kāvyaaprakāśa*.

² शब्दार्थौ वपुरस्य ।—*Ekāvalī*.

³ शरीरं तावदिष्टार्थव्यवच्छिन्ना पदावली ।—*Kāvyaadarśa*.

⁴ रमणीयार्थप्रतिपादकः शब्दः काव्यम् ।—*Rasagatgādhara*.

⁵ वाक्यं रसात्मकं काव्यम् ।—*Sāhityadarpaṇa*.

Kāvya is generally divided into two classes, namely, *superior* and *inferior*. A poetical composition,¹ where the suggested sense appeals more beautifully to our sentiment than the meaning ordinarily expressed by words, is known as the best type of poetry. An inferior class of poetry is one that is characterised by only sonorous words and marked by the absence of suggestiveness (maximum of words with minimum of sense). Mammata has referred to the grammatical doctrine of *Sphoṭa* in connection with the definition of the *superior* class of poetry.

The *Ālaṃkārikas* have divided words into three classes,² namely, *vācaka* (expressive), *lākṣaṇika* (indicative) and *vyañjaka* (suggestive). This threefold division, it must be remembered,³ refers intrinsically to the designation (*upādhi*) and not to the object designated (*upādheya*), because there are no fixed classes of words as denotative, indicative and suggestive. The same word, say *Gaṅgā*, as in the expression *Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*, may be taken either as denotative or indicative according to the context and propriety of sense. It should be particularly noticed here that *vyañjanā*, as an additional *vṛtti*, has been accorded a prominent place only

¹ इदमुत्तममतिशयिनि व्यङ्गे वाचाद्वनिर्बुधैः कथितः ।—Kāvyaaprakāśa, 4.

² स्वादाचको लाक्षणिकः शब्दोऽत्र व्यञ्जकस्तिथा ।—Kāvyaaprakāśa.

³ अत्रोपाधीनामेव चित्वं न तूपाधेयानाम् ।—

find only *one word* like *go* which is applicable to both cow-individual and *Vāhika*, have their theory based on the assumption of restricted or accidental meanings.¹ It must be, however, remembered that a word does not simultaneously express more than one meaning.² The other meanings, apart from what is called primary signification, seem to be quite as good as synonyms, comprehensible by either context or connection with some other words.³ Bhartṛhari⁴ maintains that the word *go* which is used to denote a being possessing dewlap, hump, hoofs, etc., is also applied to *Vāhika* (an inhabitant of *Vāhika*—modern Punjab) on account of his proverbial similarity to an ox in point of dullness. How, then, are we to justify the division of meaning as *gaṇa* and *mukhya*? The first meaning, we must admit, seems to have obtained more currency than the latter, that is to say, the word *go* is popularly used to denote a cow and implies *Vāhika* only indirectly or accidentally. The author of the *Vākyapadīya*⁵ states clearly that it is popular and accidental usage that renders one meaning *mukhya* or *gaṇa*. In connection with imposition (*upacāra*)

¹ तत्कैशब्ददर्शने शब्दोपचारः प्रसिद्धप्रसिद्धिनिमित्तकः ।—Punyarāja.

² यौगपद्यमतिक्रम्य पर्याये व्यवतिष्ठते ।—Vākyapadīya.

³ अर्थप्रकरणाभ्यां वा योगाच्छब्दान्तरेण वा ।—*Ibid.*

⁴ यथा साक्षादिमान् पिण्डो गोशब्देनाभिधीयते ।

तथा स एव गोशब्दो वाहीकेऽपि व्यवस्थितः ॥—*Ibid.*

⁵ प्रसिद्धिभेदाद्गौणत्वं मुख्यत्वं चोपपद्यते ।—*Ibid.*

pertaining to *artha*, Bhartṛhari¹ speaks of two kinds of meanings, namely, *svarūpa* or naturally fixed by its very form and *bāhya* as is indicated by imposition or *upacāra*. The word *go* denotes a class *gotva* by the force of *mukhyārtha*, and the same is transferred to *Vāhika* for the purpose of implying the same amount of stupidity and dullness on the part of a *Vāhika*. Thus, we find that the Ālaṃkārikas not only agree with the grammarians in regard to the circumstances and causes that necessitate the acceptance of *Lakṣaṇā*, but have made use of the same examples (*Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* and *gaurvāhikaḥ*).

The difference is, however, remarkable so far as regards the treatment of *vyañjanā* in the science of Poetics. *Vyañjanā*, as distinct from both *śakti* and *Lakṣaṇā*, has been given a prominent place in discourses on Poetics, though an additional *vṛtti* like *vyañjanā* is not actually accepted by other schools of thought. In accordance with the view of the Ālaṃkārikas, it is *Vyañjanā* or suggestiveness that gives rise to *rasa* in all poetical compositions. As *śakti* and *Lakṣaṇā* are not sufficient to bring out the sense of *extreme coldness* and *sanctity* of the Ganges, in the expression *Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*, the Ālaṃkārikas were compelled, as it were, to

¹ Vākyapadīya, 2, 256.

अयंशब्दस्य द्विविधः स्वरूपं वाच्यम् । तत्र निमित्ताच्चाद्यादीर्गोल' वाह्यीके-
ऽप्यनुपपद्यते, शब्दस्य गोलमेवाभिधत्त इति वाच्यार्थोपचारः ।—Puṇyārāja.

acknowledge the suggestiveness of words.¹ The Naiyāyikas and the earlier grammarians have not recognised *vyañjanā* as an additional meaning like the Ālaṃkārikas.

Jagadīśa² has referred to the same example *mukham vikaśitasmitam* (face blooming with a smile) whereby *suggestiveness* has been established by Mammāṭa and others, and discussed at length whether *vyañjanā* is at all worthy of recognition. There is no justification, he argues,³ to recognise the existence of something like *suggestiveness*, so far as the direct or indirect meaning of a word is concerned. The so-called suggested sense, *i.e.*, *extreme coldness* and *sanctity*, or *fragrance* (*i.e.*, the smiling face is as fragrant as flowers) is derivable by the usual mental cognition, the special beauty of the erotic sentiment (*camatkāra*) being a matter of mental apprehension (*mānasa-bodha*).

The meanings of words,⁴ says Bhartr̥hari, are not only determined by their very forms, but there are other instruments such as sentence, context, time, place, etc., which also help us

¹ विरतास्त्रभिधाद्यासु ययार्थो बोध्यतेऽपरः ।

सा वृत्तिर्व्यञ्जना नाम शब्दस्वार्थादिकस्य च ॥—Sāhityadarpaṇa.

² Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, under Kār. 24.

³ यथा कथञ्चिदुपनयवशेन मनसैव विशिष्टधीसम्भवात्, मानोरथिकसुखप्रमेद-पर्यवसितं चमत्कारं प्रत्यपि शाब्दस्यैव ज्ञानसंस्थापि बोधविशेषस्य हेतुतायाः सुवचत्वात् । व्यञ्जनाख्यपदार्थान्तरस्य स्वरूपसत्ताया अन्वयबुद्धौ तद्वैतुत्वस्य च प्रमाणविरहेणासत्त्वाच्चेति संचेपः ।—Śabdaśakti., under Kār. 24.

⁴ वाक्यात् प्रकरणादर्थोद्देशित्याद्देशकालतः ।

शब्दार्थाः प्रविभज्यन्ते न रूपादेव केवलात् ॥—Vākyapadiya, 2. 316.

in ascertaining the intended sense, specially when a word happens to have more than one meaning. When the primary signification of a word having several meanings is fixed or restricted by association, etc. (as shown by Bhartrhari), the other meanings, holds Mammata,¹ are to be regarded as suggested (*vyangya*). This is called *suggestion based on primary sense* in the science of Poetics.

There is no evidence to believe that *vyāñjanā* was ever recognised by the ancient grammarians. Among the grammarians, Nāgeśa has definitely supported *vyāñjanā*, and he lays much emphasis on the desirability of acknowledging it from the standpoint of grammar.² Nāgeśa has, however, tried to show that he was not the first among the grammarians to recognise *vyāñjanā* as such. In accordance with his interpretation, the grammarians,³ like Bhartrhari and others, have also indirectly referred to *vyāñjanā* by supporting indicativeness (*dyotakatva*) of the Nipūtas and taking *sphoṭa* as what is suggested by sound. With Nāgeśa, *dyotakatva* is the same as *vyāñjakatva*. The sense of perfection in *prajayati* and that of measuring in *prādeśam vilikhati* is nothing but suggested, because *lakṣaṇā* in such cases is not admissible

¹ अनेकार्थस्य शब्दस्य वाचकत्वे नियन्त्रिते ।

सद्योगाद्वैरवाच्यार्थधीकृष्टाप्रतिरञ्जनम् ॥—Kāvyaaprakāśa, 1. 10

² वैयाकरणानामप्येतत्स्वीकारः आवश्यकः ।—Mañjūśā, p. 160.

³ अतएव निपातानां द्योतकत्वं स्फोटस्य व्यङ्ग्यता च ह्येवमिदमिह—*Ibid.*

owing to the absence of primary signification on the part of *Nipātas*. Thus, what we call *dyotakatva* in connection with *Nipātas* and *ākṣepakatva* in relation to *Karmapravacanīya* are only different in names, but indicate the same thing, viz., suggestiveness (*vyañjakatva*).

The science of Poetics comes in closer touch with grammar in regard to the problem of rhetorical defects (*doṣa*). The entire discourse on *doṣa* is more or less grammatical in nature. The most prominent among them are as follows : *cyutasamskṛti*¹ (ungrammatical form) such as *anunāthate* for *anunāthati* ; *aprayukta* (not sanctioned by popular usage) as *daivataḥ* ; for *daivatam* ; *asamartha* (incompetent) as *hanti* in the sense of *gacchati* ; *nirarthaka* (meaningless) as *hi* in *mama hi gauri* ; *avācaka* (not capable of expressing the sense), as the use of the word *dina* in the sense of 'bright' ; *avimṛṣṭavidheyāmśa* (to place the predicate before the subject), as *nyakkāro'yameva* instead of *ayameva nyakkārah*, etc. It must be, however, remembered that these and similar other grammatical mistakes were committed by the poet almost unconsciously. Poets found it often difficult to abide by the rigid rules of grammar, and even the most famous of our poets had the boldness of using certain forms in direct violation of the rules of grammar. This is why Mallinātha often calls them *niraṅkuṣa* (ungovernable).

¹ Kāvya prakāśa, 7.

The beautiful poetry of the Vedas exhibits a considerable amount of rhetorical excellence. Sometimes we meet with examples of beautiful similes and metaphors in the hymns. The poets of the Rk-Veda have not only poured forth ritualistic prayers and invocations to the forces of nature, but also succeeded in giving a stamp of poetical beauty to their expressions by making use of some well-conceived figures of speech, mostly similes and metaphors. The sun-god ¹ (riding in a chariot drawn by seven horses) running after the resplendent Dawn (*uṣas*) is compared to a man following a beautiful woman. How brilliant is the conception with a touch of classical beauty! Again, the goddess of *Vāk* ² is described as unfolding her graceful person to a learned man, just as a loving wife dressed in fair garments shows herself to her husband. We have other instances of beautiful similes in the following: 'just as one' sifts the barley corn by means of a sieve, even so the wise discriminates the correct words by intelligence; 'as the water of a pond is agitated by a strong wind;' and 'overcoming' the sins just as crossing a river by means of a boat.' A well-chosen metaphor conveniently used in the Upaniṣads to show the difference between

¹ सूर्यो देवीसुपसं रोचमानो गच्छो न योषामभ्येति पयात् ।—Rk-Veda, 1. 10, 125.

² उतो त्वधै तन्व' विसृष्टे जायेव प्रत्य उग्रती सुवासाः ।—Rk-Veda, 10 C. 71.

³ सत्त्वमिव विततना पुनन्ती यव धीरा मनसा वाचमक्रत ।—*Ibid.*

⁴ नावेव सिन्धुं दुरितात्यघिः ।—*Ibid.*

jīvātman and *paramātman* is as follows : ‘two beautiful¹ birds related to each other by mutual friendship reside in the same tree, one of them eating the sweet fruit (*pippala*) and the other only witnessing without partaking of the fruit.’ There are other instances of beautiful *upamā* such as *hamsāviva patatamā* (falling like swans), *simho na bhīmā āyudhāni bibhrat* (holding weapons as dreadful as lions) and so on. Here and there we meet with brilliant poetic expressions as *amṛtasya putrāḥ* (the children of the immortal); *ṛtasya panthāmanveti sādhu* (following the path of righteousness); *ṛtena ṛtamapihitam* (truth veiled by truth); *dūto devānāmasi* (*Agni* is described as the messenger of the gods) and *dyaaurvaḥ pitā prthivī mātā* (heaven is your father and the earth is your mother). These show unmistakably that the *Ṛṣis* of the *Ṛk-Veda* were acquainted with the poetical use of beautiful metaphors.

Grammar seems to have some bearing upon *alamkāra* or figures of speech, specially upon *upamā*. As one radically connected with most of the *alamkāras* and one that lends supreme excellence to poetry in general, *upamā* is placed at the head of all figures of speech. The main principle underlying *upamā*, viz., similarity³.

¹ यथा वातः पुष्करिणीं समिहयति सर्वतः ।—*Ṛk-Veda*, 5. 6. 78.

² वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते । तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त-
नन्नन्नयो अभिचाकशीति ।—*Ṛk-Veda*, 1. 22. 164.

³ साधर्म्यसुपमा मेदे ।—*Kāvyaprakāśa*.

between two different objects (*samāna-dharma*), has been clearly explained by the rules of grammar (Pāṇ., 2.1.55 and 2.1.56). *Sādṛśya* or similarity means *tadbhinnatve sati tadgata-bhūyodharmavaṭṭvam*, viz., two things are said to be similar when they are materially different but possess some common properties. The particles and suffixes that often indicate similarity (*vati*, *iva*, *yathā*) are also clearly shown by the rules of grammar (Pāṇ., 5.1.105). *Jimūtasyeva* (like the cloud) occurs in the Ṛk-Veda and has been made use of by the grammarians as an instance where the case-ending is not dropped (*nitya-samāsa*). The expression *puruṣavyāghraḥ* (a tiger-like man) shows that the man, though different from the tiger, as belonging to two distinct species, possesses those qualities such as valour, strength, courage, etc., which are generally found in the tiger. Under the rule *upamānāni sāmānyavacanaiḥ* (Pāṇ., 2.1.55), Patañjali¹ has thoroughly dealt with the characteristics of *upamāna* and *upameya*. He says that two things are generally related to each other as *upamāna* and *upameya* when they are in possession of some properties that are common to both. Quite in keeping with the *Ālambkārikas*, Patañjali² has explained

¹ एवं तर्हि यत्र किञ्चित् सामान्यं कश्चिच्च विशेषस्ततोपमानोपमेये भवतः ।—
Mahābhāṣya, under the rule Pāṇ., 2 1. 55.

² चन्द्रमखौ देवदत्तेति—इहवधन्ने गुणाः, या चासौ प्रियदर्शनता सा गम्यते ।—
Ibid.

the expression *candramukhī devadattā* by observing that qualities in the moon such as *gracefulness to the sight* is transferred to the face on account of its striking similarity with the moon. The popular example under the rule Pān., 2. 1. 55, *i.e.*, *ghanaśyāmaḥ*¹ (black as the cloud), where the common property is expressly mentioned, is an attribute of Kṛṣṇa, who is often compared to a cloud on account of his black complexion. The Vedic expression² *mṛgo na bhīmaḥ* (fierce as the beast) is a similar instance where the common property, *i.e.*, *dreadfulness* is clearly pointed out.

रामार्पणमस्तु

¹ श्यामत्वस्योभयसाधारणधर्मत्वात् सामान्यवचनम् ।

² R̥k-Veda, 1. 21. 154.

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EXTRACTS FROM OPINIONS ON THE WORKS OF THE AUTHOR.

1 The Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar—(published by the University of Calcutta)

Mahamahopadhyaya Ramavatara Sarma, Sahityacarya, M A., Senior Professor of Sanskrit Patna College —

"I have an opportunity of going through the papers on the Philosophy Sanskrit Grammar written by Dr. Prabhat Chandra Chakrabarti, Ph D These writings show profound study and capacity for research He has selected a rather difficult field for his study but has already dealt with it with thoroughness marvellous for his age and limited resources available in the country "

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In accordance with the definition as suggested by the Naiyāyikas, *Karāṇa* is the same as *Kāraṇa* (*vyāpāravat kāraṇam karāṇam*) only with this difference that *karāṇa* is closely associated with the action, *i.e.*, cause, when it is actually in operation to bring about the accomplishment of the action, is what is called *karāṇa* in grammar. Gadādhara maintains that the words *kartṛ-vyāpārādhīnatva* should be added to the above definition (*vyāpāravat kāraṇam karāṇam*) so as to clearly indicate the subserviency of *Karāṇa* to the agent. An accessory (as *Karāṇa*), as we find, cannot accomplish the action unless and until it is set to work by the agent (*kartṛ-viniyoga*). This being the actual state of things, one may possibly bring forward the argument that it is more plausible to attribute the adjunct *sādhakatama* to the agent itself in preference to *Karāṇa*.¹ Bhartṛhari² meets this objection by saying that the primary function of the agent is to employ the accessories to operation³ which, thus engaged, immediately accomplish the action. This is to show how *Karāṇa* comes between the agent and the action, and, consequently, has greater proximity to the operation than the agent itself.

¹ कर्तृविनियोगोत्तरकाली साधनानां प्रवृत्तेस्तदपेक्षया कर्तुरेव साधकतमत्वं न्यायमिति—Helārāja.

² स्वातन्त्र्येऽपि प्रयोजितारसारादिवोपकुर्वते। करणेन हि सर्वेषां व्यापारी व्यवधीयते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 93.

³ विनियोगी हि कर्तृव्यापारः।

Now it is sufficiently clear why *Karāṇa* is said to be *sādhakatama* in relation to other accessories. Bhartṛhari has again alluded to the preponderance of *vivakṣū* and the difference between the agent and *Karāṇa* by referring to the example *asiśchinatti* (where the function of the agent has been attributed to the instrumental, *viz.*, sword, with a view to indicate the independent activity or excessive power for accomplishing the action on the part of *Karāṇa*). In the above example, it should be noted,¹ the sharpness of the sword comes to be regarded as *Karāṇa* when the sword itself is used as the agent.

Though apparently synonymous, *hetu* and *Karāṇa* are, however, distinguished² by the grammarians, the criterion of such difference being 'the invariable association with the action' on the part of *Karāṇa*. The first and foremost thing necessary for a *Kāraṇa* is to have close relation with the action. *Hetu* generally gives the idea of a substance and has practically no invariable connection with the action. Bhaṭṭoji³ has clearly elucidated this distinction. A substance unconnected with action is called *hetu*, but *Karāṇa*, as a form of *Kāraṇa*, is

¹ अस्मादीनां तु कर्तृत्वे तैश्चादि करणं विदुः—*Vakya-padīya*, 8. 94.

² द्रव्यादिविषयो हेतुः कारकं नियतक्रियम्—*Ibid.*

³ द्रव्यादिसाधारणं निर्व्यापारसाधारणं च हेतुत्वम् ।

करणत्वं तु क्रियामावृत्तिर्यस्य व्यापारनियतं च ॥—Bhaṭṭoji under the rule